Can a Colorado employer require assignment of every invention?
There is no statutory ceiling. Unlike California or New York, Colorado has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent overlay. The one Colorado-specific outer limit is restraint-of-trade law — where an assignment clause operates as a post-employment restraint, C.R.S. § 8-2-113 makes covenants not to compete void unless a statutory exception applies.
Because there is no statute on point, the limits come from general principles rather than a legislative carve-out. A full-text search of the Colorado Revised Statutes, current through the 2025 First Extraordinary Session, surfaces no employee-invention provision in the labor, employment, or corporations titles — no California Labor Code § 2870 analogue and no New York Labor Law § 203-f analogue. Colorado's restrictive-covenant statute, C.R.S. § 8-2-113, contains no invention, patent, or intellectual-property-assignment language of its own; its only intellectual-property hook is trade secrets, as the legitimate interest a compliant covenant must protect. A Colorado employer therefore starts from contract law, not a statutory ceiling on what an assignment promise may capture.
Colorado's own case law confirms that the contract is the vehicle. In Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., the Colorado Court of Appeals refused to award an employer any title to an employee's invention where the employee was neither hired to invent nor bound by an express assignment .
Hewett also polices how the employer obtains the promise. The court rejected the argument that merely continuing an existing job supplies consideration for a mid-employment assignment of invention rights .
The substantive default the contract operates against is the federal patent premise restated in Stanford v. Roche: absent an effective assignment, rights in an invention belong to the person who conceived it .
The practical consequence is that a Colorado employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or Washington employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. But that breadth is not unlimited. An assignment clause is still an ordinary contract term subject to contract-law defenses — including Hewett's consideration rule — and where it restrains what a person may do after employment, it runs into Colorado's statutory treatment of covenants not to compete .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
A.1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113PDFC.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(a) makes any covenant not to compete that restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for performance of labor void unless a statutory exception applies — the general restraint-of-trade bound an aggressive assignment clause would face in Colorado if it operates as a post-employment restraint.
any covenant not to compete that restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for performance of labor for any employer is void.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2)(a) (2024).
Case law · 1973-03-20
A.3 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. denied the employer any claim to an employee's invention where the employee was neither hired nor paid to invent and had signed no express assignment — so in Colorado the assignment clause itself, not a statute, defines what the employer may claim.
In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Case law · 1973-03-20
A.4 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. holds that mere continuation of already-bargained-for employment is not sufficient consideration to support an assignment of invention or patent rights — a contract-law limit on imposing an assignment mid-employment in Colorado.
we find none to bolster Samsonite's contention that continuation of employment, such employment already having been mutually bargained for, is sufficient consideration to support an assignment of invention or patent rights.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Case law · 2011-06-06
A.2 Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular SystemsStanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, the baseline against which any assignment clause is measured.
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.
See Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
Must a Colorado employer notify the employee?
Not applicable. Because Colorado has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Colorado enforces instead is contractual: the employer takes title to an employee invention only through a plain and unambiguous contract obligation .
There is nothing to give notice of. A notice requirement exists in California and Washington precisely to alert the employee to a statutory own-time carve-out that limits the assignment; Colorado has enacted no such carve-out, so there is no statutory line for a notice to mark. This is why the entry is marked not applicable rather than a bare no: the question presupposes a statutory carve-out that Colorado does not have.
Where Colorado does police an employer's claim to an employee invention, it looks to the contract's terms. Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. makes the point from the employer's side — even where the employer had acquired shop rights from the employee's use of company time and materials, no title passed without an express contractual obligation .
One nearby statute is worth distinguishing. C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4) does impose a separate, signed notice formality — before a prospective worker accepts the offer, or at least fourteen days ahead for a current worker — but only for covenants not to compete that are otherwise permissible under the statute's exceptions .
That is a restrictive-covenant formality, not an invention-assignment notice: it attaches to an ordinary invention-assignment clause only if that clause qualifies as a covenant not to compete, a characterization no Colorado decision found in our review has made. For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Colorado employer neither has to give a § 2872-style invention notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 1973-03-20
B.1 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. holds that even accrued shop rights pass no title to an employee invention absent a plain and unambiguous contract obligation — so in Colorado any assignment duty arises from the agreement itself rather than from a notice-requiring statute.
Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Primary law
B.2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113PDFC.R.S. § 8-2-113(4)(a) voids an otherwise-permissible covenant not to compete unless separate notice of the covenant and its terms is given — before the offer is accepted for a prospective worker, or at least fourteen days in advance for a current worker — a restrictive-covenant formality distinct from any invention-assignment notice.
Any covenant not to compete that is otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is void unless notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant not to compete are provided to:
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(4)(a) (2024).
Who owns an invention by default in Colorado?
The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, Colorado follows the common-law rule that an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it, and mere employment does not by itself require assignment to the employer. The exception is the employee whose job duties include inventing or solving the particular problem the invention answers.
Colorado's modern statement of the default comes from Scott System, Inc. v. Scott .
The same opinion states the hired-to-invent exception in functional terms — duties, not titles .
The foundational Colorado authority is Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., where the Court of Appeals applied both halves of the rule: the employee owned his invention because he was neither hired nor paid to invent and had signed no express assignment .
Hewett also fixes the ceiling on the employer's fallback position. Where the employee used company time, tools, and materials, the employer earns a shop right — a non-exclusive license to use the invention — but a shop right is not title .
Both decisions come from the Colorado Court of Appeals; no Colorado Supreme Court decision on employee-invention ownership was found in our review. The federal restatement of the framework matches. Under United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer .
And Stanford v. Roche anchors the baseline all of this operates against: ownership springs from invention, so an employer's title is derivative of an assignment .
Because ownership starts with the inventor and Colorado has no statute filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (hereby assigns) clause that transfers legal title automatically on conception, rather than a future promise to assign, an after-the-fact hired-to-invent argument that turns on what the employee's duties actually were, or a shop right that licenses use but passes no title.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2000-01-20
C.1 Scott System, Inc. v. ScottScott System, Inc. v. Scott states Colorado's common-law default that an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it, and that employment alone does not require assignment to the employer.
Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer.
See Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).
Case law · 2000-01-20
C.2 Scott System, Inc. v. ScottScott System, Inc. v. Scott frames Colorado's hired-to-invent exception functionally — an invention created while performing job duties that include inventing or solving the particular problem belongs to the employer.
If an employee’s job duties include the responsibility for inventing or for solving a particular problem that requires invention, any invention created by that employee during the performance of those responsibilities belongs to the employer.
See Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).
Case law · 1973-03-20
C.3 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. holds that an employee who was neither hired nor paid to invent and signed no express assignment owns his invention — the employee-ownership default for general employees in Colorado.
In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Case law · 1973-03-20
C.4 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. holds that a shop right earned through the employee's use of company time and materials is a license to use the invention, not title — no ownership passes absent a plain and unambiguous contract obligation.
Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Case law · 1933-05-08
C.5 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. holds that an employee hired to make an invention who succeeds during the term of service is bound to assign the resulting patent to the employer.
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
Case law · 2011-06-06
C.6 Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular SystemsStanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, so an employer's title is derivative of an assignment from the employee-inventor.
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.
See Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Colorado?
Most likely tested for reasonableness, but the invention-specific application is undecided. No Colorado decision found in our review has addressed a post-employment holdover invention-assignment clause, and none has applied C.R.S. § 8-2-113 to one. What Colorado does have is a well-settled reasonableness rule for covenants not to compete and, for agreements entered into on or after August 10, 2022, a statute that voids such covenants unless the worker is highly compensated and the restraint is no broader than reasonably necessary to protect trade secrets. That combined framework is what a Colorado court would most likely reach for if asked to enforce a clause sweeping in inventions conceived after employment ends.
The common-law baseline is long settled. In Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington, the Colorado Supreme Court stated the rule for covenants not to compete .
Zeff predates the 2022 rewrite of § 8-2-113 (HB 22-1317), but the current statute expressly carries that older case law forward .
The post-statute formulation makes the same point from the other direction: clearing the statute is necessary but not sufficient. In National Graphics Co. v. Dilley, the Court of Appeals held that a covenant that survives § 8-2-113 must still be reasonable .
Since August 10, 2022, the statutory layer does most of the work for anything characterized as a covenant not to compete. The rewritten § 8-2-113 voids such covenants outright, subject to a narrow exception for highly compensated workers whose covenants are tailored to trade secrets .
The highly-compensated threshold is year-indexed, not static: it is set annually by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment's PAY CALC order, and for 2026 it stands at $130,014. Because the exception applies only if the worker clears the threshold both when the covenant is signed and when it is enforced, the operative figure depends on both years. One more feature matters for multistate employers — § 8-2-113(6) locks in Colorado law and a Colorado forum for covered workers, overriding contrary choice-of-law clauses .
Applying this framework to holdover assignments is a prediction, not a holding. The uncertainty comes from missing case law rather than ambiguous doctrine: no Colorado decision found in our review has decided whether a trailing invention-assignment clause is a covenant not to compete under § 8-2-113, and no pre-2022 Colorado decision found in our review addressed holdover clauses under the common-law reasonableness rule either. A clause that captures inventions an ex-employee conceives after leaving restrains what that person can profitably do next, which is why the restraint framework — rather than ordinary ownership law — is the likely testing ground. The safe reading is that an overbroad trailing clause is at meaningful risk in Colorado: if characterized as a covenant not to compete, it is void unless the worker is highly compensated and the clause is tailored to trade secrets, and even a clause that clears the statute must still satisfy the reasonableness rule.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 1969-01-27
D.1 Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. FarringtonZeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington states the Colorado Supreme Court's well-settled rule that reasonable covenants not to compete will be enforced and that reasonableness depends on the facts of each case — the common-law standard a holdover assignment clause would most likely be measured against.
The rule is well-settled in Colorado that reasonable covenants not to compete will be enforced and that what is reasonable depends upon the facts of each case.
See Zeff, Farrington & Assocs., Inc. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 508, 449 P.2d 813 (1969).
Primary law
D.3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113PDFC.R.S. § 8-2-113(1) expressly preserves pre-August 10, 2022 state and federal case law defining what counts as a prohibited covenant not to compete and how a trade-secret covenant must be tailored — so Colorado's older reasonableness case law continues to operate inside the rewritten statutory regime.
The general assembly intends to preserve existing state and federal case law in effect before August 10, 2022, that: (a) Defines what counts as a covenant not to compete that is prohibited by this section; and (b) Specifies the extent to which a covenant not to compete for the protection of trade secrets must be tailored in scope in order to be enforceable under this section.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(1) (2024).
Case law
D.4 National Graphics Co. v. DilleyNational Graphics Co. v. Dilley holds that even a covenant not void under § 8-2-113 must satisfy the rule of reasonableness as to duration and geographic scope — clearing the statute is necessary but not sufficient for enforcement in Colorado.
We conclude that even if a non-competition clause is not void under § 8-2-113, C.R.S., to be enforceable it must satisfy the rule of reasonableness as to both duration and geographic scope.
See Nat'l Graphics Co. v. Dilley, 681 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1984).
Primary law
D.2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113PDFC.R.S. § 8-2-113(2)(b) exempts from the voidness rule only covenants governing workers who meet the highly-compensated threshold at signing and at enforcement, and only where the covenant protects trade secrets and is no broader than reasonably necessary — the exception a holdover assignment clause would have to fit if characterized as a covenant not to compete.
This subsection (2) does not apply to a covenant not to compete governing a person who, at the time the covenant not to compete is entered into and at the time it is enforced, earns an amount of annualized cash compensation equivalent to or greater than the threshold amount for highly compensated workers, if the covenant not to compete is for the protection of trade secrets and is no broader than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2)(b) (2024).
Primary law
D.5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113PDFC.R.S. § 8-2-113(6) makes Colorado law govern the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a worker who primarily resided and worked in Colorado at termination, notwithstanding any contrary contractual choice-of-law provision — and bars requiring such a worker to adjudicate enforceability outside Colorado.
Notwithstanding any contractual provision to the contrary, Colorado law governs the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a worker who, at the time of termination of employment, primarily resided and worked in Colorado.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(6) (2024).
Case law · 1973-03-20
D.6 Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.Hewett v. Samsonite Corp. holds that even accrued shop rights pass no title to an employee invention absent a plain and unambiguous contract obligation — so in Colorado any assignment duty arises from the agreement itself rather than from a notice-requiring statute.
Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett.
See Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
Case law · 2000-01-20
D.7 Scott System, Inc. v. ScottScott System, Inc. v. Scott states Colorado's common-law default that an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it, and that employment alone does not require assignment to the employer.
Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer.
See Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).
Do not assume a Colorado employee works like a California or Washington one. There is no invention-assignment statute here, so there is no statutory carve-out to rely on and no notice safe harbor — the employer's claim to an employee invention rises or falls on a plain and unambiguous contract obligation . Draft with present-assignment (hereby assigns) language so title passes automatically, because an invention is generally the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it . Keep any trailing or holdover assignment narrow, short, and tied to identifiable trade secrets: no Colorado decision found in our review has applied § 8-2-113 to a holdover invention-assignment clause, but if a court characterizes one as a covenant not to compete, it is void unless the worker meets the year-indexed highly-compensated threshold at signing and at enforcement and the clause is no broader than reasonably necessary to protect trade secrets — and even a clause that clears the statute must still satisfy Colorado's rule of reasonableness as to duration and scope .