Are repayment terms enforceable in Colorado?
Colorado voids a covenant not to compete that restricts an individual's right to receive compensation for labor, but the statute expressly permits an employer to recover the reasonable, prorated cost of qualifying education and training. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. Subsection (3) of C.R.S. § 8-2-113 also excludes from the prohibition a provision requiring repayment of a scholarship given to an apprentice who fails to comply with the scholarship agreement's conditions .
The statute does not define a covenant not to compete. It says the general assembly intends to preserve the state and federal case law in effect before August 10, 2022 that defines what counts as a prohibited covenant not to compete . A repayment term outside the four subsection (3) categories, such as a sign-on or retention bonus repayable on resignation, therefore turns on whether a court treats it as a restriction on the worker's right to be paid for labor elsewhere; the conservative course is to assume it may be, because the statute lists the training provision among covenants that would otherwise be prohibited. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Fitting a subsection (3) category is not the end of the analysis. Any covenant not to compete otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) is void unless the employer gives the worker notice of it and its terms before the worker accepts the offer, or at least fourteen days before the covenant or the change that supports it takes effect for a current worker; the notice must be a separate, signed document in clear and conspicuous terms .
The 2022 rewrite of the statute that created the current training-cost rule applies to covenants not to compete entered into or renewed on or after its effective date, August 10, 2022. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. A repayment agreement entered into before August 10, 2022 and not renewed on or after that date remains subject to the earlier statutory framework .
A training-repayment clause that meets the cost and proration limits is still void if the employer skipped the separate, signed notice, so a signed offer letter alone does not preserve it .
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(a) states that, apart from the listed exceptions, a covenant not to compete that restricts an individual's right to receive compensation for labor is void.
(2) (a) Except as provided in subsections (2)(b), (2)(d), and (3) of this section, a covenant not to compete that restricts the right of an individual to receive compensation for performance of labor is void.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(a)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) excludes from the prohibition a provision for recovering the reasonable cost of distinct, transferable education and training, decreasing proportionately over two years and consistent with the FLSA and the Wage Act.
(3) The following covenants are not prohibited by subsection (2) of this section: (a) A provision providing for an employer's recovery of the expense of educating and training a worker where the training is distinct from normal, on-the-job training and satisfies any other requirements established by the attorney general, by rule, regarding the transferability of the training or credentialing that is available to the employee as a result of the training. The employer's recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreases over the course of the two years subsequent to the training proportionately based on the number of months that have passed since the completion of the training, and the employer recovering for the costs of the training would not violate the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., or article 4 of this title 8; except that a public employer's recovery of the costs of the training may decrease over a period longer than two years.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(d) also excludes a provision requiring an apprentice to repay a scholarship on failing its conditions.
(d) A provision requiring the repayment of a scholarship provided to an individual working in an apprenticeship if the individual fails to comply with the conditions of the scholarship agreement.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(d)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(1) states the legislature's intent to preserve pre-August 10, 2022 case law defining what counts as a prohibited covenant not to compete.
(1) Legislative intent. The general assembly intends to preserve existing state and federal case law in effect before August 10, 2022, that: (a) Defines what counts as a covenant not to compete that is prohibited by this section; and (b) Specifies the extent to which a covenant not to compete for the protection of trade secrets must be tailored in scope in order to be enforceable under this section.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(1)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4) voids an otherwise permissible covenant unless the worker receives timely notice in a separate, clear, conspicuous and signed document.
(4) (a) Any covenant not to compete that is otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is void unless notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant not to compete are provided to: (I) A prospective worker before the worker accepts the employer's offer of employment; or (II) A current worker at least fourteen days before the earlier of: (A) The effective date of the covenant; or (B) The effective date of any additional compensation or change in the terms or conditions of employment that provides consideration for the covenant. (b) An employer shall provide the notice required in subsection (4)(a) of this section in a separate document from any other covenants between the worker and employer and in clear and conspicuous terms in the language in which the worker and employer communicate about the worker's performance. The notice must be signed by the worker.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4)(a)-(b)
HB 22-1317 states that it applies to covenants not to compete entered into or renewed on or after its effective date.
(2) This act applies to covenants not to compete entered into or renewed on or after the applicable effective date of this act.
See HB 22-1317, § 2(2)
Can a Colorado employer claw back pay already earned?
A Colorado employer cannot forfeit compensation once it is earned, vested, and determinable, because the Wage Act treats that compensation as wages and voids any agreement waiving Wage Act rights. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. The Wage Act counts as wages all amounts for labor or service performed and bonuses or commissions earned under the parties' agreement, and says no amount is wages until it is earned, vested, and determinable .
The Colorado Supreme Court applied that structure to a forfeiture clause in Nieto v. Clark's Market, Inc., holding that vacation pay an employer chooses to provide is no less protected than other wages and cannot be forfeited once earned . Any agreement, written or oral, by which an employee purports to waive or modify Wage Act rights is void .
The line that matters is when the money is earned. Because an amount is not wages until it is earned, vested, and determinable , a bonus written so that it is earned only after a stated period of service is treated differently from one paid outright and then subject to repayment. In our review, we found no Colorado appellate decision deciding whether a contract claim to recover a bonus already paid conflicts with these rules, so the conservative course is to treat a paid, earned bonus as wages that cannot be taken back through payroll and to make any repayment term a training-cost provision that fits C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a). On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-4-101(14)(a) defines wages to include amounts for labor performed and earned bonuses or commissions, and says no amount is wages until earned, vested, and determinable.
(14) (a) "Wages" or "compensation" means: (I) All amounts for labor or service performed by employees, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the same or whether the labor or service is performed under contract, subcontract, partnership, subpartnership, station plan, or other agreement for the performance of labor or service if the labor or service to be paid for is performed personally by the person demanding payment. No amount is considered to be wages or compensation until such amount is earned, vested, and determinable, at which time such amount shall be payable to the employee pursuant to this article. (II) Bonuses or commissions earned for labor or services performed in accordance with the terms of any agreement between an employer and employee;
See C.R.S. § 8-4-101(14)(a)(I)-(II)
In *Nieto v. Clark's Market, Inc.*, the Colorado Supreme Court held that employer-provided vacation pay is protected like other wages and cannot be forfeited once earned.
We conclude that, although the CWCA does not entitle an employee to vacation pay, when an employer chooses to provide it, such pay is no less protected than other wages or compensation and, thus, cannot be forfeited once earned.
See Nieto v. Clark's Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 3, 488 P.3d 1140
C.R.S. § 8-4-121 voids any employee agreement purporting to waive or modify Wage Act rights.
Any agreement, written or oral, by any employee purporting to waive or to modify such employee's rights in violation of this article shall be void.
See C.R.S. § 8-4-121
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) permits an employer to recover the reasonable, prorated cost of distinct, transferable training.
(a) A provision providing for an employer's recovery of the expense of educating and training a worker where the training is distinct from normal, on-the-job training and satisfies any other requirements established by the attorney general, by rule, regarding the transferability of the training or credentialing that is available to the employee as a result of the training. The employer's recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreases over the course of the two years subsequent to the training proportionately based on the number of months that have passed since the completion of the training, and the employer recovering for the costs of the training would not violate the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., or article 4 of this title 8; except that a public employer's recovery of the costs of the training may decrease over a period longer than two years.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a)
Can repayment come out of a Colorado final paycheck?
A Colorado employer may set off a repayment against final wages only as a deduction the Wage Act permits, which for a loan or advance means a written agreement that is enforceable and lawful, and since June 3, 2026 that deduction may not take pay below the applicable minimum wage. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 3 sources in this group. The final-pay statute preserves the employer's right to set off deductions under C.R.S. § 8-4-105 owed by the employee , and section 8-4-105 bars every deduction it does not list .
Senate Bill 26-160, approved June 3, 2026 and applying to conduct on or after its effective date, rewrote the two parts of section 8-4-105 that a repayment uses . Deductions are now allowed for loans, advances, goods or services, equipment or property, or any other thing that primarily benefits an employee, other than personal protective equipment, provided under a written agreement so long as it is enforceable and not in violation of law . The minimum-wage limit now reads that, except for deductions under subsections (1)(a), (1)(a.5), and (1)(d), nothing in the section authorizes a deduction below the applicable minimum wage . Before that change, the limit applied to every deduction under the section ; either way, a repayment taken under the loan-and-advance paragraph must leave pay at or above minimum wage.
The written-agreement paragraph ties the deduction to enforceability: a deduction is permitted only so long as the agreement is enforceable and not in violation of law . A training-repayment term that is void under C.R.S. § 8-2-113 therefore cannot be collected through payroll, and the noncompete statute requires that any permitted training recovery would not violate article 4 of title 8, the Wage Act . Before the 2026 amendment, the Court of Appeals held in 303 Beauty Bar LLC v. Division of Labor Standards & Statistics that an agreement for deductions covering the employer's costs of doing business is unenforceable under section 8-4-105(1)(b) .
A final-paycheck deduction for training costs that exceeds the prorated amount the noncompete statute allows, or that takes the last check below minimum wage, is an unauthorized deduction rather than a permitted setoff. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-4-109(2) preserves an employer's right to set off deductions under section 8-4-105 owed by the employee against final wages.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall limit the right of an employer to set off any deductions pursuant to section 8-4-105 owing by the employee to the employer or require the payment at the time employment is severed of compensation not yet fully earned under the compensation agreement between the employee and employer, whether written or oral.
See C.R.S. § 8-4-109(2)
As amended in 2026, C.R.S. § 8-4-105(1) bars unlisted deductions and permits deductions for loans, advances and other things primarily benefiting the employee, excluding personal protective equipment, under an enforceable and lawful written agreement.
(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages or compensation of an employee except as follows: (b) Deductions for loans, advances, goods or services, and equipment or property, OR ANY OTHER THING THAT PRIMARILY BENEFITS AN EMPLOYEE , WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT , provided by an employer to an employee pursuant to a written agreement between such employer and employee, so long as it is enforceable and not in violation of law;
See C.R.S. § 8-4-105(1)(b), as amended by 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 339, § 2
As amended in 2026, C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2) bars deductions below the applicable minimum wage except those under subsections (1)(a), (1)(a.5) and (1)(d).
(2) EXCEPT FOR A DEDUCTION MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBSECTION (1)(a), (1)(a.5), OR (1)(d) OF THIS SECTION , nothing in this section authorizes a deduction below the applicable minimum wage.
See C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2), as amended by 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 339, § 2
Chapter 339 applies to conduct on or after its effective date and, carrying a safety clause, was approved June 3, 2026.
SECTION 4. Applicability. This act applies to conduct occurring on or after the effective date of this act. SECTION 5. Safety clause. The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, 2060 Labor and Industry Ch. 339 health, or safety or for appropriations for the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state institutions. Approved: June 3, 2026
See 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 339, §§ 4-5
Before the 2026 amendment, C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2) stated that nothing in the section authorizes any deduction below the applicable minimum wage.
(2) Nothing in this section authorizes a deduction below the applicable minimum wage.
See C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2) (2025)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) limits training recovery to reasonable, prorated costs and requires that the recovery not violate the FLSA or article 4 of title 8.
The employer's recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreases over the course of the two years subsequent to the training proportionately based on the number of months that have passed since the completion of the training, and the employer recovering for the costs of the training would not violate the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., or article 4 of this title 8; except that a public employer's recovery of the costs of the training may decrease over a period longer than two years.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a)
In *303 Beauty Bar LLC v. Division of Labor Standards & Statistics*, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that an agreement for deductions covering the employer's costs of doing business is unenforceable under C.R.S. § 8-4-105(1)(b).
We conclude that the wage deductions were for the employer’s costs of doing business, and an agreement for such deductions is unenforceable under section 8-4- 105(1)(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
See 303 Beauty Bar LLC v. Div. of Lab. Standards & Stats., 2025 COA 20, ¶ 1
Does Colorado treat training or tuition repayments differently?
Colorado treats training repayment differently from other repayment terms: the noncompete statute permits recovery of the reasonable cost of education and training that is distinct from normal on-the-job training and transferable under the Attorney General's rule, reduced proportionately over the two years after the training . Recovery is capped at the reasonable costs of the training, decreases month by month over the two years after the training ends, and must not violate the federal Fair Labor Standards Act or the Colorado Wage Act; a public employer may spread the decrease over a longer period .
Since April 30, 2026, the Attorney General's rule defines transferable training. A training or credential is transferable when the employee engages in it voluntarily and it directly results in a degree or certification from a listed Colorado institution, a license defined in Colorado, another state's or a tribe's law or a federal agency's grant, or a training or credential recognized by an industry or trade association, a union, or another organization representing employers or workers in the occupation . The statute gives the Attorney General authority to adopt rules to implement and enforce the training provision . Mandatory training, or training that satisfies none of the rule's listed outcomes, falls outside the training-repayment exception .
Subsection (3) of C.R.S. § 8-2-113 names education and training costs and apprenticeship scholarships, and no other repayment category. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. A relocation-cost repayment therefore has no express carve-out, and the conservative course is to treat it like any other repayment term that may restrict a worker's right to be paid for labor elsewhere .
A training-repayment schedule that keeps the full cost owed until a cliff date, rather than reducing it with each month after the training, exceeds the recovery the statute allows .
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) permits recovery of the reasonable cost of distinct, transferable education and training, decreasing proportionately by month over two years, consistent with the FLSA and the Wage Act, with a longer period allowed for public employers.
(3) The following covenants are not prohibited by subsection (2) of this section: (a) A provision providing for an employer's recovery of the expense of educating and training a worker where the training is distinct from normal, on-the-job training and satisfies any other requirements established by the attorney general, by rule, regarding the transferability of the training or credentialing that is available to the employee as a result of the training. The employer's recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreases over the course of the two years subsequent to the training proportionately based on the number of months that have passed since the completion of the training, and the employer recovering for the costs of the training would not violate the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., or article 4 of this title 8; except that a public employer's recovery of the costs of the training may decrease over a period longer than two years.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a)
The Attorney General's rule 4 CCR 904-4, effective April 30, 2026, treats training as transferable under C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) only when voluntary and directly resulting in a listed degree, certification, license, or recognized credential.
A training or credential is transferable for the purposes of C.R.S. Section 8-2-113(3)(a) when it is engaged in voluntarily by the employee and directly results in either (a) (b) (c) an educational degree or certification from i. a private college or university authorized to operate in Colorado under C.R.S. Section 23-2-103.3; ii. a private occupational school with a certificate of approval under C.R.S. Section 23-64-115(1); iii. a community or technical college identified in C.R.S. Section 23-60-205; or iv. a public institute of higher education as defined in C.R.S. Section 23-4.5102(7); or a license i. as defined in C.R.S. Section 12-20-102(9); ii. a commercial driver’s license as defined in C.R.S. Section 42-2-402(1); iii. any license defined in Colorado law; iv. a comparable license or credential defined in the law of any other state, territory, district, or federally recognized Indian Tribe; or v. a certificate or license granted by a federal government agency; or a training or credential that is recognized by an industry or trade association, a union, or other organization representing employers or workers within the profession or occupation to which the training or credential is related. 1 CODE OF COLORADO REGULATIONS Attorney General-Consumer Protection Section 4 CCR 904-4 Editor’s Notes History New rule eff. 04/30/2026.
See 4 CCR 904-4 (new rule eff. Apr. 30, 2026)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(9)(b) authorizes the Attorney General to adopt rules to implement and enforce the training-cost provision.
(b) The attorney general may promulgate rules necessary to implement and enforce subsection (3)(a) of this section.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(9)(b)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(d) excludes a provision requiring an apprentice to repay a scholarship on failing its conditions.
(d) A provision requiring the repayment of a scholarship provided to an individual working in an apprenticeship if the individual fails to comply with the conditions of the scholarship agreement.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(d)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(a) voids, apart from listed exceptions, a covenant not to compete that restricts an individual's right to receive compensation for labor.
(2) (a) Except as provided in subsections (2)(b), (2)(d), and (3) of this section, a covenant not to compete that restricts the right of an individual to receive compensation for performance of labor is void.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(a)
What happens to a Colorado employer that enforces a void repayment term?
A Colorado employer that presents, enters into, or tries to enforce a void covenant is liable for actual damages and a $5,000 penalty per worker harmed, and the Attorney General may recover three times any training-cost recovery or attempted recovery that violates the training provision. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. The Attorney General and any harmed worker or prospective worker may sue for injunctive relief and penalties, and a worker may also recover actual damages, reasonable costs and attorney fees .
A court may reduce or eliminate the penalty if the employer shows it acted in good faith with reasonable grounds to believe it was not violating the statute . A worker, or a later employer that has hired or is considering hiring the worker, may also seek a declaratory judgment that the covenant is unenforceable .
For a worker who primarily resided or worked in Colorado at termination, the covenant may not require the worker to litigate its enforceability outside Colorado, and Colorado law governs enforceability for a worker who primarily resided and worked in Colorado at termination, notwithstanding a contrary contract term .
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(a) bars an employer from entering into, presenting, or attempting to enforce a covenant that is void under the section.
(8) (a) An employer shall not enter into, present to a worker or prospective worker as a term of employment, or attempt to enforce any covenant that is void under this section.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(a)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(b) imposes actual damages and a $5,000 per-worker penalty, authorizes suits by the Attorney General and harmed workers, lets the Attorney General recover treble unlawful training recoveries, and gives workers costs and attorney fees.
(b) An employer that violates subsection (8)(a) of this section is liable for actual damages and a penalty of five thousand dollars per worker or prospective worker harmed by the conduct. The attorney general and any worker or prospective worker harmed by an employer's conduct may bring an action for injunctive relief and to recover penalties. The attorney general may recover three times the amount of any recovery or attempted recovery by an employer in violation of subsection (3)(a) of this section. In addition to injunctive relief and the penalty allowed in this subsection (8)(b), a worker or prospective worker may recover actual damages, reasonable costs, and attorney fees in any private action brought under this section.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(b)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(c) lets a court reduce or withhold the penalty for an employer that acted in good faith on reasonable grounds.
(c) In any action brought under this subsection (8), if the employer shows that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the employer's act or omission was not a violation of this section, the court may, in its sound discretion, award the worker or workers no penalty or award a penalty of any amount not to exceed the amount specified in subsection (8)(b) of this section.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(8)(c)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(7) lets a worker or a hiring employer seek a declaratory judgment that the covenant is unenforceable.
(7) A worker who is a party to a covenant not to compete, or a subsequent employer that has hired or is considering hiring the worker, may seek a declaratory judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction or an arbitrator that the covenant not to compete is unenforceable.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(7)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(6) bars out-of-state adjudication for a worker who primarily resided or worked in Colorado and applies Colorado law to a worker who primarily resided and worked there.
(6) A covenant not to compete that applies to a worker who, at the time of termination of employment, primarily resided or worked in Colorado may not require the worker to adjudicate the enforceability of the covenant outside of Colorado. Notwithstanding any contractual provision to the contrary, Colorado law governs the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a worker who, at the time of termination of employment, primarily resided and worked in Colorado.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(6)
What repayment structure is safest under Colorado law?
The safest Colorado repayment term recovers only the reasonable cost of training that is distinct from on-the-job training and transferable under the Attorney General's rule, and reduces the amount owed month by month over the two years after the training. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. Under the rule, that means training the employee takes voluntarily that directly results in a qualifying degree, certification, license, or recognized credential .
The term should then be delivered with the statute's notice: before a prospective worker accepts the offer, or for a current worker at least fourteen days before the earlier of the covenant's effective date and the effective date of any added compensation or changed terms that supply consideration for it, in a separate document the worker signs, written in clear and conspicuous terms in the language the employer and worker use to discuss the worker's performance . The statute treats the notice as sufficient when it comes with a copy of the agreement, names the agreement and states that it contains a covenant not to compete that could restrict the worker's options for later employment, and points the worker to the specific sections that contain the covenant .
If the employer plans to collect through payroll, the deduction needs a written agreement that is enforceable and lawful and, after June 3, 2026, must leave pay at or above minimum wage. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a) limits training recovery to the reasonable cost of distinct, transferable training, decreasing proportionately by month over two years.
(a) A provision providing for an employer's recovery of the expense of educating and training a worker where the training is distinct from normal, on-the-job training and satisfies any other requirements established by the attorney general, by rule, regarding the transferability of the training or credentialing that is available to the employee as a result of the training. The employer's recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of the training and decreases over the course of the two years subsequent to the training proportionately based on the number of months that have passed since the completion of the training, and the employer recovering for the costs of the training would not violate the federal "Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., or article 4 of this title 8; except that a public employer's recovery of the costs of the training may decrease over a period longer than two years.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(3)(a)
4 CCR 904-4 treats training as transferable when the employee takes it voluntarily and it directly results in a listed degree, certification, license, or recognized credential.
A training or credential is transferable for the purposes of C.R.S. Section 8-2-113(3)(a) when it is engaged in voluntarily by the employee and directly results in either (a) (b) (c) an educational degree or certification from i. a private college or university authorized to operate in Colorado under C.R.S. Section 23-2-103.3; ii. a private occupational school with a certificate of approval under C.R.S. Section 23-64-115(1); iii. a community or technical college identified in C.R.S. Section 23-60-205; or iv. a public institute of higher education as defined in C.R.S. Section 23-4.5102(7); or a license i. as defined in C.R.S. Section 12-20-102(9); ii. a commercial driver’s license as defined in C.R.S. Section 42-2-402(1); iii. any license defined in Colorado law; iv. a comparable license or credential defined in the law of any other state, territory, district, or federally recognized Indian Tribe; or v. a certificate or license granted by a federal government agency; or a training or credential that is recognized by an industry or trade association, a union, or other organization representing employers or workers within the profession or occupation to which the training or credential is related.
See 4 CCR 904-4
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4) requires timely notice of a permitted covenant in a separate document signed by the worker.
(4) (a) Any covenant not to compete that is otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is void unless notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant not to compete are provided to: (I) A prospective worker before the worker accepts the employer's offer of employment; or (II) A current worker at least fourteen days before the earlier of: (A) The effective date of the covenant; or (B) The effective date of any additional compensation or change in the terms or conditions of employment that provides consideration for the covenant. (b) An employer shall provide the notice required in subsection (4)(a) of this section in a separate document from any other covenants between the worker and employer and in clear and conspicuous terms in the language in which the worker and employer communicate about the worker's performance. The notice must be signed by the worker.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4)(a)-(b)
C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4)(d) states that notice is sufficient when it accompanies a copy of the agreement, identifies the agreement and its noncompete, and directs the worker to the covenant's provisions.
(d) An employer satisfies the notice requirement of this subsection (4) when the notice: (I) Is provided with a copy of the agreement containing the covenant not to compete; (II) Identifies the agreement by name and states that the agreement contains a covenant not to compete that could restrict the workers' options for subsequent employment following their separation from the employer; and (III) Directs the worker to the specific sections or paragraphs of the agreement that contain the covenant not to compete.
See C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4)(d)
As amended in 2026, C.R.S. § 8-4-105(1)(b) permits deductions for loans, advances and other things primarily benefiting the employee under an enforceable and lawful written agreement.
(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages or compensation of an employee except as follows: (b) Deductions for loans, advances, goods or services, and equipment or property, OR ANY OTHER THING THAT PRIMARILY BENEFITS AN EMPLOYEE , WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT , provided by an employer to an employee pursuant to a written agreement between such employer and employee, so long as it is enforceable and not in violation of law;
See C.R.S. § 8-4-105(1)(b), as amended by 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 339, § 2
As amended in 2026, C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2) bars deductions below the applicable minimum wage except those under subsections (1)(a), (1)(a.5) and (1)(d).
(2) EXCEPT FOR A DEDUCTION MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBSECTION (1)(a), (1)(a.5), OR (1)(d) OF THIS SECTION , nothing in this section authorizes a deduction below the applicable minimum wage.
See C.R.S. § 8-4-105(2), as amended by 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 339, § 2