Are repayment terms enforceable in Alabama?
No Alabama statute specifically governs stay-or-pay, training-repayment or other employee repayment agreements in private employment. Where a repayment term fixes the amount owed on a breach, the Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes enforceable liquidated damages from a void penalty by three criteria . Where the payment is triggered by competing, it is also a restraint of trade , which Alabama voids unless Ala. Code § 8-1-190 allows it .
In Sutton v. Epperson, the court restated that three-part test from its earlier decision in Camelot Music, Inc. v. Marx Realty & Improvement Co. . A clause that fails any one of the three criteria fails as a penalty , and in cases of doubtful intention Alabama courts lean toward reading the stipulated sum as a penalty . Because the criteria separately require that the loss be difficult to estimate and that the parties intend damages rather than a penalty, evidence of what the employer spent on training or recruiting does not by itself satisfy all three .
A payment owed for going to work for a competitor is treated differently. In Associated Surgeons, P.A. v. Watwood, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a contract requiring payment of damages if one party competes with the other is a contract restraining the exercise of a lawful profession . Casting the provision as liquidated damages rather than as a prohibition did not change that result . Watwood applied the predecessor statute; the current statute, Ala. Code § 8-1-190(a), uses the same operative words and voids every contract restraining a lawful profession, trade or business except as that section provides . The listed exceptions are allowed only to preserve a protectable interest . One lets an employee of a commercial entity agree not to carry on a similar business within a specified geographic area, so long as the entity carries on a like business there, subject to reasonable time and place limits, and it presumes a restraint of two years or less reasonable . An agreement under the statute must be in writing, signed by all parties and supported by adequate consideration .
A repayment owed on any early departure, whatever work the employee does next, does not by its terms condition the payment on competing. In Anniston Urologic Associates v. Kline, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a reduction in a departing physician's stock price, owed because he left without giving nine months' written notice, was not a restraint of trade, because the term did not restrain him from practicing for any period of time or within any area. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. The court declined to read the predecessor restraint statute as voiding a duly bargained-for notice provision . Kline concerned a notice term under the predecessor statute, and no Alabama appellate decision located for this guide applies Ala. Code § 8-1-190 to a training-repayment or bonus-repayment clause, so the conservative course is to keep competition out of the repayment trigger and to make the amount meet the three Sutton criteria.
Using entry into competing work as the repayment trigger exposes the clause to invalidation as a restraint of trade unless an exception in Ala. Code § 8-1-190(b) applies. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
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The Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes a valid liquidated damages clause from a penalty by three criteria: the injury from breach must be difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum must be a reasonable pre-breach estimate of the probable loss.
The courts generally identify three criteria by which a valid liquidated damages clause may be distinguished from a penalty. First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and, third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-breach [estimate] of the probable loss.
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Camelot Music, Inc. v. Marx Realty & Improvement Co., 514 So. 2d 987, 990 (Ala. 1987)).
A liquidated damages clause that fails any one of the three criteria fails as a penalty.
If the liquidated damages clause fails to meet any one of the three criteria, it must fail as a penalty.
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1993).
Because penalty provisions are void as against public policy, Alabama courts lean against reading a contract provision as liquidated damages and, in cases of doubtful intention, treat the stipulated sum as a penalty.
It is true in Alabama that, because penalty provisions are void as against public policy, 'Courts . . . are disposed to lean against any interpretation of a contract which will make the provision one for liquidated damages and, in all cases of doubtful intention, will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty.'
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Camelot Music, Inc. v. Marx Realty & Improvement Co., 514 So. 2d 987 (Ala. 1987)).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a contract requiring the payment of damages if one party competes with the other is a contract restraining the exercise of a lawful profession under the restraint-of-trade statute.
We are convinced that a contract which requires the payment of damages in the event one of the contracting parties competes with the other is a contract “by which . . . one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession . . .” within the meaning of § 22, supra.
See Associated Surgeons, P.A. v. Watwood, 295 Ala. 229, 326 So. 2d 721 (1976).
The court held that framing the payment as liquidated damages rather than as a prohibition does not change whether it is a restraint.
The fact that the contract provision is couched in terms of liquidated damages rather than in negative form is not significant.
See Associated Surgeons, P.A. v. Watwood, 295 Ala. 229, 326 So. 2d 721 (1976).
In Kline, the employment and stock redemption agreements each reduced the departing physician's stock price by $20,000 if he ended his employment without giving nine months' advance written notice.
On its face, each agreement contained a covenant purporting to impose a $20,000 penalty on Dr. Kline (by devaluing his stock) if he terminated his employment without giving nine months' advance written notice of his intention to terminate.
See Anniston Urologic Associates v. Kline, 689 So. 2d 54, 56 (Ala. 1997).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a covenant reducing a departing physician's stock price if he left without nine months' written notice did not restrain him from practicing medicine for any period or within any area, and so was not an unenforceable restraint on a lawful profession.
This covenant did not restrain Dr. Kline from practicing medicine for any period of time or restrain him from practicing medicine within a specified geographical area.
See Anniston Urologic Associates v. Kline, 689 So. 2d 54, 60 (Ala. 1997).
The court declined to construe the restraint-of-trade statute, Ala. Code § 8-1-1(a), the predecessor of § 8-1-190, as voiding a duly bargained-for notice provision.
In the absence of any clear public policy considerations to the contrary, we decline to construe § 8-1-1 (a) as voiding a duly bargained-for notice provision, such as the one at issue in this case.
See Anniston Urologic Associates v. Kline, 689 So. 2d 54, 60 (Ala. 1997).
Ala. Code § 8-1-190(a) voids every contract restraining anyone from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business, to that extent, except as the section provides.
(a) Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind otherwise than is provided by this section is to that extent void.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-190(a)
Ala. Code § 8-1-190(b) allows the listed contracts, except as otherwise prohibited by law, to preserve a protectable interest.
(b) Except as otherwise prohibited by law, the following contracts are allowed to preserve a protectable interest: (1) A contract between two or more persons or businesses or a person and a business limiting their ability to hire or employ the agent, servant, or employees of a party to the contract where the agent, servant, or employee holds a position uniquely essential to the management, organization, or service of the business.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-190(b)
Ala. Code § 8-1-190(b)(4) allows an employee of a commercial entity to agree not to carry on a similar business within a specified geographic area while the entity carries on a like business there, subject to reasonable time and place limits, and presumes restraints of two years or less reasonable.
(4) An agent, servant, or employee of a commercial entity may agree with such entity to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business within a specified geographic area so long as the commercial entity carries on a like business therein, subject to reasonable restraints of time and place. Restraints of two years or less are presumed to be reasonable.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-190(b)(4)
Ala. Code § 8-1-192 requires an agreement under the restrictive-covenant article to be in writing, signed by all parties and supported by adequate consideration.
In order to be valid, any contract or agreement executed pursuant to this article shall be reduced to writing, signed by all parties, and be supported by adequate consideration.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-192
Can an Alabama employer claw back pay the employee already earned?
No Alabama appellate decision located for this guide decides whether a bonus or other payment already made can be recovered under a stay-or-pay term. Alabama has no general wage-payment statute of its own , and where the term stipulates a fixed sum as damages for leaving early, that sum must meet the three criteria that separate liquidated damages from a penalty . Recovering it out of later paychecks raises a separate question, because Alabama voids assignments of wages to be earned in the future and applies that rule to orders employees give covering future wages .
Forfeiture of an unpaid benefit is analyzed differently from a payment demanded from the employee. In Courington v. Birmingham Trust National Bank, a profit-sharing plan forfeited the employer's matching contributions if a former employee went into direct competition, and the Alabama Supreme Court held that the plan did not restrict the employee's entry into a competitive endeavor, because the contributions were forfeited only when he competed . The court therefore held that the agreement was not the type of contract the restraint-of-trade statute prohibits . Courington applied the predecessor statute to employer contributions not yet paid out; it does not decide whether money already paid to the employee can be demanded back.
No Alabama decision located for this guide decides whether an employee's authorization letting the employer deduct a repayment from later paychecks is an order covering future wages under Ala. Code § 8-5-21. The conservative course is to collect a disputed clawback by demand or lawsuit rather than by relying on an authorization that covers wages not yet earned.
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The Alabama Department of Labor states that Alabama has no state laws governing wage and hour issues and that employers must follow the federal rules of the U.S. Wage and Hour Division.
Alabama does not have any state laws governing wage and hour issues. Therefore, employers must follow federal guidelines set forth by the U.S. Wage and Hour Division, a division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
See Alabama Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Info
The Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes a valid liquidated damages clause from a penalty by three criteria: the injury from breach must be difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum must be a reasonable pre-breach estimate of the probable loss.
The courts generally identify three criteria by which a valid liquidated damages clause may be distinguished from a penalty. First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and, third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-breach [estimate] of the probable loss.
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a profit-sharing plan forfeiting the employer's contributions only if the former employee competed did not restrict the employee's entry into a competitive endeavor.
Here, the former employer is not prevented from earning a living. His accrued profit-sharing benefits contributed by the employer are continued should he leave the employer for a different and non-competing undertaking. It is only when he competes that those contributions of the employer are forfeited.
See Courington v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 347 So. 2d 377 (Ala. 1977).
The court held that the forfeiture-for-competition agreement was not the type of contract proscribed by the restraint-of-trade statute.
Thus, we find that the agreement before us does not fall within the type proscribed by the "restraint of trade" provisions of our Title 9.
See Courington v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 347 So. 2d 377 (Ala. 1977).
Ala. Code § 8-5-21 makes every assignment of salaries or wages to be earned in the future absolutely void and applies the same rule to orders given by employees covering all or part of future wages.
(a) All assignments made by any person of salaries or wages, to be earned in the future, shall be absolutely void. (b) The provisions of this section shall also apply to orders given by employees covering the whole or part of future wages.
See Ala. Code § 8-5-21
Can an Alabama employer take a repayment out of the final paycheck?
Alabama has no general state statute governing final-wage payment or wage deductions , although Ala. Code § 8-5-21 voids assignments of, and employee orders covering, wages to be earned in the future . The main limit on a deduction for an employer's benefit is the federal minimum wage: under the federal rule, wages count as paid only when paid finally and unconditionally, or free and clear , and the federal wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer or for the employer's benefit , which the federal rule illustrates as a violation in any workweek when an employer-required cost cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required .
The federal minimum wage for a covered employee is $7.25 an hour . No federal rule quoted here addresses training repayment specifically, so the conservative course is to keep any repayment taken from the final paycheck from cutting into the final workweek's minimum or overtime wages.
No Alabama decision located for this guide applies that section to an employer's own repayment deduction, so the conservative course is to have the employee sign any deduction authorization after the final pay has been earned, rather than relying on an authorization signed at hire.
A final-pay deduction authorization with no minimum-wage floor lets the deduction take a workweek's pay below the federal minimum wage, which leaves the employer liable for the unpaid minimum wages plus an equal amount as liquidated damages , which the court may reduce or deny only if the employer shows good faith and reasonable grounds for believing it was not violating the Act .
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The Alabama Department of Labor states that Alabama has no state laws governing wage and hour issues and that employers must follow the federal rules of the U.S. Wage and Hour Division.
Alabama does not have any state laws governing wage and hour issues. Therefore, employers must follow federal guidelines set forth by the U.S. Wage and Hour Division, a division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
See Alabama Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Info
Under the federal rule, wages count as paid only when paid finally and unconditionally, or free and clear.
Whether in cash or in facilities, “wages” cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and received by the employee unless they are paid finally and unconditionally or “free and clear.”
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.
Federal wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer or for the employer's benefit.
The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee “kicks-back” directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer's benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, an employer must pay each covered employee engaged in commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce, at least $7.25 an hour.
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: (1) except as otherwise provided in this section, not less than- (A) $5.85 an hour, beginning on the 60th day after May 25, 2007; (B) $6.55 an hour, beginning 12 months after that 60th day; and (C) $7.25 an hour, beginning 24 months after that 60th day;
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C)
Under the federal rule, the cost of employer-required tools of the trade purchased by the employee violates the Fair Labor Standards Act in any workweek in which it cuts into the required minimum or overtime wages.
For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer's particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35
29 U.S.C. § 260 lets a court award no liquidated damages, or a reduced amount, if the employer shows good faith and reasonable grounds for believing its act or omission did not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
See 29 U.S.C. § 260
Ala. Code § 8-5-21 makes every assignment of salaries or wages to be earned in the future absolutely void and applies the same rule to orders given by employees covering all or part of future wages.
(a) All assignments made by any person of salaries or wages, to be earned in the future, shall be absolutely void. (b) The provisions of this section shall also apply to orders given by employees covering the whole or part of future wages.
See Ala. Code § 8-5-21
An employer that violates the federal minimum wage or overtime provisions is liable for the unpaid amounts plus an equal amount as liquidated damages.
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
Are training or tuition repayments treated differently in Alabama?
Alabama has no statute that gives private-employer training, tuition or relocation repayment a separate rule. Where such a term stipulates a sum as damages for leaving early, it is tested under the same liquidated-damages criteria as a bonus repayment . No Alabama decision located for this guide decides whether a promise to repay an advance of actual training, tuition or relocation costs is stipulated damages or an ordinary debt, so the conservative course is to tie the amount to documented costs and draft it to satisfy those criteria as well. Training matters under the restrictive-covenant statute in one respect: specialized and unique training involving substantial business expenditure directed to a particular employee is a protectable interest that can support a restraint, but only if the training is specifically set forth in writing as the consideration for the restraint .
Job skills in and of themselves, without more, are not protectable interests . The training-reimbursement statutes located for this guide cover public employers and make the new public employer, not the employee, pay. When a law enforcement officer, certified corrections officer or firefighter of the state or a political subdivision is hired by a different public agency within 36 months after completing mandated training, the training expenses must be reimbursed to the agency that paid for the training , and that agency demands payment from the new employer . A parallel rule applies to emergency medical services personnel hired by another public employer within 24 months after training . Neither statute governs a private employer's repayment agreement. The training provision therefore matters only where the repayment term is also a restraint, such as a payment triggered by competing; it does not authorize a repayment amount that fails the liquidated-damages criteria. For an agreement subject to the restrictive-covenant article, the statute lists actual damages or lawful liquidated damages provided in the contract among the remedies .
Where the federal minimum-wage rules apply, a training repayment taken from wages is measured against them in the same way as any other deduction for the employer's benefit: the federal wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer or for the employer's benefit , and the federal rule's example treats such a cost as a violation in any workweek when it cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required .
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The Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes a valid liquidated damages clause from a penalty by three criteria: the injury from breach must be difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum must be a reasonable pre-breach estimate of the probable loss.
The courts generally identify three criteria by which a valid liquidated damages clause may be distinguished from a penalty. First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and, third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-breach [estimate] of the probable loss.
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993).
Ala. Code § 8-1-191(a)(5) includes as a protectable interest specialized and unique training involving substantial business expenditure directed to a particular employee, if the training is specifically set forth in writing as the consideration for the restraint.
(5) Specialized and unique training involving substantial business expenditure specifically directed to a particular agent, servant, or employee; provided that such training is specifically set forth in writing as the consideration for the restraint.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-191(a)(5)
Ala. Code § 8-1-191(b) provides that job skills by themselves are not protectable interests.
(b) Job skills in and of themselves, without more, are not protectable interests.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-191(b)
Ala. Code § 36-21-7(a) requires reimbursement of training expenses to the public agency that paid for the training when a law enforcement officer, certified corrections officer, fire protection personnel or firefighter of the state or a political subdivision is employed by a different public agency within 36 months after completing mandated training.
(a) When a law enforcement officer, certified corrections officer, fire protection personnel, or firefighter of the state or any political subdivision of the state is employed by a different agency of the state or political subdivision of the state within 36 months after completing the training requirements mandated by Article 3, commencing with Section 36-21-40, or by Chapter 32, commencing with Section 36-32-1, all of the following expenses shall be reimbursed to the agency of the state or political subdivision of the state which paid for the training:
See Ala. Code § 36-21-7(a)
Ala. Code § 36-21-7(b) requires the agency that paid for the training to submit an itemized sworn statement to the former trainee's new employer within 12 months and demand payment, and lets it enforce collection through civil remedies.
(b) The agency of the state or political subdivision of the state which paid for the training, within 12 months of the former trainee’s first day of employment with the new employer, shall submit an itemized sworn statement to the new employer of the former trainee and demand payment thereof, and may enforce collection of the obligation through civil remedies and procedures.
See Ala. Code § 36-21-7(b)
Ala. Code § 22-18-8 requires reimbursement of training expenses to the paying public entity when emergency medical services personnel of a municipality, county, fire district or the state are employed by another public employer within 24 months after completing mandated training.
In those instances in which EMSP of any municipality, county, fire district, or the state are employed by the State of Alabama, any county, fire district, or another municipality, within 24 months after completing the training requirements mandated by this chapter, or by rules adopted by the board, the total expense of the training, including, but not limited to, salary paid during training, transportation costs paid to the trainee for travel to and from the training facility, room, board, tuition, and any other related training expenses, shall be reimbursed to the municipality, county, fire district, or the state which paid for the training.
See Ala. Code § 22-18-8
Ala. Code § 8-1-195(a)(2) lists, among the remedies for breach of an agreement subject to the restrictive-covenant article, the actual damages suffered or lawful liquidated damages if provided in the contract.
(2) The actual damages suffered as a result of the breach or lawful liquidated damages if provided in the contract.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-195(a)(2)
Under the federal rule, the cost of employer-required tools of the trade purchased by the employee violates the Fair Labor Standards Act in any workweek in which it cuts into the required minimum or overtime wages.
For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer's particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35
Federal wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer or for the employer's benefit.
The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee “kicks-back” directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer's benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.
How are Alabama repayment and wage-deduction rules enforced?
Where a repayment term is part of an agreement under Alabama's restrictive-covenant article, the remedies for breach include injunctive relief, actual damages or lawful liquidated damages provided in the contract, and attorneys' fees or costs if the contract or other law provides for them . If an employer obtains a judgment and collects it by garnishing wages, Alabama exempts 75 percent of a resident employee's wages from the garnishment , and federal law separately caps an ordinary garnishment at the lesser of 25 percent of weekly disposable earnings or the amount by which those earnings exceed thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage . On the employee's side, where a deduction for the employer's benefit takes pay below the federal minimum wage, the employee may recover the resulting unpaid minimum wages or overtime plus an equal amount as liquidated damages , unless the court reduces or denies them because the employer shows good faith and reasonable grounds .
Under Alabama law, actions to recover wages, damages, fees or penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages must be brought within two years .
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Ala. Code § 6-10-7(a) exempts 75 percent of the wages, salaries or other compensation of resident laborers or employees from garnishment or other process for collecting debts.
(a) The wages, salaries, or other compensation of laborers or employees, residents of this state, for personal services, shall be exempt from levy under writs of garnishment or other process for the collection of debts contracted or judgments entered in tort in an amount equal to 75 percent of such wages, salaries, or other compensation due or to become due to such laborers or employees, and the levy as to such percentage of their wages, salaries, or other compensation shall be void.
See Ala. Code § 6-10-7(a)
15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) caps the part of an individual's weekly disposable earnings subject to garnishment at the lesser of 25 percent of disposable earnings or the amount by which disposable earnings exceed thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage, subject to stated exceptions.
Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)
An employer that violates the federal minimum wage or overtime provisions is liable for the unpaid amounts plus an equal amount as liquidated damages.
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
29 U.S.C. § 260 lets a court award no liquidated damages, or a reduced amount, if the employer shows good faith and reasonable grounds for believing its act or omission did not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.
See 29 U.S.C. § 260
Ala. Code § 8-1-195(a) lists the remedies for breach of an agreement subject to the restrictive-covenant article: injunctive and other equitable relief, actual damages or lawful liquidated damages if provided in the contract, and contract remedies including attorneys' fees or costs if provided by the contract or by law.
(a) The remedies available for breach of an agreement subject to this article are: (1) Such injunctive and other equitable relief as may be appropriate with respect to any actual or threatened breach. (2) The actual damages suffered as a result of the breach or lawful liquidated damages if provided in the contract. (3) Any remedies available in contract law, including attorneys’ fees or costs, if provided for in the contract or otherwise provided for by law.
See Ala. Code § 8-1-195(a)
In Alabama, actions to recover wages, overtime, damages, fees, or penalties under laws respecting the payment of wages must be brought within two years.
All actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, damages, fees, or penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages, overtime, damages, fees, and penalties must be brought within two years.
See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(m)
What repayment structure is safest under Alabama law?
A stipulated repayment amount survives the penalty rule only where the loss from an early departure is difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, the parties intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the amount is a reasonable pre-breach estimate of the probable loss . Making the amount due on any early departure, rather than on joining a competitor, keeps the term from operating as a payment for competing, which the Alabama Supreme Court treats as a restraint of trade . Collecting by demand or lawsuit avoids the bar on assignments of, and employee orders covering, wages to be earned in the future , and, for an employee covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, a deduction for the employer's benefit violates the federal wage requirements in any workweek when it cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
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The Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes a valid liquidated damages clause from a penalty by three criteria: the injury from breach must be difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum must be a reasonable pre-breach estimate of the probable loss.
The courts generally identify three criteria by which a valid liquidated damages clause may be distinguished from a penalty. First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible to accurately estimate; second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty; and, third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-breach [estimate] of the probable loss.
See Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a contract requiring the payment of damages if one party competes with the other is a contract restraining the exercise of a lawful profession under the restraint-of-trade statute.
We are convinced that a contract which requires the payment of damages in the event one of the contracting parties competes with the other is a contract “by which . . . one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession . . .” within the meaning of § 22, supra.
See Associated Surgeons, P.A. v. Watwood, 295 Ala. 229, 326 So. 2d 721 (1976).
Ala. Code § 8-5-21 makes every assignment of salaries or wages to be earned in the future absolutely void and applies the same rule to orders given by employees covering all or part of future wages.
(a) All assignments made by any person of salaries or wages, to be earned in the future, shall be absolutely void. (b) The provisions of this section shall also apply to orders given by employees covering the whole or part of future wages.
See Ala. Code § 8-5-21
Under the federal rule, the cost of employer-required tools of the trade purchased by the employee violates the Fair Labor Standards Act in any workweek in which it cuts into the required minimum or overtime wages.
For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer's particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35
Federal wage requirements are not met where the employee kicks back part of the wage to the employer or for the employer's benefit.
The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee “kicks-back” directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer's benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.
See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35.