# Employee Invention Assignment in Colorado[^about] Colorado has no employee-invention-assignment statute — no California-style own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent overlay. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under Colorado's reasonableness rule for covenants not to compete, now layered with C.R.S. § 8-2-113's void-unless-excepted regime, though no Colorado decision found in our review has applied § 8-2-113 to a holdover invention assignment. ## Can a Colorado employer require assignment of every invention? {#statutory-carve-out} **Short answer.** There is no statutory ceiling. Unlike California or New York, Colorado has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent overlay. The one Colorado-specific outer limit is restraint-of-trade law — where an assignment clause operates as a post-employment restraint, C.R.S. § 8-2-113 makes covenants not to compete void unless a statutory exception applies [^co-8-2-113-void-carveout][^stanford-baseline-carveout]. Because there is no statute on point, the limits come from general principles rather than a legislative carve-out. A full-text search of the Colorado Revised Statutes, current through the 2025 First Extraordinary Session, surfaces no employee-invention provision in the labor, employment, or corporations titles — no California Labor Code § 2870 analogue and no New York Labor Law § 203-f analogue. Colorado's restrictive-covenant statute, C.R.S. § 8-2-113, contains no invention, patent, or intellectual-property-assignment language of its own; its only intellectual-property hook is trade secrets, as the legitimate interest a compliant covenant must protect. A Colorado employer therefore starts from contract law, not a statutory ceiling on what an assignment promise may capture. Colorado's own case law confirms that the contract is the vehicle. In *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.*, the Colorado Court of Appeals refused to award an employer any title to an employee's invention where the employee was neither hired to invent nor bound by an express assignment [^hewett-express-agreement-carveout]. "In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents."[^hewett-express-agreement-carveout] *Hewett* also polices how the employer obtains the promise. The court rejected the argument that merely continuing an existing job supplies consideration for a mid-employment assignment of invention rights [^hewett-consideration-carveout]. "we find none to bolster Samsonite's contention that continuation of employment, such employment already having been mutually bargained for, is sufficient consideration to support an assignment of invention or patent rights."[^hewett-consideration-carveout] The substantive default the contract operates against is the federal patent premise restated in *Stanford v. Roche*: absent an effective assignment, rights in an invention belong to the person who conceived it [^stanford-baseline-carveout]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-baseline-carveout] The practical consequence is that a Colorado employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or Washington employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. But that breadth is not unlimited. An assignment clause is still an ordinary contract term subject to contract-law defenses — including *Hewett*'s consideration rule — and where it restrains what a person may do after employment, it runs into Colorado's statutory treatment of covenants not to compete [^co-8-2-113-void-carveout]. "any covenant not to compete that restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for performance of labor for any employer is void."[^co-8-2-113-void-carveout] ## Must a Colorado employer notify the employee? {#employee-notice} **Short answer.** Not applicable. Because Colorado has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Colorado enforces instead is contractual: the employer takes title to an employee invention only through a plain and unambiguous contract obligation [^hewett-contract-obligation-notice]. There is nothing to give notice of. A notice requirement exists in California and Washington precisely to alert the employee to a statutory own-time carve-out that limits the assignment; Colorado has enacted no such carve-out, so there is no statutory line for a notice to mark. This is why the entry is marked not applicable rather than a bare no: the question presupposes a statutory carve-out that Colorado does not have. Where Colorado does police an employer's claim to an employee invention, it looks to the contract's terms. *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.* makes the point from the employer's side — even where the employer had acquired shop rights from the employee's use of company time and materials, no title passed without an express contractual obligation [^hewett-contract-obligation-notice]. "Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett."[^hewett-contract-obligation-notice] One nearby statute is worth distinguishing. C.R.S. § 8-2-113(4) does impose a separate, signed notice formality — before a prospective worker accepts the offer, or at least fourteen days ahead for a current worker — but only for covenants not to compete that are otherwise permissible under the statute's exceptions [^co-8-2-113-notice]. "Any covenant not to compete that is otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is void unless notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant not to compete are provided to:"[^co-8-2-113-notice] That is a restrictive-covenant formality, not an invention-assignment notice: it attaches to an ordinary invention-assignment clause only if that clause qualifies as a covenant not to compete, a characterization no Colorado decision found in our review has made. For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Colorado employer neither has to give a § 2872-style invention notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause. ## Who owns an invention by default in Colorado? {#default-ownership} **Short answer.** The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, Colorado follows the common-law rule that an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it, and mere employment does not by itself require assignment to the employer. The exception is the employee whose job duties include inventing or solving the particular problem the invention answers [^scott-inventor-default][^scott-hired-to-invent]. Colorado's modern statement of the default comes from *Scott System, Inc. v. Scott* [^scott-inventor-default]. "Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer."[^scott-inventor-default] The same opinion states the hired-to-invent exception in functional terms — duties, not titles [^scott-hired-to-invent]. "If an employee’s job duties include the responsibility for inventing or for solving a particular problem that requires invention, any invention created by that employee during the performance of those responsibilities belongs to the employer."[^scott-hired-to-invent] The foundational Colorado authority is *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.*, where the Court of Appeals applied both halves of the rule: the employee owned his invention because he was neither hired nor paid to invent and had signed no express assignment [^hewett-not-hired-ownership]. "In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents."[^hewett-not-hired-ownership] *Hewett* also fixes the ceiling on the employer's fallback position. Where the employee used company time, tools, and materials, the employer earns a shop right — a non-exclusive license to use the invention — but a shop right is not title [^hewett-shop-right-ownership]. "Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett."[^hewett-shop-right-ownership] Both decisions come from the Colorado Court of Appeals; no Colorado Supreme Court decision on employee-invention ownership was found in our review. The federal restatement of the framework matches. Under *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]. "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained."[^dubilier-hired-to-invent] And *Stanford v. Roche* anchors the baseline all of this operates against: ownership springs from invention, so an employer's title is derivative of an assignment [^stanford-inventor-default]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-inventor-default] Because ownership starts with the inventor and Colorado has no statute filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) clause that transfers legal title automatically on conception, rather than a future promise to assign, an after-the-fact hired-to-invent argument that turns on what the employee's duties actually were, or a shop right that licenses use but passes no title. ## Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Colorado? {#holdover-clause-limit} **Short answer.** Most likely tested for reasonableness, but the invention-specific application is undecided. No Colorado decision found in our review has addressed a post-employment holdover invention-assignment clause, and none has applied C.R.S. § 8-2-113 to one. What Colorado does have is a well-settled reasonableness rule for covenants not to compete and, for agreements entered into on or after August 10, 2022, a statute that voids such covenants unless the worker is highly compensated and the restraint is no broader than reasonably necessary to protect trade secrets. That combined framework is what a Colorado court would most likely reach for if asked to enforce a clause sweeping in inventions conceived after employment ends [^zeff-reasonableness][^co-8-2-113-hce-holdover]. The common-law baseline is long settled. In *Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington*, the Colorado Supreme Court stated the rule for covenants not to compete [^zeff-reasonableness]. "The rule is well-settled in Colorado that reasonable covenants not to compete will be enforced and that what is reasonable depends upon the facts of each case."[^zeff-reasonableness] *Zeff* predates the 2022 rewrite of § 8-2-113 (HB 22-1317), but the current statute expressly carries that older case law forward [^co-8-2-113-intent-holdover]. "The general assembly intends to preserve existing state and federal case law in effect before August 10, 2022, that: (a) Defines what counts as a covenant not to compete that is prohibited by this section; and (b) Specifies the extent to which a covenant not to compete for the protection of trade secrets must be tailored in scope in order to be enforceable under this section."[^co-8-2-113-intent-holdover] The post-statute formulation makes the same point from the other direction: clearing the statute is necessary but not sufficient. In *National Graphics Co. v. Dilley*, the Court of Appeals held that a covenant that survives § 8-2-113 must still be reasonable [^national-graphics-reasonableness]. "We conclude that even if a non-competition clause is not void under § 8-2-113, C.R.S., to be enforceable it must satisfy the rule of reasonableness as to both duration and geographic scope."[^national-graphics-reasonableness] Since August 10, 2022, the statutory layer does most of the work for anything characterized as a covenant not to compete. The rewritten § 8-2-113 voids such covenants outright, subject to a narrow exception for highly compensated workers whose covenants are tailored to trade secrets [^co-8-2-113-hce-holdover]. "This subsection (2) does not apply to a covenant not to compete governing a person who, at the time the covenant not to compete is entered into and at the time it is enforced, earns an amount of annualized cash compensation equivalent to or greater than the threshold amount for highly compensated workers, if the covenant not to compete is for the protection of trade secrets and is no broader than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets."[^co-8-2-113-hce-holdover] The highly-compensated threshold is year-indexed, not static: it is set annually by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment's PAY CALC order, and for 2026 it stands at $130,014. Because the exception applies only if the worker clears the threshold both when the covenant is signed and when it is enforced, the operative figure depends on both years. One more feature matters for multistate employers — § 8-2-113(6) locks in Colorado law and a Colorado forum for covered workers, overriding contrary choice-of-law clauses [^co-8-2-113-choice-of-law]. "Notwithstanding any contractual provision to the contrary, Colorado law governs the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a worker who, at the time of termination of employment, primarily resided and worked in Colorado."[^co-8-2-113-choice-of-law] Applying this framework to holdover assignments is a prediction, not a holding. The uncertainty comes from missing case law rather than ambiguous doctrine: no Colorado decision found in our review has decided whether a trailing invention-assignment clause is a covenant not to compete under § 8-2-113, and no pre-2022 Colorado decision found in our review addressed holdover clauses under the common-law reasonableness rule either. A clause that captures inventions an ex-employee conceives after leaving restrains what that person can profitably do next, which is why the restraint framework — rather than ordinary ownership law — is the likely testing ground. The safe reading is that an overbroad trailing clause is at meaningful risk in Colorado: if characterized as a covenant not to compete, it is void unless the worker is highly compensated and the clause is tailored to trade secrets, and even a clause that clears the statute must still satisfy the reasonableness rule. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not assume a Colorado employee works like a California or Washington one. There is no invention-assignment statute here, so there is no statutory carve-out to rely on and no notice safe harbor — the employer's claim to an employee invention rises or falls on a plain and unambiguous contract obligation [^hewett-contract-obligation-practice]. Draft with present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) language so title passes automatically, because an invention is generally the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it [^scott-inventor-default-practice]. Keep any trailing or holdover assignment narrow, short, and tied to identifiable trade secrets: no Colorado decision found in our review has applied § 8-2-113 to a holdover invention-assignment clause, but if a court characterizes one as a covenant not to compete, it is void unless the worker meets the year-indexed highly-compensated threshold at signing and at enforcement and the clause is no broader than reasonably necessary to protect trade secrets [^co-8-2-113-hce-holdover] — and even a clause that clears the statute must still satisfy Colorado's rule of reasonableness as to duration and scope [^national-graphics-reasonableness]. [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-07-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Colorado. This article synthesizes Colorado primary law and is not legal advice from a Colorado-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. CC BY 4.0. Cite as Steven Obiajulu, *Employee Invention Assignment in Colorado*, OpenAgreements (last updated July 2, 2026), https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/colorado. [^co-8-2-113-void-carveout]: **Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113** — "any covenant not to compete that restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for performance of labor for any employer is void." *Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2)(a) (2024).* [^stanford-baseline-carveout]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^hewett-express-agreement-carveout]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^hewett-consideration-carveout]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "we find none to bolster Samsonite's contention that continuation of employment, such employment already having been mutually bargained for, is sufficient consideration to support an assignment of invention or patent rights." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^hewett-contract-obligation-notice]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^co-8-2-113-notice]: **Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113** — "Any covenant not to compete that is otherwise permissible under subsection (2) or (3) of this section is void unless notice of the covenant not to compete and the terms of the covenant not to compete are provided to:" *Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(4)(a) (2024).* [^scott-inventor-default]: **Scott System, Inc. v. Scott** — "Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer." *Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).* [^scott-hired-to-invent]: **Scott System, Inc. v. Scott** — "If an employee’s job duties include the responsibility for inventing or for solving a particular problem that requires invention, any invention created by that employee during the performance of those responsibilities belongs to the employer." *Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).* [^hewett-not-hired-ownership]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "In the case at hand Hewett was neither hired nor paid to invent, and he had not signed any express agreement as some of Samsonite's employees were required to do whereby Samsonite would be entitled to a conveyance or assignment of the employees' rights to inventions or patents." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^hewett-shop-right-ownership]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]: **United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.** — "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained." *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).* [^stanford-inventor-default]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^zeff-reasonableness]: **Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington** — "The rule is well-settled in Colorado that reasonable covenants not to compete will be enforced and that what is reasonable depends upon the facts of each case." *Zeff, Farrington & Assocs., Inc. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 508, 449 P.2d 813 (1969).* [^co-8-2-113-hce-holdover]: **Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113** — "This subsection (2) does not apply to a covenant not to compete governing a person who, at the time the covenant not to compete is entered into and at the time it is enforced, earns an amount of annualized cash compensation equivalent to or greater than the threshold amount for highly compensated workers, if the covenant not to compete is for the protection of trade secrets and is no broader than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets." *Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2)(b) (2024).* [^co-8-2-113-intent-holdover]: **Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113** — "The general assembly intends to preserve existing state and federal case law in effect before August 10, 2022, that: (a) Defines what counts as a covenant not to compete that is prohibited by this section; and (b) Specifies the extent to which a covenant not to compete for the protection of trade secrets must be tailored in scope in order to be enforceable under this section." *Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(1) (2024).* [^national-graphics-reasonableness]: **National Graphics Co. v. Dilley** — "We conclude that even if a non-competition clause is not void under § 8-2-113, C.R.S., to be enforceable it must satisfy the rule of reasonableness as to both duration and geographic scope." *Nat'l Graphics Co. v. Dilley, 681 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1984).* [^co-8-2-113-choice-of-law]: **Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113** — "Notwithstanding any contractual provision to the contrary, Colorado law governs the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a worker who, at the time of termination of employment, primarily resided and worked in Colorado." *Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(6) (2024).* [^hewett-contract-obligation-practice]: **Hewett v. Samsonite Corp.** — "Though shop rights have accrued to Samsonite, no title to such invention passed to it by virtue of such rights in the absence of a plain and unambiguous contract obligation by Hewett." *Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).* [^scott-inventor-default-practice]: **Scott System, Inc. v. Scott** — "Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer." *Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775 (Colo. App. 2000).*