Liquor Liability and Alcohol Permits for Events in New York

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 100(1) bars any person from selling an alcoholic beverage at wholesale or retail in New York without the appropriate license.

No person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage within the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor required by this chapter.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 100(1) (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that selling alcohol requires a license or permit and that any payment the customer must make to obtain the drink makes it a sale.

If a person wants to sell alcoholic beverages, the ABC Law requires the person to have the appropriate license or permit. If the customer must pay anything to obtain the alcoholic beverage, that is a sale.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 3(28) defines a sale as any transfer, exchange or barter, in any manner or by any means, for a consideration.

“Sale” means any transfer, exchange or barter in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration, and includes and means all sales made by any person, whether principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee of any alcoholic beverage and/or a warehouse receipt pertaining thereto.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(28) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 3(22) defines a person to include an individual, a copartnership, corporations, a society and a limited liability company.

“Person” includes an individual, copartnership, corporations, society, joint stock company, alcoholic beverage officer appointed by a club or a luncheon club or limited liability company.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(22) (2026).

In People v. Hardy, the Court of Appeals held that under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law private clubs must be licensed if they sell liquor.

We reverse the lqwer courts and hold that under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law private clubs must be licensed if they sell liquor, that section 44-11A of the Municipal Code of the City of Rochester is constitutional, and that whether a private club is a public resort within the meaning of the latter provision is, under the circumstances of this case, a question to be decided by the fact finder.

See People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500, 392 N.E.2d 1233, 419 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1979).

In People v. Hardy, the Court of Appeals reasoned that § 100(1) forbids a sale by any person without a license, that § 3(22) defines person to include a corporation and that § 3(28) defines sale as any transfer for a consideration.

Subdivision 1 of section 100 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law forbids a sale by any person of any alcoholic beverage without obtaining a license, section 3 (subd 22) defines “person” to include a corporation and section 3 (subd 28) defines “sale” as any transfer, exchange or barter in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration.

See People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500, 392 N.E.2d 1233, 419 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1979).

In New York State Liquor Authority v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., the Supreme Court held that incorporating a social club as a not-for-profit corporation does not permit it to sell alcohol without a license.

Furthermore, the mere incorporation of a so-called “social club” as a not-for-profit corporation cannot afford respondent carte blanche to sell alcoholic beverages without a license.

See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 1024, 403 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that champagne served to anyone who enters a gallery free is given away, but that champagne served to people who must pay a fee to enter is sold.

If anyone can walk into the gallery for free and get a glass of champagne, the champagne is being given away. If a person must pay a fee to enter the gallery and see the exhibition, that is a sale of the champagne.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

In New York State Liquor Authority v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that the price of a drink and whether it is paid for at the counter, at a cashier's booth with a ticket stub or at the door are immaterial, because the law prohibits the unlicensed sale and not the profit or loss.

It is inconsequential what the price is of an individual drink or of a “round”, and whether the drink is paid for over the counter, at a cashier’s booth (with the use of a ticket stub) or at the door. It is the unlicensed sale of the liquor which is prohibited, not the profit or loss, and the amount for which the liquor is sold cannot justify an improper act.

See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 1024, 403 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

In New York State Liquor Authority v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., the Supreme Court found that a good portion of a club's nightly door charge, no matter how labeled, paid for drinks provided free on request, which were in reality being sold.

Whether the nightly fee is $10 per session, as testified to by petitioner’s agents, or $8 for men and $6 for women (plainly discriminatory), as stated by corporate respondent’s president, it is clearly discernible that a good portion of that door charge, no matter how labeled, perforce, goes towards the purchase of the alcoholic beverages that are provided free on the premises “for the asking”, but which, in reality, are being sold to those members who come to the club on any particular night.

See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 1024, 403 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

In New York State Liquor Authority v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., the Supreme Court distinguished the club's weekend operation from the occasional dinner-dance of a legitimate political, religious, fraternal or charitable club where drinks are incidental and a small portion of the total cost.

Nor can respondent’s weekend activities be equated to the occasional dinner-dance given by a legitimate political, religious, fraternal or charitable club, wherein drinks are incidental and constitute only a small portion of the total cost of the affair.

See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 1024, 403 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

In People v. Hardy, the Court of Appeals, citing Sutton Social Club, reasoned that the liquor licensing policies and regulations would become meaningless if their requirements could be avoided by incorporating as a private club.

The policies and regulations established by the Legislature and by the authority pursuant to authorization by the Legislature would quickly become meaningless if their requirements could be avoided.by simply incorporating as a private club (Matter of New York State Liq. Auth. v Sutton Social Club, 93 Misc 2d 1024, 1030 ).

See People v. Hardy, 47 N.Y.2d 500, 392 N.E.2d 1233, 419 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1979).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 130(1) makes selling alcohol without an appropriate license a misdemeanor, punishable on first conviction by a fine of up to two times the cost of a special on-premises license in the county, 30 days to one year of imprisonment, or both, with higher fine ranges on later convictions.

Any person who manufactures for sale or sells alcoholic beverages, other than the illicit alcoholic beverages as defined in section one hundred fifty, without having an appropriate license therefor, or whose license has been revoked, surrendered or cancelled, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon first conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not more than two times the cost of a special on premises license in the county where the unlawful act took place or by imprisonment in a county jail or penitentiary for a term of not less than thirty days nor more than one year or both and upon second conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not less than two times and not more than three times the cost of a special on premises license in the county where the unlawful act took place or by imprisonment in a county jail or penitentiary for a term of not less than thirty days nor more than one year or both and upon all subsequent convictions thereof shall be punished by a fine not less than three times and not more than four times the cost of a special on premises license in the county where the unlawful act took place or by imprisonment in a county jail or penitentiary for a term of not less than thirty days nor more than one year or both provided, however, that in default of payment of any fine imposed, such person shall be imprisoned in a county jail or penitentiary for a term of not less than thirty days.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 130(1) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 64-b(1) makes it unlawful for the operator of a place run for profit or pecuniary gain with capacity for 20 or more people to permit people to come there to drink alcohol, whether supplied by the operator or brought by the guests, unless the operator first obtains a license.

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership or corporation operating a place for profit or pecuniary gain, with a capacity for the assemblage of twenty or more persons to permit a person or persons to come to the place of assembly for the purpose of consuming alcoholic beverages on said premises, which alcoholic beverages are either provided by the operator of the place of assembly, his agents, servants or employees, or are brought onto said premises by the person or persons assembling at such place, unless an appropriate license has first been obtained from the state liquor authority by the operator of said place of assembly.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 64-b(1) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 64-b(7) provides that § 64-b does not apply to non-profit religious, charitable or fraternal organizations, to clubs as defined in § 3(9) or to duly recognized political clubs, except that they may not permit drinking during hours prohibited under § 106.

This section shall not apply to any non-profit religious, charitable, or fraternal organization nor to a club as defined in section three, subdivision nine of this chapter, nor to a duly recognized political club, except that it shall be unlawful for any of the above to permit consumption of alcoholic beverages during the hours prohibited by or pursuant to section one hundred six of the alcoholic beverage control law.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 64-b(7) (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that alcohol given away free still requires a license or permit if the premises has an occupancy of 20 or more and is operated for pecuniary gain, meaning as a business.

If the alcoholic beverages are being sold, the location must have a license or permit. If the alcoholic beverages are being given away, a license or permit will still be needed if: 1) the premises has an occupancy of 20 or more; and 2) the premises is being operated “for pecuniary gain”, meaning it is being operated as a business.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that a banquet hall rented out for events is operated for pecuniary gain and needs a license or permit to let guests bring their own alcohol if its occupancy is 20 or more.

If people are allowed to bring their own alcoholic beverages to a premises, a license or permit is required if: 1) the premises has an occupancy of 20 or more; and 2) the premises is being operated “for pecuniary gain”, meaning it is being operated as a business. For example, the owner of a banquet hall charges for the use of the hall. The owner allows people attending events to bring their own alcoholic beverages. Since the hall is being rented out, it is being operated “for pecuniary gain.” If the hall has an occupancy of 20 or more, a license or permit is needed.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 64-b(1) provides that nothing in it prohibits or restricts the leasing or use of a place of assembly by an organization or club listed in § 64-b(7).

Nothing contained herein shall prohibit or restrict the leasing or use of such place of assemblage as defined herein by any organization or club enumerated in subdivision seven hereof.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 64-b(1) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 3(28) defines a sale as any transfer, exchange or barter, in any manner or by any means, for a consideration.

“Sale” means any transfer, exchange or barter in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration, and includes and means all sales made by any person, whether principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee of any alcoholic beverage and/or a warehouse receipt pertaining thereto.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(28) (2026).

In New York State Liquor Authority v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., the Supreme Court held that even a legitimate not-for-profit club as defined in § 3(9) is not exempt from § 100 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.

Even if we were dealing here with a legitimate not-for-profit “club”, as defined by subdivision 9 of section 3 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, such a club is in no manner exempt from the plain provisions of section 100 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.

See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Sutton Social Club, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 1024, 403 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 3(9) generally defines a club as an organization incorporated under the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law or the Benevolent Orders Law that is the owner, lessee or occupant of a building used exclusively for club purposes and is not operated for pecuniary gain, with an express exception allowing a qualifying club located in an office or business building or a state armory to be licensed.

“Club” shall mean an organization of persons incorporated pursuant to the provisions of the not-for-profit corporation law or the benevolent orders law, which is the owner, lessee or occupant of a building used exclusively for club purposes, and which does not traffic in alcoholic beverages for profit and is operated solely for a recreational, social, patriotic, political, benevolent or athletic purpose but not for pecuniary gain; except that where such club is located in an office or business building, or state armory, it may be licensed as such provided it otherwise qualifies as a “club” within the meaning of this subdivision.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(9) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 97(1) authorizes the State Liquor Authority to issue temporary permits, effective for no more than 24 consecutive hours, for the sale of beer, wine, cider, mead, braggot and liquor at outdoor or indoor gatherings within the hours when local on-premises licensees may sell.

The liquor authority is hereby authorized to issue temporary permits effective for a period not to exceed twenty-four consecutive hours to authorize the sale of beer, wine, cider, mead and/or braggot, and liquor at outdoor or indoor gatherings, functions, occasions or events, within the hours fixed by or pursuant to subdivision five of section one hundred six of this chapter, during which alcoholic beverages may lawfully be sold or served upon premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages at retail for on-premises consumption in the community in which is located the premises in which such gathering, function, occasion or event is held.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 97(1) (2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page states that licensees and members of the general public can apply for a One-Day Alcohol Event Permit.

Licensees and members of the general public can apply for a One-Day Alcohol Event Permit.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page requires an application for a One-Day Alcohol Event Permit to be received at least 15 business days before the event.

The application for a One-Day Alcohol Event Permit must be received by the Authority a minimum of 15 business days prior to the event.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

As of the October 8, 2026 review, the State Liquor Authority's permits page listed the One-Day Alcohol Event Permit fee as $36 per point of sale, per day; the page is the current source for the fee.

One-Day Alcohol Event Permit Fee: $36 per point of sale, per day Catering Permit A Catering Permit is a one-day permit that authorizes currently licensed on-premises retailers to provide alcoholic beverages at specific, private events located off the premises.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 97(1) sets the fee for a temporary permit at twenty-six dollars.

The fee for such permit shall be twenty-six dollars.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 97(1) (2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page describes the One-Day Alcohol Event Permit, also known as a Temporary Alcohol Permit, as authorizing the sale or service of wine, beer, cider and liquor at a gathering for 24 hours.

A One-Day Alcohol Event Permit, also known as a Temporary Alcohol Permit (previously known as a One-Day Beer and Wine Permit), authorizes the sale and/or service of wine, beer, cider and liquor for consumption at a gathering for a period of 24 hours.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states that applications for a one-day permit must be filed at least 15 days before the event.

This permit authorizes the sale of beer, braggot, cider, mead, wine and liquor at retail for consumption at a gathering for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive hours, commencing 8:00 a.m. of the effective date of such permit, except that in no event shall the sale of alcohol be permitted prior to 10:00 am on Sunday or during the hours prohibited by the provisions of Section 106(5) of the ABC Law, or by rule of the county government having jurisdiction in the county in which the event is held. The permit may be applied for by the public or by a licensee for a function being held away from their licensed premises. This permit is subject to the following conditions: Applications must be filed a minimum of 15 days prior to the event;

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page notes that, because of high application volume, permits are often issued within 24 to 48 hours of the event date.

Notice Regarding Permit Processing Times: Please note that due to a high volume of applications, permits are often issued within 24-48 hours of the event date.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page states that its permit fee schedule shows, for each permit, the fee, a non-refundable filing fee and the total.

Please refer to our Permit Fee Schedule that includes: the type of permit; fee schedule; fee; non-refundable filing fee, along with totals for more information.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states that a one-day permit is required for each point of sale on each date, must be displayed at the event, and allows alcohol to be bought only from a licensed New York manufacturer or wholesaler and not from a retail licensee.

A separate permit is required for each point of sale for each date; The permit must be on display at the event; Alcoholic beverages must be purchased from a licensed New York State manufacturer, or wholesaler ONLY, and not from a retail licensee; No alcohol may be taken from the premises where said event is held except that at the termination of said event, any alcohol which shall remain on hand will be removed from said premises by a manufacturer or wholesaler from which it was purchased, or by its designated agent.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page states that the Landlord Authorization Form is filled out by the landlord to grant permission for the sale and service of alcohol while a permit is used.

This form should be filled out by the landlord to grant permission for the sale and services of alcoholic beverages while using a permit.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states that no alcohol may be taken from the event premises and that alcohol remaining at the end is removed by the manufacturer or wholesaler that sold it, or its agent.

No alcohol may be taken from the premises where said event is held except that at the termination of said event, any alcohol which shall remain on hand will be removed from said premises by a manufacturer or wholesaler from which it was purchased, or by its designated agent.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states that the one-day permit runs for no more than 24 consecutive hours from 8:00 a.m. on its effective date, with no sales before 10:00 a.m. on Sunday or during hours barred by § 106(5) or county rule.

This permit authorizes the sale of beer, braggot, cider, mead, wine and liquor at retail for consumption at a gathering for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive hours, commencing 8:00 a.m. of the effective date of such permit, except that in no event shall the sale of alcohol be permitted prior to 10:00 am on Sunday or during the hours prohibited by the provisions of Section 106(5) of the ABC Law, or by rule of the county government having jurisdiction in the county in which the event is held.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express lists, as a one-day permit condition, that no alcohol may be sold or given to a person actually or apparently under 21 and that no child actually or apparently under 16 will be admitted to the event premises unless accompanied by a parent or guardian or an adult authorized by the parent or guardian, citing Penal Law § 260.20.

No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold, delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to any person, actually or apparently under the age of twenty-one years and no child, actually or apparently under the age of 16 years will be admitted to the premises at which event is held unless accompanied by their parent or guardian or by an adult person authorized by its parent or guardian, as provided by Section 260.20 of the Penal Law.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states, as one-day permit conditions, that no alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in any area where bingo is played, that alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in areas where authorized games of chance are held, and that applicants allowing games of chance must contact the NYS Gaming Commission for authorization.

No alcoholic beverages may be sold, served or consumed in any area where bingo is played. Alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in rooms or areas in which authorized games of chance are held. Applicants allowing games of chance must contact the NYS Gaming Commission for authorization to do so.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page states that alcohol sold by a one-day permittee may not be consumed outside the permitted area during the event.

During the event, no alcoholic beverages sold by the permittee can consumed outside of the area that is licensed.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

Penal Law § 260.20(2) makes it an offense to give or sell, or cause to be given or sold, an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21, except for the person's parent or guardian and certain required instructional tastings in a state-registered curriculum.

2. He gives or sells or causes to be given or sold any alcoholic beverage, as defined by section three of the alcoholic beverage control law, to a person less than twenty-one years old; except that this subdivision does not apply to the parent or guardian of such a person or to a person who gives or causes to be given any such alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of twenty-one years, who is a student in a curriculum licensed or registered by the state education department, where the tasting or imbibing of alcoholic beverages is required in courses that are part of the required curriculum, provided such alcoholic beverages are given only for instructional purposes during classes conducted pursuant to such curriculum.

See N.Y. Penal Law § 260.20(2) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 99-e bars issuing a § 97 temporary permit to an applicant other than a State Finance Law § 179-q not-for-profit for premises that have had a permit more than four times in a year, unless the Authority, after consultation, finds that an additional single permit does not circumvent licensing and would not harm the community.

Any other provision of any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, an applicant, other than a not-for-profit organization as defined in section one hundred seventy-nine-q of the state finance law, shall not be issued a temporary permit pursuant to section ninety-seven of this article for events to take place upon any premise for which the authority has issued any license, or has issued a permit more than four times within any one year period, provided however that the authority may, in its sole discretion, issue additional single permits if it shall determine upon the issuance of each that (a) the application for such permit is not an attempt to circumvent licensing provisions of this chapter, and (b) the issuance of such permit would not be a detriment to the community or the surrounding neighborhood as such shall be determined by the authority after consultation with municipal authorities and police agencies and community boards for the purpose of reviewing community or neighborhood or police agency complaints, or violations of state or local laws.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 99-e (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 99-e restricts § 97 temporary permits for an applicant other than a State Finance Law § 179-q not-for-profit at premises for which the Authority has issued any license and at premises with a permit issued more than four times in a year, and ends with a discretionary proviso for additional single permits whose application to licensed premises the text does not resolve.

Any other provision of any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, an applicant, other than a not-for-profit organization as defined in section one hundred seventy-nine-q of the state finance law, shall not be issued a temporary permit pursuant to section ninety-seven of this article for events to take place upon any premise for which the authority has issued any license, or has issued a permit more than four times within any one year period, provided however that the authority may, in its sole discretion, issue additional single permits if it shall determine upon the issuance of each that (a) the application for such permit is not an attempt to circumvent licensing provisions of this chapter, and (b) the issuance of such permit would not be a detriment to the community or the surrounding neighborhood as such shall be determined by the authority after consultation with municipal authorities and police agencies and community boards for the purpose of reviewing community or neighborhood or police agency complaints, or violations of state or local laws.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 99-e (2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page states that, except for certain not-for-profits, a location may have four one-day permits in 12 months, and that the Authority will consider more, up to 12 in 12 calendar months, with a letter of no objection from the municipality and police department.

With the exception of certain Not-for-Profits, the ABC Law limits the number of One-Day Alcohol Event Permits that can be issued for a location to four permits during a 12-month period. The Authority will consider additional one-day alcohol permits for a location (not to exceed 12 permits in a 12-calendar month period) if a letter of no objection is provided by the municipality and police department.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

State Finance Law § 179-q(7) defines a not-for-profit organization as a domestic corporation incorporated under or subject to the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, a charitable organization registered with the secretary of state, certain identified special act and other corporations, a corporation with § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, or a federation of charitable organizations.

“Not-for-profit organization” or “organization” means a domestic corporation incorporated pursuant to or otherwise subject to the not-for-profit corporation law, a charitable organization registered with the secretary of state, a special act corporation created pursuant to chapter four hundred sixty-eight of the laws of eighteen hundred ninety-nine, as amended, a special act corporation formed pursuant to chapter two hundred fifty-six of the laws of nineteen hundred seventeen, as amended, a corporation authorized pursuant to an act of congress approved January fifth, nineteen hundred five, (33 stat. 599), as amended, a corporation established by merger of charitable organizations pursuant to an order of the supreme court, New York county dated July twenty-first, nineteen hundred eighty-six and filed in the department of state on July twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred eighty-six, or a corporation having tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal revenue code, and shall further be deemed to mean and include any federation of charitable organizations.

See N.Y. State Fin. Law § 179-q(7) (2026).

NY Business Express states that not-for-profit organizations are not limited to four one-day permits a year but that the Authority reserves the right to limit a location at any time.

The ABC Law limits the number of one day alcohol event permits that can be issued for a location to no more than four (4) permits during the past 12 month period. Additional permits (not more than 12 annually) may be considered for a location when a letter of no objection from both the municipality and police department are submitted with the application. Not for profit organizations are not limited to the 4 per year rule; however, the Authority does reserve the right to limit a location at any time;

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2017-6 lists three ways a not-for-profit can sell or serve alcohol for on-premises consumption, including an event catered by a business with its own on-premises license, at the licensee's location or at another site with a caterer's permit.

There are three ways a not-for-profit organization can sell/serve alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption: at an event with a temporary beer and wine permit; at its own premises with its own on-premises license; and at an event catered by a business with its own on-premises license, either at the licensee’s location or at another site with a caterer’s permit.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2017-6, Donations of Alcoholic Beverages to Charitable and/or Not-for-Profit Organizations (Dec. 7, 2017).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 98(1) authorizes the State Liquor Authority to issue an on-premises retail licensee or licensed off-premises caterer furnishing provisions and service for a particular function in a hotel, restaurant, club, ballroom or other premises a temporary permit of up to 24 consecutive hours to serve alcohol at that function.

The liquor authority is hereby authorized to issue to a retail licensee for on-premises consumption or a licensed off-premises caterer furnishing provisions and service for use at a particular function, occasion or event in a hotel, restaurant, club, ballroom or other premises a temporary permit effective for a period not to exceed twenty-four consecutive hours, which shall authorize the service of alcoholic beverages at such function, occasion or event within the hours, fixed by or pursuant to subdivision five of section one hundred six of this chapter, during which alcoholic beverages may lawfully be sold or served upon premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages at retail for on-premises consumption in the community in which is located the premises in which such function, occasion or event is held.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 98(1) (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2017-6 states that a retailer catering a not-for-profit's event that charges attendees for drinks must buy the alcohol from a licensed wholesaler or manufacturer and may not share those profits with the not-for-profit.

Donations are only permitted if attendees at the event are not charged for the alcoholic beverages (an “open bar”, for example). If the retailer is going to charge attendees for alcoholic beverages (a “cash bar”, for example), the retailer must purchase the alcoholic beverages from a duly authorized licensed wholesaler or manufacturer and may not share profits from such sales with the not-for-profit organization.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2017-6, Donations of Alcoholic Beverages to Charitable and/or Not-for-Profit Organizations (Dec. 7, 2017).

9 NYCRR 29.1 provides that a caterer's permit will be issued only to an on-premises liquor, wine or beer licensee furnishing provisions and service for a particular function.

A permit will be issued only to an on-premises liquor, wine or beer licensee who is furnishing provisions and service for use at a particular function, occasion or event.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 29.1 (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 98(5) authorizes the State Liquor Authority, notwithstanding any other provision of the chapter or any Authority rule, to issue caterers and other persons furnishing provisions and services for an event at a winery or farm winery a temporary indoor and/or outdoor permit for up to 24 consecutive hours.

5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any rule of the liquor authority, the liquor authority is hereby authorized to issue, to caterers and other persons furnishing provisions and services for use at a particular function or occasion or event to be held at a winery or farm winery, a temporary indoor and/or outdoor permit effective for a period not to exceed twenty-four consecutive hours, which shall authorize the service of alcoholic beverages at such function, occasion or event within the hours as fixed by or pursuant to subdivision five of section one hundred six of this chapter, during which alcoholic beverages may lawfully be sold or served upon premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages at retail for on-premises consumption in the community in which is located the premises in which such function, occasion or event is held.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 98(5) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 98(5) makes both the permittee and the winery or farm winery licensee responsible for violations while the permit is in effect, and provides that liability under General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101 accrues to both.

For purposes of this subdivision, both the permittee and the winery or farm winery licensee shall be responsible for any violations of this chapter or the rules of the authority occurring while the permit is in effect. Liability under the provisions of sections 11-100 and 11-101 of the general obligations law shall accrue to both the permittee and the winery or farm winery licensee.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 98(5) (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law limits the ability of club licensees to obtain a caterer's permit either at the club's premises or at another location.

The ABC Law places limits on the ability of club licensees to obtain a caterer’s permit either at the club’s premises or at another location.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 98(4) bars granting a caterer's permit to a licensed club for a function off the club premises unless the function is exclusively for the use and benefit of the club's members and is so restricted.

4. A caterer's permit will not be granted to a club licensed for a function to be held off the club premises except where such is exclusively for the use and benefit of the club members only and is so restricted.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 98(4) (2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page describes a Catering Permit as a one-day permit for licensed on-premises retailers to provide alcohol at specific private events off their premises, and states that the applicant must provide food and may not cater for itself.

A Catering Permit is a one-day permit that authorizes currently licensed on-premises retailers to provide alcoholic beverages at specific, private events located off the premises. The applicant must provide food, in addition to alcoholic beverages at the event. Applicants may not cater for themselves.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

The State Liquor Authority's permits page requires a catering permittee to provide food meeting minimum requirements, such as salads, soups, sandwiches or finger foods, and states that pretzels and potato chips do not qualify.

Food must be provided by the applicant, meeting the minimum requirements under the ABC Law, for example: salads, soups, sandwiches, finger foods. Pretzels and potato chips do not meet minimum requirements for food.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

As of the October 8, 2026 review, the State Liquor Authority's permits page required a Catering Permit application to be received at least 15 business days before the event and listed a fee of $48 per point of sale, per day; the page is the current source for the fee.

The application for a Catering Permit must be received by the Liquor Authority a minimum of 15 business days prior to the event. Food must be provided by the applicant, meeting the minimum requirements under the ABC Law, for example: salads, soups, sandwiches, finger foods. Pretzels and potato chips do not meet minimum requirements for food. Only active on-premises retail licensees can apply for a Catering Permit. Catering Permit and Catering Permit for Club Licensees Fee: $48 per point of sale, per day

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Permits Available Online (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's-permit event must be private and should be by invitation or RSVP with a guest list or by tickets bought in advance.

The function/event must be private (not open to the public). It should be invitation/RSVP in advance with guest list or ticket purchase in advance.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that any payment the customer must make to obtain an alcoholic beverage makes it a sale requiring a license or permit.

If a person wants to sell alcoholic beverages, the ABC Law requires the person to have the appropriate license or permit. If the customer must pay anything to obtain the alcoholic beverage, that is a sale.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit can be issued only for a specific indoor function or event.

Permit can only be issued for a specific indoor function/event.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 requires a caterer's-permit applicant to submit proof, such as a public assembly permit, that the premises can be used for the event with the stated number of attendees.

Applicants must submit proof, such as a public assembly permit, that the premises can be used for the intended event with the number of attendees stated in the application.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that, unlike temporary permits, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law sets no limit on the number of caterer's permits.

Unlike Temporary Beer and Wine permits, there is no limit in the ABC Law on the number of permits that can be issued.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that the Authority monitors caterer's permits per location and, in general, may deny further applications once 12 permits have issued for a location in a 6-calendar-month period.

The Authority will, however, monitor the number of permits being issued for a specific location to determine if the permits are being used to circumvent the need to have the location licensed. In general, if 12 permits have been issued for the same location during a 6-calendar month period, applications for any additional permits may be denied.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit can be issued for premises that are currently licensed without delicensing the space.

Permit can be issued for a premises that is currently licensed. There is no need to “delicense” the space to issue the permit.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 requires a caterer's-permit applicant for licensed premises to submit proof that the licensee agrees to the use of its premises.

The applicant for the permit must submit proof that the licensee/applicant agrees to the use of its premises.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold or served under the applicant's current license.

Permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold/served under the applicant’s current license.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit for a licensed location is limited to the beverages that can be sold or served under the current license at that location.

Permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold/served under the current license at the location.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 111 makes a license available only to the person named in it and only for the licensed premises, except as the Authority authorizes.

It shall be available only to the person therein specified, and only for the premises licensed and no other except if authorized by the authority.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 111 (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit can be issued for premises that are currently licensed without delicensing the space.

Permit can be issued for a premises that is currently licensed. There is no need to “delicense” the space to issue the permit.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 requires a caterer's-permit applicant for licensed premises to submit proof that the licensee agrees to the use of its premises.

The applicant for the permit must submit proof that the licensee/applicant agrees to the use of its premises.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

9 NYCRR 48.2 requires each on-premises licensee to exercise a high degree of supervision over its establishment and holds it strictly accountable for all violations on the licensed premises committed, suffered or permitted by its managers, agents or employees.

It shall be the obligation of each person licensed pursuant to this Part to insure that a high degree of supervision is exercised over the conduct of the licensed establishment at all times in order to safeguard against abuses of the license privilege and violations of law. Each such licensee will be held strictly accountable for all violations that occur in the licensed premises and are committed by or suffered and permitted by any manager, agent or employee of such licensee.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 48.2 (2026).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold or served under the applicant's current license.

Permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold/served under the applicant’s current license.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-36 states that a caterer's permit for a licensed location is limited to the beverages that can be sold or served under the current license at that location.

Permit is limited to the beverages that can be sold/served under the current license at the location.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory No. 2022-36, Caterer's Permits (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 99-e restricts § 97 temporary permits for an applicant other than a State Finance Law § 179-q not-for-profit at premises for which the Authority has issued any license and at premises with a permit issued more than four times in a year, and ends with a discretionary proviso for additional single permits whose application to licensed premises the text does not resolve.

Any other provision of any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, an applicant, other than a not-for-profit organization as defined in section one hundred seventy-nine-q of the state finance law, shall not be issued a temporary permit pursuant to section ninety-seven of this article for events to take place upon any premise for which the authority has issued any license, or has issued a permit more than four times within any one year period, provided however that the authority may, in its sole discretion, issue additional single permits if it shall determine upon the issuance of each that (a) the application for such permit is not an attempt to circumvent licensing provisions of this chapter, and (b) the issuance of such permit would not be a detriment to the community or the surrounding neighborhood as such shall be determined by the authority after consultation with municipal authorities and police agencies and community boards for the purpose of reviewing community or neighborhood or police agency complaints, or violations of state or local laws.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 99-e (2026).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals held that the Dram Shop Act requires a commercial sale of alcohol.

We find no basis for departing from the consistent interpretation of lower courts that the Dram Shop Act requires a commercial sale of alcohol.

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

General Obligations Law § 11-101(1) gives a person injured by an intoxicated person a right of action, for actual and exemplary damages, against any person who caused or contributed to the intoxication by unlawfully selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for that person.

1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.

See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101(1) (2026).

In Sherman v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals held that under General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101 the intoxicated person who causes the injury must be the very person to whom the defendant furnished the alcohol or for whom it was procured.

The plain language of the enactments specifies that the individual who by reason of intoxication causes injury must be the very person to whom defendant furnished the alcoholic beverages, or for whom they were procured.

See Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483 (1992).

In McGirr v. Zurbrick, the Fourth Department held that liability under General Obligations Law § 11-101 required proof of an unlawful sale of alcohol and not merely that alcohol was given away.

We therefore conclude that, for liability to be imposed under General Obligations Law § 11-101, plaintiff was required to establish that there was an unlawful sale of alcohol and that it was not merely given away ( see Stevens v Spec, Inc., 224 AD2d 811, 813 [3d Dept 1996]; Carr v Kaifler, 195 AD2d 584, 585 [2d Dept 1993]; Custen v Salty Dog, 170 AD2d 572, 572 [2d Dept 1991]).

See McGirr v. Zurbrick, 2023 NY Slip Op 03568 (4th Dep't 2023).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals held that the association made no direct sales of alcohol, had no recognizable expectation of pecuniary gain, and did not make a commercial sale by making beer available to members who had chipped in for their own food and drink.

The Association made no direct sales of alcohol, and had no recognizable expectation of pecuniary gain from its social affairs. The availability of beer to coemployees who had chipped in to buy their own food and beverages for the picnic cannot be considered a commercial sale of alcohol within the Dram Shop Act.

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In Casselberry v. Dominick, the Fourth Department held that a local that bought beer for its banquet from membership dues and ticket sales, made no direct sales, served beer self-service and ran a substantial deficit was not engaged in the sale of alcohol for profit.

Like the defendant in D’Amico, the local is not engaged in the sale of alcohol for profit and did not plan its “Sports Night” banquet in order to make a profit. The local purchased the alcohol from membership dues and ticket sales. It did not make any “direct” sales of alcohol, and there is no evidence that the provision of alcohol resulted in a pecuniary gain. On the contrary, the balance sheet submitted by the local in support of the motion establishes that the event resulted in a substantial deficit. Finally, beer was available on a self-service basis.

See Casselberry v. Dominick, 143 A.D.2d 528 (4th Dep't 1988).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that a license or permit is required to sell alcohol, that any payment a customer must make to obtain a drink is a sale, and that a required entry fee to an event where champagne is handed out makes it a sale of the champagne.

If a person wants to sell alcoholic beverages, the ABC Law requires the person to have the appropriate license or permit. If the customer must pay anything to obtain the alcoholic beverage, that is a sale. For example, an art gallery is having an exhibition and anyone (of legal age) attending the exhibition can get a glass (or glasses) of champagne. If anyone can walk into the gallery for free and get a glass of champagne, the champagne is being given away. If a person must pay a fee to enter the gallery and see the exhibition, that is a sale of the champagne.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

In Casselberry v. Dominick, the Fourth Department stated that the Dram Shop Act applies only to commercial sales of alcohol, meaning direct sales of alcohol for profit.

The Dram Shop Act applies only to commercial sales of alcohol, i.e., “direct sales of alcohol” “for profit” (D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 83-84).

See Casselberry v. Dominick, 143 A.D.2d 528 (4th Dep't 1988).

In Romano v. Stanley, the Court of Appeals described General Obligations Law § 11-101(1) as making a party that unlawfully sells alcohol liable for injuries caused by the buyer's intoxication, and Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65(2) as making it unlawful to furnish alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person.

General Obligations Law § 11-101 (1), popularly known as the Dram Shop Act, makes a party who “unlawfully” sells alcohol to another person liable for injuries caused by reason of that person’s intoxication. Under Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 (2), it is unlawful to furnish an alcoholic beverage to any “visibly intoxicated person.”

See Romano v. Stanley, 90 N.Y.2d 444 (1997).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 bars any person from selling, delivering or giving away alcoholic beverages to a person actually or apparently under 21, a visibly intoxicated person, or a habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense them.

No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold, delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to 1. Any person, actually or apparently, under the age of twenty-one years; 2. Any visibly intoxicated person; 3. Any habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense any alcoholic beverages.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 65(1)–(3) (2026).

In Sherman v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals held that a knowledge requirement must be inferred in General Obligations Law § 11-101 because § 11-100 was intended to parallel the Dram Shop Act.

While section 11-101 does not explicitly refer to knowledge, that same requirement must be inferred because the legislative history makes plain that section 11-100 was intended to parallel the Dram Shop Act (Letter from Assemblyman John F. Duane explaining Senate-Assembly Bill S 6502-A, A 7236-A, July 10, 1983, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 641).

See Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483 (1992).

In Romano v. Stanley, the Court of Appeals held that the visible-intoxication element does not have to be proved by testimony from someone who observed the person's demeanor when and where the alcohol was served.

The Legislature’s use of the term “visible,” however, does not create a rigid requirement that that essential element of the claim be established by direct proof in the form of testimonial evidence from someone who actually observed the allegedly intoxicated person’s demeanor at the time and place that the alcohol was served.

See Romano v. Stanley, 90 N.Y.2d 444 (1997).

In Romano v. Stanley, the Court of Appeals held that proof of a high blood alcohol count alone generally does not establish the visible intoxication that Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65(2) requires.

Proof of a high blood alcohol count alone, however, generally does not establish the “visible” intoxication that Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 (2) requires.

See Romano v. Stanley, 90 N.Y.2d 444 (1997).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the picnic was organized by a voluntary employee society that ran two members-only events a year, bought food and beverages out of $1 monthly dues and $5 ticket sales, and left cans of beer freely available on ice.

The event was organized by the Schlegel Social and Athletic Association (the Association), a voluntary society formed by Schlegel employees. The sole purpose of the Association was to organize two annual members-only social functions, a Christmas party and a summer picnic. Association members themselves set up the picnic, cooked, and cleaned up the site. Food and beverages were purchased out of a fund made up of members’ monthly dues of $1 and the proceeds of $5 ticket sales. At the picnic, cans of beer were kept on ice, freely available, in plastic-lined trash cans.

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that General Obligations Law § 11-101 claims against Pascarella and the Levkuliches should have been dismissed because the guests were not charged for the beer served at the party.

Concerning plaintiffs’ statutory claims, Pascarella’s and the Levkuliches’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims based on General Obligations Law § 11-101 should have been granted since it is undisputed that the guests were not charged for the beer served at the party (see D’Amico, 71 NY2d at 83-84).

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals stated that the Dram Shop Act is not literally restricted to dram shops or commercial taverns but has consistently been read to apply only to sales of alcohol for profit.

While not literally restricted to actual “dram shops” or commercial taverns (see, e.g., Bartkowiak v St. Adalbert’s R. C. Church Socy., 40 AD2d 306), the Dram Shop Act has consistently been read by lower courts as applicable only to sales of alcohol for profit — that is, commercial sales (see, Edgar v Kajet, 84 Misc 2d 100, affd 55 AD2d 597, supra; Conigliaro v Franco, 122 AD2d 15, 16; Greer v Ferrizz, 118 AD2d 536; Wright v Sunset Recreation, 91 AD2d 701; Gabrielle v Craft, 75 AD2d 939; Kohler v Wray, 114 Misc 2d 856).

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., the driver had attended a fundraiser for volunteer fire departments earlier on the day of the accident.

Earlier that day, defendant Carlson had attended the Gala Days event, a fundraiser to benefit various volunteer fire departments.

See Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., 184 A.D.2d 12 (4th Dep't 1992).

In Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., the Fourth Department held that Dram Shop Act claims could proceed against the two companies that operated the beer concessions, where the driver appeared somewhat drunk when he left the event.

Murray Hose and the Portland Fire Company, however, operated the two concessions which sold beer and defendant Carlson appeared to be “somewhat drunk” when he left the event. Thus, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the Dram Shop Act causes of action against Murray Hose and the Portland Fire Company.

See Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., 184 A.D.2d 12 (4th Dep't 1992).

In Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., the Fourth Department stated that a vendor cannot be held liable under the Dram Shop Act without proof that it sold alcoholic beverages directly to the alleged tortfeasor.

A vendor cannot be held liable under the Dram Shop Act absent proof that it sold alcoholic beverages directly to the alleged tortfeasor (see, Stewart v Taylor, 167 AD2d 846 , lv denied 77 NY2d 805 ; Smith v Guli, 117 AD2d 1017 ).

See Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., 184 A.D.2d 12 (4th Dep't 1992).

In Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, the decedent was killed at a lawn fete sponsored by a church society by a 15-year-old who allegedly became intoxicated on beer he bought there from the society.

The decedent was stabbed to death on July 12,1969 while attending a lawn fete sponsored by defendant St. Adalbert’s Roman Catholic Church Society. His assailant was a 15-year-old boy who allegedly became intoxicated on beer he purchased at the evening social from defendant.

See Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, 40 A.D.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1973).

In Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, the Fourth Department found that the record showed an unlawful sale of beer to a 15-year-old who was apparently intoxicated.

The proof in this record reveals an unlawful sale of beer to a 15-year-old who was apparently intoxicated.

See Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, 40 A.D.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1973).

In Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., the Court of Appeals described the long-standing judicial construction of the Dram Shop Act's language as precluding recovery by the intoxicated person, and inferred that the Legislature intended the same result under § 11-100.

Since the Legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the long-standing judicial construction of that language as precluding recovery by the intoxicated person, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended the same result in cases arising under section 11-100.

See Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629 (1989).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 3(28) defines a sale as any transfer, exchange or barter of an alcoholic beverage in any manner for a consideration, by any person.

28. “Sale” means any transfer, exchange or barter in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration, and includes and means all sales made by any person, whether principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee of any alcoholic beverage and/or a warehouse receipt pertaining thereto.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(28) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 100(1) bars any person from selling alcoholic beverages at wholesale or retail in New York without the appropriate license.

1. No person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage within the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor required by this chapter.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 100(1) (2026).

General Obligations Law § 11-100(1) gives a person injured by reason of the intoxication or impairment of a person under 21 a right of action for actual damages against any person who knowingly caused it by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages for that person with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the person was under 21.

1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, by reason of the intoxication or impairment of ability of any person under the age of twenty-one years, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action to recover actual damages against any person who knowingly causes such intoxication or impairment of ability by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such person was under the age of twenty-one years.

See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-100(1) (2026).

In Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., the Court of Appeals described General Obligations Law § 11-100 as providing recovery against a person who knowingly caused a young person's intoxication by furnishing alcoholic beverages, with or without charge.

Even more to the point, General Obligations Law § 11-100, which was enacted in 1983, provides for recovery against a person who knowingly caused a young person’s intoxication by furnishing alcoholic beverages, with or without charge, “with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such person was [a person under the legal purchase age].”

See Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629 (1989).

Penal Law § 260.20(2) makes it an offense to give or sell, or cause to be given or sold, an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21, except for the person's parent or guardian and certain required instructional tastings in a state-registered curriculum.

2. He gives or sells or causes to be given or sold any alcoholic beverage, as defined by section three of the alcoholic beverage control law, to a person less than twenty-one years old; except that this subdivision does not apply to the parent or guardian of such a person or to a person who gives or causes to be given any such alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of twenty-one years, who is a student in a curriculum licensed or registered by the state education department, where the tasting or imbibing of alcoholic beverages is required in courses that are part of the required curriculum, provided such alcoholic beverages are given only for instructional purposes during classes conducted pursuant to such curriculum.

See N.Y. Penal Law § 260.20(2) (2026).

General Obligations Law § 11-101(1), the Dram Shop Act, allows a person injured through an unlawful sale to recover actual and exemplary damages.

1. Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.

See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101(1) (2026).

In Sherman v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals stated that General Obligations Law § 11-100 extended dram-shop-type liability without the necessity of a commercial sale.

This statute, “intended to parallel those [provisions] contained in New York’s Dram Shop Statute” (Letter from Senator William T. Smith explaining Senate Bill S 6502-B, July 22, 1983, Governor’s Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 641), extended dram-shop-type liability without the necessity of a commercial sale.

See Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483 (1992).

In Sherman v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals stated that liability under General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101 attaches only on an unlawful sale or delivery of alcohol.

Liability under sections 11-100 and 11-101 attaches only in the event of an “unlawful” sale or delivery of alcohol.

See Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483 (1992).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 bars any person from selling, delivering or giving away alcoholic beverages to any person actually or apparently under 21.

No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold, delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to 1. Any person, actually or apparently, under the age of twenty-one years; 2. Any visibly intoxicated person; 3. Any habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense any alcoholic beverages.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 65(1)–(3) (2026).

In Rust v. Reyer, the host allegedly gave permission for alcohol at her party, stored the kegs before and after it, negotiated a share of the cup-sale proceeds and tried to arrange free beer for her friends.

Here, Reyer allegedly gave permission for the alcohol at the party she was planning, provided storage for the kegs of beer both before and after the party, negotiated a share of the proceeds from cup sales for herself and at least attempted to arrange for her friends to drink the beer without charge.

See Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998).

In Rust v. Reyer, the Court of Appeals held that the host's alleged acts, if proven at trial, could come within the meaning of furnishing under General Obligations Law § 11-100.

We conclude that if proven at trial, these facts could bring Reyer’s acts within the meaning of “furnishing” as used in the statute.

See Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998).

In Rust v. Reyer, the Court of Appeals rejected limiting furnishing under General Obligations Law § 11-100 to those who hand the alcohol to the minor.

To interpret “furnishing” as Reyer suggests — in effect limiting it to those who hand the alcohol to the minor — gives the term an overly narrow reach that undermines the clear legislative goal.

See Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998).

In Rust v. Reyer, the Court of Appeals described the host as more than a passive participant who merely knew of the underage drinking, and as playing an indispensable role in making the alcohol available to underage guests.

Similarly, she was more than a passive participant who merely knew of the underage drinking and did nothing else to encourage it (cf., Lane v Barker, 241 AD2d 739; MacGilvray v Denino, 149 AD2d 571; see also, Pelinsky v Rockensies, 209 AD2d 392). Reyer played an indispensable role in the scheme to make the alcohol available to the underage party guests.

See Rust v. Reyer, 91 N.Y.2d 355 (1998).

In Lane v. Barker, the parents authorized their adult son to host a party at their home, knew alcohol would be consumed, and knew or should have known that minors would attend.

It is clear from the record that the parents authorized their son, an adult, to host a party at their residence and that they knew alcohol would be consumed at the affair. The record further reveals that they knew or should have known that minors would be in attendance and that they instructed their son to be sure that there was no underage drinking.

See Lane v. Barker, 241 A.D.2d 739 (3d Dep't 1997).

In Lane v. Barker, the Third Department held that the parents were entitled to summary judgment on the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim because the statute requires that a person furnish or procure alcohol.

Inasmuch as General Obligations Law § 11-100 mandates that a person “furnish” or “procure” alcoholic beverages as a predicate for liability, Supreme Court erred in denying summary judgment as to the parents with regard to the third cause of action of plaintiffs complaint (see, e.g., Rust v Reyer, 235 AD2d 413; Pelinsky v Rockensies, 209 AD2d 392).

See Lane v. Barker, 241 A.D.2d 739 (3d Dep't 1997).

In Lane v. Barker, the Third Department kept the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim against Todd Keehfus because he procured and furnished the alcohol for the party.

The record makes plain that he procured and furnished alcoholic beverages for the party, and there exists a question of fact as to whether Barker was intoxicated at the time of the underlying altercation. Thus, Supreme Court quite properly denied the motion for summary judgment as to Todd Keehfus.

See Lane v. Barker, 241 A.D.2d 739 (3d Dep't 1997).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department sustained the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim against Andrea Levkulich because she both procured and furnished the beer.

However, the section 11-100 claim was properly sustained as against Andrea since she both procured and furnished the beer, and as against Pascarella in view of the conflicting deposition testimony as to whether he assisted in procuring the beer.

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim against the church whose hall was used was properly dismissed, even if it knew beer would be served, because it did not play an indispensable role in making the beer available.

As against the Church, the section 11-100 claim would not be viable even if it knew that there would be beer at the party, and was properly dismissed upon a record establishing that the Church did not play an “indispensable role” in making the beer available to the underage persons on its premises (see Rust v Reyer, 91 NY2d 355, 361 [1998]).

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim was properly dismissed against Mr. and Mrs. Levkulich on a record showing they were passive participants who merely knew of the underage drinking.

Similarly, the section 11-100 claim was properly dismissed as against the Diocese, whose alleged liability appears to be wholly derivative of the Church’s, and as against Mr. and Mrs. Levkulich upon a record establishing they were “passive participant[s] who merely knew of the underage drinking and did nothing else to encourage it” (id.; see also Lane, 241 AD2d at 739-740).

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., the Court of Appeals inferred that the Legislature intended General Obligations Law § 11-100, like the Dram Shop Act, to preclude recovery by the intoxicated person.

Significantly, in enacting this statute, which specifically addresses the problem of civil damages resulting from youthful alcoholic excesses, the Legislature authorized suit only by persons “injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise, by [the intoxicated person]”, the same language as that used in General Obligations Law § 11-101. Since the Legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the long-standing judicial construction of that language as precluding recovery by the intoxicated person, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended the same result in cases arising under section 11-100.

See Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629 (1989).

Penal Law § 260.20 classifies unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree as a class A misdemeanor.

Unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

See N.Y. Penal Law § 260.20 (2026).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals stated that landowners have a duty to act reasonably to prevent harm to those on their property, including a duty to control third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity and are reasonably aware of the need.

Landowners in general have a duty to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on their property (Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241). In particular, they have a duty to control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to control such persons and are reasonably aware of the need for such control (see, De Ryss v New York Cent. R. R. Co., 275 NY 85).

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In Holiday v. Poffenbarger, the Second Department stated that a defendant may be liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest on its property or in an area it controls, where it had the opportunity to control the guest and was reasonably aware of the need.

A defendant may be liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest that occurred on the defendant’s property, or in an area under the defendant’s control, where the defendant had the opportunity to control the intoxicated guest and was reasonably aware of the need for such control (see D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 [1987]).

See Holiday v. Poffenbarger, 110 A.D.3d 841 (2d Dep't 2013).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that claims for negligent provision of alcohol should have been dismissed because no such cause of action exists at common law.

The claims against Pascarella and the Levkuliches for negligent provision of alcohol should have been dismissed since no such cause of action exists at common law (see D'Amico at 83, 85).

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals explained that a landowner's duty regarding intoxicated guests arises from its obligation to keep its premises free of known dangerous conditions, not from the provision of alcohol.

That duty emanated not from the provision of alcohol but from the obligation of a landowner to keep its premises free of known dangerous conditions, which may include intoxicated guests.

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In D'Amico v. Christie, the Court of Appeals held that the association was not in the position of a bartender or host dispensing alcohol, that the injuries occurred on a public highway miles from the picnic, and that the association lacked the opportunity to supervise and control the drinker.

The Association was not in the position of a bartender or even a host dispensing alcohol, who may deny the request of a patron or guest for another drink. Second, the injuries complained of did not take place on the picnic premises, or Association property; the accident occurred on a public highway several miles distant. The Association lacked the opportunity to supervise and control that defendants in the cited cases had.

See D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (1987).

In Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., the Fourth Department held that common-law negligence claims against three defendants should have been dismissed because New York courts decline to impose common-law liability on alcohol providers when the injury occurs some distance from the defendant's property.

In New York the courts have declined to impose common-law liability upon providers of alcohol for the conduct of an intoxicated person when the injury takes place at a location some distance from the defendant’s property (see, D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85; Besner v Bucci, 135 AD2d 1081, 1082; Delamater v Kimmerle, 104 AD2d 242; Wright v Sunset Recreation, 91 AD2d 701). Thus, Supreme Court erred in denying the motions of Fireman’s Fraternity, Gala Days Committee and Murray Hose insofar as they sought dismissal of the common-law negligence causes of action asserted against them.

See Haskell v. Chautauqua County Fireman's Fraternity, Inc., 184 A.D.2d 12 (4th Dep't 1992).

In Holiday v. Poffenbarger, the Second Department held that the fraternity chapter defendant owed no duty to supervise or control the attacker because the injuries occurred in an area not under its control.

Here, the Sigma Pi defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the negligence cause of action insofar as asserted against SPFI by showing that the plaintiffs injuries occurred in an area not under SPFI’s control and, thus, that SPFI had no duty to supervise or control Poffenbarger’s conduct in that area (see Walters v Sternlieb, 255 AD2d 309, 310 [1998]; White v Celebrity Lounge, 215 AD2d 650 [1995]).

See Holiday v. Poffenbarger, 110 A.D.3d 841 (2d Dep't 2013).

In Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, security guards were present, presumably to control the conduct of the members of the public whom the defendant had invited to its lawn fete.

There were security guards present presumably for the purpose of controlling the conduct of those members of the public whom the defendant invited to attend this lawn fete.

See Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, 40 A.D.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1973).

In Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, the Fourth Department held that the evidence about the assailant's conduct was sufficient to create a jury question on the negligence claim.

Applying this test to plaintiff’s cause of action in negligence, we believe that there was sufficient evidence presented regarding the assailant’s conduct to create a jury question.

See Bartkowiak v. St. Adalbert's Roman Catholic Church Society, 40 A.D.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1973).

In Lane v. Barker, the Third Department held that parents who were home during the party, and could be found to have known that as many as half of the 75 to 100 guests were minors, many of them drinking, faced a question of fact on whether a fight causing injury was foreseeable.

Here, the record reveals that the parents were present at their home when the altercation took place and there is evidence from which it could be inferred that they knew or should have known that as many as one half of the 75 to 100 guests were minors, many of whom were drinking. Under the circumstances, a question of fact exists as to whether it was foreseeable “that someone would get drunk at the party, engage in a fight, and cause injury to a third party” (Comeau v Lucas, 90 AD2d 674, 675).

See Lane v. Barker, 241 A.D.2d 739 (3d Dep't 1997).

In Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, the Third Department stated that liability for alcohol consumed on premises is imposed only when the defendant is present and knows it can, and has the opportunity to, control third parties' conduct and is reasonably aware of the need for that control.

As it relates to the consumption of alcohol on premises, the rule is that liability will be imposed only when the defendant is present and then only when he “ ‘knows that he can and has the opportunity to control the third parties’ conduct and is reasonably aware of the necessity for such control’ ” (Huyler v Rose, 88 AD2d 755 , appeal dismissed 57 NY2d 777 , quoting Mangione v Dimino, 39 AD2d 128, 129 ; see also, D'Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 ; Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 ).

See Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, 142 A.D.2d 202 (3d Dep't 1988).

In Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, the Third Department held that the hall's owners were not obligated to, and did not, supervise the renter's party or otherwise retain any control over the premises during it.

Viewing the evidence submitted on the motion in a manner most favorable to plaintiff, as we must (Bershaw v Altman, 100 AD2d 642, 643 ), including the disputed evidence that Valentino had knowledge that beer was to be served at the party, and even assuming, arguendo, that Mitchell and plaintiff became intoxicated from drinking alcoholic beverages furnished by Macherone and Hastings , evidence not present in this record, and that such intoxication was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries, defendants were not obligated to, and the uncontroverted evidence was that they did not, supervise the party or otherwise retain any control over the premises during Macherone and Hastings’ party.

See Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, 142 A.D.2d 202 (3d Dep't 1988).

In Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, the Third Department noted exceptions to the general rule for master-servant, parent-child and principal-agent relationships, and held that no such relationship was present.

While exceptions have been made in the case of a master-servant (see, D'Amico v Christie, supra, at 88), parent-child (see, Comeau v Lucas, 90 AD2d 674 [16-year-old girl had party where parents, who were out of the country, gave consent and were aware beer would be served]; cf., Fessler v Brunza, 89 AD2d 640 [parents had no obligation to supervise son’s farming operation on their property]), and principal-agent relationship (see, Comeau v Lucas, supra, at 675), no such relationship is present here.

See Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, 142 A.D.2d 202 (3d Dep't 1988).

In Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, the Third Department declined to create a new duty enlarging liability for injuries in or about hired premises, reasoning that owners would otherwise have to supervise each affair held there.

Denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment would, we believe, require a substantial and unjustified enlargement of the common law regarding liability for injuries occurring in or about hired premises. We conclude that the creation of such a new legal duty is unwise. Owners would be placed in the economically impossible position of having to provide supervision for each and every affair conducted on the premises, including weddings, retirement dinners and the like, and still fear that the precautions might somehow be deemed inadequate to protect all guests from any kind of injury, foreseeable or otherwise (see, D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 89-90, supra).

See Cavanaugh v. Knights of Columbus Council 4360, 142 A.D.2d 202 (3d Dep't 1988).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that a church that did not host the party, but let a parishioner use its hall for a $100 donation, had no duty to supervise the party or retain control of its premises.

Concerning plaintiffs’ common-law claims, although the Church, as owner of the premises where the injured plaintiff was attacked, owed him a duty “to keep its premises free of known dangerous conditions, which may include intoxicated guests” (D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 [1987]), the Church did not host the party at which such drinking took place, but merely permitted Andrea Levkulich (Andrea), then a 20-year-old parishioner, to use its hall in exchange for a $100 donation. Under these circumstances, the Church was not under a duty to supervise Andrea’s party or otherwise retain control of its premises (see id. at 86; Cavanaugh v Knights of Columbus Council 4360, 142 AD2d 202 [1988], lv denied 74 NY2d 604 [1989]).

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, the First Department held that Andrea Levkulich was not entitled to summary judgment on the common-law claim based on failure to supervise, which stood on a different footing.

Since the claim of common-law negligence against Andrea based on failure to supervise stands on a different footing, she is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

See McGlynn v. St. Andrew the Apostle Church, 304 A.D.2d 372 (1st Dep't 2003).

In Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that the premises-control exception has no application to a claim by the person who voluntarily became intoxicated.

However, that exception has no application in a case such as this, which involves an attempt to recover by the person who voluntarily became intoxicated.

See Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629 (1989).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Third Department held that the exclusion was not clearly intended to apply to casual, nonrecurring selling or serving of liquor unconnected with a business, because its language was susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.

This brings us to the more difficult question of whether the exclusion was clearly intended to apply to casual, nonrecurring situations involving the selling or serving of liquor not connected with a business on premises owned by plaintiff. We think that it was not. The language employed, particularly the word “purposes”, is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

In New York Mutual Underwriters v. Burdick, the Third Department held that all the negligence allegations arose out of the bar's business of selling and serving alcohol and were therefore excluded.

It is apparent that all these allegations either directly or indirectly arose out of the Colonial Inn’s business of selling and serving alcoholic beverages and, as such, they are excluded under plaintiff’s policy (see, Amherst & Clarence Ins. Co. v Cazenovia Tavern, 90 AD2d 631, 632, revd on other grounds as moot 59 NY2d 983).

See New York Mutual Underwriters v. Burdick, 196 A.D.2d 668 (3d Dep't 1993).

In New York Mutual Underwriters v. Burdick, the Third Department held that the liability policy issued to a bar's owners excluded both common-law negligence and Dram Shop Act claims arising out of the sale of alcohol.

In our view, Supreme Court erred in not granting plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The liability insurance policy issued by plaintiff to Burdick and her business partners specifically excludes coverage for both common-law negligence and Dram Shop Act claims arising out of the sale of alcoholic beverages.

See New York Mutual Underwriters v. Burdick, 196 A.D.2d 668 (3d Dep't 1993).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Third Department reasoned that an ongoing alcohol venture creates a continuing dram shop risk an insurer might exclude, while infrequent sales reduce the risk so that coverage might be extended without an additional premium under a general liability policy.

The use of premises for an on-going venture of manufacturing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages creates a continuing risk of liability under New York’s dram shop law, for which an insurer might wish to exclude coverage except upon payment of an additional premium. Where, however, the sale of alcohol takes place on an infrequent basis, the risk of liability is reduced, wherefore coverage might be deemed to be extended without payment of additional premiums under a general liability policy such as the one in force here.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, an insurer, recommends that a nonprofit selling alcohol at fundraising events request a full liquor policy, because those events may not be covered by the host liquor liability included in its policy.

The nonprofit should request a full liquor policy to cover these events as they may not be covered under the host liquor liability included on their policy.

See Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, Liquor Liability 101: How to Serve Alcohol at Your Nonprofit Events (Dec. 21, 2017).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the injured passenger and driver had attended a party on community college premises sponsored by the student government association, for which a temporary beer permit had been obtained.

La Vallee and Ganott had attended a party on premises of the Schenectady County Community College sponsored by the Student Government Association of said college. A temporary permit for the sale of beer had been obtained from appropriate State authorities.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the insurer rejected the county's demand for a defense of the injury suit, disclaiming coverage based on an exclusion in the policy's bodily injury liability section.

Plaintiff’s demand that Travelers defend the La Vallee action was rejected pursuant to a disclaimer of coverage based on Exclusion (f) to the bodily injury liability section of the policy.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Third Department held that the student government association was not profit-seeking and that a temporary permit lasting only seven hours dispelled any notion that a business was being conducted.

It is not seriously contended that the Student Government Association was a profit-seeking organization or that plaintiff stood to realize a pecuniary gain from the party. The temporary nature of the permit itself, with a duration of only seven hours, satisfactorily dispels any notion that a “business” was being conducted.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

In County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Third Department concluded that the insurer's choice of the word business imposed a limitation on the extent of the exclusion.

Because the insurer did choose to use the word business, we think it fair to conclude that a limitation was imposed on the extent of the exclusion.

See County of Schenectady v. Travelers Insurance Co., 48 A.D.2d 299 (3d Dep't 1975).

In Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., the club's commercial general liability insurer relied on a liquor liability exclusion to disclaim coverage when the club was sued over the alleged distribution of alcohol at its premises.

The policy contained a liquor liability exclusion which Nautilus relied upon to disclaim coverage when the Molesi Club was sued in an action arising from the alleged distribution of alcoholic beverages at the insured premises.

See Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., 39 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dep't 2007).

In Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., the Second Department held that the insurer was obligated to defend the club in the underlying personal injury action.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Molesi Club’s cross motion which was for summary judgment declaring that Nautilus is obligated to defend it in the underlying personal injury action.

See Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., 39 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dep't 2007).

In Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., the Second Department held that, given conflicting accounts of how the driver became intoxicated, it was premature to conclude that the club was entitled to indemnification.

However, in light of the conflicting versions of the circumstances giving rise to the alleged intoxication of the driver in the underlying personal injury action, it was premature to conclude that the Molesi Club is entitled to indemnification.

See Staten Island Molesi Social Club, Inc. v. Nautilus Insurance Co., 39 A.D.3d 843 (2d Dep't 2007).

In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the operator of a nightclub, sued after an intoxicated patron allegedly shot another patron, sought coverage under both a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy, and the insurer disclaimed under an assault and battery exclusion in each.

The relevant allegations in the underlying negligence action may be summarized as follows: Jonathan Ilchert, while in a nightclub operated by Hipps, was confronted verbally and physically by a fellow patron who was intoxicated. While in the parking lot of the club a short time later, he heard a noise and realized that he had been shot, allegedly by the same patron. Ilchert commenced an action against Hipps claiming that a proximate cause of his injuries was that Hipps was negligent in failing to maintain a secure premises and in hiring and supervising its personnel, and that Hipps had violated the so-called Dram Shop Act by allowing his assailant to continue to drink alcoholic beverages even after he was visibly intoxicated. Hipps, in turn, sought coverage from its insurer, Sphere Drake, pursuant to a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy. Sphere Drake disclaimed coverage under an assault and battery exclusion in each policy and commenced this declaratory judgment action.

See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).

In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the Second Department held that the insurer properly and timely disclaimed coverage under policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.

We grant such relief on the ground that Sphere Drake properly and timely disclaimed coverage pursuant to policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.

See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).

The IRMI insurance glossary defines host liquor liability as liability for bodily injury or property damage arising from serving or distributing alcohol by a party not engaged in that activity as a business, and states that the exposure is insurable under standard general liability policies.

Host liquor liability is the liability for bodily injury (BI) or property damage (PD) arising out of the serving or distribution of alcoholic beverages by a party not engaged in this activity as a business enterprise. Host liquor liability exposures are insurable under standard general liability policies.

See IRMI, Host Liquor Liability, Insurance Glossary (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, an insurer, writes that a standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability for events where alcohol is provided free to guests, but not where alcohol is sold.

A standard general liability policy provides host liquor liability, which covers events where alcohol is provided free to guests, but not situations where alcohol is sold.

See Nonprofits Insurance Alliance, Liquor Liability 101: How to Serve Alcohol at Your Nonprofit Events (Dec. 21, 2017).

Nonprofit Risk Management Center guidance recommends asking an insurance agent or broker whether the current policy covers events where alcohol is served or whether additional liquor liability coverage is needed.

Ask your insurance agent or broker for assistance in determining whether your current insurance policy covers events where alcohol is served or if additional liquor liability coverage is needed.

See Nonprofit Risk Mgmt. Ctr., Serving Alcohol at Special Events, in Insurance Fails to Cover Drunk Driving Accident (Community Risk Management & Insurance, Jan. 2004).

Nonprofit Risk Management Center guidance states that when a caterer is used, most of the risks can be transferred to the caterer once the proper additional insured endorsement is obtained from the caterer's insurer.

If using a caterer, most of the risks can be transferred to that company when you have obtained the proper additional insured endorsement from the company’s carrier.

See Nonprofit Risk Mgmt. Ctr., Serving Alcohol at Special Events, in Insurance Fails to Cover Drunk Driving Accident (Community Risk Management & Insurance, Jan. 2004).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 100(1) bars any person from selling an alcoholic beverage at wholesale or retail in New York without the appropriate license.

No person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alcoholic beverage within the state without obtaining the appropriate license therefor required by this chapter.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 100(1) (2026).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 64-b(1) makes it unlawful for the operator of a place run for profit or pecuniary gain with capacity for 20 or more people to permit people to come there to drink alcohol, whether supplied by the operator or brought by the guests, unless the operator first obtains a license.

It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership or corporation operating a place for profit or pecuniary gain, with a capacity for the assemblage of twenty or more persons to permit a person or persons to come to the place of assembly for the purpose of consuming alcoholic beverages on said premises, which alcoholic beverages are either provided by the operator of the place of assembly, his agents, servants or employees, or are brought onto said premises by the person or persons assembling at such place, unless an appropriate license has first been obtained from the state liquor authority by the operator of said place of assembly.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 64-b(1) (2026).

NY Business Express states that a one-day permit is required for each point of sale on each date, must be displayed at the event, and allows alcohol to be bought only from a licensed New York manufacturer or wholesaler and not from a retail licensee.

A separate permit is required for each point of sale for each date; The permit must be on display at the event; Alcoholic beverages must be purchased from a licensed New York State manufacturer, or wholesaler ONLY, and not from a retail licensee; No alcohol may be taken from the premises where said event is held except that at the termination of said event, any alcohol which shall remain on hand will be removed from said premises by a manufacturer or wholesaler from which it was purchased, or by its designated agent.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

NY Business Express states, as one-day permit conditions, that no alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in any area where bingo is played, that alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in areas where authorized games of chance are held, and that applicants allowing games of chance must contact the NYS Gaming Commission for authorization.

No alcoholic beverages may be sold, served or consumed in any area where bingo is played. Alcohol may be sold, served or consumed in rooms or areas in which authorized games of chance are held. Applicants allowing games of chance must contact the NYS Gaming Commission for authorization to do so.

See N.Y. Business Express, One Day Alcohol Event Permit (accessed Oct. 8, 2026).

In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the Second Department described a nightclub operator that sought coverage under a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy, and an insurer that disclaimed under an assault and battery exclusion in each policy.

Hipps, in turn, sought coverage from its insurer, Sphere Drake, pursuant to a general liability policy and a liquor liability policy. Sphere Drake disclaimed coverage under an assault and battery exclusion in each policy and commenced this declaratory judgment action.

See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).

In Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., the Second Department held that the insurer properly and timely disclaimed coverage under policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.

We grant such relief on the ground that Sphere Drake properly and timely disclaimed coverage pursuant to policy exclusions for claims arising out of an alleged assault and battery.

See Sphere Drake Insurance Co. v. Block 7206 Corp., 265 A.D.2d 78 (2d Dep't 2000).

State Liquor Authority Advisory 2022-31 states that a license or permit is required to sell alcohol, that any payment a customer must make to obtain a drink is a sale, and that a required entry fee to an event where champagne is handed out makes it a sale of the champagne.

If a person wants to sell alcoholic beverages, the ABC Law requires the person to have the appropriate license or permit. If the customer must pay anything to obtain the alcoholic beverage, that is a sale. For example, an art gallery is having an exhibition and anyone (of legal age) attending the exhibition can get a glass (or glasses) of champagne. If anyone can walk into the gallery for free and get a glass of champagne, the champagne is being given away. If a person must pay a fee to enter the gallery and see the exhibition, that is a sale of the champagne.

See N.Y. State Liquor Auth., Advisory 2022-31, BYOB and Providing Free Alcoholic Beverages to Customers (Dec. 13, 2022).

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 bars any person from selling, delivering or giving away alcoholic beverages to a person actually or apparently under 21, a visibly intoxicated person, or a habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense them.

No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold, delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to 1. Any person, actually or apparently, under the age of twenty-one years; 2. Any visibly intoxicated person; 3. Any habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense any alcoholic beverages.

See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 65(1)–(3) (2026).