Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Arkansas?
Yes, if the covenant is ancillary to employment, protects a statutory business interest, and is no broader in time and scope than necessary to defend that interest .
For agreements governed by the current statute, Arkansas is a permissible, enforce-if-reasonable state rather than a ban state. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 lists protectable interests, supplies a two-year duration presumption, allows no defined geographic restriction in some cases, and requires reformation of overbroad covenants.
The effective-date line matters. Box treated Act 921 as effective July 22, 2015, and said the statute only arguably applied to the agreement executed after that date, while older agreements remained on the pre-Act common-law track .
Do not cite pre-2015 Arkansas cases as if they still supply the whole remedial rule. They remain useful for the old common-law framework and reasonableness concepts, but current covered employment covenants start with § 4-75-101.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
A.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports enforceability for an employment non-compete that is ancillary to employment, backed by a protectable business interest, and limited as to time and scope.
A covenant not to compete agreement is enforceable if the agreement is ancillary to an employment relationship or part of an otherwise enforceable employment agreement or contract to the extent that: (1) The employer has a protectable business interest; and (2) The covenant not to compete agreement is limited with respect to time and scope in a manner that is not greater than necessary to defend the protectable business interest of the employer.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(a). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
A.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory list of protectable business interests, including trade secrets, customer lists, goodwill, confidential information, training, and other valuable employer data.
For the purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the protectable business interest of the employer includes the employer's: (1) Trade secrets; (2) Intellectual property; (3) Customer lists; (4) Goodwill with customers; (5) Knowledge of his or her business practices; (6) Methods; (7) Profit margins; (8) Costs; (9) Other confidential business information that is confidential, proprietary, and increases in value from not being known by a competitor; (10) Training and education of the employer's employees; and (11) Other valuable employer data that the employer has provided to an employee that an employer would reasonably seek to protect or safeguard from a competitor in the interest of fairness.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(b). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
A.3 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports mandatory reformation and enforcement of a covered overbroad covenant under reformed terms.
The court shall enforce the covenant not to compete agreement under the reformed terms and conditions.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(f). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 2017-11-08
A.4 Box v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.Box supports the Act 921 effective-date framing for distinguishing agreements governed by the statute from agreements predating the Act.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-75-101 (Supp. 2015), which became effective on July 22, 2015, pursuant to the enactment of Act 921 of 2015.
See Box v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 605, 533 S.W.3d 603.
What makes an Arkansas non-compete reasonable or enforceable?
The covenant must be tied to a protectable business interest and limited in time and scope no more than necessary to defend that interest .
The statute supplies the protectable-interest categories. They include trade secrets, intellectual property, customer lists, customer goodwill, business practices, methods, margins, costs, confidential business information, employee training and education, and other valuable employer data reasonably safeguarded from competitors .
Reasonableness is still contextual. The statute tells courts to consider the nature of the employer's protectable interest, the geographic scope of the business, whether a geographic limit is feasible, whether the restriction is limited to a specific customer or business group, and the nature of the employer's business .
Ordinary competition is not enough. Even before Act 921, Arkansas cases required a real protectable interest rather than a covenant designed only to eliminate competition, and the current statute keeps that interest requirement at the center.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
B.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the core Arkansas reasonableness test for employment non-competes.
The covenant not to compete agreement is limited with respect to time and scope in a manner that is not greater than necessary to defend the protectable business interest of the employer.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(a). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
B.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory categories of protectable business interests.
For the purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the protectable business interest of the employer includes the employer's: (1) Trade secrets; (2) Intellectual property; (3) Customer lists; (4) Goodwill with customers; (5) Knowledge of his or her business practices; (6) Methods; (7) Profit margins; (8) Costs; (9) Other confidential business information that is confidential, proprietary, and increases in value from not being known by a competitor; (10) Training and education of the employer's employees; and (11) Other valuable employer data that the employer has provided to an employee that an employer would reasonably seek to protect or safeguard from a competitor in the interest of fairness.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(b). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
B.3 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory reasonableness factors for assessing a covenant without a specific geographic limit.
The reasonableness of a covenant not to compete agreement shall be determined after considering: (A) The nature of the employer's protectable business interest; (B) The geographic scope of the employer's business and whether or not a geographic limitation is feasible under the circumstances; (C) Whether or not the restriction placed on the employee is limited to a specific group of customers or other individuals or entities associated with the employer's business; and (D) The nature of the employer's business.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(c). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 2011-05-11
B.4 Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. BicakMercy supports the pre-Act Arkansas rule that a covenant cannot be used merely to prohibit ordinary competition.
Unless the covenantee has a legitimate interest to be protected by the agreement, the law will not enforce such a contract, as this would merely prohibit ordinary competition.
See Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. Bicak, 2011 Ark. App. 341, 383 S.W.3d 869.
Does an Arkansas non-compete need a geographic limit?
Not always. The current statute says the lack of a specific or defined geographic restriction does not make a covenant overbroad if the restraint is otherwise reasonable as to time and scope .
That is a major statutory shift from the old common-law risk. In Bendinger, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a covenant with no geographic limit because the facts did not justify it; in NanoMech, the Eighth Circuit applied pre-Act Arkansas law to invalidate a no-geography, any-capacity covenant.
The current drafting point is practical rather than formalistic. If there is no geography, the covenant needs another limiting mechanism, such as customer scope, activity scope, or business-scope limits tied to the employer's protectable interest.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
C.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the rule that lack of a specific geographic restriction does not itself make an otherwise reasonable covenant overbroad.
The lack of a specific or defined geographic descriptive restriction in a covenant not to compete agreement does not make the covenant not to compete agreement overly broad under subdivision (a)(2) of this section if the covenant not to compete agreement is limited with respect to time and scope in a manner that is not greater than necessary to defend the protectable business interest of the employer.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(c). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
C.4 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports considering business geography, feasible geographic limits, customer or entity scope, and the nature of the business.
The reasonableness of a covenant not to compete agreement shall be determined after considering: (A) The nature of the employer's protectable business interest; (B) The geographic scope of the employer's business and whether or not a geographic limitation is feasible under the circumstances; (C) Whether or not the restriction placed on the employee is limited to a specific group of customers or other individuals or entities associated with the employer's business; and (D) The nature of the employer's business.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(c). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 1999-07-15
C.2 Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co.Bendinger supports the pre-Act common-law geography problem for an overbroad employee covenant lacking an adequate limiting feature.
We hold that the failure of the covenant to contain a geographic restriction in this case renders it overbroad.
See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 338 Ark. 410, 994 S.W.2d 468 (1999).
Case law · 2015-02-06
C.3 NanoMech, Inc. v. SureshNanoMech supports the pre-Act federal application of Arkansas law invalidating a no-geography, any-capacity covenant.
Under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be valid as written; a court may not narrow it.
See NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh, 777 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2015).
How long can an Arkansas non-compete last?
Two years is presumptively reasonable under the statute, unless the particular facts clearly show that two years is unreasonable compared with the employer's protectable interest .
The presumption is not a safe harbor for every two-year clause. The statute ties duration back to the employer's protectable business interest, and Bud Anderson noted the older Arkansas damages treatise summary that one- and two-year limits had been upheld while three- and five-year limits had been unreasonable or invalid.
Avoid treating two years as automatic. The presumption can be overcome by case-specific facts, especially if the protected interest is narrow or the work restriction is broad .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
D.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the two-year presumption and its case-specific exception.
A post-termination restriction of two (2) years is presumptively reasonable as to length of time under subdivision (a)(2) of this section unless the facts and circumstances of a particular case clearly demonstrate that two (2) years is unreasonable compared to the employer's protectable business interest.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(d). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 2018-03-07
D.2 Bud Anderson Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. NeilBud Anderson supports the Arkansas appellate discussion that historically one- and two-year limits had been upheld while three- and five-year limits had been unreasonable or invalid.
[W]hile the courts have upheld time limits of one year and two years, restrictions of three years and five years were unreasonable and invalid.
See Bud Anderson Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Neil, 2018 Ark. App. 183, 545 S.W.3d 819.
Will an Arkansas court reform an overbroad non-compete?
Yes, for a covered employment non-compete under § 4-75-101. If the restrictions are unreasonable, the court must reform the covenant as needed and enforce it under the reformed terms .
That mandatory reformation rule is the watershed change from pre-Act Arkansas law. Under the old regime, the contract had to be valid as written, and the court would not narrow it to a reasonable version.
The temporal framing is important. Bendinger and NanoMech remain useful for the old all-or-nothing rule, and Box confirms Act 921's effective-date line; they should not be cited as current authority against mandatory statutory reformation for a covered post-Act employment covenant.
Reformation does not remove the need to draft narrowly. The statute tells courts to reform only to the extent necessary to make the limitations reasonable and no greater than needed to protect the business interest .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
E.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports mandatory judicial reformation of an overbroad covered employment covenant to reasonable limits.
If restrictions in a covenant not to compete agreement are found to be unreasonable and impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the protectable business interest of the employer under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the court shall reform the covenant not to compete agreement to the extent necessary to: (A) Cause the limitations contained in the covenant not to compete agreement to be reasonable; and (B) Impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the protectable business interest.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(f). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
E.5 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports enforcement under the reformed covenant terms.
The court shall enforce the covenant not to compete agreement under the reformed terms and conditions.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(f). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 1999-07-15
E.2 Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co.Bendinger supports the pre-Act Arkansas rule that a restrictive covenant had to be valid as written and would not be rewritten by the court.
The court has held that the contract must be valid as written, and the court will not apportion or enforce a contract to the extent that it might be considered reasonable.
See Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 338 Ark. 410, 994 S.W.2d 468 (1999).
Case law · 2015-02-06
E.3 NanoMech, Inc. v. SureshNanoMech supports the Eighth Circuit's pre-Act reading that Arkansas courts could not narrow an overbroad non-compete.
Under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be valid as written; a court may not narrow it.
See NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh, 777 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2015).
Case law · 2017-11-08
E.4 Box v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.Box supports treating Act 921 as the effective-date line between pre-Act agreements and post-Act statutory treatment.
However, in the present case the statutory law arguably applies only to the parties’ third restricted stock agreement executed in October 2015 after Act 921 became effective.
See Box v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 605, 533 S.W.3d 603.
Is continued employment enough consideration for an Arkansas non-compete?
Yes. The statute says continued employment is sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete .
That means Arkansas does not require a separate bonus, promotion, equity grant, or new job offer for consideration when the statutory rule applies. The covenant still must satisfy the other statutory requirements, including protectable interest and reasonable time and scope.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
F.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports continued employment as sufficient consideration for an Arkansas employment non-compete.
An employee's continued employment is sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete agreement.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(g). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
F.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the separate statutory enforceability requirements of protectable interest and reasonable time and scope.
The employer has a protectable business interest; and (2) The covenant not to compete agreement is limited with respect to time and scope in a manner that is not greater than necessary to defend the protectable business interest of the employer.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(a). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Are physician and professional non-competes enforceable in Arkansas?
Physician practice restrictions are void under the current statute, and § 4-75-101 otherwise does not apply to covered Title 17 professional licensees except for that physician rule.
The physician ban was added by the 2025 amendment. The statute defines physician by reference to the Arkansas Medical Practices Act and osteopathy licensing provisions .
Older physician cases should be framed as pre-2025 public-policy and common-law context, not as the current statutory text. In Mercy v. Bicak, the Court of Appeals emphasized public access to physicians and affirmed summary judgment against enforcement of the physician non-compete.
Do not generalize the physician void rule to every licensed professional. The statute voids covered physician practice restrictions, while separately saying § 4-75-101 does not apply to people holding a professional license under Arkansas Code Title 17, Subtitle 3, except as provided in subsection k.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
G.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory rule voiding a physician non-compete that restricts the physician's right to practice within scope.
A covenant not to compete agreement that restricts the right of a physician to practice within the physician's scope of practice is void.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(k). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
G.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the carve-out for professional licensees under Arkansas Code Title 17, Subtitle 3, except as provided by the physician rule.
Except as provided under subsection (k) of this section, this section shall not: (1) Be read to impair, limit, or change a party's protections and rights under the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act, § 4-75-601 et seq.; or (2) Apply to a person holding a professional license under Arkansas Code Title 17, Subtitle 3.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(j). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
G.3 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory definition of physician for the physician non-compete ban.
As used in subdivision (k)(1) of this section, "physician" means a person authorized or licensed to practice medicine under the Arkansas Medical Practices Act, § 17-95-201 et seq., § 17-95-301 et seq., and § 17-95-401 et seq., and a person authorized to practice osteopathy under § 17-91-101 et seq.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(k). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 2011-05-11
G.4 Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. BicakMercy supports the pre-2025 Arkansas public-policy concern with unduly restricting patient access to physicians.
Covenants not to compete are not looked upon with favor by the law; in fact, it is contrary to public policy to unduly restrict the [spublic’s right of access to the physicians of their choice.
See Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. Bicak, 2011 Ark. App. 341, 383 S.W.3d 869.
Case law · 2011-05-11
G.5 Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. BicakMercy supports affirmance of summary judgment against enforcement of the physician covenant on the pre-Act record.
The circuit court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Dr. Bicak on the eovenant-not-to-compete claim because Mercy did not counter the evidence demonstrating that it had no interest sufficient to warrant its enforcement; that it was designed only to eliminate competition; and that it would unreasonably interfere with the public’s right of access to the physicians of their choice and Dr. Bicak’s ability to earn a living.
See Mercy Health Sys. of Nw. Ark., Inc. v. Bicak, 2011 Ark. App. 341, 383 S.W.3d 869.
Does an Arkansas non-compete period toll or extend during breach or litigation?
Sometimes by equitable injunction, but drafted contractual tolling clauses remain an open question. Bud Anderson treated a prospective injunction beyond the nominal one-year period as legally possible, while § 4-75-101 does not expressly validate tolling-on-breach clauses.
The practical lesson is that Arkansas courts may keep a non-compete injunction dispute alive even after the stated period expires. Bud Anderson rejected a mootness dismissal where the employer sought an injunction running one year from the order and the record did not show that relief was impossible .
That is different from saying every contract clause that automatically extends the restricted period during breach is enforceable. The Arkansas statute speaks to damages, injunctive relief, irreparable harm, reformation, and enforcement under reformed terms, but it does not contain an express contractual tolling rule.
Draft tolling language as a risk allocation, not as settled Arkansas law. Bud Anderson supports judicially fashioned prospective relief in the injunction posture; it does not squarely decide whether a private extension-on-breach clause is independently enforceable under § 4-75-101.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2018-03-07
H.1 Bud Anderson Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. NeilBud Anderson supports the availability question for a prospective injunction running beyond the contract's nominal one-year post-employment period in the non-compete injunction posture.
Therefore, it is not clear and obvious on the record before us that BAHC could not obtain the relief it seeks on appeal, a one-year prospective injunction.
See Bud Anderson Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Neil, 2018 Ark. App. 183, 545 S.W.3d 819.
Primary law
H.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory remedies and irreparable-harm language for breach of a covenant not to compete.
In a private court action, a court may award the employer damages for a breach of a covenant not to compete agreement, appropriate injunctive relief, or both, if appropriate.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(e). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
H.3 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports the statutory reformation remedy for unreasonable restrictions.
The court shall enforce the covenant not to compete agreement under the reformed terms and conditions.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(f). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
What remedies are available for breach of an Arkansas non-compete?
A court may award damages, appropriate injunctive relief, or both, and immediate harm from breach is statutorily treated as irreparable for preliminary-injunction purposes.
Porter's applied that current statutory rule. The Court of Appeals reversed because the circuit court used only the common-law definition of irreparable harm and failed to apply § 4-75-101 in a case involving non-compete agreements executed after 2015.
The statutory irreparable-harm rule does not eliminate every injunction defense. Subsection e says the remedies language does not limit defenses to preliminary injunctive relief or the employer's right to monetary damages .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
I.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports damages, appropriate injunctive relief, or both in a private action for breach of a covenant not to compete.
In a private court action, a court may award the employer damages for a breach of a covenant not to compete agreement, appropriate injunctive relief, or both, if appropriate.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(e). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Primary law
I.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports treating immediate harm from breach as irreparable for preliminary-injunction purposes.
The immediate harm associated with the breach of a covenant not to compete agreement shall be considered irreparable to establish the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(e). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)
Case law · 2024-04-03
I.3 Porter's Commercial Refrigeration, Inc. v. BrewerPorter's supports applying the statutory irreparable-harm framework to breaches of non-compete agreements executed after 2015.
The grounds for establishing the right to an injunction are straightforward, but the analysis becomes layered in the context of allegations regarding breaches of noncompete agreements executed after 2015.
See Porter's Com. Refrigeration, Inc. v. Brewer, 2024 Ark. App. 232, 688 S.W.3d 145.
Case law · 2024-04-03
I.4 Porter's Commercial Refrigeration, Inc. v. BrewerPorter's supports the rule that a party can establish statutory irreparable harm by showing immediate harm associated with breach of a post-2015 non-compete.
This means that a party seeking a preliminary injunction concerning a noncompete agreement executed after 2015 can establish irreparable harm by establishing immediate harm associated with a breach of the noncompete.
See Porter's Com. Refrigeration, Inc. v. Brewer, 2024 Ark. App. 232, 688 S.W.3d 145.
Primary law
I.5 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 supports preserving other defenses to preliminary injunctive relief and monetary-damages rights.
This subsection does not limit: (A) Any other defense available to a party against a claim for preliminary injunctive relief; or (B) An employer's right to monetary damages for breach of a covenant not to compete agreement.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101(e). (Acts 2015, No. 921, § 1; 2025, No. 232, §§ 1-3.)