When a New York venue requires additional insured status, what coverage does the venue get under an event organization's general liability policy?
Under a New York additional insured endorsement limited to injury caused, in whole or in part, by the named insured, a venue is covered only for injury the event organization proximately caused, not for injury caused solely by the venue's own negligence. The Court of Appeals settled that reading of the wording in 2017, and the reach of a venue's coverage under other wording depends on the endorsement the policy actually carries.
Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary describes additional insured status as added by an endorsement that amends the policy's Who Is an Insured section, and notes that the policy must either be endorsed or contain a blanket additional insured endorsement. On that description, the question for a venue is whether the policy's existing wording, including any blanket endorsement, grants the status the venue requires; a separate endorsement for each event is not necessarily needed.
Causation wording. In Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, the Court of Appeals held that coverage limited to injury caused, in whole or in part, by the named insured's acts or omissions applies to injury the named insured proximately caused, and it rejected the view that an additional insured may collect for injury caused solely by its own negligence. The court noted that the ISO additional insured form at issue was amended in 2004 to replace the words arising out of with caused, in whole or in part. On our reading, a venue named under that wording would therefore not be covered for an injury caused only by a condition the venue alone was responsible for, such as a defective stair it maintains.
Other wording. The Burlington court tied its holding to the words the parties chose and said that the First Department's analogy to arising out of language did not apply because the policy did not use that phrase. Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary describes an edition of the ISO managers or lessors of premises form (CG 20 11 01 96) that covers the lessor or manager only for liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the part of the premises leased to the named insured. So the scope of a venue's coverage turns on which form is attached, and Burlington does not decide how far arising out of wording reaches.
Written contract wording. In Gilbane Building Co./TDX Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals held that a blanket endorsement covering those with whom the named insured agreed by written contract to add as additional insureds requires a written contract between the named insured and the additional insured. On our reading, if an organization signs its rental agreement with a venue's operator or manager but not with the building owner, an endorsement of that kind may not reach the owner.
Alcohol conditions in venue agreements. A venue agreement can tie alcohol service to additional insured coverage. In Big Apple Circus, Inc. v. Chubb Insurance Group, the First Department described a tent agreement that barred the party host from serving alcohol unless it provided an insurance certificate showing $1 million in coverage for the circus performance naming the circus as an additional insured. The court read the host's one-day endorsement to cover an injury at the party, because its only clear limits excluded injuries arising out of the circus's sole negligence or not arising out of work performed for the host.
Sources for this answer
In Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, the Court of Appeals held that additional insured coverage limited to injury caused, in whole or in part, by the named insured's acts or omissions applies to injury the named insured proximately caused, and that an additional insured may not collect for injury caused solely by its own negligence where the named insured bears no legal fault.
We conclude that where an insurance policy is restricted to liability for any bodily injury “caused, in whole or in part,” by the “acts or omissions” of the named insured, the coverage applies to injury proximately caused by the named insured. The Appellate Division erroneously interpreted this policy language as extending coverage broadly to any injury causally linked to the named insured, and wrongly concluded that an additional insured may collect for an injury caused solely by its own negligence, even where the named insured bears no legal fault for the underlying harm.
See Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 29 N.Y.3d 313 (2017).
In Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, the Court of Appeals declined to apply the First Department's arising-out-of analogy because the policy did not use that phrase, and stated that only the language the parties adopted in the policy matters.
Since the parties did not use the phrase “arising out of,” the First Department’s analogy is inapt. All that matters is the language adopted by the parties to the insurance policy at issue in this appeal.
See Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 29 N.Y.3d 313 (2017).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary states that additional insured status is always added by an endorsement amending the policy's Who Is an Insured section, and that the agent or broker must request the endorsement and the insurer must issue it.
Additional Insured status is always added by endorsement, which amends the Who Is an Insured section to add another person or organization as an Insured. Therefore, an Additional Insured will only have the extent of coverage offered to other Insureds or as defined by the endorsement. It may seem complex, but it really is not. An endorsement must be requested by the agent or broker, and issued by the insurance company to add the person or organization to the policy as an Additional Insured.
See George L. Head, The Additional Insured, Nonprofit Risk Management Center (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary states that a certificate of insurance without an additional insured endorsement does not provide additional insured status, and that the policy must be endorsed or contain a blanket additional insured endorsement.
A Certificate of Insurance without an Additional Insured Endorsement does not provide additional insured status to the requestor — the policy must be endorsed or contain a blanket additional insured endorsement.
See George L. Head, The Additional Insured, Nonprofit Risk Management Center (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
In Burlington Insurance Co. v. NYC Transit Authority, the Court of Appeals noted that the ISO additional insured form required by the contract was amended in 2004 to replace the words arising out of with caused, in whole or in part.
In crafting the additional insured endorsement, NYCTA required that the policy include additional insured coverage using the latest ISO “Form CG 20 10 or equivalent.” In 2004— four years before the parties entered the construction contract and BSI purchased insurance from Burlington — the version of this ISO form was amended to replace the language “arising out of” with “caused, in whole or in part.”
See Burlington Ins. Co. v. NYC Transit Auth., 29 N.Y.3d 313 (2017).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary describes the ISO Additional Insured — Manager or Lessors of Premises form (CG 20 11 01 96) as adding the lessor or manager as an insured only for liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the part of the premises leased to the named insured.
For example, ISO Form “Additional Insured — Manager or Lessors of Premises” (CG 20 11 01 96) adds the lessor or manager as an insured “but only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to you.”
See George L. Head, The Additional Insured, Nonprofit Risk Management Center (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
In Gilbane Building Co./TDX Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals held that the policy terms before it required a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured before coverage extended to the additional insured.
We now affirm, because the terms of the policy at issue here require a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured, if coverage is to be extended to an additional insured.
See Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 31 N.Y.3d 131 (2018).
In Big Apple Circus, Inc. v. Chubb Insurance Group, the First Department described a tent agreement that prohibited the party host from serving alcohol unless it provided an insurance certificate showing $1 million in coverage naming the circus as an additional insured.
Under paragraph 10a, Bloomberg was prohibited from serving alcohol at the party unless it provided “an insurance certificate providing coverage in the sum of 1 Million Dollars ($1 million) indemnity for the Performance naming Big Apple Circus as an additional insured.”
See Big Apple Circus, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Group, 305 A.D.2d 197 (1st Dep't 2003).
In Big Apple Circus, Inc. v. Chubb Insurance Group, the First Department held that the only clear limits on the circus's additional insured coverage excluded injuries arising out of the circus's sole negligence or not arising out of work performed for the host, and that neither limit applied, so it construed the one-day amendment as adding the circus to the host's policy for the party.
The only clear limitations on Circus’s coverage are for injuries arising out of Circus’s sole negligence or not arising out of work performed for Bloomberg, neither of which describes the injury in issue here. Accordingly, like the IAS court, we construe the amendment to mean that Bloomberg deemed it “necessary or desirable” that the Federal policy cover the party, and that, as “required” by the Tent Sale Agreement, it was adding Circus to that policy.
See Big Apple Circus, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Group, 305 A.D.2d 197 (1st Dep't 2003).
What can a New York venue recover if an event organization promises additional insured coverage and does not obtain it?
In New York, a landlord's recovery for its tenant's failure to obtain promised insurance is limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the breach when the landlord had its own insurance covering the risk. The Court of Appeals so held in Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, and on our reading the same measure applies to a venue that rents space to an event organization. A landlord left uninsured without knowledge of the breach may recover the full underlying tort liability and defense costs.
Failing to buy promised coverage. In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., a construction case, the Court of Appeals held that an agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless, so General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 did not void a subcontractor's promise to insure the general contractor. The court held that because the subcontractor breached its agreement to procure liability insurance covering the contractor, it was liable for the resulting damages, including the contractor's liability to the injured plaintiff. Kinney arose under a construction statute, and the Court of Appeals later addressed the measure of damages in a lease case. In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, a tenant took out a liability policy but failed to include coverage for its landlord, and the Court held that the landlord's recovery was limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the breach. Because the landlord had obtained its own insurance, the Court held that it could not recover the full settlement and defense costs in the underlying tort claim from the tenant. By contrast, a landlord that has no knowledge of the failure to obtain insurance and is left uninsured may recover the full underlying tort liability and defense costs. The Court noted that Kinney had not considered whether the promisee's own insurance could reduce the damages. On our reading, an organization that promises a venue additional insured coverage and does not obtain it faces a breach-of-contract claim whose size depends largely on whether the venue had its own coverage for the loss.
Sources for this answer
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division majority that the landlord's recovery should be limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the tenant's breach.
We agree with the majority that the landlord’s recovery should be limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the tenant’s breach.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals stated that a landlord with no knowledge of a tenant's failure to obtain the required insurance that is left uninsured may recover the full underlying tort liability and defense costs, and noted that the landlord before it had procured its own insurance covering the risk.
A landlord who has no knowledge of a tenant’s failure to acquire the requisite insurance and is left uninsured may recover the full amount of the underlying tort liability and defense costs from the tenant (see, Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v Universal Transp. Co., 194 App Div 272, 273 , affd 233 NY 581 ; see generally, 2 Dolan, Rasch’s Landlord and Tenant § 21:11, at 148 [4th ed]). Here, however, the landlord procured its own insurance covering the risk.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., the Court of Appeals held that General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 addresses only agreements to indemnify or hold harmless, and that an agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless.
By its terms, the statute addresses only agreements to indemnify or hold harmless. It makes no reference to agreements to purchase or maintain insurance such as that contained in the subcontract here, and there is no basis for construing the statute’s narrow and unambiguous prohibition to cover such agreements. An agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless, and the distinction between the two is well recognized (see, Roblee v Corning Community Coll., 134 AD2d 803 , lv denied 72 NY2d 803 ; Grant v United States, 271 F2d 651, 655-656 [2d Cir]).
See Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215 (1990).
In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., the Court of Appeals held that a subcontractor that breached its agreement to procure liability insurance covering the general contractor was liable for the resulting damages, including the contractor's liability to the injured plaintiff.
Finally, because Hudson breached its agreement to procure liability insurance covering Cromwell, it is liable for the resulting damages, including Cromwell’s liability to plaintiff (see, Roblee v Corning Community Coll., supra, at 805; 4 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 2269; Robinson v Janay, 105 NJ Super 585, 253 A2d 816, 819 ).
See Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215 (1990).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals described a tenant that took out a liability policy but failed to include coverage for the benefit of its landlord.
Although the tenant took out a policy, it failed to include coverage for the benefit of the landlord.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals held that the landlord, which had obtained its own insurance, could not look to the tenant for the full amount of the settlement and defense costs in the underlying tort claim.
Accordingly, it may not now look to the tenant for the full amount of the settlement and defense costs in the underlying tort claim.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals stated that in Kinney the question whether damages could be reduced by the general contractor's own insurance was not raised or considered.
The question of whether resulting damages could be minimized by any insurance the general contractor had obtained was not raised by the parties or considered by the Court.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
What New York rules apply to a liability insurance policy bought for a single event?
New York Insurance Law § 3426(d)(2) allows a covered commercial policy with a term under one year when it is issued to cover a specific event or particular project that will be performed in less than one year. Section 3426's nonrenewal-notice rules do not apply to such a policy.
Policies for a single event. Insurance Law § 3426 applies to commercial risk insurance, and § 3426(d)(2) bars a covered policy with a term under one year except in listed cases, one of which is a policy issued to cover a specific event or particular project that will be performed in less than one year. Section 3426(e), which sets the nonrenewal and conditional renewal notice rules, does not apply to a policy of that specific-event type. Section 3426 as a whole does not apply to policies written on an excess line basis.
Excess-line placement of event coverage. Under 11 NYCRR 27.3(a), an excess line broker generally may not place a New York insured's risk with an unauthorized insurer unless at least three authorized insurers have declined it. Section 27.3(g) exempts listed coverages from that declination requirement, and the list includes Special Events coverage, described as primary or excess liability coverage for unique exposures of limited duration issued to sponsors, organizers, performers and participants of events such as trade shows, parades, fairs and concerts. The list's liquor entry is narrower: it covers monoline liquor law liability only for taverns and restaurants whose liquor sales exceed 75 percent of total sales revenue. On our reading, a special-event liability policy may therefore be placed with an unauthorized insurer through an excess line broker without the three declinations, while a small organization's liquor coverage does not qualify under the listed tavern-and-restaurant liquor entry. Three declinations generally remain necessary for that coverage unless another exemption applies, such as the exempt-commercial-purchaser rule in § 27.3(h), so the classification and exemption used for the actual placement are a point for the broker to confirm in writing. A policy placed on an excess line basis is outside § 3426, and, if written on a claims-made basis, outside the claims-made regulation's minimum standards, so its cancellation, nonrenewal and tail provisions come from the policy and need careful review. The late-notice protections of Insurance Law § 3420(a)(4) still need to be considered, because the Department of Financial Services applies the § 3420 notice amendments to policies issued in the excess line market.
Occurrence or claims-made. Under 11 NYCRR 73.2(a), directors and officers liability is among the listed coverages that may be written on a claims-made basis, and ordinary premises general liability is not on the list. A liability policy may also be written claims-made if it meets a large-risk test, such as insuring a large commercial insured or carrying at least $5,000,000 of primary coverage per occurrence. On our reading, a small organization's event general liability policy from an authorized insurer will therefore normally be written on an occurrence basis, while its directors and officers policy may be claims-made. That limit binds policies subject to the regulation; an excess-line policy is exempt from it, so whether such a policy is occurrence or claims-made is set by its own terms.
Sources for this answer
Insurance Law § 3426(d)(2) bars issuing a covered policy with a term of less than one year in New York except in listed cases, which include a policy issued to cover a specific event or particular project that will be performed in less than one year.
(2) No covered policy which provides for a policy term of less than one year may be issued, or issued for delivery, in this state, except: (A) a policy issued to an insured for a seasonal purpose; (B) a policy issued to cover a specific event or particular project that will be performed in less than one year; (C) a new policy where the specific term is made to coincide with the term of an insured's already existing policy with the same insurer, with any insurer at the insured's written request or, in the case of an excess liability policy, with different insurers;
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3426(d)(2)(B) (2026).
Insurance Law § 3426(e)(9) excludes policies of the types specified in § 3426(d)(2)(A), (B) and (E) from subsection (e).
(9) This subsection shall not apply to a hyper limits excess liability policy except in regard to nonrenewal or to a policy of the type specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (E) of paragraph two of subsection (d) of this section.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3426(e)(9) (2026).
Insurance Law § 3426(a)(1) defines a covered policy as a policy of commercial risk insurance, professional liability insurance or public entity insurance, including any contract, certificate or other evidence of such insurance.
(1) “Covered policy” means, for purposes of this section, a policy of commercial risk insurance, professional liability insurance or public entity insurance, and shall include any contract, certificate or other evidence of such insurance.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3426(a)(1) (2026).
Insurance Law § 3426(l)(2) provides that § 3426 does not apply to policies written on an excess line basis, among other listed exclusions.
(2) This section shall not apply to policies issued pursuant to a plan established under article fifty-three, fifty-four or fifty-five of this chapter, surety policies, policies providing workers' compensation or employers' liability coverage, financial guaranty insurance, policies providing mortgage guaranty or credit insurance, policies principally marine insurance as defined by paragraph twenty of subsection (a) of section one thousand one hundred thirteen of this chapter, legal services insurance, reinsurance contracts, policies written on an excess line basis, or policies subject to section three thousand four hundred twenty-five of this chapter.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3426(l)(2) (2026).
11 NYCRR 27.3(a) bars an excess line broker, except as Insurance Law § 2118(b)(3)(F) and § 27.3(g) provide, from placing a risk of an insured whose home state is New York with an unauthorized insurer unless at least three authorized insurers have declined it.
(a) Except as provided in section 2118 (b)(3)(F) of the Insurance Law and subdivision (g) of this section, no excess line broker shall place coverage for a risk with any unauthorized insurer, when the insured's home state is this State, unless the risk has been declined by at least three authorized insurers, each of which is authorized in this State to write insurance of the kind requested and is an insurer that the excess line broker has reason to believe might consider writing the type of coverage or class of insurance involved.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 27.3(a) (2026).
11 NYCRR 27.3(g)(1)(i) relieves an excess line broker of the declination requirements of § 27.3(a), (b) and (c) for the placement of the coverages it lists.
(g) Exceptions. (1) (i) Pursuant to the provisions of section 2118 (b)(4) of the Insurance Law, the superintendent has determined that an excess line broker shall not be required to comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of this section with regard to the placement of any of the following coverages: Asbestos, Fungi and Water Damage Remediation and Removal-Liability and Property Damage Amusement Parks and Carnivals Property and/or liability coverage for the owners/operators of amusement parks, theme parks and carnivals.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 27.3(g)(1)(i) (2026).
11 NYCRR 27.3(g)(1)(i) lists Special Events coverage, described as primary or excess liability coverage for unique exposures of limited duration generally issued to sponsors, organizers, performers and participants of trade shows, parades, flea markets, concerts, fairs and similar events.
Special Events Primary or excess liability coverage for unique exposures of limited duration, which require varied and specialized terms, conditions and coverages generally issued to sponsors, organizers, performers and participants of trade shows, parades, flea markets, concerts, fairs and other similar events.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 27.3(g)(1)(i) (2026).
11 NYCRR 27.3(g)(1)(i) lists liquor law liability coverage only as monoline coverage for taverns and restaurants whose liquor sales exceed 75 percent of total sales revenue.
Liquor Law Liability Coverage Monoline liquor law liability coverage for taverns and restaurants only where liquor sales exceed 75 percent of total sales revenue.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 27.3(g)(1)(i) (2026).
11 NYCRR 27.3(h) provides that the declination requirements of § 27.3(a) through (c) do not apply to an excess line broker placing insurance for an exempt commercial purchaser that receives the stated disclosure and then asks in writing for placement with an unauthorized insurer.
(h) Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall not apply to an excess line broker seeking to procure or place insurance in this State for an exempt commercial purchaser if the broker discloses to the exempt commercial purchaser that the insurance may or may not be available from the authorized market that may provide greater protection with more regulatory oversight, and the exempt commercial purchaser has subsequently requested in writing that the licensee procure or place the insurance from an unauthorized insurer.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 27.3(h) (2026).
In Segal Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, the Appellate Division, First Department, stated that policies procured from unauthorized insurers by licensed excess line brokers are exempt from Regulation 121, New York's claims-made regulation in 11 NYCRR Part 73.
Policies procured from unauthorized insurers by licensed excess line brokers are exempt from the provisions of Regulation 121 (11 NYCRR 27.10 [a]; see Matter of John Paterno, Inc. v Curiale, 88 NY2d 328 , 332 n [1996]).
See Segal Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 21 A.D.3d 138 (1st Dep't 2005).
Insurance Law § 3420(a)(4) requires a provision that failure to give notice within the policy's time does not invalidate a claim if timely notice was not reasonably possible and notice was given as soon as reasonably possible afterward.
(4) A provision that failure to give any notice required to be given by such policy within the time prescribed therein shall not invalidate any claim made by the insured, an injured person or any other claimant if it shall be shown not to have been reasonably possible to give such notice within the prescribed time and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably possible thereafter.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(a)(4) (2026).
DFS Circular Letter No. 26 (2008) states that the 2008 notice amendments apply to all liability policies, including renewals and excess line policies, issued or delivered in New York on or after January 17, 2009.
The amendments apply to all liability policies (including renewals) issued or delivered in New York on or after the effective date of January 17, 2009, including policies issued in the excess line market.
See N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Circular Letter No. 26 (Nov. 18, 2008).
11 NYCRR 73.2(a) lists the coverages and risks that may be written on a claims-made basis, and the list includes directors and officers liability but not general premises liability.
(a) The following coverages or risks may be written on a claims-made basis: (1) completed operations liability; (2) directors and officers liability; (3) employee benefits liability; (4) errors and omissions liability; (5) excess liability; (6) fiduciary liability; (7) pollution and environmental impairment liability; (8) public entity liability; (9) products liability; (10) professional liability (including medical malpractice liability); (11) ski resort liability, subject to subdivision (f) of this section; (12) employment practices liability; and (13) risks specified in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 73.2(a) (2026).
11 NYCRR 73.2(d)(1) permits a liability policy to be written on a claims-made basis if it insures a large commercial insured, provides at least $5,000,000 of primary coverage per occurrence, provides qualifying umbrella or excess coverage, or carries a deductible or self-insured retention of at least $100,000 per occurrence.
(1) A liability policy may be issued or renewed in this State on a claims-made basis if the policy: (i) insures a large commercial insured; (ii) provides primary coverage of at least $5,000,000 per occurrence; (iii) provides umbrella or excess coverage of at least $1,000,000 per occurrence, where the underlying limits are at least $2,000,000 per occurrence; or (iv) is written with a deductible, or over a self-insured retention, of at least $100,000 per occurrence.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 73.2(d)(1) (2026).
What does a certificate of insurance prove to a New York venue or parent organization about an event organization's coverage?
Under New York Insurance Law § 502(c), a certificate of insurance cannot amend, extend or alter the policy or give a venue or parent organization any rights beyond those the policy expressly provides. Section 501(a) defines a certificate as evidence of coverage and excludes the policy itself from that definition.
The statute. Insurance Law § 501(a) defines a certificate as a document prepared or issued by an insurer or insurance producer as evidence of property/casualty coverage, and excludes a policy or a binder from the definition. Section 502(c) provides that a certificate cannot amend, extend or alter the coverage of the policy it references, and cannot confer on any person rights beyond those the policy expressly provides. According to the Department of Financial Services, Article 5 was added to the Insurance Law by Chapter 552 of the Laws of 2014 and Chapter 8 of the Laws of 2015.
Wording a venue may not demand. Section 502(b) bars any person or governmental entity from wilfully requiring a certificate to include terms, conditions or language that the referenced policy does not expressly include, while still allowing a request for clarification of the policy's terms or endorsements. So a venue or parent organization may ask what the policy and its endorsements say, but it may not insist that the certificate state coverage the policy lacks.
What the courts hold. In Tribeca Broadway Associates, LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., the First Department held that the certificate before it did not confer coverage, describing a certificate as only evidence of a carrier's intent to provide coverage. In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Sirius America Insurance Co., the Fourth Department stated that a certificate, by itself, does not confer coverage, particularly one that says it is issued for information only and does not amend, extend or alter the policy.
Estoppel. Sevenson also recognized that an insurer that issues a certificate naming a party as an additional insured may be estopped from denying coverage to that party if the party reasonably relied on the certificate to its detriment. For estoppel to apply, the certificate must have been issued by the insurer itself or by the insurer's agent. In Tribeca, the court declined to estop the carrier because the broker that issued the certificate had no authority to bind it and did not act as its agent. In County of Erie v. Gateway-Longview, Inc., the Fourth Department found an issue of fact on estoppel because the insurer offered no evidence on the holder's reliance or on who issued the certificate.
Certificates and estoppel. In our review we found no New York appellate decision reconciling § 502(c)'s bar on a certificate conferring rights beyond the policy with the certificate-estoppel cases, so the conservative course for a venue or parent organization is to rely on an additional insured endorsement rather than on a certificate.
Practice guidance. Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary reads that a certificate without an additional insured endorsement does not provide additional insured status, and recommends asking for a copy of the additional insured endorsement when requesting that status.
Sources for this answer
Insurance Law § 502(c) provides that a certificate of insurance shall not amend, extend or alter the coverage of the policy it references and shall not confer on any person rights beyond those expressly provided by that policy.
(c) A certificate of insurance shall not amend, extend, or alter the coverage provided by the insurance policy to which the certificate of insurance makes reference. A certificate of insurance shall further not confer to any person any rights beyond those expressly provided by the policy of insurance referenced therein.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 502(c) (2026).
Insurance Law § 501(a) defines a certificate of insurance as any document prepared or issued by an insurer or insurance producer as evidence of property/casualty insurance coverage, and excludes a policy of insurance or an insurance binder from that definition.
(a) “Certificate” or “certificate of insurance” means any document or instrument, or addendum thereto no matter how titled or described, prepared or issued by an insurer or insurance producer as evidence of property/casualty insurance coverage. “Certificate” or “certificate of insurance” shall not include a policy of insurance or an insurance binder.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 501(a) (2026).
The Department of Financial Services states that Chapter 552 of the Laws of 2014 and Chapter 8 of the Laws of 2015 added Article 5, Certificates of Insurance, to the Insurance Law.
Chapter 552 of the Laws of 2014 and Chapter 8 of the Laws of 2015 amended the Insurance Law by adding a new Article 5 entitled “Certificates of Insurance.”
See N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Certificates of Insurance (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
Insurance Law § 502(b) bars any person or governmental entity from wilfully requiring a certificate of insurance to include terms, conditions or language that the referenced policy does not expressly include, but does not bar requesting clarification of the policy's terms or endorsements.
(b) No person or governmental entity shall wilfully require the inclusion of terms, conditions or language of any kind, including warranties or guarantees, that the insurance policy provides coverage or otherwise sets forth terms and conditions in a certificate of insurance, if the insurance policy referenced by such certificate of insurance does not expressly include such terms, conditions, or language. This subsection shall not prohibit any person or governmental entity from including minimum insurance requirements, coverage limits, terms, or other conditions in the solicitation of bids as part of a competitive process, and it shall not prohibit any person or governmental entity from requesting, or an insurer or insurance producer from responding to such a request with, clarification regarding the terms of the policy, or endorsement thereto.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 502(b) (2026).
In Tribeca Broadway Associates, LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., the First Department held that the certificate of insurance before it did not confer coverage, because a certificate is only evidence of a carrier's intent to provide coverage and not a contract to insure the designated party.
Nor does the certificate of insurance in this case confer coverage. A certificate of insurance is only evidence of a carrier’s intent to provide coverage but is not a contract to insure the designated party nor is it conclusive proof, standing alone, that such a contract exists (Buccini v 1568 Broadway Assoc., 250 AD2d 466 [1998]).
See Tribeca Broadway Assocs., LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 5 A.D.3d 198 (1st Dep't 2004).
In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Sirius America Insurance Co., the Fourth Department stated that a certificate of insurance, by itself, does not confer coverage, particularly where the certificate says it is issued for information only and does not amend, extend or alter the coverage of the listed policies.
It is well established that a certificate of insurance, by itself, does not confer insurance coverage, particularly under the circumstances of this case, in which the certificate expressly provides that it “is issued as a matter of information only and confers no rights upon the certificate holder [and] does not amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by the policies listed below,” e.g., the general liability policy.
See Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.3d 1751 (4th Dep't 2010).
In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Sirius America Insurance Co., the Fourth Department recognized that an insurer that issues a certificate naming a party as an additional insured may be estopped from denying coverage to that party where the party reasonably relies on the certificate to its detriment.
Nevertheless, an insurance company that issues a certificate of insurance naming a particular party as an additional insured may be estopped from denying coverage to that party where the party reasonably relies on the certificate of insurance to its detriment (see Lenox Realty v Excelsior Ins. Co., 255 AD2d 644, 645-646 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 807 [1999]; Bucon, Inc. v Pennsylvania Mfg. Assn. Ins. Co., 151 AD2d 207, 210-211 [1989]).
See Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.3d 1751 (4th Dep't 2010).
In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Sirius America Insurance Co., the Fourth Department held that certificate-based estoppel applies only if the certificate was issued by the insurer itself or by an agent of the insurer.
For estoppel based upon the issuance of a certificate of insurance to apply, however, the certificate must have been issued by the insurer itself or by an agent of the insurer (see Tribeca Broadway Assoc., 5 AD3d at 200 ; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Skibeck Pipeline Co., 270 AD2d 867, 869 [2000]; Lenox Realty, 255 AD2d at 646 ; see also American Ref-Fuel Co. of Hempstead v Resource Recycling, 248 AD2d 420, 423-424 [1998]).
See Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.3d 1751 (4th Dep't 2010).
In Tribeca Broadway Associates, LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., the First Department declined to estop the carrier from denying coverage because the insured's broker had no authority to bind the carrier and did not act as its agent.
Nor does it appear in this case that GDM’s broker had the authority to bind the carrier, for which it did not act as agent, so that we would not on that basis estop the carrier from denying the existence of coverage (compare Bucon, Inc. v Pennsylvania Mfg. Assn. Ins. Co., 151 AD2d 207 [1989]).
See Tribeca Broadway Assocs., LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 5 A.D.3d 198 (1st Dep't 2004).
In County of Erie v. Gateway-Longview, Inc., the Fourth Department held that an issue of fact existed whether the insurer was estopped from denying additional insured coverage, because the insurer presented no evidence on the holder's reliance on the certificate or that neither it nor an authorized agent issued the certificate.
Here, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether defendant is estopped from denying additional insured coverage to plaintiff. In its moving papers, defendant did not present any evidence addressing plaintiff's reliance on the certificate of insurance or establishing that “neither it nor an authorized agent issued the certificate[] of insurance” ( id .; cf. Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v Sirius Am. Ins. Co. , 74 AD3d 1751, 1753 [4th Dept 2010]).
See County of Erie v. Gateway-Longview, Inc., 193 A.D.3d 1336 (4th Dep't 2021).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center commentary states that a certificate of insurance without an additional insured endorsement does not provide additional insured status, and recommends asking for a copy of the additional insured endorsement.
A Certificate of Insurance without an Additional Insured Endorsement does not provide additional insured status to the requestor — the policy must be endorsed or contain a blanket additional insured endorsement. When requesting additional insured status always ask for a copy of the additional insured endorsement.
See George L. Head, The Additional Insured, Nonprofit Risk Management Center (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
Are the indemnity and insurance clauses in a New York venue rental agreement enforceable against a small event organization?
Under New York General Obligations Law § 5-321, a venue's clause relieving it of liability for its own negligence is void if the rental is a lease, but the statute does not reach a license. The Second Department has held that § 5-321 does not apply to a license. The Court of Appeals has held that § 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity where a lessor and lessee use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties. Even an enforceable clause covers the venue's own negligence only where the contract shows an unmistakable intent to indemnify for it.
The statute. General Obligations Law § 5-321 makes void and wholly unenforceable any agreement in or collateral to a lease of real property that exempts the lessor from liability for injuries caused by its negligence in operating or maintaining the premises.
Licenses. In Karp v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., the Second Department held § 5-321 inapplicable because the agreement was a license, not a lease, and the licensee lacked exclusive control and dominion over a defined space. In Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High School, the same court held that a youth baseball organization's field-use agreement with a school was a license, so § 5-321 did not apply, and it held that the school was entitled to judgment on its contractual indemnification claim against the organization after finding that the injury, which occurred on a field the organization had permission to use, triggered the indemnification clause. The inapplicability of § 5-321 to a license does not make every license clause enforceable; whether the clause reaches the injury is a separate question of its wording.
Leases backed by insurance. In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior Construction Corp., the Court of Appeals held that § 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity where a lessor and lessee freely agree to use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties. Earlier, in Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., the Court of Appeals held that § 5-321 did not bar a lessor's contractual indemnity claim against its tenant, reasoning that the parties were allocating the risk of liability to third parties between themselves through insurance. Great Northern stressed that the case involved a commercial lease negotiated between two sophisticated parties. In our review we found no New York appellate decision applying that reasoning to a small organization signing a venue's standard form, so the conservative course is to assume the clause will be enforced and to carry insurance that covers the promised indemnity. The Court of Appeals left open whether a landlord may seek indemnification beyond the tenant's insurance limits, so limits that match the venue's exposure matter.
Insurance clauses are not indemnity clauses. In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., the Court of Appeals held that an agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless, in reading General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 as addressing only indemnity and hold-harmless agreements. That holding applies to a venue rental only by analogy, because Kinney construed § 5-322.1 rather than § 5-321, but Kinney relied on the lease decision in Hogeland , which supports the analogy.
Strict reading of indemnity clauses. Even where a clause is enforceable, New York courts read it to cover the venue's own negligence only where the contract shows an unmistakable intent to indemnify for that negligence.
Lease or license. Whether a particular event rental is a license or a lease depends on its terms; in Karp the deciding facts were that the licensee lacked exclusive control and dominion over a defined space. On our reading, a short rental of shared space at set times looks like the license in Siegel, while a longer rental giving the organization exclusive control of a defined hall could be argued to be a lease, so the conservative course for such a rental is to treat § 5-321 as potentially applicable.
Sources for this answer
General Obligations Law § 5-321 makes void and wholly unenforceable any agreement in or collateral to a lease of real property that exempts the lessor from liability for injuries to person or property caused by the negligence of the lessor or its agents in operating or maintaining the premises.
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-321 (2026).
In Karp v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., the Second Department held General Obligations Law § 5-321 inapplicable because the agreement was a license rather than a lease, the licensee lacking exclusive control and dominion over a defined space.
Contrary to Flowerama’s contention, General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable because the agreement between it and Federated was not a lease, but was, as it was called, a license agreement. Pursuant to the agreement’s terms, Flowerama did not have exclusive control and dominion over a defined space.
See Karp v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 301 A.D.2d 574 (2d Dep't 2003).
In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior Construction Corp., the Court of Appeals held that General Obligations Law § 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity where a lessor and lessee freely enter into an indemnification agreement using insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties between themselves.
Where, as here, a lessor and lessee freely enter into an indemnification agreement whereby they use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties between themselves, General Obligations Law § 5-321 does not prohibit indemnity.
See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Interior Constr. Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412 (2006).
In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior Construction Corp., the Court of Appeals stated that courts construe a contract to indemnify a party for its own negligence only where the contractual language evinces an unmistakable intent to do so.
Courts will construe a contract to provide indemnity to a party for its own negligence only where the contractual language evinces an “unmistakable intent” to indemnify (see Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205, 212 [1971]).
See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Interior Constr. Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412 (2006).
In Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High School, the Second Department held that the field-use agreement before it was a license and not a lease, so General Obligations Law § 5-321 did not apply.
The agreement constitutes a license and not a lease, and, therefore, General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable (see Karp v Federated Dept. Stores, 301 AD2d 574, 575 [2003]).
See Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High Sch., 153 A.D.3d 572 (2d Dep't 2017).
In Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High School, the Second Department held that the trial court erred in dismissing the school's contractual indemnification claim against the youth baseball organization and that the school established its entitlement to judgment on that claim.
The Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the motion of the Generals which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification against it and denying, as academic, that branch of the motion of the school defendants which was for summary judgment on that third-party cause of action. The school defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on that cause of action.
See Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High Sch., 153 A.D.3d 572 (2d Dep't 2017).
In Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High School, the Second Department held that the school established that the plaintiff's injury, which occurred on the boys' baseball field the youth organization had permission to use, triggered the indemnification clause of its agreement with the organization.
As such, the school defendants established that the plaintiff’s injury, which occurred on the warning track area of the boys’ baseball field during practice, triggered the indemnification clause of the agreement with the Generals (see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d at 494 ; see also Ezzard v One E. Riv. Place Realty Co., LLC, 137 AD3d 648, 649 [2016]).
See Siegel v. Albertus Magnus High Sch., 153 A.D.3d 572 (2d Dep't 2017).
In Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., the Court of Appeals held that General Obligations Law § 5-321 did not bar the lessor, Berenson, from recovering on its contractual indemnity claim against its tenant.
Nor does section 5-321 of the General Obligations Law interdict Berenson’s right to recover.
See Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153 (1977).
In Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., the Court of Appeals reasoned that the lease parties were allocating the risk of liability to third parties between themselves through insurance.
Rather, the parties are allocating the risk of liability to third parties between themselves, essentially through the employment of insurance.
See Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153 (1977).
In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior Construction Corp., the Court of Appeals described the case as involving a commercial lease negotiated between two sophisticated parties with a broad indemnification provision coupled with an insurance procurement requirement.
As in Hogeland , this case presents a commercial lease negotiated between two sophisticated parties who included a broad indemnification provision, coupled with an insurance procurement requirement.
See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Interior Constr. Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412 (2006).
In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Interior Construction Corp., the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether a landlord may seek indemnification in excess of the tenant's insurance limits.
The question of whether a landlord may seek indemnification in excess of insurance limits is therefore not before us and we do not reach it.
See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Interior Constr. Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412 (2006).
In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., the Court of Appeals held that General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 addresses only agreements to indemnify or hold harmless, and that an agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless.
By its terms, the statute addresses only agreements to indemnify or hold harmless. It makes no reference to agreements to purchase or maintain insurance such as that contained in the subcontract here, and there is no basis for construing the statute’s narrow and unambiguous prohibition to cover such agreements. An agreement to procure insurance is not an agreement to indemnify or hold harmless, and the distinction between the two is well recognized (see, Roblee v Corning Community Coll., 134 AD2d 803 , lv denied 72 NY2d 803 ; Grant v United States, 271 F2d 651, 655-656 [2d Cir]).
See Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215 (1990).
In Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., the Court of Appeals described its earlier Hogeland decision as holding that a commercial tenant's agreement to maintain liability insurance for its landlord did not violate General Obligations Law § 5-321.
We have previously upheld similar agreements against challenges that they violate other sections of the General Obligations Law which, like section 5-322.1, prohibit agreements intended to free certain promisees from liability for their own negligence (see, e.g., Board of Educ. v Valden Assocs., 46 NY2d 653, 657 [building owner’s agreement to obtain liability coverage for contractor and subcontractors not violative of General Obligations Law § 5-323]; Hogeland v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 NY2d 153, 160 [commercial tenant’s agreement to maintain liability insurance for landlord not violative of General Obligations Law § 5-321]).
See Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215 (1990).
What should a New York organization confirm in writing with its insurance broker about event liability and alcohol coverage?
Under New York Insurance Law § 502(c), a certificate of insurance confers no rights beyond the policy it references, so written confirmation of event coverage should come from the policy and its endorsements. That confirmation should show whether the general liability policy is written on an occurrence basis, whether it covers alcohol served free or sold, and which venues are added as additional insureds by endorsement, a list that is our synthesis of the questions in the table below.
Guidance from the Nonprofit Risk Management Center states that a certificate without an additional insured endorsement does not make the requester an additional insured, and recommends asking for a copy of the endorsement.
Questions that decide event coverage. The table pairs each question with the rule or source that makes it matter.
| Question for the broker | Why it matters under New York law or the policy |
|---|---|
| 1. Is the event general liability policy occurrence-based or claims-made, and was it placed on an excess line basis? | Ordinary premises general liability is not independently listed among the coverages eligible for claims-made writing, but § 73.2 permits claims-made policies for specified risks, including qualifying large risks. Policies procured from unauthorized insurers through licensed excess line brokers are exempt from Part 73. An occurrence policy covers liability arising from incidents during the policy period even if the claim comes later. |
| 2. Does the general liability policy include host liquor liability for alcohol served free? | General Obligations Law § 11-100 creates liability for knowingly and unlawfully furnishing alcohol to a person known or reasonably believed to be under 21 whose resulting intoxication or impairment causes injury. Commentary from IRMI states that host liquor exposures are insurable under standard general liability policies. |
| 3. If the organization sells drinks or tickets that include alcohol, which policy covers the alcohol exposure, whether an existing policy, an endorsement or a separate liquor liability policy? | General Obligations Law § 11-101 creates liability for resulting injuries where an unlawful commercial sale of alcohol caused or contributed to the recipient's intoxication. An insurer's guidance states that host liquor coverage does not reach alcohol that is sold. |
| 4. Are the venue and the parent organization added as additional insureds by endorsement, and does each have the written contract the endorsement requires? | A certificate confers no rights beyond the policy. The Court of Appeals enforced an endorsement that required a written contract between the named insured and the additional insured. |
| 5. Does a caterer that serves alcohol carry liquor liability coverage, and will the organization receive the caterer's additional insured endorsement, its limits and its material exclusions, including any assault and battery exclusion? | Guidance from the Nonprofit Risk Management Center states that most risks can be transferred to a caterer through the proper additional insured endorsement from the caterer's insurer. The Second Department upheld an insurer's disclaimer under assault and battery exclusions in a nightclub's general liability and liquor liability policies. |
| 6. Has the insurer been told about the events the organization runs? | Venable's D&O commentary warns that undisclosed activities may affect coverage; applying that warning to event liability insurance is our inference. |
Sources for this answer
11 NYCRR 73.2 bars claims-made coverage except as the section allows, and the coverages § 73.2(a) lists as eligible for claims-made writing do not include ordinary general liability.
Claims-made coverage any not be provided in any policy issued or renewed in this State, except that: (a) The following coverages or risks may be written on a claims-made basis: (1) completed operations liability; (2) directors and officers liability; (3) employee benefits liability; (4) errors and omissions liability; (5) excess liability; (6) fiduciary liability; (7) pollution and environmental impairment liability; (8) public entity liability; (9) products liability; (10) professional liability (including medical malpractice liability); (11) ski resort liability, subject to subdivision (f) of this section; (12) employment practices liability; and (13) risks specified in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 73.2 (2026).
Guidance from the Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, an insurer, states that a standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability for events where alcohol is free to guests, but not where alcohol is sold.
A standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability, which covers events where alcohol is provided free to guests, but not situations where alcohol is sold.
See Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, Liquor Liability 101: How to Serve Alcohol at Your Nonprofit Events (Dec. 21, 2017).
In Gilbane Building Co./TDX Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals held that the policy before it required a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured for coverage to extend to the additional insured.
We now affirm, because the terms of the policy at issue here require a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured, if coverage is to be extended to an additional insured.
See Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 31 N.Y.3d 131 (2018).
Insurance Law § 502(c) provides that a certificate of insurance does not amend, extend or alter the coverage of the referenced policy and confers no rights beyond those the policy expressly provides.
(c) A certificate of insurance shall not amend, extend, or alter the coverage provided by the insurance policy to which the certificate of insurance makes reference. A certificate of insurance shall further not confer to any person any rights beyond those expressly provided by the policy of insurance referenced therein.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 502(c) (2026).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center guidance by George L. Head states that a certificate of insurance without an additional insured endorsement does not give the requester additional insured status, and recommends always asking for a copy of the endorsement.
A Certificate of Insurance without an Additional Insured Endorsement does not provide additional insured status to the requestor — the policy must be endorsed or contain a blanket additional insured endorsement. When requesting additional insured status always ask for a copy of the additional insured endorsement.
See George L. Head, The Additional Insured, Nonprofit Risk Management Center (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
11 NYCRR 73.1(j) defines an occurrence policy as one covering liability arising out of incidents, acts or omissions during the policy period, where a claim may be made during or after the policy period.
(j) Occurrence policy means an insurance policy that covers liability for injury or damage that the insured is legally obligated to pay arising out of incidents, acts or omissions that occurred during the policy period, and where a claim may be made during or subsequent to the policy period.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 73.1(j) (2026).
General Obligations Law § 11-100(1) gives a person injured by reason of the intoxication of a person under 21 a right of action for actual damages against anyone who knowingly caused the intoxication by unlawfully furnishing or assisting in procuring alcohol with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the person was under 21.
1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, by reason of the intoxication or impairment of ability of any person under the age of twenty-one years, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action to recover actual damages against any person who knowingly causes such intoxication or impairment of ability by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such person was under the age of twenty-one years.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-100(1) (2026).
The IRMI insurance glossary defines host liquor liability as liability for bodily injury or property damage arising from serving or distributing alcohol by a party not in that business, and states that host liquor exposures are insurable under standard general liability policies.
Host liquor liability is the liability for bodily injury (BI) or property damage (PD) arising out of the serving or distribution of alcoholic beverages by a party not engaged in this activity as a business enterprise. Host liquor liability exposures are insurable under standard general liability policies.
See IRMI, Host Liquor Liability, Insurance Glossary (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).
General Obligations Law § 11-101(1) gives a person injured by an intoxicated person a right of action, including for actual and exemplary damages, against anyone who caused or contributed to the intoxication by unlawfully selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for that person.
1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101(1) (2026).
In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals adopted the lower courts' consistent interpretation that the Dram Shop Act requires a commercial sale of alcohol.
We find no basis for departing from the consistent interpretation of lower courts that the Dram Shop Act requires a commercial sale of alcohol.
See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).
Nonprofit Risk Management Center guidance states that, when a caterer is used, most of the risks can be transferred to the caterer once the organization has obtained the proper additional insured endorsement from the caterer's insurer.
If using a caterer, most of the risks can be transferred to that company when you have obtained the proper additional insured endorsement from the company’s carrier.
See Nonprofit Risk Management Center, Serving Alcohol at Special Events (sidebar), Community Risk Management & Insurance (Jan. 2004).
In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the Second Department described a nightclub operator that sought coverage under a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy, and an insurer that disclaimed under an assault and battery exclusion in each policy.
Hipps, in turn, sought coverage from its insurer, Sphere Drake, pursuant to a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy. Sphere Drake disclaimed coverage under an assault and battery exclusion in each policy and commenced this declaratory judgment action.
See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).
In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the Second Department held that the insurer properly and timely disclaimed coverage under policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.
We grant such relief on the ground that Sphere Drake properly and timely disclaimed coverage pursuant to policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.
See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).
Venable LLP commentary states that an insurer that priced D&O coverage without knowing of a nonprofit's other activities may be able to avoid its coverage obligations, a problem that can arise when a nonprofit starts a new activity without advising its insurers.
If an insurer prices its D&O coverage based on an understanding that a nonprofit engages in certain activities, but would have issued a materially different policy had it known that the nonprofit engages in other activities, it may be able to avoid its coverage obligations. Such unintentional misrepresentations can occur when, during a policy period, a nonprofit enters a new line of activity without advising its insurance companies.
See Venable LLP, You're Not Covered for Everything: Making Sure that Your Nonprofit's Directors & Officers Insurance Coverage Matches Your Expectations (Oct. 16, 2012).
11 NYCRR 73.2(d)(1) permits a liability policy to be written on a claims-made basis if it insures a large commercial insured, provides at least $5,000,000 of primary coverage per occurrence, provides qualifying umbrella or excess coverage, or carries a deductible or self-insured retention of at least $100,000 per occurrence.
(1) A liability policy may be issued or renewed in this State on a claims-made basis if the policy: (i) insures a large commercial insured; (ii) provides primary coverage of at least $5,000,000 per occurrence; (iii) provides umbrella or excess coverage of at least $1,000,000 per occurrence, where the underlying limits are at least $2,000,000 per occurrence; or (iv) is written with a deductible, or over a self-insured retention, of at least $100,000 per occurrence.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 73.2(d)(1) (2026).
In Segal Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, the Appellate Division, First Department, stated that policies procured from unauthorized insurers by licensed excess line brokers are exempt from Regulation 121, New York's claims-made regulation in 11 NYCRR Part 73.
Policies procured from unauthorized insurers by licensed excess line brokers are exempt from the provisions of Regulation 121 (11 NYCRR 27.10 [a]; see Matter of John Paterno, Inc. v Curiale, 88 NY2d 328 , 332 n [1996]).
See Segal Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 21 A.D.3d 138 (1st Dep't 2005).
What written confirmation of insurance should a New York organization hold before an event at a rented venue?
Under New York Insurance Law § 502(c), a certificate of insurance confers no rights beyond those the policy expressly provides, so the event file for a rented venue should contain the endorsement or blanket endorsement granting the venue additional insured status. The file should also contain any written contract that the endorsement wording requires.
The event file for a rented venue can contain the following records.
| Record | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| 1. The event general liability policy, with written confirmation of alcohol coverage for the organization's actual activities, whether supplied by an existing policy, an endorsement or a separate liquor liability policy | An insurer's guidance states that host liquor coverage under a standard general liability policy does not reach alcohol that is sold. |
| 2. For each venue that requires it, the additional insured endorsement or blanket endorsement and the written contract the endorsement requires | The Court of Appeals enforced an endorsement that required a written contract between the named insured and the additional insured. |
| 3. The signed venue agreement, reviewed for its indemnity clause, its insurance-procurement terms and whether it grants a lease or a license, together with proof that any promised additional insured coverage was obtained | General Obligations Law § 5-321 voids lease clauses exempting a lessor from its own negligence. In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals limited the landlord's recovery for the tenant's failure to obtain promised insurance to out-of-pocket damages caused by the breach; the landlord had obtained its own insurance covering the risk. |
| 4. An incident log, and copies of written notice to every insurer whose policy may respond, with proof of delivery | Commentary from the law firm Venable recommends that communications with insurers be in writing, with a copy kept and delivery confirmed. |
Sources for this answer
Insurance Law § 502(c) provides that a certificate of insurance does not amend, extend or alter the coverage of the referenced policy and confers no rights beyond those the policy expressly provides.
(c) A certificate of insurance shall not amend, extend, or alter the coverage provided by the insurance policy to which the certificate of insurance makes reference. A certificate of insurance shall further not confer to any person any rights beyond those expressly provided by the policy of insurance referenced therein.
See N.Y. Ins. Law § 502(c) (2026).
In Gilbane Building Co./TDX Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals held that the policy before it required a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured for coverage to extend to the additional insured.
We now affirm, because the terms of the policy at issue here require a written contract between the named insured and an additional insured, if coverage is to be extended to an additional insured.
See Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 31 N.Y.3d 131 (2018).
Guidance from the Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, an insurer, states that a standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability for events where alcohol is free to guests, but not where alcohol is sold.
A standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability, which covers events where alcohol is provided free to guests, but not situations where alcohol is sold.
See Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, Liquor Liability 101: How to Serve Alcohol at Your Nonprofit Events (Dec. 21, 2017).
General Obligations Law § 5-321 makes void and wholly unenforceable any agreement in or collateral to a lease of real property that exempts the lessor from liability for injuries to person or property caused by the negligence of the lessor or its agents in operating or maintaining the premises.
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-321 (2026).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division majority that the landlord's recovery should be limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the tenant's breach.
We agree with the majority that the landlord’s recovery should be limited to out-of-pocket damages caused by the tenant’s breach.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Avenue Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals described the landlord as having procured its own insurance covering the risk.
Here, however, the landlord procured its own insurance covering the risk.
See Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P'ship, 96 N.Y.2d 111 (2001).
Venable LLP commentary recommends that a nonprofit, even when a broker reports a claim or other significant development to an insurer, insist that the communication be in writing, receive a copy and confirm the message was delivered.
A nonprofit’s emphasis nonetheless should be on delegation, not abdication. Even if a broker will report a claim or other significant development to an insurer, the nonprofit should insist that the communication be in writing, receive a copy, and follow up to make sure that the message was delivered.
See Venable LLP, You're Not Covered for Everything: Making Sure that Your Nonprofit's Directors & Officers Insurance Coverage Matches Your Expectations (Oct. 16, 2012).