Can a Pennsylvania employer require assignment of every invention?
There is no statutory ceiling, but there is a judge-made one of sorts. Pennsylvania has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention the way California or New York law does — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and a strict-construction canon rather than a legislative carve-out. Pennsylvania courts construe agreements to assign inventions strictly against the party seeking the invention, and a contract presumptively grants rights only to inventions that existed when it was made unless the language plainly reaches future inventions. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Because there is no statute on point, the limits come from case law rather than a legislative carve-out. Our review of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes and unconsolidated statutes surfaced no employee-invention-assignment provision. The state trade-secrets act, 12 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301–5308, supplies misappropriation remedies only, and the only recent Pennsylvania restraint statute located in our review — the 2024 act limiting certain health-care practitioner noncompetes — is sector-limited and says nothing about invention assignment. There is no Pennsylvania analogue to California Labor Code § 2870 and no statutory notice regime.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set the construction rule more than a century ago. In White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, it required unmistakable contractual language before an employer could appropriate an employee's invention .
A federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania applied the same instinct to future inventions. Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger — a contract-construction dispute over a sale of inventions, not an employment case — refused to read an agreement as capturing inventions that did not yet exist .
Federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have carried the strict-construction rule forward. In Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., the court, citing White Heat , construed a covenant to assign strictly against the party claiming the inventions and held that both of the covenant's conditions had to exist before it gave that party any rights .
“Jackson’s covenant to assign to Catalyst must be strictly construed against Catalyst.”
The practical consequence is that a Pennsylvania employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or New York employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. But breadth on paper is not breadth in court: general words will not be stretched to capture an invention the agreement does not unmistakably cover, and an aggressive clause remains subject to ordinary contract-law defenses and, if it operates as a post-employment restraint, to the unsettled trailing-clause analysis discussed below.
Sources for this answer
White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the rule that Pennsylvania construes agreements to assign inventions strictly, requiring clear language showing an unmistakable intention that the particular invention is within the intention of the parties.
where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties
See White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).
Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger supports the canon that a contract for the sale of inventions presumptively grants rights only to inventions existing when the contract was made, and reaches future inventions only through language plainly expressive of that purpose.
Presumptively a contract for the sale of inventions grants rights only to those inventions which existed when the contract was made. If the parties intend to contract for future inventions, language plainly expressive of such purpose must appear.
See Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929).
Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. supports the point that federal courts applying Pennsylvania law construe a covenant to assign inventions strictly against the party claiming the inventions, following White Heat.
Jackson’s covenant to assign to Catalyst must be strictly construed against Catalyst.
See Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 106 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1953).
Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. holds that the covenant to assign was subject to two conditions, both of which had to exist before the covenant created rights in the party claiming the inventions.
Jackson’s covenant to assign to Catalyst is subject to two conditions, both of which must exist in order to create rights thereunder in Catalyst: (1) The inventions or improvements must have been made by him during the course of his employment by Catalyst. (2) The inventions must have been made in connection with the business of Catalyst.
See Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 106 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1953).
Must a Pennsylvania employer notify the employee?
Not applicable. Because Pennsylvania has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Pennsylvania enforces instead is contractual: a duty to assign exists only if an express or implied agreement creates it, and the Superior Court has refused to imply one from the employment relationship alone .
There is nothing to give notice of. A notice requirement exists in California and Washington precisely to alert the employee to a statutory own-time carve-out that limits the assignment; Pennsylvania has enacted no such carve-out, so there is no statutory line for a notice to mark. This is why the entry is marked not applicable rather than a bare no: the question presupposes a statutory carve-out that Pennsylvania does not have.
Where Pennsylvania imposes disclosure and assignment duties, they come from the agreement, not a statute. In Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland, the Superior Court examined the engineer's employment relationship and declined to find any obligation to assign that the parties had not actually made .
The employee's protection in Pennsylvania is the construction rule rather than a notice formality. Under White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, the agreement's language must clearly and unmistakably cover the particular invention before the employer can claim it .
For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Pennsylvania employer neither has to give a § 2872-style notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause. The enforceability of the assignment turns on the contract language, read strictly, not on any statutory notice or disclosure formality.
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Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland supports the point that in Pennsylvania a duty to assign an invention arises only from an express or implied agreement — the court refused to imply an agreement to assign from the employment relationship — so assignment obligations are contractual, not statutory, and there is no statutory notice regime.
On these facts, we cannot imply an agreement in appellee’s employment contract to assign his invention to appellant.
See Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 343 Pa. Super. 64, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the point that the employee's protection in Pennsylvania comes from strict construction of the assignment agreement's language rather than from any statutory notice requirement.
where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties
See White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).
Who owns an invention by default in Pennsylvania?
The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, the baseline is that rights in an invention belong to the employee who conceived it; mere employment does not entitle the employer to an assignment. The exceptions are the employee hired to invent — whose resulting invention the employer owns — and the shop right, a nonexclusive license the employer earns when the invention was developed on its time and with its resources. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 3 sources in this group.
The federal premise anchors the default here as everywhere. In Stanford v. Roche, the Supreme Court of the United States treated inventor ownership as the baseline against which any assignment is measured .
The leading modern Pennsylvania synthesis is Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland. A general staff engineer, assigned to design a piece of mill equipment, patented his design and refused to assign it. The Superior Court — applying the rule of United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. that the mere existence of an employer-employee relationship does not of itself entitle the employer to an assignment of the employee's inventions — held that the engineer owned his patent interest and that no agreement to assign could be implied; the employer received only a shop right limited to the project .
The principal exception is the employee hired to invent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the rule in Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot, where an employee engaged specifically to design an oil-dispensing device had to yield the resulting invention to the employer .
The federal formulation is the same. Under Dubilier, an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer . Aetna-Standard restates the exception in modern terms: an employee hired for the purpose of using his inventive ability to solve a specific problem or design a certain device for the employer must assign, because in that case the invention is the precise subject of the employment contract .
An employer that wants to compel an assignment without a clean written clause faces a heavy burden. In University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman — the litigation over a University of Pennsylvania faculty patent policy circulated through handbooks — the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied a demanding standard of proof to equitable actions to compel assignment .
Two orientation points for the practitioner. First, the court levels matter: the Pennsylvania Supreme Court anchors are the older cases (White Heat in 1920 , Quaker State in 1934 ), while Aetna-Standard — the leading modern synthesis — is a Superior Court decision . Second, because ownership starts with the inventor and Pennsylvania has no statute filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (hereby assigns) clause that transfers title automatically on conception, rather than an implied understanding a court will refuse to find or a future promise the employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence.
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Stanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, the baseline against which any assignment clause is measured.
Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.
See Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland, applying the Dubilier rule that mere employment does not entitle the employer to an assignment, holds that a general staff engineer owned his patent interest because no agreement to assign could be implied, with the employer receiving only a shop right.
On these facts, we cannot imply an agreement in appellee’s employment contract to assign his invention to appellant.
See Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 343 Pa. Super. 64, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot supports the hired-to-invent exception in Pennsylvania — an employee hired by contract to make a particular invention or solve a specific problem must yield the resulting invention to the employer.
Where an employee by contract is hired to make a particular invention or solve a specific problem for the employer the property in the inventions of the employee belongs to the employer — the employee has sold in advance the fruit of his talent, skill and knowledge, to his employer, who is equitably entitled to it; in making such inventions or solving such problems the employee is merely doing what he was hired to do
See Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot, 315 Pa. 517, 174 A. 99 (Pa. 1934).
White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, a 1920 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, requires clear language showing an unmistakable intention before an agreement to assign reaches a particular invention.
Prima facie, a wheel intended to be used for grinding purpose is not an invention relating to the manufacture of bricks, stone products or earthenware products, especially when we consider the rule that in cases of this kind where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties: Allison Bros. Co. v. Allison, 144 N. Y. 21 ; Joliet Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 Ill. 649 . Measured by this rule the wording of the contract of 1911 fails to measure up to the required standard.
See White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. holds that an employee hired to make an invention who succeeds during the term of service is bound to assign the resulting patent to the employer.
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, applying Pennsylvania law, states the standard that an employer seeking to compel assignment of an employee's invention in equity must show by clear and convincing proof a valid, binding, unambiguous contract whose conditions were fulfilled.
In an equitable action to compel the assignment of an invention of an employee to the employer, the employer must show by clear and convincing proof that (1) the invention was conceived by the employee while in the employ of the employer; (2) the assignment was governed by a valid, binding, and enforceable contract, unambiguous in its terms so as to warrant specific performance; and (3) all conditions and covenants concerning the assignment agreement were fulfilled.
See University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Pennsylvania?
Unsettled. No Pennsylvania decision — state court or federal court applying Pennsylvania law — found in our review squarely decides whether a trailing clause reaching inventions first conceived after employment ends is enforceable, and there is no statutory temporal cap because there is no invention-assignment statute at all. What Pennsylvania does supply are strong limiting signals: restrictive covenants are disfavored and enforceable only within reasonableness limits, agreements are presumed not to reach future inventions absent plain language, and a covenant added mid-employment needs fresh consideration. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 3 sources in this group.
Two gaps define the Pennsylvania picture. First, there is no statute: nothing caps the duration of a post-employment trailing assignment or otherwise limits what such a clause may reach. Second, our review found no Pennsylvania holding — and no federal decision applying Pennsylvania law — that tests an invention-holdover clause under any framework, so the doctrinal route a court would take is genuinely open. The materials below are the doctrines a Pennsylvania court would most plausibly choose between, not holdings on trailing clauses.
The restraint framework is Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's modern restatement of restrictive-covenant law. If a court treats a trailing assignment as a post-employment restraint, this is the test it would most likely reach for .
The same opinion states the policy backdrop: covenants restraining a former employee are not favored . Hess is an insurance-business noncompete and assignability case, not an invention case, so extending its framework to a holdover assignment is a prediction, not a holding.
The construction canon points the same direction. Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger refused specific performance as to future inventions absent plain language — and it did so quoting an 1887 federal circuit court opinion by Justice Bradley that denounced open-ended claims on an inventor's future output . Monsanto is a contract-construction case between inventors and a buyer of their processes, not an employment-holdover holding, so it limits how such clauses are read rather than deciding whether they are enforceable ; it works together with the strict-construction rule of White Heat .
Consideration is the third limiting signal, and the most concrete. Under Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc., a restrictive covenant signed mid-employment fails without new and valuable consideration — continued at-will employment is not enough, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that boilerplate invoking the state written-obligations statute cannot cure the defect .
Rullex Co., LLC v. Tel-Stream, Inc. sharpens the timing rule: a covenant executed after the first day of employment needs fresh consideration unless its essential terms were agreed at the outset .
Whether those covenant rules even reach a pure invention-assignment clause is itself an open question. In West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser, the Middle District of Pennsylvania distinguished the enforceability requirements for noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants from those applicable to nondisclosure provisions, and it did not decide how invention-assignment clauses are classified . So a court might treat a holdover assignment like a noncompete (triggering Hess reasonableness and Socko consideration ) or like a nondisclosure obligation (escaping those rules) — no Pennsylvania decision found in our review makes that classification.
Out-of-state authority fills part of this gap in practice but none of it in law. Decisions elsewhere testing holdover clauses under a reasonableness rubric apply other states' law; no Pennsylvania state or federal decision adopting such a test for trailing assignment clauses was found in our review, and nonbinding analogy should not be presented as Pennsylvania law. The safe reading is that an aggressive holdover clause faces meaningful risk in Pennsylvania — from strict construction, the disfavored status of post-employment restraints, and the consideration rules — but the controlling standard has not been decided.
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Hess v. Gebhard & Co. states Pennsylvania's restrictive-covenant test — incident to an employment relationship, reasonably necessary for the employer's protection, and reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent — the framework a court would most plausibly apply if it treats a trailing assignment clause as a post-employment restraint.
In Pennsylvania, restrictive covenants are enforceable if they are incident to an employment relationship between the parties; the restrictions imposed by the covenant are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer; and the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent.
See Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 570 Pa. 148, 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002).
Hess v. Gebhard & Co. supports the policy point that restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania and are historically viewed as a trade restraint that prevents a former employee from earning a living.
However, restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania and have been historically viewed as a trade restraint that prevents a former employee from earning a living.
See Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 570 Pa. 148, 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002).
Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, quoting Justice Bradley's opinion in Aspinwall Co. v. Gill, supports the hostility of courts sitting in Pennsylvania toward open-ended assignments of an inventor's future output — the mortgage-on-a-man's-brain objection — while remaining a contract-construction case rather than an employment-holdover holding.
A naked assignment or agreement to assign, in gross, a man’s future labors as an author or inventor — in other words, a mortgage on a man’s brain, to bind all his future products — does not address itself favorably to our consideration.
See Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929) (quoting Aspinwall Co. v. Gill, 32 F. 697 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887) (Bradley, J.)).
Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, construing a contract for the sale of inventions, holds that such a contract presumptively grants rights only to inventions existing when it was made, and reaches future inventions only through language plainly expressive of that purpose.
Presumptively a contract for the sale of inventions grants rights only to those inventions which existed when the contract was made. If the parties intend to contract for future inventions, language plainly expressive of such purpose must appear.
See Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929).
Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA holds that a restrictive covenant entered into mid-employment requires new and valuable consideration — mere continuation of at-will employment is insufficient — and that language invoking the Uniform Written Obligations Act cannot cure the defect.
More specifically, the mere continuation of the employment relationship at the time of entering into the restrictive covenant is insufficient to serve as consideration for the new covenant, despite it being an at-will relationship terminable by either party.
See Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc., 633 Pa. 555, 126 A.3d 1266 (Pa. 2015).
Rullex Co. v. Tel-Stream holds that a restrictive covenant executed after the first day of employment is enforceable without new consideration only if the parties had agreed to its essential provisions as of the beginning of the employment relationship.
From the foregoing it should be evident that, for a restrictive covenant executed after the first day of employment to be enforceable absent new consideration, the parties must have agreed to its essential provisions as of the beginning of the employment relationship.
See Rullex Co., LLC v. Tel-Stream, Inc., 232 A.3d 620 (Pa. 2020).
West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser supports the point that courts applying Pennsylvania law distinguish the enforceability requirements for noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants from those applicable to nondisclosure provisions — leaving open whether the covenant rules (Hess reasonableness, Socko consideration) reach a pure invention-assignment clause.
We recently relied upon Bell Fuel Corporation and the authority cited therein to further distinguish the enforceability requirements for noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants from those applicable to nondisclosure provisions in the employment context.
See West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser, 661 F. Supp. 3d 356 (M.D. Pa. 2023).
White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the drafting point that Pennsylvania construes agreements to assign inventions strictly, so a trailing clause will capture only what its language clearly and unmistakably covers.
where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties
See White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).
Pennsylvania rewards precise drafting and punishes assumptions. Because Pennsylvania construes assignment agreements strictly and will not read them to reach an invention — especially a future invention — that the language does not unmistakably cover, draft the assignment clause to say expressly what it captures, and use present-assignment (hereby assigns) wording rather than a promise a court must be persuaded to enforce . When adding or refreshing an invention-assignment agreement mid-employment, provide new and valuable consideration such as a raise, bonus, or promotion — continued at-will employment is insufficient for a restrictive covenant, and intent-to-be-legally-bound boilerplate will not cure the gap . Keep any trailing or holdover assignment narrow, short, and tied to the employer's trade secrets or confidential information, because no Pennsylvania authority found in our review has decided whether such clauses are enforceable, restraints on former employees are disfavored, and a court could test an aggressive clause under the reasonableness framework for post-employment restraints .
What does federal law require a confidentiality and invention assignment agreement in Pennsylvania to say about whistleblowers and pay?
An employee confidentiality, non-compete, or invention assignment agreement signed or updated now that governs trade secrets or other confidential information must give the Defend Trade Secrets Act whistleblower-immunity notice, and for employees the National Labor Relations Act covers, Section 7 of that Act protects concerted activity, including joining together over pay and working conditions, that a broad confidentiality clause can restrict. The employer may satisfy the notice duty by cross-referencing a qualifying policy document provided to the employee, but an employer that omits the notice may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under the Defend Trade Secrets Act in an action against an employee who was not given notice.
The notice describes a federal immunity: an individual cannot be held liable under federal or state trade-secret law for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to a government official or an attorney solely to report or investigate a suspected violation of law, or in a court filing made under seal. For an agreement signed or updated now, the duty to give that notice reaches any agreement with an employee that governs trade secrets or other confidential information, whatever else the agreement does.
Section 7 gives employees the National Labor Relations Act covers a statutory right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, including joining together to improve pay and working conditions. For employees the Act covers, the Board's work-rule standard adopted in 2023 makes a rule presumptively unlawful if it has a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their Section 7 rights; an employer can rebut that presumption only by showing a legitimate and substantial business interest it cannot serve with a more narrowly tailored rule. The 2023 standard may change, but the Section 7 right it enforces is statutory. State law may add its own requirements for the same clauses.
A form carried over without the immunity notice, or a cross-reference to a reporting policy the employee never received, leaves the confidentiality clause without a valid notice, so the Act's exemplary damages and attorney fees are unavailable against that employee. A Confidential Information definition that sweeps in pay and working conditions with no carve-out exposes the employer to an unfair-labor-practice finding for employees the Act covers.
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An individual is immune from criminal and civil liability under federal and state trade-secret law for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to a government official or an attorney solely to report or investigate a suspected violation of law, or in a court filing made under seal.
An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that— (A) is made— (i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or (B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1).
An employer must give notice of the trade-secret whistleblower immunity in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.
An employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A).
An employer complies with the notice requirement by cross-referencing a policy document, provided to the employee, that sets out the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.
An employer shall be considered to be in compliance with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A) if the employer provides a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(B).
An employer that does not give the required notice may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees in a trade-secret action against an employee who did not receive it.
If an employer does not comply with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A), the employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom notice was not provided.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
Section 7 gives employees the right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, the statutory basis for keeping discussion of pay and working conditions outside confidentiality restrictions.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (NLRA § 7).
The National Labor Relations Board protects the right of private-sector employees, with or without a union, to join together to improve wages, benefits, and working conditions.
Established in 1935, the National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal agency that protects employees from unfair labor practices and protects the right of private sector employees to join together, with or without a union, to improve wages, benefits and working conditions.
See NLRB Office of Public Affairs, news release of Feb. 21, 2023 (agency mission statement).
Under the work-rule standard the Board adopted in 2023, a rule with a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their Section 7 rights is presumptively unlawful unless the employer proves a legitimate and substantial business interest it cannot advance with a more narrowly tailored rule.
Under the new standard adopted in Stericycle, the General Counsel must prove that a challenged rule has a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their rights. If the General Counsel does so, then the rule is presumptively unlawful. However, the employer may rebut the presumption by proving that the rule advances a legitimate and substantial business interest and that the employer is unable to advance that interest with a more narrowly tailored rule.
See Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023); NLRB Office of Public Affairs, Board Adopts New Standard for Assessing Lawfulness of Work Rules (Aug. 2, 2023).