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Reviewer Checklist

Non-Compete Agreement Review Checklist — Kentucky

A clause-by-clause reviewer checklist for Kentucky employee restrictive covenant agreements — confidentiality, non-solicits, non-competes, and non-disparagement under the common-law fair-protection standard, the Creech new-consideration rule for existing employees, and the temporary health-care staffing ban.

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Parties and cover-term identification

Review every item below the way a Kentucky court would: there is no general non-compete statute, every restraint is tested against the common-law fair-protection standard, an existing employee's covenant fails without new consideration, and one statutory ban voids covenants for temporary health-care staffing workers. For the question-by-question legal analysis behind these items, see the Kentucky non-compete practice note.

1.1Parties identified by name

Confirm the named employer is the entity the worker actually works for and that gave whatever value supports the covenant. Kentucky's consideration analysis asks what the contracting employer gave up or handed over — a covenant papered with an affiliate that paid nothing and promised nothing starts the review with a consideration question instead of a clean answer.

Recommended (SHOULD)
1.2Effective date

The date does real work in Kentucky: whether the covenant was signed at the start of employment or partway through decides whether new consideration was required. An offer of employment supports a covenant signed at the outset, but a covenant signed by someone already on the payroll needs something new behind it — so pin down when the agreement was executed relative to the first day of work.

Recommended (SHOULD)
1.3Employee title

Record the title and the actual duties. Kentucky has no earnings thresholds or title-based statutory gates for the ordinary workforce — the role matters because it drives the reasonableness analysis: what the worker can carry to a competitor, how hard the restraint lands on them, and what restraint the employer can honestly call fair protection all turn on what the person actually did.

Recommended (SHOULD)
1.4Governing law state named

Check that the governing state is stated. The selection decides whether the covenant is measured against Kentucky's fair-protection standard and its new-consideration rule for existing employees — and Kentucky law is a deliberate, defensible pick for a multi-state workforce, a point the governing-law item near the end of this checklist walks through.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2014-06-19

A.1 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports that an existing employee who signs a covenant after hire must receive new consideration; continued employment with nothing more is insufficient.

In short, Brown received no consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or after he signed the Agreement.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

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Definitions

2.1Confidential information

Tie the definition to material the employer genuinely guards. Kentucky's trade-secret statute keys protection to information that has value because it is secret and that the employer takes reasonable efforts to keep secret — a confidentiality definition that sweeps in public information or everything the worker ever learned undercuts the very interest the covenants need to lean on.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.2Trade secrets

Keep trade secrets defined separately from ordinary confidential information, and align the definition with the statutory twin tests: independent economic value from secrecy, plus efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain that secrecy. The separate term lets trade-secret protection run as long as secrecy lasts and anchors the strongest protectable interest a Kentucky restraint can claim.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.3Restricted period

One defined Restricted Period keeps every duration auditable. Kentucky imposes no statutory cap — the length is tested as part of the whole restraint, against what fair protection of the employer's interest actually requires and what hardship it imposes on the worker — so a clean, single definition is what lets a reviewer or a court see the duration plainly.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.4Restricted territory

Map the territory to where the employer actually does business. Kentucky case law shows a court can supply a reasonable geographic limit when a covenant omits one — at least in the sale-of-a-business setting — but an employment covenant should never bet on that: state the territory, and draw it around the real market rather than the company's ambitions.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.5Covered customers

Bound the class to customers the worker actually served or dealt with during a stated look-back window. The customer relationships the worker personally built or managed are where the employer's goodwill interest is concrete; an entire-book-of-business definition turns a targeted restraint into a market ban and invites the undue-hardship half of the reasonableness test.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.6Covered employees

Keep the no-poach class to colleagues the departing worker actually worked with or supervised during the look-back window. No Kentucky statute speaks to employee non-solicits, so the clause is judged on the same holistic reasonableness principles as every other restraint — a modest, relationship-based class is far easier to defend than a workforce-wide hiring fence.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.7Protected business interests

Name the interests in the vocabulary Kentucky recognizes: trade secrets, confidential business information, and customer goodwill. The reasonableness standard asks whether the restraint affords fair protection to the interests of the covenantee — a recital that claims only a wish to be free of competition names no interest the law protects, and the covenants resting on it inherit the gap.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.8Competitive business

Describe the genuinely competing activity in concrete terms, then test the definition against the worker's trade. A definition that expands to anything the employer might someday do reads as suppression of ordinary competition rather than protection of a specific interest — and it loads the undue-hardship side of the scale before the covenant is ever enforced.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.9Small public-stock carve-out

Where ownership or investment in competitors is restricted, look for a passive-holdings carve-out below a stated threshold. A clause that technically forbids index funds and ordinary public shares restrains conduct that threatens no protectable interest — gratuitous breadth that makes the whole package look like overreach to a court weighing hardship against fair protection.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.10Passive public holdings

A drafting convenience, not a requirement — many agreements inline the carve-out language instead. If the capitalized term appears, confirm its percentage matches the operative carve-out it supports.

Optional (MAY)
2.11What counts as soliciting

Pin the term down so enforcement does not become a fact-by-fact dispute. A non-solicitation claim in Kentucky is won by proving contact with protected customers, so the definition should make clear what contact counts — and a definition tied to outreach the worker initiates toward covered customers is a narrower, more defensible restraint than one that captures every interaction.

Recommended (SHOULD)
2.12Termination of employment

Verify the trigger covers resignation, dismissal, and expiration of a fixed term the same way. Every covenant clock runs from this event, and in a state where the restraint's overall fairness is the test, ambiguity about when the restricted period started is ambiguity about how long the worker is actually restrained.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Primary law

B.1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880

KRS 365.880 supports Kentucky's statutory trade-secret definition that operates alongside contractual restraints.

“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880(4).

Case law · 2009-10-30

B.2 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel restates Kentucky's common-law rule that a non-compete is reasonable only if it affords fair protection to the employer's interest without being so broad as to harm the public or impose undue hardship on the employee.

agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, “on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

Case law · 1985-05-03

B.3 Hodges v. Todd

Hodges supports that a Kentucky court may supply a reasonable geographic limitation to enforce a covenant that omitted one, at least in the sale-of-business context.

we hold that the trial court had the authority to enforce the covenant by establishing a reasonable geographical limitation based on the intention of the parties at the time the contract was executed.

See Hodges v. Todd, 698 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. App. 1985).

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Timing and execution acknowledgements

3.1New consideration for a mid-employment covenant

This is the item that kills more Kentucky covenants than any other. A covenant signed by someone already employed must come with independent, new consideration — a bonus, a raise, a promotion, or specialized training — because continued at-will employment by itself is not enough. The Kentucky Supreme Court held a covenant unenforceable where a sixteen-year employee signed a conflicts-of-interest agreement containing a non-compete and received nothing: the employer gave up no legal right, the employee gained no new benefit, and a bare recital of consideration did not save it. A covenant signed at the outset of the relationship stands on different footing — the offer of employment itself is the consideration. Find the signing date, find the consideration, and confirm the worker actually received it.

Required (MUST)
3.2Chance to consult a lawyer

No Kentucky statute demands it, but the reasonableness standard weighs the situation of the parties — and a documented opportunity to take the agreement to a lawyer before signing is cheap evidence that the process was fair rather than pressured, which matters when a court is balancing hardship against protection.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2014-06-19

C.1 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports the rule that a non-compete fails for lack of consideration when the employer gives up no legal right and the employee receives nothing of value.

Because the Agreement did not require Creech to forbear the exercise of some legal right or otherwise result in some detriment to Creech, there was no consideration.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

Case law · 2014-06-19

C.2 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports that an existing employee who signs a covenant after hire must receive new consideration; continued employment with nothing more is insufficient.

In short, Brown received no consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or after he signed the Agreement.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

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Confidentiality and trade-secret treatment

4.1Trade-secret protection without an end date

The trade-secret obligation should last as long as secrecy does — that is how federal law defines the right, and Kentucky's own trade-secret act keys protection to the same combination of value-from-secrecy and reasonable secrecy efforts. A fixed expiry on trade-secret confidentiality quietly forfeits protection the employer is entitled to keep, and weakens the strongest interest its covenants can claim.

Required (MUST)
4.2Confidentiality end date

Give ordinary confidential information its own finite term. Kentucky tests every restraint for overall fairness, and a perpetual lid on non-secret information is exactly the kind of unbounded obligation that draws an overbreadth attack — the two-track structure keeps the perpetual duty where the law actually supports it.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Primary law

D.1 Defend Trade Secrets Act — definition of a trade secret, 18 U.S.C. § 1839

Federal law keys trade-secret status to continued secrecy, which is why contractual trade-secret protection should run as long as secrecy does rather than to a fixed date.

the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information

See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2018).

Primary law

D.2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880

KRS 365.880 supports Kentucky's statutory trade-secret definition that operates alongside contractual restraints.

“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880(4).

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Permitted disclosures and protected conduct

5.1DTSA whistleblower notice

Federal law, fully applicable in Kentucky: omit the immunity notice and the employer forfeits exemplary damages and attorney fees in a later federal trade-secret suit against the worker. For an employer whose restraint package leans on trade secrets and confidential information, giving up those remedies over a missing paragraph is an unforced error.

Required (MUST)
5.2Wage-discussion carve-out

Confidentiality and non-disparagement language has to leave wages, hours, and working conditions discussable. Federal labor law protects that speech regardless of the governing state, and the Board has been striking overbroad clauses in employee agreements.

Required (MUST)
5.3Court-ordered disclosure allowed

Confirm the carve-out for disclosure required by law, court order, or a government investigation, with notice to the employer where lawful. A confidentiality clause cannot stop legally compelled disclosure, and a clause that pretends otherwise hands the worker an overbreadth argument for free.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Primary law

E.1 Defend Trade Secrets Act — employer immunity-notice requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)

The DTSA requires an employer to give notice of the trade-secret whistleblower immunity in any agreement governing the use of trade secrets or other confidential information.

An employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A) (2018).

Primary law

E.2 NLRA Section 7 — protected concerted activity, 29 U.S.C. § 157

Section 7 protects concerted activity including wage discussion — the statutory basis for the carve-out from confidentiality and non-disparagement restrictions.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection

See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (NLRA § 7).

Agency guidance · 2023-02-21

E.3 NLRB news release on McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023)

The NLRB held that offering severance terms that broadly waive Section 7 rights — including overbroad confidentiality and non-disparagement terms — violates the NLRA.

simply offering employees a severance agreement that requires them to broadly give up their rights under Section 7 of the Act violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

See McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023); NLRB Office of Public Affairs (Feb. 21, 2023).

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Property return and certification

6.1Property return and sign-off

Return-or-delete at separation, certified in writing. In a state whose trade-secret act requires reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, the certification is part of those efforts — contemporaneous evidence of exactly what confidential material left and what came back, ready before any covenant fight begins.

Recommended (SHOULD)

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Restrictive covenants (each independently includable)

7.1Employee non-solicit

Optional, and the quietest covenant in the Kentucky family: no statute addresses it, so it is judged on the same holistic reasonableness principles as everything else. Keep it inside the Covered Employees class and the Restricted Period, and remember that even this lighter restraint needs the same valid consideration as the rest of the package when an existing employee signs it.

Optional (MAY)
7.2Customer non-solicit

Often the best-value covenant in Kentucky: enforcing it requires proving contact with protected customers rather than meeting the statutory trade-secret threshold, which makes it easier to win on than a misappropriation claim. Keep it tied to customers the worker actually served and to the stated Restricted Period so that the proof advantage is not squandered on an overbroad class.

Optional (MAY)
7.3Non-dealing covenant

Non-dealing bars serving covered customers even when they call first — a restraint on receiving business, not just chasing it. That extra reach lands squarely on the undue-hardship and public-interest sides of Kentucky's balancing test, so treat its inclusion as a deliberate escalation that needs its own justification, with the customer class and period kept tight.

Optional (MAY)
7.4Non-compete covenant

Available in Kentucky, but only on the common law's terms. Run the review in order: valid consideration first — for an existing employee that means new value, not just keeping the job — then the fair-protection standard checked in the Kentucky gates at the end of this list. A covenant that exists only to keep a former employee out of the market fails the standard no matter how it is worded.

Optional (MAY)
7.5Named-competitor narrowing

When the employer can name its real competitors, the covenant should bind those instead of leaning on the open-ended Competitive Business definition. A named list is self-proving narrowness in a state whose test is whether the restraint affords only fair protection — it leaves the worker the rest of the industry and makes the employer's restraint look measured instead of punitive.

Recommended (SHOULD)
7.6Non-investment covenant

Rare and deliberate. Confirm the passive-holdings carve-out is intact and the clause shares the defined Restricted Period — an investment restraint with no carve-out and no end date is breadth no Kentucky protectable interest justifies, and it drags the rest of the package toward the overreach finding with it.

Optional (MAY)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2009-10-30

G.1 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel restates Kentucky's common-law rule that a non-compete is reasonable only if it affords fair protection to the employer's interest without being so broad as to harm the public or impose undue hardship on the employee.

agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, “on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

Case law · 2014-06-19

G.2 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports the rule that a non-compete fails for lack of consideration when the employer gives up no legal right and the employee receives nothing of value.

Because the Agreement did not require Creech to forbear the exercise of some legal right or otherwise result in some detriment to Creech, there was no consideration.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

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Non-disparagement

8.1Non-disparagement

Standard to include with a stated term, but audit the carve-outs: truthful testimony, statements to government agencies, and protected workplace speech must sit outside the clause. Federal labor law polices overbroad versions in every state, and no Kentucky statute gives the clause any special shelter.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Agency guidance · 2023-02-21

H.1 NLRB news release on McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023)

The NLRB held that severance terms broadly waiving Section 7 rights — including overbroad non-disparagement provisions — violate the NLRA.

simply offering employees a severance agreement that requires them to broadly give up their rights under Section 7 of the Act violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

See McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023); NLRB Office of Public Affairs (Feb. 21, 2023).

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Physician-specific notices and carve-outs

9.1Health-care rights and notices

The dedicated clause should state Kentucky's actual health-care rule precisely, because it does not track the usual physician shape: there is no general physician non-compete ban, and ordinary clinicians fall under the same reasonableness and consideration analysis as everyone else. The categorical statutory ban targets a different class — temporary direct care staff contracted with or employed by a health care services agency, whose employment opportunities the agency may not restrict in any manner, including through buy-out or non-compete clauses. The hard gate is checked in the Kentucky section at the end of this checklist.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Primary law

I.1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724

KRS 216.724 bars a health care services agency from restricting the employment of temporary direct care staff through non-compete or buy-out clauses.

Restrict in any manner the employment opportunities of any temporary direct care staff that is contracted with or employed by the agency, including but not limited to contract buy-out provisions or contract non-compete clauses;

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724(1)(a).

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No conflicting obligations

10.1No conflicting obligations

The worker's representation that no earlier agreement or order blocks the new role. It surfaces an incoming covenant on day one — when the parties can still test it against Kentucky's reasonableness standard and consideration rule — instead of after a demand letter arrives mid-quarter.

Recommended (SHOULD)

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Notice to future employers and other third parties

11.1Notice to future employers

A genuine drafting choice, not a requirement. A notice provision can support enforcement, but warning a new employer off a worker based on a covenant a Kentucky court would refuse to enforce — for missing consideration or overbreadth — invites a tortious-interference dispute. If the clause appears, condition any outreach on a covenant that actually survives this checklist's gates.

Optional (MAY)

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Tolling during breach

12.1Restriction extended during a breach

The agreement should say whether the clock pauses during a breach — but flag any extension mechanism as an open Kentucky question. No staged statute or appellate decision squarely endorses automatic tolling, and the background rules cut both ways against it: any clause extending the restricted period must still satisfy the ordinary reasonableness standard, and Kentucky courts reform restraints toward reasonableness rather than mechanically enlarging them. Draft any extension as a separate, breach-tied, bounded restraint, and do not assume a court will revive an expired covenant.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2009-10-30

L.1 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel supports applying Kentucky's reasonableness standard to any clause that extends the restricted period.

agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, “on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

Case law · 2009-10-30

L.2 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel supports that Kentucky courts reform overbroad restraints toward reasonableness rather than mechanically enlarging them, leaving tolling-on-breach unsettled.

our courts have adopted a “blue pencil” rule, whereby we are empowered to reform or amend restrictions in a non-compete clause if the initial restrictions are overly broad or burdensome.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

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Remedies

13.1Injunction availability

Look for the acknowledgement that breach may cause irreparable harm and that an injunction is appropriate relief. Covenant enforcement is equitable at its core, and in Kentucky the court granting that relief is the same court weighing whether the restraint affords only fair protection — the acknowledgement supports the showing but never replaces it.

Recommended (SHOULD)
13.2Attorney fees and costs

A commercial choice; the default American Rule applies if the agreement is silent. Check that any fee-shifting is mutual and prevailing-party based — a one-way employer clause adds to the harshness of a package whose overall fairness is exactly what a Kentucky court will be weighing.

Optional (MAY)

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Severability and reformation

14.1Reformation allowed, not relied on

The severability and reformation clause earns its place in Kentucky: courts here are empowered to reform or amend restrictions that come in overly broad or burdensome, and in a sale-of-business case a court went as far as supplying a reasonable geographic limit the covenant had omitted. But read the clause as permission, not insurance — the power is discretionary, and an employer that drafts an abusively broad covenant cannot assume a court will rewrite it into something enforceable. Prefer tiered, severable restraints sized to the protectable interest from the outset, so a court inclined to enforce has reasonable text to work with rather than a rescue request.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2009-10-30

N.1 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel supports Kentucky's blue-pencil rule empowering courts to reform or amend overly broad non-compete restrictions.

our courts have adopted a “blue pencil” rule, whereby we are empowered to reform or amend restrictions in a non-compete clause if the initial restrictions are overly broad or burdensome.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

Case law · 1985-05-03

N.2 Hodges v. Todd

Hodges supports that a Kentucky court may supply a reasonable geographic limitation to enforce a covenant that omitted one, at least in the sale-of-business context.

we hold that the trial court had the authority to enforce the covenant by establishing a reasonable geographical limitation based on the intention of the parties at the time the contract was executed.

See Hodges v. Todd, 698 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. App. 1985).

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Survival

15.1Survival after the agreement ends

Per-covenant survival keeps each clock independently checkable — perpetual for trade secrets, finite elsewhere. The discipline matters in Kentucky because each surviving restraint is weighed on its own footing for fair protection and hardship: a defensible customer non-solicit should not have its fate bundled with a shakier market-wide ban inside one undifferentiated survival clause.

Recommended (SHOULD)

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Assignment and successors

16.1Assignment and successors

Confirm employer-side assignability to successors and that the worker cannot assign. No staged Kentucky authority resolves how covenants travel in a sale, so the contract text is what a successor will stand on — explicit language that names the restrictive covenants beats a generic successors-and-assigns recital, and whoever ends up enforcing still inherits the same consideration and reasonableness questions the original employer faced.

Recommended (SHOULD)

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Governing law, venue, dispute process

17.1Governing law with a real Kentucky connection

The clause should name governing law, venue, and the dispute process — and a Kentucky selection is a genuinely strong pick when it is anchored in a real connection to the state. Federal courts sitting elsewhere have honored contractual Kentucky choice-of-law clauses for non-competes, one applying Kentucky law under the agreement's choice-of-law and forum-selection clause and another holding that applying a blue-penciling state's law was not repugnant enough to the forum's public policy to override the parties' choice. The limit is that same public-policy test: the clause is strongest paired with a genuine Kentucky connection and a covenant reasonable on its own terms, and the supporting decisions are federal trial-court rulings, so never treat the clause as automatically dispositive.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2008-09-08

Q.1 Senture, LLC v. Dietrich

Senture supports that a court will apply Kentucky law to a non-compete under the agreement's choice-of-law and forum-selection clause.

With respect to the first issue, this Court will apply Kentucky law to this case.

See Senture, LLC v. Dietrich, 575 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Va. 2008).

Case law · 2012-04-23

Q.2 Edwards Moving & Rigging, Inc. v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc.

Edwards Moving supports enforcing a Kentucky choice-of-law clause because Kentucky's blue-penciling rule is not so repugnant to the forum's public policy as to override the parties' choice.

Applying the law of a state that allows “blue penciling” is not so repugnant to Virginia public policy as to overcome Virginia's preference for enforcing choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses.

See Edwards Moving & Rigging, Inc. v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc., No. 3:12CV146-HEH (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2012).

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Entire agreement, amendment, waiver, e-signatures

18.1Entire agreement, amendments, e-signatures

Boilerplate with a Kentucky trap inside: a covenant added by amendment lands on a worker who is, by definition, already employed — which means it needs independent, new consideration of its own, because the employer that demands a signature while giving up nothing has given no consideration at all. Review the amendment mechanics so a routine refresh does not quietly create a covenant the employer never paid for.

Recommended (SHOULD)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2014-06-19

R.1 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports the rule that a non-compete fails for lack of consideration when the employer gives up no legal right and the employee receives nothing of value.

Because the Agreement did not require Creech to forbear the exercise of some legal right or otherwise result in some detriment to Creech, there was no consideration.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

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Kentucky gates (the fair-protection standard and KRS 216.724)

The four items below exist only on this Kentucky page: the common-law fair-protection standard every restraint must pass, the no-safe-harbor sizing of time and territory, the protectable-interest tether, and the one categorical statutory ban for temporary health-care staffing workers.

19.1Restraint passes the fair-protection test

Run every restraint through Kentucky's controlling question: considering the subject, the nature of the business, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances of the case, does the restriction afford only fair protection to the employer's interests — without being so large that it interferes with the public interests or imposes undue hardship on the worker? Both halves bind. A restraint that protects a real interest still fails if it reaches further than that protection requires, and the analysis is judge-made: there is no general statute to fall back on, so the agreement's own tailoring is the entire case for enforceability.

Required (MUST)
19.2Time and territory match the real market

Do not accept a fixed term or radius copied from another form — there is no statutory cap and no safe-harbor number in Kentucky, so duration and territory are weighed together against the employer's actual footprint, the worker's role, and the time genuinely needed to protect the relationship. An intermediate appellate court once proposed a six-factor framework for this analysis — industry, employer characteristics, the history of the employment relationship, the protectable interest, the hardship on the worker, and the public effect — and trial courts often look to it, but the state's highest court resolved that very case on consideration grounds alone and never adopted the test, so treat the factors as a useful lens rather than a checklist that guarantees enforcement.

Recommended (SHOULD)
19.3Restraint protects a real business interest

Every restraint has to guard something the employer is entitled to guard — trade secrets, confidential business information, or customer goodwill — not a general wish to keep a former employee out of the market. Kentucky's trade-secret act supplies the statutory leg: information qualifies when it derives independent economic value from secrecy and is the subject of reasonable secrecy efforts. Check that the covenant names its interest and that the interest is real, and keep trade-secret remedies running on their own statutory track alongside the contract — a non-solicit won by proving customer contact is often the more practical enforcement path than a misappropriation claim.

Required (MUST)
19.4No covenants for temporary health-care staffing workers

If the employer is a health care services agency and the worker is temporary direct care staff, stop: the agreement must not restrict the worker's employment opportunities in any manner — non-compete clauses and contract buy-out provisions are both named — and a non-complying contract is an unfair trade practice and void. No reasonableness analysis rescues it; a covenant the statute voids is void no matter how measured it looks. Check the class carefully on both sides: the ban turns on the agency-and-temporary-staff relationship, not on a license or job title, and a 2023 amendment leaves the placement of permanent direct care staff outside it.

Prohibited (MUST NOT)
Sources for this answer

Case law · 2009-10-30

S.1 Kegel v. Tillotson

Kegel restates Kentucky's common-law rule that a non-compete is reasonable only if it affords fair protection to the employer's interest without being so broad as to harm the public or impose undue hardship on the employee.

agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, “on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted.

See Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).

Case law · 2014-06-19

S.2 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech notes that the Kentucky Court of Appeals proposed a six-factor reasonableness test for non-compete enforceability.

In doing so, the Court proposed a six factor test that should be applied by the trial court in determining whether the non-compete portion of the Agreement is enforceable.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

Case law · 2014-06-19

S.3 Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown

Creech supports that the Kentucky Supreme Court resolved the case on consideration alone and did not adopt the Court of Appeals' six-factor test.

Because we hold that this Agreement was not supported by adequate consideration, that is the only issue we address.

See Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).

Primary law

S.4 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880

KRS 365.880 supports Kentucky's statutory trade-secret definition that operates alongside contractual restraints.

“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880(4).

Primary law

S.5 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724

KRS 216.724 bars a health care services agency from restricting the employment of temporary direct care staff through non-compete or buy-out clauses.

Restrict in any manner the employment opportunities of any temporary direct care staff that is contracted with or employed by the agency, including but not limited to contract buy-out provisions or contract non-compete clauses;

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724(1)(a).

Primary law

S.6 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724

KRS 216.724 makes a non-complying health care services agency contract an unfair trade practice and void.

Any contract between a health care services agency and temporary direct care staff that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section shall be considered an unfair trade practice and be void pursuant to KRS 365.060.

See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724(2).