Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Rhode Island?
Often no for covered workers. The Rhode Island Noncompetition Agreement Act makes a non-compete unenforceable against FLSA-nonexempt employees, student interns, workers age 18 or younger, and low-wage employees .
The statutory ban is targeted rather than universal. It applies to covered employees within Chapter 28-59, and the statute defines an employee to exclude independent contractors . For workers outside the banned categories, Rhode Island common law still requires a valid relationship, consideration, a legitimate interest, and a reasonable restraint.
The low-wage category is indexed to the federal poverty level. The statute defines it as an employee whose average annual earnings are not more than 250 percent of the federal poverty level for individuals .
Do not treat Rhode Island as a total-ban state. Chapter 28-59 bars non-competes only for the worker categories listed in the statute, while other workers and other restrictive covenants still require separate analysis. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
Section 28-59-3 supports the rule that Rhode Island non-competes are unenforceable against FLSA-nonexempt employees, student interns, workers age 18 or younger, and low-wage employees.
A noncompetition agreement shall not be enforceable against the following types of workers:
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-3(a).
Section 28-59-2 defines employee for Chapter 28-59 and excludes independent contractors.
“Employee” means an individual who works for hire, including an individual employed in a supervisory, managerial, or confidential position, but shall not include an independent contractor.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(3).
Section 28-59-2 defines low-wage employee by reference to 250 percent of the federal poverty level for individuals.
“Low-wage employee” means an employee whose average annual earnings, as defined in subsection (2), are not more than two hundred fifty percent (250%) of the federal poverty level for individuals as established by the United States Department of Health and Human Services federal poverty guidelines.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(7).
Durapin supports Rhode Island's common-law baseline that non-competes are disfavored and enforced only if reasonable and no broader than necessary.
However, since such provisions are not favored, they are subject to judicial scrutiny and will be enforced as written only if the contract is reasonable and does not extend beyond what is apparently necessary for the protection of those in whose favor it runs.
See Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1989).
What Rhode Island restrictions are excluded from the statutory non-compete definition?
Rhode Island excludes several common restraints from the Chapter 28-59 definition of a noncompetition agreement, including employee non-solicits, customer non-solicits and confidentiality agreements. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 3 sources in this group. It also excludes a covenant made in connection with the sale of a business entity or of all or substantially all of its operating assets, or the disposal of an ownership interest, but only when the restricted party is a significant owner, member or partner who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale .
That does not make those covenants automatically enforceable. It means the RINAA ban does not decide the issue. Customer non-solicits, employee non-solicits, NDAs, confidentiality clauses, sale covenants, and qualifying separation agreements fall back to common law, trade-secret law, or the separate statute that governs the profession or industry.
For drafting, the most important consequence is precision. A customer non-solicit should be written as a customer restraint, a confidentiality clause as a confidentiality clause, and a sale covenant as a sale covenant, because calling every restraint a non-compete can blur the statutory analysis.
An employee non-solicit, a customer non-solicit, and a confidentiality clause sit outside the Chapter 28-59 definition of a noncompetition agreement, so the worker-category ban does not decide their fate and each runs through common law or trade-secret law instead. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. That exclusion holds only while each restraint stays the covenant type it claims to be: a customer non-solicit confined to served customers, a confidentiality clause confined to protecting information, and a no-business restraint that reaches customers who approach the worker sitting at the strict end of the reasonableness test because it restrains doing the work rather than chasing it. A restraint labeled a non-solicit or an NDA but drafted to bar ordinary competition reads as an activity restraint in disguise, which pulls it back under the definition it was meant to sit outside and invites analysis under the least favorable regime.
Sources for this answer
Section 28-59-2 defines a noncompetition agreement as an agreement between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an existing or anticipated employment relationship, not to compete after the employment ends.
“Noncompetition agreement” means an agreement between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an existing or anticipated employment relationship, under which the employee or expected employee agrees that he or she will not engage in certain specified activities competitive with his or her employer after the employment relationship has ended.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8).
Section 28-59-2 excludes nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements from the statutory definition of noncompetition agreement.
(vi) Nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements;
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8)(vi).
Section 28-59-2(8) lists the agreements excluded from the definition of noncompetition agreement, including employee and customer non-solicitation covenants and confidentiality agreements.
Noncompetition agreements include forfeiture for competition agreements, but do not include: (i) Covenants not to solicit or hire employees of the employer; (ii) Covenants not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, or vendors of the employer; (iii) Noncompetition agreements made in connection with the sale of a business entity or all or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary of any of the foregoing, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal; (iv) Noncompetition agreements originating outside of an employment relationship; (v) Forfeiture agreements; (vi) Nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements; (vii) Invention assignment agreements; (viii) Noncompetition agreements made in connection with the cessation of or separation from employment if the employee is expressly granted seven (7) business days to rescind acceptance; or (ix) Agreements by which an employee agrees to not reapply for employment to the same employer after termination of the employee.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8).
Section 28-59-2 excludes from the definition of noncompetition agreement a covenant made in connection with the sale of a business entity or all or substantially all of its operating assets, or the disposal of an ownership interest, when the restricted party is a significant owner, member or partner who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale.
(iii) Noncompetition agreements made in connection with the sale of a business entity or all or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary of any of the foregoing, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal;
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8)(iii).
What common-law test applies to Rhode Island restrictive covenants not banned by statute?
Rhode Island applies strict reasonableness review. The party seeking enforcement must show a valid underlying relationship, adequate consideration, a legitimate interest, and a restraint no broader than reasonably necessary. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Durapin supplies the core framework. Rhode Island recognizes that non-competes can serve legitimate purposes, but treats them as disfavored restraints. The key practical point is that ordinary competition is not enough. The promisee needs a legitimate interest such as confidential customer relationships, goodwill, trade secrets, or another protectable interest.
Cranston Print Works reinforces the same standard and calls for strict judicial scrutiny. It also warns that covenants lacking both time and geographic limits may still be enforceable in some settings, but only to the extent necessary to protect legitimate interests .
Every covenant not banned by statute is a disfavored restraint subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and the party seeking enforcement carries the burden of the full showing: that the covenant is ancillary to a valid relationship, supported by consideration, protective of a legitimate interest, and no broader than apparently necessary. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. Protection from ordinary competition is not a legitimate interest, so a covenant that names Protected Interests without a real interest behind it — confidential customer relationships, goodwill, or trade secrets — leaves nothing for the restraint to protect when the burden is tested. A covenant with no stated time or geographic limit is not automatically void, but it is enforced only to the extent necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests, so an open-ended restraint is measured down to what the record proves rather than to what it says . An assignment moves the covenant without lightening that showing: whoever enforces it carries the same elements the original employer would.
Sources for this answer
Durapin supports Rhode Island's common-law enforcement elements for non-competes.
Before a court reaches this question, however, the party seeking to enforce a noncompetition provision must show that (1) the provision is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship, such as an employment contract or a contract for the purchase and sale of a business, Restatement (Second)
See Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1989).
Cranston Print Works supports strict judicial scrutiny for covenants not to compete.
It is well settled that covenants not to compete are disfavored and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
See Cranston Print Works Co. v. Pothier, 848 A.2d 213, 219 (R.I. 2004).
Cranston Print Works supports enforcing unlimited restraints only to the extent necessary to protect legitimate interests.
courts should uphold them only to the extent they are necessary to protect the promisee’s legitimate interests.
See Cranston Print Works Co. v. Pothier, 848 A.2d 213, 220 (R.I. 2004).
Does continued employment support a Rhode Island restrictive covenant?
It can. In Walls, the Rhode Island Supreme Court treated continued at-will employment, plus training and licensure support, as part of a lawful exchange supporting a 24-month customer restriction .
Walls matters because the agreement was signed during employment, not only at initial hire. The court also rejected the argument that involuntary termination prevented enforcement; the covenant applied on termination from employment without limiting language tied to the reason for departure .
The restraint in Walls was customer-focused. It barred solicitation and pest-control work for current and former company customers for 24 months, and the court emphasized that it did not use a geographic territory . That makes the case useful for customer non-solicits and customer-service restrictions, not for broad bans on working in the same industry.
Consideration is one of the enforcement elements the employer must prove, so a covenant signed during employment stands on what the record shows moved in exchange for it. Rhode Island treats continued at-will employment, plus training and licensure support, as part of a lawful exchange that can support a restraint agreed mid-employment, and it enforced such a covenant even after an involuntary termination where the covenant applied on any termination without language tied to the reason for departure. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. That signal is strong but not final: it came from the affirmance of a preliminary injunction reviewed for abuse of discretion, not a final judgment on validity, so a covenant that rests on a thin or unrecorded exchange is exposed once a fuller record is developed . The restraint that carried was customer-scoped rather than a broad activity ban, which is the shape a mid-employment refresh is measured against .
Sources for this answer
Walls supports treating continued employment and employer-provided training as consideration for a Rhode Island customer restriction.
employment relationship with plaintiff: In consideration for continued employment
See Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co. v. Walls, 313 A.3d 616, 625 (R.I. 2024).
Walls supports enforcement after involuntary termination when the covenant is not limited by the circumstances of termination.
Walls’s argument that an involuntary termination would preclude enforcement of
See Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co. v. Walls, 313 A.3d 616, 627 (R.I. 2024).
Walls supports a 24-month customer-based restraint limited to current and prior customers rather than a geographic territory.
month period, and extends only to plaintiff’s current and previous clients, rather than
See Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co. v. Walls, 313 A.3d 616, 626 (R.I. 2024).
Walls reviewed the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, so it does not finally adjudicate the covenant's validity.
This Court reviews a trial justice’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.
See Griggs & Browne Pest Control Co. v. Walls, 313 A.3d 616, 623 (R.I. 2024).
Will Rhode Island courts narrow an overbroad non-compete?
Usually yes if equitable. Durapin adopted partial enforcement rather than an all-or-nothing or mechanical blue-pencil rule, absent bad faith or deliberate overreaching .
Partial enforcement is not a drafting strategy. Even under Durapin, the court should go no further than reasonably necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests . Overbreadth still creates litigation risk and may leave the employer without meaningful relief if the employee did not jeopardize a protectable interest. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these limits, the Rhode Island non-compete reviewer checklist walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
RINAA also has a severability rule for contracts containing a non-compete that is unenforceable under § 28-59-3. That rule preserves the remainder of the contract and allows a court to impose a non-compete restriction as a remedy for breach of another agreement or duty .
Statutory severability is not automatic enforcement. Rhode Island permits a court to modify and enforce an unreasonable restraint whether or not its terms are divisible, but that reformation still turns on reasonableness, legitimate interests, and equitable limits, and a court goes no further than is reasonably necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. Deliberate overreaching is the one posture that forfeits that modification, so a covenant drafted broad in reliance on judicial rescue is the covenant most likely to lose it. The act's severability layer runs the same way: where a non-compete is unenforceable against the worker, the remainder of the contract survives and a court may still impose a restriction as a remedy for breach of another agreement or duty, but that preserves the contract, not the banned covenant .
Sources for this answer
Durapin adopts partial enforcement for unreasonable covenants unless circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching.
We believe this is the appropriate time to choose the route that permits unreasonable restraints to be modified and enforced, whether or not their terms are divisible, unless the circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching on the part of the promisee.
See Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058-59 (R.I. 1989).
Durapin limits judicial enforcement to what is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests.
Even under this approach a court will go no further in granting relief than is reasonably necessary to protect a promisee’s legitimate interests.
See Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1059 (R.I. 1989).
Section 28-59-3 preserves the remainder of a contract containing an unenforceable non-compete and allows court-imposed restrictions as remedies for other breaches or duties.
This section does not render void or unenforceable the remainder of a contract or agreement containing the unenforceable noncompetition agreement, nor does it preclude the imposition of a noncompetition restriction by a court, whether through preliminary or permanent injunctive relief or otherwise, as a remedy for a breach of another agreement or of a statutory or common law duty.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-3(b).
Which Rhode Island professions have special non-compete bans?
Rhode Island has separate statutory bans for physicians and advanced practice registered nurses, each with a sale-of-practice exception for covenants lasting no more than five years. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
The physician statute voids restrictions on the right to practice medicine, including geographic practice limits and limits on treating, consulting with, or soliciting current patients. The APRN statute uses parallel language for APRNs licensed under Rhode Island nursing law.
Both statutes share the same shape: a categorical ban on practice restrictions, paired with a sale-of-practice exception capped at five years. Outside these regulated professions, Rhode Island has no other occupation-specific non-compete ban, so most workers fall under Chapter 28-59 and common law.
The physician and APRN bans void any restriction of the right to practice, and they reach further than a clause labeled non-compete: geographic practice limits and limits on treating, consulting with, or soliciting current patients are all restrictions of the right to practice. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group. A customer non-solicit aimed at a provider's patients therefore sits inside the ban even though it would otherwise fall outside Chapter 28-59, so a restraint that captures a physician's or an advanced practice registered nurse's patients is void as to that restriction while the rest of the agreement survives. Each statute shares one exception — a covenant made in connection with the sale of a practice that lasts no more than five years — and the APRN ban has applied since June 17, 2024, so a covenant against an APRN signed on or after that date is measured against it.
Sources for this answer
Section 5-37-33 voids physician practice restrictions and preserves a sale-of-practice exception for covenants lasting no more than five years.
Any contract or agreement that creates or establishes the terms of a partnership, employment, or any other form of professional relationship with a physician licensed to practice medicine pursuant to this chapter that includes any restriction of the right of such physician to practice medicine shall be void and unenforceable with respect to said restriction; provided, however, that nothing herein shall render void or unenforceable the remaining provisions of any such contract or agreement.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-33(a).
Section 5-34-50 voids APRN practice restrictions and preserves a sale-of-practice exception for covenants lasting no more than five years.
Any contract or agreement that creates or establishes the terms of a partnership, employment, or any other form of professional relationship with an advanced practice registered nurse (“APRN”) licensed to practice pursuant to § 5-34-45 that includes any restriction of the right of the APRN to practice shall be void and unenforceable with respect to said restriction; provided, however, that nothing herein shall render void or unenforceable the remaining provisions of any such contract or agreement.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-34-50(a).
How do Rhode Island trade-secret rules affect non-compete drafting?
Rhode Island trade-secret law is the main confidentiality alternative to a non-compete. RIUTSA protects qualifying information and authorizes injunctions for actual or threatened misappropriation. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
RINAA itself preserves agreements not to share trade-secret information after employment . That makes trade-secret and confidentiality drafting especially important when a worker falls within a non-compete ban or when a broad activity restraint would be difficult to justify.
RIUTSA also preserves contractual remedies, so a well-drafted NDA can operate alongside statutory trade-secret claims. The safer approach is to define confidential information carefully, reserve trade-secret protection for information that meets the statutory definition, and avoid writing an NDA so broadly that it functions like a hidden non-compete.
When a worker falls inside a non-compete ban or a broad activity restraint is hard to justify, the confidentiality and trade-secret terms carry the entire protective load, and Rhode Island preserves them for that role: the act expressly permits an agreement not to share employer trade-secret information after employment . That fallback holds only while the confidentiality clause stays a confidentiality clause. An NDA written broadly enough to bar ordinary post-employment work functions as a hidden non-compete and invites reclassification under the very regime the drafter was avoiding, so reserving trade-secret treatment for information that meets the statutory definition, and keeping a written return-and-certification record, are what stand up when protected material later surfaces at a competitor. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
Sources for this answer
Section 6-41-1 defines trade secret for Rhode Island trade-secret law.
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-1(4).
Section 6-41-2 authorizes injunctions for actual or threatened trade-secret misappropriation.
Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-2(a).
Section 28-59-3 preserves agreements not to share employer trade-secret information after employment.
Nothing in this section shall preclude an employer from entering into an agreement with an employee not to share any information, including after the employee is no longer employed by the employer, regarding the employer or the employment that is a trade secret.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-3(c).
Section 6-41-7 preserves contractual remedies despite RIUTSA displacement of conflicting civil remedies.
This chapter does not affect:
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-7(b).
What recent Rhode Island and federal developments should employers monitor?
As of June 2, 2026, Rhode Island's enacted baseline remains Chapter 28-59 plus profession-specific statutes and common law. Recent proposals and federal activity matter for monitoring, but they should not be treated as the current Rhode Island rule unless enacted or effective. On a touch screen, a tap shows all 2 sources in this group.
The 2024 Rhode Island broad-ban bill, H8059/S2436, passed both houses but was vetoed by Governor McKee in June 2024. The 2025 S0302 proposal would have added a $125,000 earnings threshold, but monitor the official General Assembly record before relying on any pending or prior-session bill as law.
The federal FTC Non-Compete Rule is also background rather than an operative Rhode Island rule. The rule was challenged, blocked, and later treated by the FTC as not enforceable, so Rhode Island analysis still starts with state statutes, profession-specific statutes, common law, and trade-secret law.
Rhode Island non-compete law may change through future legislation, but un-enacted bills do not replace the enacted worker-category statute. Check Chapter 28-59 and any active bill text before reusing a Rhode Island form .
Sources for this answer
Chapter 28-59 remains the enacted Rhode Island Noncompetition Agreement Act baseline for employee non-compete restrictions.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Noncompetition Agreement Act.”
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-1.
Section 5-34-50 is the enacted 2024 APRN restrictive-covenant statute.
P.L. 2024, ch. 118, § 1, effective June 17, 2024; P.L. 2024, ch. 128, § 1, effective June 17, 2024.
See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-34-50, history.
What does federal law require a non-compete or confidentiality agreement in Rhode Island to say about whistleblowers and pay?
An employee confidentiality, non-compete, or invention assignment agreement signed or updated now that governs trade secrets or other confidential information must give the Defend Trade Secrets Act whistleblower-immunity notice, and for employees the National Labor Relations Act covers, Section 7 of that Act protects concerted activity, including joining together over pay and working conditions, that a broad confidentiality clause can restrict. The employer may satisfy the notice duty by cross-referencing a qualifying policy document provided to the employee, but an employer that omits the notice may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under the Defend Trade Secrets Act in an action against an employee who was not given notice.
The notice describes a federal immunity: an individual cannot be held liable under federal or state trade-secret law for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to a government official or an attorney solely to report or investigate a suspected violation of law, or in a court filing made under seal. For an agreement signed or updated now, the duty to give that notice reaches any agreement with an employee that governs trade secrets or other confidential information, whatever else the agreement does.
Section 7 gives employees the National Labor Relations Act covers a statutory right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, including joining together to improve pay and working conditions. For employees the Act covers, the Board's work-rule standard adopted in 2023 makes a rule presumptively unlawful if it has a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their Section 7 rights; an employer can rebut that presumption only by showing a legitimate and substantial business interest it cannot serve with a more narrowly tailored rule. The 2023 standard may change, but the Section 7 right it enforces is statutory. State law may add its own requirements for the same clauses.
A form carried over without the immunity notice, or a cross-reference to a reporting policy the employee never received, leaves the confidentiality clause without a valid notice, so the Act's exemplary damages and attorney fees are unavailable against that employee. A Confidential Information definition that sweeps in pay and working conditions with no carve-out exposes the employer to an unfair-labor-practice finding for employees the Act covers.
Sources for this answer
An individual is immune from criminal and civil liability under federal and state trade-secret law for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to a government official or an attorney solely to report or investigate a suspected violation of law, or in a court filing made under seal.
An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that— (A) is made— (i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and (ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or (B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1).
An employer must give notice of the trade-secret whistleblower immunity in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.
An employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A).
An employer complies with the notice requirement by cross-referencing a policy document, provided to the employee, that sets out the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.
An employer shall be considered to be in compliance with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A) if the employer provides a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(B).
An employer that does not give the required notice may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees in a trade-secret action against an employee who did not receive it.
If an employer does not comply with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A), the employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom notice was not provided.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
Section 7 gives employees the right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, the statutory basis for keeping discussion of pay and working conditions outside confidentiality restrictions.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (NLRA § 7).
The National Labor Relations Board protects the right of private-sector employees, with or without a union, to join together to improve wages, benefits, and working conditions.
Established in 1935, the National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal agency that protects employees from unfair labor practices and protects the right of private sector employees to join together, with or without a union, to improve wages, benefits and working conditions.
See NLRB Office of Public Affairs, news release of Feb. 21, 2023 (agency mission statement).
Under the work-rule standard the Board adopted in 2023, a rule with a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their Section 7 rights is presumptively unlawful unless the employer proves a legitimate and substantial business interest it cannot advance with a more narrowly tailored rule.
Under the new standard adopted in Stericycle, the General Counsel must prove that a challenged rule has a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exercising their rights. If the General Counsel does so, then the rule is presumptively unlawful. However, the employer may rebut the presumption by proving that the rule advances a legitimate and substantial business interest and that the employer is unable to advance that interest with a more narrowly tailored rule.
See Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023); NLRB Office of Public Affairs, Board Adopts New Standard for Assessing Lawfulness of Work Rules (Aug. 2, 2023).