Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Vermont?
Sometimes, under a common-law reasonableness test, but the framework is in active flux as the 2025-2026 legislature advances a sweeping prohibition.
Vermont has no general non-compete statute in force as of June 2026. Enforcement is governed by a Vermont Supreme Court reasonableness test that runs back to Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. Andrus in 1974: courts enforce a covenant unless it is contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the employee's rights, with attention to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances of performance.
The modern articulation in Systems & Software, Inc. v. Barnes adopts Restatement-style framing: courts proceed with caution when asked to enforce covenants against competitive employment because those restraints run counter to public policy favoring the right to engage in lawful commercial activity .
The Vermont common-law reasonableness test still governs new restrictive covenants as of June 2026. But the General Assembly is actively advancing H.205 (a strike-all amendment that absorbed the prior H.334 stay-or-pay provisions) and H.583 (a healthcare-specific non-compete ban). Both bills are alive in the 2025-2026 session and would substantially supersede the common-law framework if enacted. Track status before relying on existing templates.
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
A.1 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports the foundational Vermont common-law test for enforceability of post-employment restrictive covenants.
enforcement will be ordered unless the agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 315 A.2d 456 (1974).
Primary source · Case law
A.2 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes supports Vermont's modern reasonableness framework and the 'proceed with caution' posture toward covenants against competitive employment.
We have stated that “we will proceed with caution” when asked to enforce covenants against competitive employment because such restraints run counter to public policy favoring the right of individuals to engage in the commercial activity of their choice.
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762.
Primary source · Case law
A.3 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes supports the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 framing that a covenant is unreasonable if the restraint exceeds what is needed or if the employer's need is outweighed by hardship and public injury.
Like many other courts, this Court has adopted a position with respect to enforcement of noncompetition agreements similar to that set forth in § 188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) , which provides that a restrictive covenant “is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.”
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, ¶ 4, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) (1981)).
What does Vermont consider a reasonable restriction?
A restraint is reasonable only if it protects a legitimate employer interest, is no broader than needed, and does not outweigh the employee's hardship and the public's interest in free commerce.
The Vermont Supreme Court has rejected the narrow view that non-competes may protect only trade secrets or confidential customer information. In Systems & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, the court held that protectable interests extend to things like customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill, not just confidential information already protected by trade-secret law.
Vermont also requires the employer to actually prove a protectable interest — generic protection from competition is not enough. In Barnes, the Supreme Court accepted that “The trial court found that during his employment with plaintiff, defendant had acquired inside knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s products — knowledge that he could use to compete against plaintiff.” That legitimate interest, in a small market, justified a six-month restraint. The employer carries the burden on reasonable necessity: as Summits 7 puts it, “[t]he employer has the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of the restrictive covenant.”
Geography and duration are evaluated together and on a sliding scale. Vermont has upheld a five-year, single-county restraint in Andrus (kitchen-installation business in Rutland County) , but in Roy's Orthopedic '82 the Supreme Court reversed enforcement because “the trial court concluded that the restrictive covenant not to compete was reasonably limited to time and place without having made a finding as to what ‘place’ was covered by the agreement.”
Vermont has no general non-compete statute and no statutory safe harbor, so every covenant in the agreement stands or falls on the common-law reasonableness test, and a covenant that fails it is unenforceable rather than trimmed to fit. A restraint holds only where it protects a genuine interest — Vermont recognizes customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill, not merely trade secrets, but not an interest in avoiding ordinary competition — and the employer carries the burden of proving the covenant's reasonable necessity. Duration and territory are weighed together against the employer's actual market on the facts, with no safe-harbor number: a five-year, single-county restraint tied to a proven market was upheld, while a covenant whose territory the record leaves indeterminate fails for want of a finding as to what place it covered, so a term or radius copied from another form is measured against a market it was never sized to. A covenant's stated term is taken literally, so a restraint does not revive after its stated duration has run, and a disclosure to a departing employee's next employer built on a covenant that later fails this analysis exposes the employer to a claim of its own.
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
B.1 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes supports the rule that Vermont protectable interests are not limited to trade secrets or confidential customer information; customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill can also justify a restraint.
noncompetition agreements may protect legitimate employer interests such as customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill that are “significantly broader” than proprietary information such as trade secrets and confidential customer information.
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, ¶ 5, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762.
Primary source · Case law
B.5 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes supports the proposition that competitive 'inside knowledge' of an employer's product strengths and weaknesses, in a small market, can constitute a legitimate protectable interest in Vermont.
The trial court found that during his employment with plaintiff, defendant had acquired inside knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s products — knowledge that he could use to compete against plaintiff.
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, ¶ 6, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762.
Primary source · Case law
B.3 Summits 7, Inc. v. KellySummits 7 supports the rule that the employer bears the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of the restrictive covenant.
[t]he employer has the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of the restrictive covenant.
See Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 2005 VT 97, ¶ 14, 178 Vt. 396, 886 A.2d 365.
Primary source · Case law
B.2 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports the conclusion that a five-year, single-county restraint can be reasonable when tied to the employer's actual market and the employee's developed customer relationships.
The area involved was Rutland County, and the defendants had elected to establish their business outside of that county already. After five years,' all restrictions were at an end.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 199, 315 A.2d 456, 458 (1974).
Primary source · Case law
B.4 Roy's Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne (first appeal)Roy's Orthopedic (1982) supports the rule that enforcement fails where the trial court does not make findings on the actual geographic territory covered by the covenant.
the trial court concluded that the restrictive covenant not to compete was reasonably limited to time and place without having made a finding as to what “place” was covered by the agreement.
See Roy's Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne, 142 Vt. 347, 454 A.2d 1242 (1982).
Is continued employment sufficient consideration for a non-compete signed mid-employment?
Yes. In Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, the Vermont Supreme Court held that continued at-will employment alone is sufficient consideration to support a non-compete entered into during the employment relationship.
The court adopted the majority view, agreeing that continued employment alone is sufficient consideration for a covenant signed after at-will employment has begun. The rationale is that the at-will employer can fire the employee at any time, so the consideration is the same whether the covenant is signed at hire or later.
This sets Vermont apart from neighboring jurisdictions. Massachusetts and New Hampshire commentary generally treat mid-employment non-competes as requiring independent consideration beyond continued at-will employment; in Vermont, no separate signing bonus, raise, or promotion is required as a matter of doctrine.
Continued employment is enough consideration under Summits 7, but the covenant must still satisfy the reasonableness test on its own terms. Adequate consideration does not cure overbreadth in scope, geography, or duration, and the employer still bears the burden of proving reasonable necessity under Summits 7 and the Andrus framework.
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
C.1 Summits 7, Inc. v. KellySummits 7 supports the rule that continued at-will employment alone is sufficient consideration to support a non-compete entered into during the employment relationship.
we agree with the superior court, the majority of other courts, and the recent Restatement draft that continued employment alone is sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to compete entered into during an at-will employment relationship.
See Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 2005 VT 97, ¶ 18, 178 Vt. 396, 886 A.2d 365.
Primary source · Case law
C.2 Summits 7, Inc. v. KellySummits 7 supports the drafting caution that adequate consideration does not relieve the employer of the burden to prove reasonable necessity.
[t]he employer has the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of the restrictive covenant.
See Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 2005 VT 97, ¶ 14, 178 Vt. 396, 886 A.2d 365.
Primary source · Case law
C.3 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports the drafting caution that consideration questions are independent from reasonableness questions; the employer must still satisfy the public-policy, employer-necessity, and employee-rights prongs.
enforcement will be ordered unless the agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 315 A.2d 456 (1974).
Will Vermont courts blue-pencil or reform an overbroad Vermont non-compete?
Genuinely mixed. The Vermont Supreme Court will not make a contract for the parties — it will not, for example, extend an expired time term — but it has also endorsed the modern rule of enforcing covenants to the extent reasonable in dicta.
The conservative anchor is Roy's Orthopedic '85. There, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to extend the covenant's time period because the litigation delay had run out the clock. The court explained that courts construe contracts but will not make them for the parties, and rejected the employer's attempt to relabel an extension as a postponed commencement date.
The opposite signal comes from Summits 7 and the Second Circuit. The Vermont Supreme Court observed that most modern courts agree that a trial court can enforce restrictive covenants to the extent that they are reasonable, and cited A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough — the Second Circuit's Erie prediction that Vermont would permit enforcement of a defective restrictive covenant to the limit of its validity.
The two strands can be reconciled: Vermont will not rewrite a contract by inventing new terms (no extending time, no judicially imposed geographic line), but a court may enforce only that subset of an overbroad covenant the conduct actually breaches when that subset is plainly within a reasonable restraint. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these drafting rules, the Vermont non-compete reviewer checklist walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level.
An intentionally overbroad Vermont covenant does not survive on the assumption that a court will narrow it to fit. Roy's Orthopedic '85 makes clear that Vermont judges will not equitably rewrite the contract — including by extending or shifting a time term — so an overbroad restraint stands to fail as written rather than be trimmed to the reasonable one, and the partial-enforcement dicta in Summits 7 and Deringer are case-bound rather than a free pass.
A restraint whose clock runs out during a breach or the litigation over it is not extended by a Vermont court as a matter of course: the Vermont Supreme Court refused to add time to a covenant after litigation delay exhausted its term, holding that the term is a matter of contract and that a court construes contracts but will not make them for the parties, and it declined to recharacterize the extension as a postponed start date . An extension therefore reaches only as far as the agreement itself provides for it, and an express tolling clause is itself an additional restraint that must independently satisfy the same reasonableness limits as the covenant it extends — an open-ended or indefinite extension is exposed on that ground, while the partial-enforcement dicta elsewhere in Vermont law are case-bound rather than a reliable source of judicially supplied time .
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
D.1 Roy's Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne (second appeal)Roy's Orthopedic (1985) supports the rule that Vermont courts will not equitably rewrite a noncompetition agreement by extending or shifting its time term.
The term of the noncompetition agreement was a matter of contract between the parties. This Court will construe contracts but it will not make them for the parties.
See Roy's Orthopedic, Inc. v. Lavigne, 145 Vt. 324, 487 A.2d 173 (1985).
Primary source · Case law
D.2 Summits 7, Inc. v. KellySummits 7 supports the dicta that most modern courts may enforce restrictive covenants only to the extent reasonable, even when the drafted scope is larger.
Most modem courts agree that a trial court can enforce restrictive covenants to the extent that they are reasonable.
See Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 2005 VT 97, ¶ 23, 178 Vt. 396, 886 A.2d 365.
Primary source · Case law
D.3 A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. StroughA.N. Deringer supports the Second Circuit's Erie prediction that the Vermont Supreme Court would permit enforcement of a defective restrictive covenant to the limit of its validity.
we conclude that Vermont would permit enforcement of a defective restrictive covenant to the limit of its validity.
See A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1996).
Are sale-of-business non-competes treated differently in Vermont?
Yes. Sale-of-business covenants get more breathing room than ordinary employment non-competes, especially on duration and geography, when the covenant is part of an arms-length transaction.
In Fine Foods, Inc. v. Dahlin, the Vermont Supreme Court enforced a five-year, 25-mile restaurant covenant delivered at the closing of a $240,000 sale, with $5,000 separately allocated to the covenant. The court read the covenant's term occupation broadly, found the restraint reasonable as to time and place, and rejected the seller's effort to escape it by taking a maître d' job inside the restricted area.
Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp. situates the sale-of-business covenant in damages doctrine. There, the asset-purchase agreement contained a five-year non-compete with $30,000 in dedicated consideration, paid in five annual installments. Litigation over an alleged breach turned not on enforceability but on the measure of damages, and the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the trial court's rule that failure to prove lost profits is fatal — the buyer could measure loss by the value of the bargained-for non-compete itself.
Sale-of-business reasoning has a contract-formation corollary in Miller v. Flegenheimer. The court held that a stock-sale agreement was not enforceable in part because the parties had left material terms open, including whether the contract would include a form of non-compete or non-solicitation agreement, the share price, and a claw-back structure. The takeaway: a non-compete is a distinct, bargained-for term in a Vermont stock sale, not an automatic incident.
A covenant ancillary to the sale of a business is measured differently from an employment restraint: Vermont gives it more breathing room on duration and geography when it is supported by dedicated transaction consideration and sized to the acquired goodwill, so a five-year, twenty-five-mile covenant delivered at closing with a sum paid for the covenant alone held reasonable in time and place, and a five-year covenant with dedicated consideration is treated as a bargained-for transaction asset whose breach can be valued by the covenant itself. That leeway is earned by the deal structure, not presumed: a covenant is a distinct, negotiated sale term rather than an automatic incident of the transaction, and leaving material covenant terms open — including whether the deal carries a covenant at all — can defeat contract formation, so a covenant transferred in a sale that is not papered expressly, or consideration that is not tied to the covenant, leaves the restraint on ordinary employment-covenant footing when its scope is later tested .
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
E.1 Fine Foods, Inc. v. DahlinFine Foods supports the conclusion that a five-year, 25-mile sale-of-business restraint with dedicated consideration is reasonable as to time and place.
In addition, a sum of five thousand dollars was paid for the executed covenant alone. Under the circumstances, the restrictions agreed to were reasonable to time and place.
See Fine Foods, Inc. v. Dahlin, 147 Vt. 599, 523 A.2d 1228 (1986).
Primary source · Case law
E.2 Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp.Foti Fuels supports the use of a five-year non-compete with dedicated consideration in an asset-purchase agreement and the availability of multiple damages theories when a sale-of-business covenant is breached.
The asset-purchase agreement contained a five-year non-competition provision for $30,000 in consideration, to be paid in five equal annual installments.
See Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 111, 195 Vt. 524, 90 A.3d 885.
Primary source · Case law
E.3 Miller v. FlegenheimerMiller supports the rule that a non-compete is a distinct, bargained-for term in a Vermont stock sale rather than an automatic incident, and that leaving it open can defeat contract formation.
whether or not the contract includes a form of non compete or non solicitation agreement, the price to be paid for the shares (as opposed to the Non-Compete Agreement), and the structure of the claw-back provision.
See Miller v. Flegenheimer, 2016 VT 125, ¶ 21, 203 Vt. 620, 161 A.3d 524.
What profession-specific or context-specific limits apply to Vermont non-competes?
Three categories matter: barber/cosmetology training, attorney practice, and franchisor no-poach enforcement. Healthcare may soon join the list if H.583 passes.
Vermont's narrowest categorical bar is in 26 V.S.A. § 281(c), which provides that a school of barbering or cosmetology shall not require a covenant not to compete as a condition of training for licensure. It is the only generally applicable Vermont statute that voids a category of restrictive covenant outright.
Attorneys are separately governed by Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6, which prohibits partnership, shareholder, operating, and employment agreements that restrict a lawyer's right to practice after termination, except for agreements concerning retirement benefits . The rule also bars settlement agreements that restrict a lawyer's future right to practice .
The Vermont Attorney General has used antitrust and consumer-protection authority to police franchisor no-poach clauses. The 2019 multistate Five Guys Franchisor settlement required Five Guys to stop including no-poach provisions in new franchise agreements nationwide . That enforcement is independent of the common-law non-compete framework.
Healthcare-professional non-competes are not yet categorically void, but H.583 is moving through the General Assembly: it passed the House on March 20, 2026, the Senate proposed amendments, and on May 22, 2026 the House concurred in the Senate proposal of amendment. If enacted, H.583 would explicitly void noncompetition, nondisclosure, and nondisparagement agreements between licensed healthcare professionals and their employers — with a narrow exception for covenants ancillary to the sale of a 25%-or-greater equity interest. Until H.583 is signed into law, physician non-competes are evaluated under the same Andrus / Barnes reasonableness test as other employment covenants.
A covenant restraining a licensed healthcare professional from practicing is not categorically void in Vermont as of this review, but it is not exempt either: it runs the same common-law reasonableness test as any other covenant, with the public-interest prong weighing patient access and continuity of care, and the employer carries the burden of proving its reasonable necessity. A healthcare covenant sized to a narrow radius and a short term is the one that survives that scrutiny; a broad one is exposed on the public-interest prong. The footing is unstable: H.583 would categorically void noncompetition, nondisclosure, and nondisparagement agreements for healthcare professionals if enacted, so a covenant drafted under current law stands to be displaced on enactment .
A covenant not to compete imposed as a condition of training for licensure at a school of barbering or cosmetology is void outright — the one generally applicable Vermont statute that voids a category of restrictive covenant, and no drafting saves it . The bar turns on the training-for-licensure relationship rather than on a job title, so a restraint the school or an affiliate extracts from a person training for licensure falls outside enforcement whatever the instrument is called.
A partnership, shareholders, operating, or employment agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after the relationship ends is barred by the rules of professional conduct, except as to benefits upon retirement, and a restriction on a lawyer's right to practice may not be made part of the settlement of a client controversy. Because the rule polices the substance of the restriction rather than its label, a non-compete, a practice-area carve-up, or a client-facing restraint that operates as a practice restriction all sit inside the bar, so a covenant applied to an attorney is unenforceable on that ground however it is drafted.
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F.1 26 V.S.A. § 281(c)26 V.S.A. § 281(c) supports the categorical prohibition on barber- and cosmetology-school non-competes imposed as a condition of training for licensure.
A school of barbering or cosmetology shall not require, as a condition of training for licensure, that a person enter into a covenant not to compete with the training organization or an affiliate.
See 26 V.S.A. § 281(c).
Primary source · Primary law
F.3 Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6PDFVermont Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 supports attorney-specific limits on practice restrictions.
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.
See Vt. R. Prof. Conduct 5.6(b).
Primary source · Primary law
F.2 Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6PDFVermont Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(a) supports the attorney-specific bar on firm and employment agreements restricting lawyer practice after termination.
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
See Vt. R. Prof. Conduct 5.6(a).
Official source · Agency guidance
F.4 Five Guys Franchisor, LLC Multistate Settlement AgreementPDFThe Five Guys multistate settlement supports the Attorney General enforcement point that Five Guys agreed to stop including no-poach provisions in future franchise agreements nationwide.
Five Guys agrees that it will no longer include No-Poach Provisions in any of its franchise agreements in the United States signed after the execution date of this Agreement.
See Settlement Agreement Between the Settling States and Five Guys Franchisor, LLC, para. 11 (2019).
Primary source · Case law
F.5 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports the rule that a Vermont healthcare-professional covenant is measured under the same common-law reasonableness test — public policy, employer necessity, and employee hardship — as any other restrictive covenant.
enforcement will be ordered unless the agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 315 A.2d 456 (1974).
Primary source · Case law
F.6 Summits 7, Inc. v. KellySummits 7 supports the rule that the employer bears the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of a restrictive covenant, including a covenant restraining a healthcare professional.
[t]he employer has the burden of proving the reasonable necessity of the restrictive covenant.
See Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 2005 VT 97, ¶ 14, 178 Vt. 396, 886 A.2d 365.
Primary source · Primary law
F.7 Vt. H.583 (2025-2026) — Bill StatusH.583 — titled 'An act relating to clinical decision making' — would categorically void noncompetition, nondisclosure, and nondisparagement agreements for licensed healthcare professionals if enacted.
An act relating to clinical decision making
See H.583, 2025-2026 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2026) (passed House Mar. 20, 2026; House concurred in Senate proposal of amendment, May 22, 2026).
What pending Vermont legislation matters for restrictive covenants?
Two bills are alive in the 2025-2026 session and would substantially supersede the common-law framework: H.205 (general non-compete and stay-or-pay prohibition, absorbing former H.334) and H.583 (healthcare-professional non-compete ban).
H.205 — general non-compete + stay-or-pay (strike-all amendment). As of June 2026, H.205 is the umbrella vehicle for Vermont's pending non-compete legislation. A strike-all amendment introduced in early 2026 absorbed the stay-or-pay provisions of the separate H.334 bill, and committee markup continued through March 2026. The current bill would void most non-compete agreements with a narrowly drawn carve-out for executive employees above a wage threshold, impose a three-business-day notice period for executive offers, and regulate stay-or-pay and training-repayment agreements as unlawful employment practices unless they satisfy strict voluntariness and proportionality criteria. The bill is titled An act relating to agreements not to compete and was recommitted on March 13, 2026.
H.334 — original stay-or-pay bill (absorbed). H.334 as introduced was framed as An act relating to limiting employer restrictions on individuals separating from employment, and its substance was folded into the H.205 strike-all amendment. Practitioners tracking either bill should treat H.205 as the operative vehicle.
H.583 — healthcare non-compete ban. H.583, titled An act relating to clinical decision making, passed the Vermont House on March 20, 2026, the Senate proposed amendments, and the House concurred in the Senate proposal of amendment on May 22, 2026. If enacted, the bill would explicitly void noncompetition, nondisclosure, and nondisparagement agreements between licensed healthcare professionals and their employers or contracting entities, subject only to a narrow exception for covenants ancillary to the sale of a 25%-or-greater equity interest.
None of these bills is in force as of June 2026. The common-law Andrus / Barnes / Summits 7 framework still governs new covenants and existing covenants . But because H.205 and H.583 contemplate retroactive notice obligations and an anticipated July 1, 2026 effective date, Vermont employers should not rely on existing template rollovers without monitoring the status pages for both bills.
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G.1 Vt. H.205 (2025-2026) — Bill StatusH.205, recommitted March 13, 2026, is the umbrella legislative vehicle for Vermont's pending non-compete and stay-or-pay prohibition; the bill text is titled 'An act relating to agreements not to compete'.
An act relating to agreements not to compete
See H.205, 2025-2026 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2026) (recommitted Mar. 13, 2026).
Primary source · Primary law
G.3 Vt. H.334 (2025-2026) — As IntroducedPDFH.334 as introduced was framed as a bill 'limiting employer restrictions on individuals separating from employment' — the original stay-or-pay framework later absorbed into the H.205 strike-all.
An act relating to limiting employer restrictions on individuals separating
See H.334, 2025-2026 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2025) (as introduced).
Primary source · Primary law
G.2 Vt. H.583 (2025-2026) — Bill StatusH.583 — titled 'An act relating to clinical decision making' — would categorically void noncompetition, nondisclosure, and nondisparagement agreements for licensed healthcare professionals.
An act relating to clinical decision making
See H.583, 2025-2026 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2026) (passed House Mar. 20, 2026; House concurred in Senate proposal of amendment, May 22, 2026).
Primary source · Case law
G.4 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports the rule that the common-law reasonableness framework (legitimate interest, employee hardship, public interest) governs Vermont restrictive covenants until and unless H.205 or H.583 displaces it.
enforcement will be ordered unless the agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 315 A.2d 456 (1974).
What alternatives do Vermont employers have if a non-compete isn't enforceable?
The strongest alternatives are statutory trade-secret protection under the Vermont Trade Secrets Act, narrowly drawn confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements, sale-of-business carve-outs, and garden-leave structures.
Trade-secret protection. The Vermont Trade Secrets Act (9 V.S.A. §§ 4601-4609) gives employers a statutory remedy that does not depend on a contractual non-compete. Section 4602 provides that a court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret, with the injunction continued for a reasonable period to eliminate any commercial advantage that would otherwise be derived from misappropriation. Damages, royalties, and exceptional-circumstances royalty-condition orders are also available .
Narrow confidentiality and NDA terms. Vermont's reasonableness scrutiny in Andrus and Barnes applies to restrictive covenants generally, so NDA terms that operate as practical work bans carry non-compete risk. Confidentiality clauses tied to actual confidential information and trade-secret subject matter are easier to defend .
Sale-of-business covenants. As Fine Foods, Foti Fuels, and Miller v. Flegenheimer together show, covenants ancillary to a real arms-length sale get more breathing room than employment covenants. Tie the covenant to dedicated transaction consideration and limit it to the geography of the acquired goodwill .
Garden leave. A paid notice-period structure keeps the employee on the payroll — employed but not working — during the notice period, so any restriction operates while the employment relationship is still intact rather than as a post-termination restraint. Vermont courts have not yet tested how that structure fares under the reasonableness analysis, so treat it as an untested option rather than a guaranteed work-around. Check pending H.205 before using any separation-payment structure, because H.205 is the active vehicle for Vermont's broader non-compete and stay-or-pay restrictions .
Trade-secret protection and ordinary confidentiality carry different durations: a trade-secret obligation runs for as long as the information remains a trade secret, but a perpetual lid on non-secret information operates as an indirect restraint that inherits the same reasonableness scrutiny as a non-compete, so ordinary confidential information holds up only under a finite term tied to actual confidential information . The Vermont Trade Secrets Act supplies a remedy that stands independent of any covenant, but not an automatic one: a court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret and continue the injunction only for a reasonable period to eliminate the resulting commercial advantage, which calls for conduct- or threat-specific proof rather than the bare fact that a former employee has taken a new position.
Do not rely on a Vermont inevitable disclosure theory as a primary trade-secret strategy. The VTSA's remedy reaches only actual or threatened misappropriation — § 4602 authorizes an injunction against actual or threatened misappropriation, which calls for conduct- or threat-specific proof rather than a presumption that a departing employee will inevitably use trade secrets in a new role .
Sources for this answer
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H.1 9 V.S.A. § 4602 — Injunctive relief9 V.S.A. § 4602 supports the availability of injunctive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret as an alternative to contractual non-compete enforcement.
A court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
See 9 V.S.A. § 4602(a).
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H.2 9 V.S.A. § 4603 — Damages9 V.S.A. § 4603 supports the recovery of compensatory damages, unjust enrichment, and reasonable royalty for trade-secret misappropriation under Vermont law.
Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation.
See 9 V.S.A. § 4603(a)(1).
Primary source · Primary law
H.9 9 V.S.A. § 4602 — Injunctive relief9 V.S.A. § 4602 supports the caution that VTSA injunctive relief requires actual or threatened misappropriation, not a presumed risk from new employment alone.
A court may enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret.
See 9 V.S.A. § 4602(a).
Primary source · Case law
H.3 Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. AndrusAndrus supports applying Vermont reasonableness scrutiny to restrictive covenants that burden employee rights.
enforcement will be ordered unless the agreement is found to be contrary to public policy, unnecessary for protection of the employer, or unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee, with due regard being given to the subject matter of the contract and the circumstances and conditions under which it is to be performed.
See Vt. Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195, 315 A.2d 456 (1974).
Primary source · Case law
H.4 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes supports the Restatement framing for treating overbroad work-restriction clauses as unreasonable restraints.
Like many other courts, this Court has adopted a position with respect to enforcement of noncompetition agreements similar to that set forth in § 188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) , which provides that a restrictive covenant “is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.”
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, ¶ 4, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) (1981)).
Primary source · Case law
H.5 Fine Foods, Inc. v. DahlinFine Foods supports the sale-of-business alternative because Vermont enforced a sale-closing covenant with dedicated consideration and reasonable time-and-place limits.
In addition, a sum of five thousand dollars was paid for the executed covenant alone. Under the circumstances, the restrictions agreed to were reasonable to time and place.
See Fine Foods, Inc. v. Dahlin, 147 Vt. 599, 523 A.2d 1228 (1986).
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H.6 Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp.Foti Fuels supports treating a sale-of-business non-compete as a bargained-for transaction asset with dedicated consideration.
The asset-purchase agreement contained a five-year non-competition provision for $30,000 in consideration, to be paid in five equal annual installments.
See Foti Fuels, Inc. v. Kurrle Corp., 2013 VT 111, 195 Vt. 524, 90 A.3d 885.
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H.7 Miller v. FlegenheimerMiller supports treating a non-compete or non-solicitation covenant as a distinct, negotiated sale term rather than an automatic incident of a stock transaction.
whether or not the contract includes a form of non compete or non solicitation agreement, the price to be paid for the shares (as opposed to the Non-Compete Agreement), and the structure of the claw-back provision.
See Miller v. Flegenheimer, 2016 VT 125, ¶ 21, 203 Vt. 620, 161 A.3d 524.
Primary source · Primary law
H.8 Vt. H.205 (2025-2026) — Bill StatusH.205 supports the caution to check the active Vermont legislative vehicle before using separation-payment or stay-or-pay structures alongside non-compete alternatives.
An act relating to agreements not to compete
See H.205, 2025-2026 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2026) (recommitted Mar. 13, 2026).
Are customer and employee non-solicits enforceable in Vermont?
Vermont reviews a non-solicitation covenant under the same common-law reasonableness test it applies to non-competes, and it recognizes customer relationships and goodwill as legitimate interests a covenant may protect. No Vermont decision in our review squarely decides a stand-alone customer or employee non-solicit, so this rests on the general framework.
Vermont applies one reasonableness test across restrictive covenants, and in Systems & Software, Inc. v. Barnes the Supreme Court confirmed that protectable interests reach beyond trade secrets to customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill .
A clause barring solicitation of the employer's own workforce would be tested the same way, but we found no Vermont appellate decision squarely on an employee anti-raiding covenant — so an employer cannot assume protection against employee raiding is recognized as a distinct interest.
Scope a Vermont non-solicit to the customer relationships or goodwill the employee actually worked with, and keep the duration and reach reasonable — the same factors that decide a Vermont non-compete decide a non-solicit. Do not treat the bare cost of recruiting employees as a protectable interest without authority .
Sources for this answer
Primary source · Case law
I.1 Systems & Software, Inc. v. BarnesBarnes recognizes that Vermont protectable interests extend beyond trade secrets to customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill — the customer-side interests a non-solicit would protect under Vermont's single reasonableness test.
noncompetition agreements may protect legitimate employer interests such as customer relationships and employee-specific goodwill that are “significantly broader” than proprietary information such as trade secrets and confidential customer information.
See Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 2005 VT 95, ¶ 5, 178 Vt. 389, 886 A.2d 762.