Are repayment terms enforceable?
For Illinois Freedom to Work Act agreements entered after its January 1, 2022 amendment took effect, repayment triggered by post-employment competition falls within noncompete restrictions for covered employers, excluding governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. Payroll collection separately requires a wage-deduction exception.
The definition addresses adverse financial consequences triggered by competitive activities after termination. It does not classify every departure-triggered debt as a noncompete.
The Act’s employer definition excludes governmental and quasi-governmental bodies.
In 2026, covered noncompetes require actual or expected annualized earnings above $75,000; nonsolicits require earnings above $45,000. These thresholds rise to $80,000 and $47,500 on January 1, 2027.
Additional restrictions concern pandemic-like layoffs, public-sector collective bargaining, construction workers (with specified management, engineering or architectural, design, sales, and ownership exceptions), and certain post-January 1, 2025 covenants affecting veterans’ and first responders’ mental-health services. Their statutory conditions still matter even above the earnings thresholds.
A covered covenant needs adequate consideration, a valid employment relationship, protection no greater than a legitimate business interest requires, no undue employee hardship, and no public injury.
Adequate consideration can be two years of post-signing employment or adequate professional or financial benefits.
The employer must advise the employee in writing to consult an attorney and provide a 14-calendar-day review opportunity. The employee may voluntarily sign earlier.
Sources for this answer
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act includes post-2021 agreements imposing adverse financial consequences for post-employment competition in its noncompete definition.
"Covenant not to compete" also means an agreement between an employer and an employee, entered into after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, that by its terms imposes adverse financial consequences on the former employee if the employee engages in competitive activities after the termination of the employee's employment with the employer.
See 820 ILCS 90/5
Public Act 102-358, which amended the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, took effect January 1, 2022.
Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect January 1, 2022.
See Pub. Act 102-358, § 99 (Ill. 2021)
Illinois Freedom to Work Act definitions attribute the amendment to Public Act 102-358, effective January 1, 2022.
(820 ILCS 90/5) Sec. 5. Definitions. In this Act: "Adequate consideration" means (1) the employee worked for the employer for at least 2 years after the employee signed an agreement containing a covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit or (2) the employer otherwise provided consideration adequate to support an agreement to not compete or to not solicit, which consideration can consist of a period of employment plus additional professional or financial benefits or merely professional or financial benefits adequate by themselves. "Covenant not to compete" means an agreement between an employer and an employee that is entered into after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly that restricts the employee from performing: (1) any work for another employer for a specified period of time; (2) any work in a specified geographical area; or (3) work for another employer that is similar to employee's work for the employer included as a party to the agreement. "Covenant not to compete" also means an agreement between an employer and an employee, entered into after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, that by its terms imposes adverse financial consequences on the former employee if the employee engages in competitive activities after the termination of the employee's employment with the employer. "Covenant not to compete" does not include (1) a covenant not to solicit, (2) a confidentiality agreement or covenant, (3) a covenant or agreement prohibiting use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions, (4) invention assignment agreements or covenants, (5) a covenant or agreement entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest, (6) clauses or an agreement between an employer and an employee requiring advance notice of termination of employment, during which notice period the employee remains employed by the employer and receives compensation, or (7) agreements by which the employee agrees not to reapply for employment to the same employer after termination of the employee. "Covenant not to solicit" means an agreement that is entered into after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly between an employer and an employee that (1) restricts the employee from soliciting for employment the employer's employees or (2) restricts the employee from soliciting, for the purpose of selling products or services of any kind to, or from interfering with the employer's relationships with, the employer's clients, prospective clients, vendors, prospective vendors, suppliers, prospective suppliers, or other business relationships. "Earnings" means the compensation, including earned salary, earned bonuses, earned commissions, or any other form of taxable compensation, reflected or that is expected to be reflected as wages, tips, and other compensation on the employee's IRS Form W-2 plus any elective deferrals not reflected as wages, tips, and other compensation on the employee's IRS Form W-2, such as, without limitation, employee contributions to a 401(k) plan, a 403(b) plan, a flexible spending account, or a health savings account, or commuter benefit-related deductions. "Employee" means any individual permitted to work by an employer in an occupation. "Employer" has the meaning given to such term in subsection (c) of Section 3 of the Minimum Wage Law. "Employer" does not include governmental or quasi-governmental bodies. "Construction" means any constructing, altering, reconstructing, repairing, rehabilitating, refinishing, refurbishing, remodeling, remediating, renovating, custom fabricating, maintenance, landscaping, improving, wrecking, painting, decorating, demolishing, and adding to or subtracting from any building, structure, highway, roadway, street, bridge, alley, sewer, ditch, sewage disposal plant, water works, parking facility, railroad, excavation or other structure, project, development, real property or improvement, or to do any part thereof, whether or not the performance of the work herein described involves the addition to, or fabrication into, any structure, project, development, real property or improvement herein described of any material or article of merchandise. (Source: P.A. 102-358, eff. 1-1-22 .)
See 820 ILCS 90/5
Illinois prohibits wage and final-compensation deductions except under its specified statutory routes, including freely given contemporaneous written consent.
Except as hereinafter provided, deductions by employers from wages or final compensation are prohibited unless such deductions are (1) required by law; (2) to the benefit of the employee; (3) in response to a valid wage assignment or wage deduction order; (4) made with the express written consent of the employee, given freely at the time the deduction is made; (5) made by a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, a community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District to pay a debt owed by the employee to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment; or (6) made by a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more to pay a debt owed by the employee to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Board of Education, the county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. Before a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the housing authority shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the housing authority and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or housing authority for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education or housing authority pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review; (7) the result of an excess payment made due to, but not limited to, a typographical or mathematical error made by a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 or to collect a debt owed to a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 after notice to the employee and an opportunity to be heard; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 15% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to the municipality, the municipality shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review.
See 820 ILCS 115/9
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act bars noncompetes at earnings of $75,000 or less and nonsolicits at $45,000 or less, with increases in 2027.
(a) No employer shall enter into a covenant not to compete with any employee unless the employee's actual or expected annualized rate of earnings exceeds $75,000 per year. This amount shall increase to $80,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2027, $85,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2032, and $90,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2037. A covenant not to compete entered into in violation of this subsection is void and unenforceable. (b) No employer shall enter into a covenant not to solicit with any employee unless the employee's actual or expected annualized rate of earnings exceeds $45,000 per year. This amount shall increase to $47,500 per year beginning on January 1, 2027, $50,000 per year beginning on January 1, 2032, and $52,500 per year beginning on January 1, 2037. A covenant not to solicit entered into in violation of this subsection is void and unenforceable.
See 820 ILCS 90/10(a)–(b)
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act adds pandemic-related, public-sector collective bargaining, construction, and specified mental-health-services restrictions.
(c) No employer shall enter into a covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit with any employee who an employer terminates or furloughs or lays off as the result of business circumstances or governmental orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic or under circumstances that are similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, unless enforcement of the covenant not to compete includes compensation equivalent to the employee's base salary at the time of termination for the period of enforcement minus compensation earned through subsequent employment during the period of enforcement. A covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit entered into in violation of this subsection is void and unenforceable. (d) A covenant not to compete is void and illegal with respect to individuals covered by a collective bargaining agreement under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act or the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. (e) A covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit is void and illegal with respect to individuals employed in construction, regardless of whether an individual is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. This subsection (e) does not apply to construction employees who primarily perform management, engineering or architectural, design, or sales functions for the employer or who are shareholders, partners, or owners in any capacity of the employer. (f) Any covenant not to compete or covenant not to solicit entered into after January 1, 2025 (the effective date of Public Act 103-915) shall not be enforceable with respect to the provision of mental health services to veterans and first responders by any licensed mental health professional in this State if the enforcement of the covenant not to compete or covenant not to solicit is likely to result in an increase in cost or difficulty for any veteran or first responder seeking mental health services. For the purpose of this subsection: "First responders" means any persons who are currently or formerly employed as: (i) emergency medical services personnel, as defined in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act, (ii) firefighters, and (iii) law enforcement officers. "Licensed mental health professional" means a person licensed under the Clinical Psychologist Licensing Act, the Clinical Social Work and Social Work Practice Act, the Marriage and Family Therapy Licensing Act, the Nurse Practice Act, or the Professional Counselor and Clinical Professional Counselor Licensing and Practice Act.
See 820 ILCS 90/10(c)–(f)
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act makes covenants void unless all five enforceability requirements are met.
A covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit is illegal and void unless (1) the employee receives adequate consideration, (2) the covenant is ancillary to a valid employment relationship, (3) the covenant is no greater than is required for the protection of a legitimate business interest of the employer, (4) the covenant does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (5) the covenant is not injurious to the public.
See 820 ILCS 90/15
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act defines adequate consideration through two years of post-signing employment or adequate professional or financial benefits.
"Adequate consideration" means (1) the employee worked for the employer for at least 2 years after the employee signed an agreement containing a covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit or (2) the employer otherwise provided consideration adequate to support an agreement to not compete or to not solicit, which consideration can consist of a period of employment plus additional professional or financial benefits or merely professional or financial benefits adequate by themselves.
See 820 ILCS 90/5
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act requires written advice to consult an attorney and a 14-day review opportunity.
A covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit is illegal and void unless (1) the employer advises the employee in writing to consult with an attorney before entering into the covenant and (2) the employer provides the employee with a copy of the covenant at least 14 calendar days before the commencement of the employee's employment or the employer provides the employee with at least 14 calendar days to review the covenant. An employer is in compliance with this Section even if the employee voluntarily elects to sign the covenant before the expiration of the 14-day period.
See 820 ILCS 90/20
The Illinois Freedom to Work Act employer definition excludes governmental and quasi-governmental bodies.
"Employer" has the meaning given to such term in subsection (c) of Section 3 of the Minimum Wage Law. "Employer" does not include governmental or quasi-governmental bodies.
See 820 ILCS 90/5
Can the employer claw back pay already earned?
An Illinois employer can take back compensation already paid from wages only through a wage-deduction exception. Otherwise the employer must pursue a creditor claim, which remains subject to general contract defenses such as unconscionability. Outside the Freedom to Work Act, no Illinois statute in the reviewed authorities decides whether such a repayment promise is valid.
In Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, the Illinois Supreme Court described procedural unconscionability as a term so difficult to find, read, or understand that the party cannot fairly be said to have been aware of agreeing to it, taking into account a lack of bargaining power.
An action on a written contract or other written evidence of indebtedness must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action accrued, which covers an employer's suit on a written repayment agreement.
A payroll clawback requires a statutory deduction exception, even when an agreement provides for repayment.
An earned bonus depends on an unequivocal promise and satisfaction of the agreed conditions.
The rules distinguish objective sign-on and relocation incentives from discretionary bonuses.
The rules protect a proportionate service bonus after mutual-consent termination or employer termination through no fault of the employee, despite an employment-on-a-particular-date condition.
In Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., the federal district court rejected an FLSA kickback theory concerning the particular training-debt provision while leaving possible state-law invalidity arguments as contract defenses.
That federal ruling does not establish the validity of every Illinois repayment clause, and no precedential Illinois decision in the reviewed authorities decides the validity of departure-triggered repayment of compensation already paid.
First Peek Ultrasound L.L.C. v. Weideman is a 2018 Rule 23 order. It falls outside Rule 23’s permission for persuasive citation of qualifying orders entered on or after January 1, 2021; it is not a generally citable persuasive Illinois authority for a wage-clawback rule.
Sources for this answer
Illinois prohibits wage and final-compensation deductions except under its specified statutory routes, including freely given contemporaneous written consent.
Except as hereinafter provided, deductions by employers from wages or final compensation are prohibited unless such deductions are (1) required by law; (2) to the benefit of the employee; (3) in response to a valid wage assignment or wage deduction order; (4) made with the express written consent of the employee, given freely at the time the deduction is made; (5) made by a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, a community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District to pay a debt owed by the employee to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment; or (6) made by a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more to pay a debt owed by the employee to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Board of Education, the county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. Before a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the housing authority shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the housing authority and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or housing authority for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education or housing authority pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review; (7) the result of an excess payment made due to, but not limited to, a typographical or mathematical error made by a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 or to collect a debt owed to a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 after notice to the employee and an opportunity to be heard; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 15% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to the municipality, the municipality shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review.
See 820 ILCS 115/9
Illinois earned-bonus rules require fulfillment of promised conditions and protect a proportionate service bonus after qualifying no-fault termination.
a) An employee has a right to an earned bonus when there is an unequivocal promise by the employer and the employee has performed the requirements set forth in the bonus agreement between the parties and all of the required conditions for receiving the bonus set forth in the bonus agreement have been met. Unless one of the conditions for the bonus is that the employee be on the payroll at the time of the bonus payout, the bonus is due and owing to the employee at the time of separation. b) A former employee shall be entitled to a proportionate share of a bonus earned by length of service, regardless of any provision in the contract or agreement conditioning payment of the bonus upon employment on a particular date, when the employment relationship was terminated by mutual consent of the parties or by an act of the employer through no fault of the former employee.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.500(a)–(b)
Illinois rules distinguish discretionary bonuses from objective conditions including sign-on and relocation incentives.
d) A discretionary bonus is when the terms associated with the earning of the bonus are indefinite or uncertain, such as bonus being upon a positive evaluation of the "employee's performance" and not when the earning of a bonus is based on objective factors such as length of service, attendance or sign-on or relocation incentives.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.500(d)
Bland rejected an FLSA kickback theory concerning its training-debt provision while recognizing possible state-law defenses.
All the arguments that Plaintiffs raise against the TCR Provision—that $75,000 does not bear a rational resemblance to the costs Defendants actually incurred in their training, that Defendants used the threat of the TCR Provision to force Plaintiffs to work extra allegedly uncompensated time, etc., see, e.g. [35, ¶¶ 24, 26]—are either potential defenses to the enforcement of the contract that Plaintiffs could raise if and when Defendants attempt to enforce the provision or possible reasons to invalidate the contract as a matter of state law. They are not reasons to find that the TRC Provision violates the FLSA. The TCR Provision does not violate the FLSA because it is not a kickback, but rather constitutes to a loan that Plaintiffs’ accrued when they achieved “can sell” status. Consequently, any payment under the TCR Provision is not a kickback that would reduce the Plaintiffs’ wages to below the statutory minimum wage.
See Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 18-cv-1832, slip op. at 16–17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2019)
The Illinois Supreme Court described procedural unconscionability by reference to hidden or incomprehensible terms and lack of bargaining power.
Procedural unconscionability refers to a situation where a term is so difficult to find, read, or understand that the plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have been aware he was agreeing to it, and also takes into account a lack of bargaining power.
See Razor v. Hyundai Motor America, 222 Ill. 2d 75 (2006)
First Peek was a 2018 Rule 23 nonprecedential order with restricted citation.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
See First Peek Ultrasound L.L.C. v. Weideman, 2018 IL App (1st) 18-0858-U
Illinois Rule 23 permits persuasive citation of qualifying nonprecedential orders entered on or after January 1, 2021.
(1) An order entered under subpart (b) or (c) of this rule is not precedential except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case. However, a nonprecedential order entered under subpart (b) of this rule on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1)
Illinois final compensation includes earned commissions, bonuses, vacation and holidays, and other compensation owed under the employment agreement.
Payments to separated employees shall be termed "final compensation" and shall be defined as wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties.
See 820 ILCS 115/2
Illinois actions on written contracts and other written evidences of indebtedness must be commenced within ten years after accrual.
Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing and actions brought under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued; but if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing, on any bond, note, bill, lease, contract, or other written evidence of indebtedness, within or after the period of 10 years, then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay.
See 735 ILCS 5/13-206
Can repayment come out of the final paycheck?
Repayment may come out of Illinois final compensation only through a permitted deduction route. An ordinary deduction needs written consent freely given at the time of the deduction, so an earlier repayment promise is not by itself an authorization to deduct; the cash-advance and fixed recurring-deduction rules are the exceptions.
Final compensation includes wages, salaries, earned commissions and bonuses, earned vacation and holidays, and other compensation owed under the employment agreement.
Final compensation must be paid in full at separation if possible, and no later than the next regularly scheduled payday.
An ordinary written authorization must be freely given when the deduction occurs. For recurring deductions, an agreement specifying a defined duration and the same deduction amount each pay period is treated as contemporaneously given; that duration cannot exceed six months. Cash-advance consent may instead be given when the advance is made.
A cash advance repaid through payroll requires an agreement signed by both parties specifying the advance amount, repayment schedule, and method.
The cash-advance rules exclude wired travel funds when a signed authorization is impracticable.
A cash-advance repayment schedule cannot exceed 15% of gross wages or final compensation per paycheck.
At termination, a balance above 15% may be withheld only if the agreement signed when the advance was made included that arrangement.
The 15% rule governs cash-advance payroll collection; it does not supply a general cap for every repayment debt.
The deduction rules do not authorize violations of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law or FLSA.
The employer bears the burden of proving a section 9 exception.
A wage dispute does not excuse timely unconditional payment of amounts conceded due.
Sources for this answer
Illinois prohibits wage and final-compensation deductions except under its specified statutory routes, including freely given contemporaneous written consent.
Except as hereinafter provided, deductions by employers from wages or final compensation are prohibited unless such deductions are (1) required by law; (2) to the benefit of the employee; (3) in response to a valid wage assignment or wage deduction order; (4) made with the express written consent of the employee, given freely at the time the deduction is made; (5) made by a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, a community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District to pay a debt owed by the employee to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment; or (6) made by a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more to pay a debt owed by the employee to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 25% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the community college district in a city with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Park District, the Chicago Transit Authority, a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, the Chicago Board of Education, the county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, or the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, the county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. Before a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more or a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more, a county with a population of 3,000,000 or more, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or a housing authority of a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to a housing authority in a municipality with a population of 500,000 or more under this Section, the housing authority shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to dispute the debt that is due and owing the housing authority and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education, or housing authority for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality, county, the Cook County Forest Preserve District, the Chicago Park District, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago Board of Education or housing authority pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review; (7) the result of an excess payment made due to, but not limited to, a typographical or mathematical error made by a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 or to collect a debt owed to a municipality with a population of less than 500,000 after notice to the employee and an opportunity to be heard; provided, however, that the amount deducted from any one salary or wage payment shall not exceed 15% of the net amount of the payment. Before the municipality deducts any amount from any salary or wage of an employee to pay a debt owed to the municipality, the municipality shall certify that (i) the employee has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to dispute the debt that is due and owing the municipality, and (ii) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction order and has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing, conducted by the municipality, to object to the order. For purposes of this Section, "net amount" means that part of the salary or wage payment remaining after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be deducted and "debt due and owing" means (i) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality for services, work, or goods, after the period granted for payment has expired, or (ii) a specified sum of money owed to the municipality pursuant to a court order or order of an administrative hearing officer after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review.
See 820 ILCS 115/9
Illinois deduction authorizations require contemporaneous free consent, with specified cash-advance and fixed-duration exceptions.
Section 300.720 Written Agreement Authorizing Deductions a) Any written agreement between employer and employee permitting or authorizing deductions from wages or final compensation must be given freely at the time the deduction is made. In the case of cash advances, the agreement may be made either at the time of the deduction or at the time of the advance itself. b) When a deduction is to continue over a defined duration of time and the written agreement provides for that defined duration of time and provides for the same amount of deduction each pay period, the agreement shall be considered to be given freely at the time the deduction is made. No agreements for a defined duration of time shall last longer than six months.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.720
Illinois cash-advance payroll repayment requires both parties to sign an agreement stating the amount, schedule, and method.
Section 300.750 Cash Advance Repayment Agreement If a cash advance is to be repaid through payroll deductions, both the employer and the employee must sign an agreement specifying the amount of the advance, the repayment schedule, and the method of repayment.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.750
Illinois cash-advance rules exclude travel funds wired when signed authorization is impracticable.
Section 300.790 Cash Advance Exception The provisions of these rules pertaining to cash advances shall not apply to funds transmitted by wire to employees who are traveling, if a signed authorization is not practicable.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.790
Illinois cash-advance repayment schedules cannot exceed 15% of gross wages or final compensation per paycheck.
Section 300.800 Deduction Limit No cash advance repayment agreement shall provide for a repayment schedule of more than 15% of an employee's gross wages or final compensation per paycheck.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.800
Illinois permits a cash-advance balance above 15% at termination only under an arrangement signed when the advance was made.
Section 300.810 Balance Due at Termination If, upon termination, an employee owes an amount greater than 15% of gross wages or final compensation, that amount may be withheld from the employee's wages or final compensation, but only if such an arrangement was included in the agreement signed when the advance was made.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.810
Illinois deduction rules do not permit violations of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law or FLSA.
Nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to permit an employer to violate the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law [820 ILCS 105] or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 USC 201 et seq.).
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.700
The Illinois employer bears the burden of proving a claimed exception to IWPCA section 9.
The employer shall bear the burden of establishing the applicability of any claimed exception to Section 9 of the Act.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.710
Illinois requires timely unconditional payment of the undisputed portion of wages.
In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall pay, without condition and within the time set by this Act, all wages or parts thereof, conceded by him to be due, leaving to the employee all remedies to which he may otherwise be entitled as to any balance claimed.
See 820 ILCS 115/9
Illinois final compensation includes earned commissions, bonuses, vacation and holidays, and other compensation owed under the employment agreement.
Payments to separated employees shall be termed "final compensation" and shall be defined as wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties.
See 820 ILCS 115/2
Illinois employers must pay final compensation in full at separation if possible, and no later than the next regular payday.
Every employer shall pay the final compensation of separated employees in full, at the time of separation, if possible, but in no case later than the next regularly scheduled payday for such employee.
See 820 ILCS 115/5
How does Illinois treat payroll deductions to repay training or tuition costs?
Illinois distinguishes payroll deductions for voluntary elective tuition advances from deductions for employer-required training: the former follow written cash-advance agreement rules, while the latter require free express written consent at deduction.
The elective-course rule covers advances for tuition, textbooks, and other expenses paid to or for the employee.
The employer-required-training deduction rule applies even when government also requires the course.
These provisions regulate deduction authority; they do not by themselves establish enforceability of a separate creditor claim.
A separate debt claim does not authorize taking FLSA-protected pay. In Heder v. City of Two Rivers, the employee retained minimum wages for the withheld final pay periods, leaving the city to collect any residue as an ordinary creditor.
Heder v. City of Two Rivers supplies a federal overtime limit: repayment cannot leave the employee below FLSA-required overtime compensation.
A later federal decision describes Heder’s state-law training-repayment analysis as applying Wisconsin law, so that analysis does not establish an Illinois contract rule.
Sources for this answer
Illinois voluntary elective tuition advances require a written cash-advance agreement before deduction.
Section 300.770 Tuition Reimbursement If an employer advances payment to or on behalf of the employee for the cost of tuition, textbooks and other expenses of voluntary elective educational courses, the employer may not deduct such advances from the employee's wages or final compensation without a written agreement as set forth in the rules pertaining to cash advances (see Sections 300.720 and 300.750).
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.770
Illinois employer-required training deductions require express written consent freely given when the deduction is made.
Section 300.780 Training and Educational Expenses An employer shall not deduct expenses for training or educational courses required by the employer, even though such training or educational courses are also required by State or federal government, unless the employee's express written consent is given freely at the time the deduction is made.
See 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 300.780
Heder preserved FLSA minimum wages for withheld final pay periods while leaving residual debt to ordinary-creditor collection.
That means, in particular, that Heder was entitled to at least the statutory minimum wage for his final two pay periods (leaving the City to collect any residue as an ordinary creditor), see 29 U.S.C. §206(a)(1), and that Heder is entitled to time and a half for any overtime hours for which the FLSA requires that premium.
See Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 779 (7th Cir. 2002)
Heder held that contractual repayment could not leave the firefighter below FLSA overtime compensation.
The agreement seems to call for repayment of the overtime compensation, but as we have already observed this violates the FLSA to the extent that it would leave Heder with less than time and a half for all overtime hours.
See Heder v. City of Two Rivers, 295 F.3d 777, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2002)
Bland identifies Heder as a decision evaluating the Two Rivers firefighter agreement under Wisconsin law.
In Heder, the Eastern District of Wisconsin and then the Seventh Circuit evaluated the validity of an agreement between the City of Two Rivers and the city’s firefighters under Wisconsin law.
See Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 18-cv-1832, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2019)
How are Illinois wage-payment and noncompete repayment rules enforced?
An employee aggrieved by an Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act violation may file an Illinois Department of Labor complaint or sue in circuit court without exhausting administrative remedies.
A Department complaint requires a signed completed wage-claim application and supporting documents within one year after the wages, final compensation, or wage supplements were due.
The separate civil limitations period for an IWPCA action is ten years after accrual under section 13-206.
In Prorok v. Hiben, the Illinois Supreme Court applied that period to an IWPCA back-pay claim against a public employer rather than the Tort Immunity Act’s one-year period.
An employee not timely paid may recover the underpayment and damages of 5% of that amount for each month it remains unpaid through a Department claim or a civil action, but not both.
For a Department claim adjudicated through an administrative hearing, monthly damages accrue until the final order becomes a debt due and owed to the State.
A final Department order requiring payment becomes State debt when the employer or other party neither pays within 35 days nor timely files an action for administrative review.
In a civil action, the employee also recovers costs and all reasonable attorney’s fees.
The IWPCA permits an action by one or more employees on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees.
In an employer-filed civil action or arbitration to enforce a covered noncompete or nonsolicit, including a complaint or counterclaim, a prevailing employee recovers costs and reasonable attorney fees regarding that claim; the court or arbitrator may award appropriate relief.
The Illinois Attorney General may initiate or intervene in a civil action on reasonable cause to believe a person or entity is engaged in a prohibited pattern and practice.
In an action under the Freedom to Work Act, the Attorney General may obtain monetary damages to the State, restitution, and equitable relief, including injunctions.
The Attorney General may request, and the court may impose, a civil penalty up to $5,000 for each violation or $10,000 for each repeat violation within five years. Each violation for each person subjected to an unlawful agreement is separate.
An employer ordered to pay that neither seeks timely review nor complies within 15 days after a Department demand or 35 days after an order also owes a 20% penalty to the Department and a penalty to the employee of 1% per calendar day of delay.
Discharging or discriminating against an employee for a wage complaint, proceeding, or testimony is a Class C misdemeanor, and the employee may recover all appropriate legal and equitable relief through a Department claim or civil action, but not both, with costs and reasonable attorney's fees in a civil action.
Corporate officers or agents who knowingly permit the employer to violate the IWPCA are deemed employers of its employees.
Sources for this answer
Illinois Department of Labor wage complaints require an application and supporting documents within one year after payment was due.
An employee may file a complaint with the Department alleging violations of the Act by submitting a signed, completed wage claim application on the form provided by the Department and by submitting copies of all supporting documentation. Complaints shall be filed within one year after the wages, final compensation, or wage supplements were due.
See 820 ILCS 115/11
Illinois employees may sue in circuit court without exhausting administrative remedies and may bring similarly situated claims.
Any employee aggrieved by a violation of this Act or any rule adopted under this Act may file suit in circuit court of Illinois, in the county where the alleged violation occurred or where any employee who is party to the action resides, without regard to exhaustion of any alternative administrative remedies provided in this Act. Actions may be brought by one or more employees for and on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated.
See 820 ILCS 115/11(d)
Illinois IWPCA civil actions must commence within ten years after accrual.
Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing and actions brought under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued; but if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing, on any bond, note, bill, lease, contract, or other written evidence of indebtedness, within or after the period of 10 years, then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay.
See 735 ILCS 5/13-206
The Illinois Supreme Court held that IWPCA back-pay claims against a public employer use the ten-year period rather than the Tort Immunity Act one-year period.
This case presents the question of whether a claim for back pay against a public employer under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/5 (West 2016)) is subject to the 1-year limitations period in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2016)) or the 10-year limitations period applicable to claims arising under the Wage Act (735 ILCS 5/13-206 (West 2016)). We hold today that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to such claims, and therefore the 10-year limitations period is applicable.
See Prorok v. Hiben, 2017 IL 121032, ¶ 1
The IWPCA permits underpayments and five-percent monthly damages through a Department claim or civil action, but not both.
(a) Any employee not timely paid wages, final compensation, or wage supplements by his or her employer as required by this Act shall be entitled to recover through a claim filed with the Department of Labor or in a civil action, but not both, the amount of any such underpayments and damages of 5% of the amount of any such underpayments for each month following the date of payment during which such underpayments remain unpaid.
See 820 ILCS 115/14(a)
IWPCA administrative-hearing monthly damages accrue until the final Department order becomes a debt owed to the State.
In a claim filed with the Department and adjudicated through an administrative hearing, the damages of 5% shall accrue for each month that the underpayments remain unpaid until the date the final order and decision of the Department becomes a debt due and owed to the State.
See 820 ILCS 115/14(a)
An employee recovering in an IWPCA civil action also recovers costs and reasonable attorney fees.
In a civil action, such employee shall also recover costs and all reasonable attorney's fees.
See 820 ILCS 115/14(a)
An employee prevailing on a covered covenant enforcement claim filed by the employer recovers costs and reasonable attorney fees under the Illinois Freedom to Work Act.
In addition to any remedies available under any agreement between an employer and an employee or under any other statute, in a civil action or arbitration filed by an employer (including, but not limited to, a complaint or counterclaim), if an employee prevails on a claim to enforce a covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit, the employee shall recover from the employer all costs and all reasonable attorney's fees regarding such claim to enforce a covenant not to compete or a covenant not to solicit, and the court or arbitrator may award appropriate relief.
See 820 ILCS 90/25
The Illinois Attorney General may sue or intervene on reasonable cause to believe a person or entity engages in a prohibited pattern and practice.
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or entity is engaged in a pattern and practice prohibited by this Act, the Attorney General may initiate or intervene in a civil action in the name of the People of the State in any appropriate court to obtain appropriate relief.
See 820 ILCS 90/30(a)
In an Illinois Freedom to Work Act action, the Attorney General may obtain specified relief and request statutory civil penalties.
(d)(1) In an action brought under this Act, the Attorney General may obtain, as a remedy, monetary damages to the State, restitution, and equitable relief, including any permanent or preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in a violation, or order any action as may be appropriate. In addition, the Attorney General may request and the court may impose a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 for each violation or $10,000 for each repeat violation within a 5-year period. For purposes of this Section, each violation of this Act for each person who was subject to an agreement in violation of this Act shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
See 820 ILCS 90/30(d)(1)
An unpaid final Illinois Department order becomes State debt when required payment is not made within 35 days and timely judicial review is not sought.
If a final and binding administrative decision issued by the Department requires an employer or other party to pay wages, penalties, or other amounts in connection with a wage claim, and the employer or other party has neither: (i) made the required payment within 35 days of the issuance of the final and binding administrative decision; nor (ii) timely filed a complaint seeking review of the final and binding administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Review Law in a court of competent jurisdiction, the final and binding administrative decision is a debt due and owed to the State and may be collected using all remedies available under the law, including, but not limited to, those found in Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
See 820 ILCS 115/11(d)
An Illinois employer that neither seeks timely review nor timely pays a Department or court wage order owes additional percentage penalties.
Any employer who has been so demanded or ordered by the Department or ordered by a court to pay such wages, final compensation, or wage supplements and who fails to seek timely review of such a demand or order as provided for under this Act and who fails to comply within 15 calendar days after such demand or within 35 days of an administrative or court order is entered shall also be liable to pay a penalty to the Department of Labor of 20% of the amount found owing and a penalty to the employee of 1% per calendar day of the amount found owing for each day of delay in paying such wages to the employee.
See 820 ILCS 115/14(b)
The IWPCA makes wage-complaint retaliation a misdemeanor and gives the employee a Department or civil remedy.
(c) Any employer, or any agent of an employer, who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because that employee has made a complaint to his or her employer, to the Director of Labor or his or her authorized representative, in a public hearing, or to a community organization that he or she has not been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or because that employee has caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act, or because that employee has testified or is about to testify in an investigation or proceeding under this Act, is guilty, upon conviction, of a Class C misdemeanor. An employee who has been unlawfully retaliated against shall be entitled to recover through a claim filed with the Department of Labor or in a civil action, but not both, all legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate. In a civil action, such employee shall also recover costs and all reasonable attorney's fees.
See 820 ILCS 115/14(c)
IWPCA liability extends to officers and agents who knowingly permit violations.
In addition to an individual who is deemed to be an employer pursuant to Section 2 of this Act, any officers of a corporation or agents of an employer who knowingly permit such employer to violate the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation.
See 820 ILCS 115/13