Are repayment terms enforceable in Massachusetts?
Massachusetts enforces an agreed damages amount if, when the contract was made, actual damages were difficult to ascertain and the amount was a reasonable forecast of the damages expected from a breach . Apart from section 24L's rules for forfeiture for competition agreements, discussed below, no Massachusetts statute bans or limits stay-or-pay, training-repayment or sign-on bonus repayment terms in private employment, so the conservative inference is that a court would test a fixed repayment amount under that liquidated damages rule .
In Kelly v. Marx, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to take a second look at the damages actually suffered and held that a liquidated damages clause will be enforced where, when the agreement was made, potential damages were difficult to determine and the clause was a reasonable forecast of the expected damages . In NPS, LLC v. Minihane, the court placed on the party resisting the clause the burden of showing that the amount is unreasonably and grossly disproportionate to the real damages from a breach, or unconscionably excessive . Where damages are easily ascertainable and the agreed amount is grossly disproportionate or unconscionably excessive, the court awards no more than actual damages .
The Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, chapter 149, section 24L, separates two kinds of forfeiture terms. A forfeiture agreement, as the Act defines it, imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee because employment ended, regardless of whether the employee goes on to compete, and the Act expressly excludes forfeiture agreements from the noncompetition agreements it regulates. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. A forfeiture for competition agreement imposes those consequences if the employee engages in competitive activities, and the Act counts it as a noncompetition agreement. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. A repayment that is owed only if the employee joins a competitor must therefore meet the Act's minimum requirements to be valid and enforceable , including support by a garden leave clause or other mutually agreed consideration specified in the agreement . In Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc., the court held that a forfeiture clause triggered by breach of a nonsolicitation agreement is not a forfeiture for competition agreement under the Act . The Act applies only to agreements entered into on or after October 1, 2018 .
A competition-triggered repayment clause that omits section 24L's required safeguards, such as specified consideration, risks being unenforceable. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 3 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
In *Cummings Properties, LLC v. National Communications Corp.*, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that a liquidated damages amount will usually be enforced if actual damages were difficult to ascertain when the contract was made and the amount was a reasonable forecast of the expected damages.
If, at the time the contract was made, actual damages were difficult to ascertain and the sum agreed on by the parties as liquidated damages represents a reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach, it will usually be enforced.
See Cummings Props., LLC v. National Commc'ns Corp., 449 Mass. 490 (2007)
In *Kelly v. Marx*, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the second-look approach and enforced a liquidated damages clause that, when the agreement was made, was a reasonable forecast of damages that were difficult to determine.
We affirm the decision of the Superior Court because we reject the “second look” approach, and conclude that a liquidated damages clause in a purchase and sale agreement will be enforced where, at the time the agreement was made, potential damages were difficult to determine and the clause was a reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach.
See Kelly v. Marx, 428 Mass. 877 (1999)
In *NPS, LLC v. Minihane*, the Supreme Judicial Court placed on the party resisting a liquidated damages clause the burden of showing that the amount is unreasonably and grossly disproportionate to the real damages, or unconscionably excessive.
It is the defendant’s burden to show that the amount of liquidated damages is “unreasonably and grossly disproportionate to the real damages from a breach” or “unconscionably excessive.”
See NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451 Mass. 417 (2008)
In *NPS*, the court stated that where damages are easily ascertainable and the agreed amount is grossly disproportionate or unconscionably excessive, the court awards no more than actual damages.
Where damages are easily ascertainable, and the amount provided for is grossly disproportionate to actual damages or unconscionably excessive, the court will award the aggrieved party no more than its actual damages.
See NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451 Mass. 417 (2008)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) defines a forfeiture agreement as one imposing adverse financial consequences on a former employee because employment ended, regardless of whether the employee later competes.
''Forfeiture agreement'', an agreement that imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship, regardless of whether the employee engages in competitive activities following cessation of the employment relationship. Forfeiture agreements do not include forfeiture for competition agreements.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) excludes forfeiture agreements from the noncompetition agreements the Act regulates.
Noncompetition agreements include forfeiture for competition agreements, but do not include: (i) covenants not to solicit or hire employees of the employer; (ii) covenants not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, or vendors of the employer; (iii) noncompetition agreements made in connection with the sale of a business entity or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary thereof, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal; (iv) noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship; (v) forfeiture agreements;
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) defines a forfeiture for competition agreement as one imposing adverse financial consequences on a former employee if the employee engages in competitive activities.
''Forfeiture for competition agreement'', an agreement that by its terms or through the manner in which it is enforced imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship if the employee engages in competitive activities.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
In *Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc.*, the Supreme Judicial Court read the Act's plain language to exclude nonsolicitation agreements from noncompetition agreements and to make forfeiture for competition agreements a subset of noncompetition agreements.
Under the plain language of the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, (1) noncompetition agreements do not include nonsolicitation agreements, and (2) forfeiture for competition agreements are a subset of noncompetition agreements.
See Miele v. Foundation Med., Inc., 496 Mass. 171 (2025)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b) makes a noncompetition agreement valid and enforceable only if it meets the minimum requirements in paragraphs (i) through (viii).
To be valid and enforceable, a noncompetition agreement must meet the minimum requirements of paragraphs (i) through (viii).
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii) requires a noncompetition agreement to be supported by a garden leave clause or other mutually agreed consideration specified in the agreement.
The noncompetition agreement shall be supported by a garden leave clause or other mutually-agreed upon consideration between the employer and the employee, provided that such consideration is specified in the noncompetition agreement.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii)
In *Miele*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a forfeiture clause triggered by breach of a nonsolicitation agreement is not a forfeiture for competition agreement under the Act.
That is, for the reasons we discuss below, we conclude that a forfeiture clause triggered by a breach of a nonsolicitation agreement does not constitute a "forfeiture for competition agreement" within the meaning of the act.
See Miele v. Foundation Med., Inc., 496 Mass. 171 (2025)
In *NuVasive, Inc. v. Day*, the First Circuit recognized that the Act applies only to employee noncompetition agreements entered into on or after October 1, 2018.
But, the MNCA "only applies to employee noncompetition agreements entered into on or after October 1, 2018," Automile Holdings, LLC v. McGovern, 136 N.E.3d 1207, 1217 n.15 (Mass. 2020); see St. 2018 Mass., ch. 228, § 71 ("Section 24L of chapter 149 of the General Laws may be referred to as the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act and shall apply to employee noncompetition agreements entered into on or after October 1, 2018."), and Day signed the PIIA nearly a year earlier, on January 6, 2018.
See NuVasive, Inc. v. Day, 954 F.3d 439 (1st Cir. 2020)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) defines a forfeiture for competition agreement as one imposing adverse financial consequences on a former employee who engages in competitive activities.
''Forfeiture for competition agreement'', an agreement that by its terms or through the manner in which it is enforced imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship if the employee engages in competitive activities.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b) makes a noncompetition agreement valid and enforceable only if it meets the minimum requirements in paragraphs (i) through (viii).
To be valid and enforceable, a noncompetition agreement must meet the minimum requirements of paragraphs (i) through (viii).
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii) requires a noncompetition agreement to be supported by a garden leave clause or other specified, mutually agreed consideration.
The noncompetition agreement shall be supported by a garden leave clause or other mutually-agreed upon consideration between the employer and the employee, provided that such consideration is specified in the noncompetition agreement.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii)
Can a Massachusetts employer claw back pay the employee already earned?
A Massachusetts employer may not recapture wages the employee has already earned. In Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court held that chargebacks used to recapture wages already earned and paid were not a valid set-off because they corresponded to no clear and established debt owed by the employee , and that the employer was not free to withhold, much less recapture, earned wages . The Wage Act bars an employer from exempting itself from its payment duties by a special contract with an employee or by any other means , and it applies to commissions once their amount, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable .
Pay that is discretionary, or contingent on staying employed, may fall outside the Wage Act. In Weems v. Citigroup Inc., the court held that discretionary restricted-stock bonus awards were not wages under the Act, noting that the full benefit came only if the employee remained with the company for the defined period after the award. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. In Nunez v. Syncsort Inc., the court held that retention bonus payments conditioned on the employee staying until fixed dates were not wages but additional, contingent compensation outside the Wage Act . That agreement also required the employee to return the entire retention bonus if he resigned before a retention date or was terminated for cause , but the court decided only whether the bonus was a wage. In our review we found no Massachusetts appellate decision on recovering a cash sign-on or retention bonus already paid, so the conservative course is to treat repayment of a bonus advanced before it was earned as a contract claim and, if the agreement instead fixes an amount as damages for leaving early, to expect a court to test that amount under the liquidated damages rule , and to collect either separately rather than from wages, remembering that an employer may not separately bill an employee for amounts it could not lawfully deduct .
“Coverall is not free to withhold — much less recapture — the employee’s earned wages.”
Sources for this answer
In *Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that chargebacks recapturing wages already earned and paid were not a valid set-off because they corresponded to no clear and established debt.
“Chargebacks” represent a means for Coverall to recapture wages already earned and paid. They are not a valid setoff; they correspond to no “clear and established debt owed to the employer by the employee.”
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484 (2011)
In *Awuah*, the court stated that an employer dissatisfied with an employee's work may impose sanctions, including termination, but may not withhold or recapture earned wages.
If an employee’s work is inadequate, Coverall is free to implement sanctions, including termination; Coverall is not free to withhold — much less recapture — the employee’s earned wages.
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484 (2011)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 bars any person from exempting itself from § 148 or § 150 by a special contract with an employee or by any other means.
No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 applies to commissions once their amount, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable.
This section shall apply, so far as apt, to the payment of commissions when the amount of such commissions, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to such employee, and commissions so determined and due such employees shall be subject to the provisions of section one hundred and fifty.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148
In *Weems v. Citigroup Inc.*, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the restricted-stock bonus awards carried a contingency: the employee received the full benefit only by remaining with the company for a defined period.
In other words, this part of the compensation for participants in the bonus and branch manager programs was not only discretionary, but it also had an important contingency attached to it: an employee who received such an award would receive the full benefit of the stock (i.e., the restriction would be lifted and the stock would vest fully) only if the employee remained with the company for the defined period after the award.
See Weems v. Citigroup Inc., 453 Mass. 147 (2009)
In *Weems*, the court concluded that the stock programs at issue were not wages under the Wage Act, so its special contract provision did not apply.
Because of our conclusion that the stock programs at issue here do not constitute wages under the act, the special contract provision does not apply.
See Weems v. Citigroup Inc., 453 Mass. 147 (2009)
In *Nunez v. Syncsort Inc.*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that retention bonus payments conditioned on continued employment to fixed dates are not wages under the Wage Act but additional, contingent compensation.
The plaintiff entered into an agreement with his employer, Syncsort Incorporated (Syncsort or company), whereby he would receive two retention bonus payments if he remained with the company until fixed dates and remained in good performance standing without any reduction in his work schedule. The question in this case is whether those retention bonus payments are "wages" for purposes of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148. We conclude that they are not; instead, they are a form of additional, contingent compensation outside the ambit of the Wage Act.
See Nunez v. Syncsort Inc., 496 Mass. 706 (2025)
The retention agreement in *Nunez* required the employee to return the entire retention bonus if he resigned before a retention date or was terminated for cause.
The agreement also contained a disgorgement provision requiring the plaintiff to return the entire retention bonus should he voluntarily terminate his employment before either retention date or if he were to be terminated for cause.
See Nunez v. Syncsort Inc., 496 Mass. 706 (2025)
454 CMR 27.05(5) bars an employer from separately charging or billing an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions.
(5) Indirect Deductions. An employer may not separately charge or bill an employee for fees or amounts not allowed as deductions.
See 454 CMR 27.05(5)
*Cummings* enforces a liquidated damages amount that was a reasonable forecast of damages that were difficult to ascertain when the contract was made.
If, at the time the contract was made, actual damages were difficult to ascertain and the sum agreed on by the parties as liquidated damages represents a reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach, it will usually be enforced.
See Cummings Props., LLC v. National Commc'ns Corp., 449 Mass. 490 (2007)
Can a Massachusetts employer take a repayment out of the final paycheck?
A Massachusetts employer may set a repayment off against final wages only if it is a clear and established debt owed by the employee. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. In Camara v. Attorney General, the court held that a deduction based on the employer's unilateral, untested judgment of fault and damages was not such a debt, while recognizing that a set-off arrangement could be valid where the parties voluntarily agreed to appropriately independent procedures for determining both the existence and amount of the debt On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.; the inference is that a training or bonus repayment the employee disputes, and that no such procedure has established, is unlikely to qualify. An employee who leaves must be paid in full on the next regular payday, and an employee who is discharged must be paid in full on the day of discharge . In a Wage Act action, the only defenses to a failure to pay are attachment by trustee process, a valid assignment, a valid set-off, the employee's absence at the time of payment, or an actual tender of the wages .
The Appeals Court has stated that an employer may not reduce wages by, or condition full and timely payment of wages on, payments by the employee to or on behalf of the employer . In our review we found no Massachusetts appellate decision holding that an employee's advance written consent turns a training or bonus repayment into a clear and established debt, and the Act bars exempting an employer from its payment duties by a special contract , so the conservative course is to pay final wages in full and collect any balance separately, within the minimum-wage limits described next.
Massachusetts minimum-wage rules add a floor. No deduction other than those required or expressly allowed by law, or the listed lodging and meal deductions, may be made from the basic minimum wage, and an employer may not separately bill an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. The state minimum wage is $15.00 per hour .
Netting a disputed training or bonus repayment against the last paycheck risks a Wage Act claim in which a prevailing employee must be awarded treble damages, litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
In *Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that chargebacks recapturing earned wages were not a valid set-off because they corresponded to no clear and established debt owed by the employee.
“Chargebacks” represent a means for Coverall to recapture wages already earned and paid. They are not a valid setoff; they correspond to no “clear and established debt owed to the employer by the employee.”
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484 (2011)
In *Camara v. Attorney General*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that employee deduction agreements are special contracts barred by § 148 unless the deductions are valid set-offs for clear and established debts under § 150.
The statutory language and the interplay of §§ 148 and 150 of the Wage Act reflect that employee deduction agreements of the type at issue in this case constitute special contracts that § 148 prohibits unless the deductions are valid setoffs for clear and established debts within the meaning of § 150.
See Camara v. Attorney General, 458 Mass. 756 (2011)
In *Camara*, the court recognized that a set-off arrangement outside formal proceedings could be valid if the parties voluntarily agreed to appropriately independent procedures for determining the existence and amount of the debt.
There well may be other circumstances — for example as part of a collective bargaining agreement — in which an employer and employee enter into a set-off arrangement that does not involve formal judicial or administrative proceedings but that would be valid because it can be shown that the parties have voluntarily agreed to a set of appropriately independent procedures for determining, in a manner that adequately protects the employee’s interests, both the existence and amount of the debt or obligation owed by the employee to the employer.
See Camara v. Attorney General, 458 Mass. 756 (2011)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 requires an employee who leaves to be paid in full on the following regular payday, and a discharged employee to be paid in full on the day of discharge.
or in the case of an employee who has worked for a period of less than five days, hereinafter called a casual employee, shall, within seven days after the termination of such period, pay the wages earned by such casual employee during such period, but any employee leaving his employment shall be paid in full on the following regular pay day, and, in the absence of a regular pay day, on the following Saturday; and any employee discharged from such employment shall be paid in full on the day of his discharge
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 limits an employer's defenses to a failure to pay wages to trustee process, a valid assignment, a valid set-off, the employee's absence, or an actual tender.
On the trial no defence for failure to pay as required, other than the attachment of such wages by trustee process or a valid assignment thereof or a valid set-off against the same, or the absence of the employee from his regular place of labor at the time of payment, or an actual tender to such employee at the time of payment of the wages so earned by him, shall be valid.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150
In *Camara v. Attorney General*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Wage Act prohibits wage deductions based on an employer's unilateral determination of an employee's fault and damages.
Giving deference to the Attorney General’s reasonable interpretation of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, and in agreement with DALA, we conclude that the statute prohibits wage deductions associated with an employer’s unilateral determination of an employee’s fault and damages; and that the ABC policy, by withholding employees’ wages, contravenes the Wage Act.
See Camara v. Attorney General, 458 Mass. 756 (2011)
In *Fraelick v. PerkettPR, Inc.*, the Appeals Court stated that an employer may not reduce wages by, or condition full and timely payment of wages on, payments by the employee to or on behalf of the employer.
The relevant precedent makes it clear that an employer may not reduce wages by, or condition the full and timely payment of wages on, payments by an employee to or on behalf of the employer.
See Fraelick v. PerkettPR, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 698 (2013)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 bars any person from exempting itself from § 148 or § 150 by a special contract with an employee or by any other means.
No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148
454 CMR 27.05(1) bars deductions from the basic minimum wage other than those required or expressly allowed by law and the listed lodging and meal deductions.
(1) Deductions from Basic Minimum Wage. No deduction, other than those required or expressly allowed by law, and those allowed for lodging and meals listed in 454 CMR 27.05(2) and (3), shall be made from the basic minimum wage.
See 454 CMR 27.05(1)
454 CMR 27.05(5) bars an employer from separately charging or billing an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions.
(5) Indirect Deductions. An employer may not separately charge or bill an employee for fees or amounts not allowed as deductions.
See 454 CMR 27.05(5)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1 conclusively presumes that a wage below $15.00 per hour is oppressive and unreasonable, unless the commissioner approves a lesser wage under sections 7 and 9.
A wage of less than $15.00 per hour, in any occupation, as defined in this chapter, shall conclusively be presumed to be oppressive and unreasonable, wherever the term ''minimum wage'' is used in this chapter, unless the commissioner has expressly approved or shall expressly approve the establishment and payment of a lesser wage under the provisions of sections seven and nine.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1
*Camara* holds that the Wage Act prohibits wage deductions based on an employer's unilateral determination of an employee's fault and damages.
Giving deference to the Attorney General’s reasonable interpretation of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, and in agreement with DALA, we conclude that the statute prohibits wage deductions associated with an employer’s unilateral determination of an employee’s fault and damages; and that the ABC policy, by withholding employees’ wages, contravenes the Wage Act.
See Camara v. Attorney General, 458 Mass. 756 (2011)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 requires an award of treble damages, litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing employee.
An employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150
Are training or tuition repayments treated differently in Massachusetts?
No Massachusetts statute specifically regulates training, tuition or relocation repayment agreements in private employment, apart from section 24L's rules for repayments triggered by competition . The conservative inference is that a court would test a fixed training-repayment amount under the same liquidated damages rule that applies to other agreed amounts . Payroll collection of a training balance faces the same Wage Act limits as any other deduction, including the bar on special contracts that exempt the employer from paying earned wages .
The Supreme Judicial Court has treated some charges an employee pays to obtain work as contrary to public policy. In Awuah, the court viewed initial franchise fees that workers paid to enter what was in substance an employment relationship as special contracts that operate to require employees to buy their jobs, and said they violate public policy . In our review we found no Massachusetts appellate decision applying that reasoning, or the liquidated damages rule, to a private employer's training-repayment agreement, so the conservative course is to limit repayment to the documented cost of training that has value to the employee beyond the job, and to collect it separately, remembering that an employer may not separately bill an employee for amounts it could not lawfully deduct .
Federal law adds a separate floor: under the Fair Labor Standards Act regulations, wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back the whole or part of the wage to the employer, and the regulation's example treats the cost of employer-required tools as a violation in any workweek when it cuts into the required minimum or overtime wages. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
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Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) defines a forfeiture for competition agreement as one imposing adverse financial consequences on a former employee if the employee engages in competitive activities.
''Forfeiture for competition agreement'', an agreement that by its terms or through the manner in which it is enforced imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship if the employee engages in competitive activities.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
454 CMR 27.05(5) bars an employer from separately charging or billing an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions.
(5) Indirect Deductions. An employer may not separately charge or bill an employee for fees or amounts not allowed as deductions.
See 454 CMR 27.05(5)
*Cummings* enforces a liquidated damages amount that was a reasonable forecast of damages that were difficult to ascertain when the contract was made.
If, at the time the contract was made, actual damages were difficult to ascertain and the sum agreed on by the parties as liquidated damages represents a reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach, it will usually be enforced.
See Cummings Props., LLC v. National Commc'ns Corp., 449 Mass. 490 (2007)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 bars any person from exempting itself from § 148 or § 150 by a special contract with an employee or by any other means.
No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148
In *Awuah*, the Supreme Judicial Court viewed franchise fees paid to enter an employment relationship as special contracts that require employees to buy their jobs and violate public policy.
Our view is that fees such as these constitute “special contracts,” not usual between employers and employees. In substance, they operate to require employees to buy their jobs from employers, and in that respect we think they violate public policy.
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484 (2011)
29 C.F.R. § 531.35 provides that FLSA wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer, directly or indirectly.
The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee “kicks-back” directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer's benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35
29 C.F.R. § 531.35 treats employer-required tool costs as a violation in any workweek when they cut into the required minimum or overtime wages.
For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer's particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35
How are Massachusetts repayment and wage-deduction rules enforced?
An employee whose wages are withheld to collect a repayment may sue under the Wage Act 90 days after filing a complaint with the Attorney General, or sooner with the Attorney General's written assent . The suit must be brought within three years after the violation, but that period is tolled from the filing of a complaint with the Attorney General until the Attorney General authorizes a private action or an Attorney General enforcement action becomes final . A prevailing employee must be awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for lost wages and other benefits, plus litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees . An employer may not penalize an employee in any way for seeking rights under the wage and hour provisions of chapter 149 .
An employer seeking to recover a repayment brings an ordinary contract action, which generally must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues . An employee who claims that a repayment amount is a penalty bears the burden of showing that the amount is grossly disproportionate or unconscionably excessive .
Sources for this answer
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 lets an employee sue for a violation of § 148 90 days after filing a complaint with the Attorney General, or sooner with written assent, and within three years after the violation.
An employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of sections 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C or 190 or section 19 of chapter 151 may, 90 days after the filing of a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents in writing, and within 3 years after the violation, institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred, and for any lost wages and other benefits; provided, however, that the 3 year limitation period shall be tolled from the date that the employee or a similarly situated employee files a complaint with the attorney general alleging a violation of any of these sections until the date that the attorney general issues a letter authorizing a private right of action or the date that an enforcement action by the attorney general becomes final.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 requires an award of treble damages for lost wages and other benefits, with litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, to a prevailing employee.
An employee so aggrieved who prevails in such an action shall be awarded treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages and other benefits and shall also be awarded the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A bars an employer from penalizing an employee for seeking rights under the chapter's wage and hour provisions.
No employee shall be penalized by an employer in any way as a result of any action on the part of an employee to seek his or her rights under the wages and hours provisions of this chapter.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2 requires most contract actions to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.
Actions of contract, other than those to recover for personal injuries, founded upon contracts or liabilities, express or implied, except actions limited by section one or actions upon judgments or decrees of courts of record of the United States or of this or of any other state of the United States, shall, except as otherwise provided, be commenced only within six years next after the cause of action accrues.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2
In *NPS*, the court placed on the party resisting a liquidated damages clause the burden of showing that the amount is grossly disproportionate to the real damages or unconscionably excessive.
It is the defendant’s burden to show that the amount of liquidated damages is “unreasonably and grossly disproportionate to the real damages from a breach” or “unconscionably excessive.”
See NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 451 Mass. 417 (2008)
What repayment structure is safest under Massachusetts law?
The safest Massachusetts repayment term sets an amount that, when the agreement is signed, is a reasonable forecast of the employer's hard-to-measure loss from an early departure, such as documented training or recruitment costs, because that is the test Massachusetts courts apply to an agreed amount . As a drafting matter, a schedule that reduces the balance as the employee serves the commitment keeps the amount closer to the employer's unrecovered cost.
Making the repayment owed on any early departure, rather than only on joining a competitor, keeps it within the Act's definition of a forfeiture agreement, which the Act excludes from regulated noncompetition agreements. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. Collecting the balance by separate demand or action is safer than deducting it from pay, because the Wage Act recognizes a set-off only for a clear and established debt , and any deduction may not reduce the basic minimum wage . Separate collection does not escape that limit, because an employer may not separately charge or bill an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions .
Sources for this answer
*Cummings* enforces a liquidated damages amount that was a reasonable forecast of damages that were difficult to ascertain when the contract was made.
If, at the time the contract was made, actual damages were difficult to ascertain and the sum agreed on by the parties as liquidated damages represents a reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach, it will usually be enforced.
See Cummings Props., LLC v. National Commc'ns Corp., 449 Mass. 490 (2007)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) defines a forfeiture agreement as one imposing adverse financial consequences on a former employee because employment ended, regardless of later competition.
''Forfeiture agreement'', an agreement that imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship, regardless of whether the employee engages in competitive activities following cessation of the employment relationship. Forfeiture agreements do not include forfeiture for competition agreements.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a) excludes forfeiture agreements from noncompetition agreements.
Noncompetition agreements include forfeiture for competition agreements, but do not include: (i) covenants not to solicit or hire employees of the employer; (ii) covenants not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, or vendors of the employer; (iii) noncompetition agreements made in connection with the sale of a business entity or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary thereof, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal; (iv) noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship; (v) forfeiture agreements;
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L(a)
*Awuah* treats recapture of earned wages as no valid set-off where it corresponds to no clear and established debt owed by the employee.
“Chargebacks” represent a means for Coverall to recapture wages already earned and paid. They are not a valid setoff; they correspond to no “clear and established debt owed to the employer by the employee.”
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484 (2011)
454 CMR 27.05(5) bars an employer from separately charging or billing an employee for amounts not allowed as deductions.
(5) Indirect Deductions. An employer may not separately charge or bill an employee for fees or amounts not allowed as deductions.
See 454 CMR 27.05(5)
454 CMR 27.05(1) bars deductions from the basic minimum wage other than those required or expressly allowed by law and the listed lodging and meal deductions.
(1) Deductions from Basic Minimum Wage. No deduction, other than those required or expressly allowed by law, and those allowed for lodging and meals listed in 454 CMR 27.05(2) and (3), shall be made from the basic minimum wage.
See 454 CMR 27.05(1)