Which federal and New York discrimination laws cover a private school, and at what employee count?
The New York State Human Rights Law covers every employer in the state regardless of size, while Title VII, the ADA and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act reach employers with fifteen or more employees and the ADEA reaches employers with twenty or more.
As of the November 19, 2026 review of the official text, the Human Rights Law's employment provision protects age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status and status as a victim of domestic violence. The federal headcount counts employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
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New York Executive Law § 292(5) defines employer to include all employers within the state, with no minimum employee count.
5. The term "employer" shall include all employers within the state.
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(5).
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), defines employer as a person in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A), defines employer as a person in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees in each of twenty or more calendar weeks.
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg(2)(B)(i), makes an employer with fifteen or more employees, as defined in Title VII, a covered entity.
(1) the term "Commission" means the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; (2) the term "covered entity"— (A) has the meaning given the term "respondent" in section 2000e(n) of this title; and (B) includes— (i) an employer, which means a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees as defined in section 2000e(b) of this title; (ii) an employing office, as defined in section 1301 of title 2 and section 411(c) of title 3; (iii) an entity employing a State employee described in section 2000e–16c(a) of this title; and
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg(2)(B)(i).
The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), defines employer as a person in an industry affecting commerce with twenty or more employees in each of twenty or more calendar weeks.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers.
See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
New York Executive Law § 296(1)(a) bars employment discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status or domestic violence victim status.
(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual's age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a).
Does New York or federal law require an independent school to adopt a written equal employment opportunity policy?
Neither Title VII nor the New York State Human Rights Law requires a private school to adopt a general written equal employment opportunity policy. Title VII instead requires a covered employer to post the EEOC's notice, and New York requires every employer to adopt a written sexual harassment prevention policy. The State Human Rights Law bars discrimination by every employer in the state, and it separately bars a recruitment statement, advertisement or application form that expresses a limitation based on a protected characteristic unless it rests on a bona fide occupational qualification.
An equal employment opportunity statement in a school's handbook or job postings is therefore a description of obligations the school already has, not a separately mandated document. A religious school's statement can also describe the religious preference that Executive Law § 296(11) permits, as explained in the question on preferring co-religionists.
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Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a), requires a covered employer to post an EEOC-prepared or approved notice; the provision addresses posting, not adoption of a policy.
(a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, as the case may be, shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts, from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a).
New York Labor Law § 201-g(1)(b) requires every employer to adopt the model sexual harassment prevention policy or an equal or better one.
b. Every employer shall adopt the model sexual harassment prevention policy promulgated pursuant to this subdivision or establish a sexual harassment prevention policy to prevent sexual harassment that equals or exceeds the minimum standards provided by such model sexual harassment prevention policy.
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-g(1)(b).
New York Executive Law § 292(5) defines employer for the Human Rights Law to include all employers within the state.
5. The term "employer" shall include all employers within the state.
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(5).
New York Executive Law § 296(1)(d) makes it unlawful for an employer to circulate a statement, advertisement or application form expressing a limitation based on a protected characteristic unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification.
(d) For any employer or employment agency to print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification;
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(d).
New York Executive Law § 296(11) permits a religious institution, or a charitable or educational organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, to limit employment to or prefer persons of the same religion.
11. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(11).
May a religious school in New York prefer co-religionists or require employees to support its religious mission?
A New York school that qualifies as a religious educational institution under Title VII, or as an organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization under Executive Law § 296(11), may prefer members of its religion, but neither exemption permits discrimination because of race, color, sex or national origin.
Section 702 of Title VII exempts a religious educational institution with respect to employing individuals of a particular religion, and § 703(e)(2) separately permits a school that is substantially owned, supported, controlled or managed by a religion, or whose curriculum is directed toward propagating a religion, to hire employees of that religion. Executive Law § 296(11) reaches a religious institution itself and a charitable or educational organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and it also permits action calculated to promote the religious principles for which the organization is maintained.
The EEOC's Compliance Manual states that religious organizations remain subject to Title VII's prohibitions on race, color, sex and national origin discrimination and to the ADEA and ADA. The Manual also states that the exemption applies only to organizations whose purpose and character are primarily religious, judged on all the facts, so the inquiry looks at how the school actually operates as well as at its governing documents. Section 703(e)(2) applies its own test, asking whether the school is substantially owned, supported, controlled or managed by a religion or directs its curriculum toward propagating one. The New York Court of Appeals reads § 296(11) narrowly: in Scheiber v. St. John's University it held that the exemption does not let a religious employer discriminate on the basis of religion generally, and instead excludes from discrimination a preference for persons of the same faith that the institution makes to carry out its religious mission. Scheiber concerned a preference in hiring, and the text does not say how far the clause permitting action to promote religious principles reaches a requirement that employees support the mission when the requirement bears on another protected characteristic; the conservative course is to tie any mission-support requirement to religious belief and conduct and to treat it as subject to the ordinary discrimination rules on every other ground.
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Title VII § 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a), makes Title VII inapplicable to a religious educational institution with respect to employing individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with its activities.
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
Title VII § 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2), permits a school substantially owned, supported, controlled or managed by a religion, or whose curriculum is directed toward propagating a religion, to hire employees of that religion.
(2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
New York Executive Law § 296(11) permits a religious institution, or an educational organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, to limit employment to or prefer co-religionists and to act to promote its religious principles.
11. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from taking such action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(11).
The EEOC Compliance Manual states that religious organizations remain subject to Title VII's bars on race, color, sex and national origin discrimination and to the ADEA, ADA and GINA, and may not retaliate.
Religious organizations are subject to the Title VII prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin (as well as the anti-discrimination provisions of the other EEO laws such as the ADEA, ADA, and GINA), and may not engage in related retaliation.
See EEOC Compliance Manual § 12-I-C (Jan. 15, 2021).
The EEOC Compliance Manual states that the religious-organization exemption applies only to organizations whose purpose and character are primarily religious, judged by weighing all the facts.
This “religious organization” exemption applies only to those organizations whose “purpose and character are primarily religious,” but to determine whether this statutory exemption applies, courts have looked at “all the facts,” considering and weighing “the religious and secular characteristics” of the entity.
See EEOC Compliance Manual § 12-I-C (Jan. 15, 2021).
In Scheiber v. St. John's University, the New York Court of Appeals held that Executive Law § 296(11) does not permit a religious employer to discriminate on the basis of religion generally, and excludes from discrimination only a same-faith hiring preference calculated to effectuate the institution's religious mission.
Discrimination is unlawful, whether committed by a religious or any other employer. Nor does Executive Law § 296 (11) empower a religious organization simply to discriminate against persons on the basis of religion. Rather, the exemption operates to exclude from the definition of "discrimination” exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its religious mission.
See Scheiber v. St. John's University, 84 N.Y.2d 120, 126–27 (1994).
Which religious school teachers and staff fall within the ministerial exception to discrimination claims?
The ministerial exception bars employment discrimination claims by employees whom a religious school entrusts with educating students in its faith, and the test turns on what the employee does.
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court recognized the exception, reasoning that requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister intrudes on more than an employment decision. The Court balanced society's interest in enforcing discrimination statutes against a religious group's interest in choosing who will teach its faith. In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Court said that educating young people in their faith lies at the core of a private religious school's mission.
The Second Circuit, whose decisions bind federal courts in New York, applied the exception in Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York to a Catholic elementary school's lay principal who sued under Title VII and Executive Law § 296, holding that because she held herself out as a spiritual leader of the school and performed important religious functions, the exception barred her employment-discrimination claims. In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, decided December 16, 2025, the New York Court of Appeals applied the exception to a claim under Labor Law § 201-d by a teacher whose offer letter established that her core teaching responsibilities were religious. The Fourth Circuit's 2024 decision in Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, which does not bind New York courts, applied the exception to a longtime English and drama teacher, concluding that he played a vital role as a messenger of the school's faith.
The EEOC's Compliance Manual describes the exception as reaching lay employees and even employees who are not co-religionists. Because the test asks what the employee does, a teacher whose duties include teaching the faith is closer to the exception than an employee whose role has no religious function.
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In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court recognized a ministerial exception, reasoning that requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister intrudes upon more than an employment decision.
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (decided Jan. 11, 2012).
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court weighed society's interest in enforcing discrimination statutes against a religious group's interest in choosing who will teach its faith.
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the Supreme Court held that what matters is what an employee does, and that educating young people in the faith lies at the core of a private religious school's mission.
What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does. And implicit in our decision in Hosanna-Tabor was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school.
See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020) (decided July 8, 2020).
The EEOC Compliance Manual states that the ministerial exception is not limited to clergy and can apply to lay employees and non-co-religionists.
The ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation, leaders, ministers, or members of the clergy, and can apply to “lay” employees and even non-“co-religionists” or those not “practicing” the faith.
See EEOC Compliance Manual § 12-I-C (Jan. 15, 2021).
In Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, the Second Circuit described the principal's employment-discrimination claims as brought under Title VII and New York Executive Law § 296.
She claims employment discrimination by the School, St. Anthony’s Shrine Church (the “Church”), and the Archdiocese of New York (the “Archdiocese”), alleging that her employment was terminated on the basis of gender discrimination and in retaliation for her reporting the alleged discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and New York State Executive Law § 296.
See Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017).
In Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, the Second Circuit held that the ministerial exception barred a lay principal's employment-discrimination claims because she held herself out as a spiritual leader of the school and performed important religious functions.
In sum, then, we conclude that although Fratello’s formal title was not inherently religious, the record makes clear that she held herself out as a spiritual leader of the School and performed many important religious functions to advance its Roman Catholic mission. The ministerial exception thus bars her employment-discrimination claims because she was a minister within the meaning of the exception.
See Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017).
In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, the New York Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception barred a teacher's Labor Law § 201-d claim because her offer letter established that her core teaching responsibilities were religious.
Whatever the scope of section 201-d, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the ministerial exception, which precludes application of employment discrimination laws to claims involving an employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. Plaintiff's offer letter conclusively establishes that her core teaching responsibilities were religious, rather than secular, in nature. Accordingly, we affirm on this alternative ground.
See Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, 2025 NY Slip Op 06958 (N.Y. Dec. 16, 2025).
In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, the Fourth Circuit described the plaintiff as a longtime English and drama teacher who sued under Title VII after the school fired him for his plans to marry his same-sex partner.
Lonnie Billard, a longtime teacher of English and drama at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS), sued for sex discrimination under Title VII after CCHS fired him for his plans to marry his same-sex partner.
See Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, 101 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024).
In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, the Fourth Circuit held that the teacher fell within the ministerial exception to Title VII because he played a vital role as a messenger of the school's faith.
We conclude that because Billard played a vital role as a messenger of CCHS’s faith, he falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII.
See Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, 101 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024).
Can a New York religious school discipline or dismiss an employee for off-duty conduct that conflicts with its religious teachings?
New York Labor Law § 201-d bars employers from acting against employees because of lawful off-duty political activities, recreational activities and use of consumable products, so a religious school's off-duty conduct rule is most secure for employees within the ministerial exception.
In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, the Court of Appeals did not decide how far § 201-d's protection of recreational activities reaches, and instead held that the ministerial exception barred a religious teacher's § 201-d claim. The Fourth Circuit's Billard decision, which does not bind New York courts, upheld a Catholic school's decision under a diocesan policy against conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith, on the ground that the teacher fell within the ministerial exception.
For staff without a religious role, the ministerial exception does not apply, and the school relies on the statutory exemptions instead. Section 201-d itself exempts a Title VII-exempt religious educational institution only for speech on religious matters to employees who work on its religious activities. Labor Law § 203-e, which bars discrimination based on an employee's reproductive health decisions, contains no religious-employer exception, as the question on the reproductive health notice explains. Courts also differ on how far Title VII's religious-employer exemption reaches: the Fourth Circuit held in October 2026 that it does not cover a religiously motivated decision challenged as sex discrimination, a decision that does not bind New York courts. For staff outside the ministerial exception, the conservative course is to treat an off-duty conduct rule as subject to the ordinary federal and New York discrimination laws and their statutory exemptions.
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New York Labor Law § 201-d(2) bars an employer from refusing to hire, discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of lawful off-duty political activities, legal use of consumable products and legal recreational activities.
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any employer or employment agency to refuse to hire, employ or license, or to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an individual in compensation, promotion or terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of: a. an individual's political activities outside of working hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property, if such activities are legal, provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to persons whose employment is defined in paragraph six of subdivision (a) of section seventy-nine-h of the civil rights law, and provided further that this paragraph shall not apply to persons who would otherwise be prohibited from engaging in political activity pursuant to chapter 15 of title 5 and subchapter III of chapter 73 of title 5 of the USCA; b. an individual's legal use of consumable products, including cannabis in accordance with state law, prior to the beginning or after the conclusion of the employee's work hours, and off of the employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property; c. an individual's legal recreational activities, including cannabis in accordance with state law, outside work hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property;
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d(2)(a)–(c).
In Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, the New York Court of Appeals reserved the scope of Labor Law § 201-d and held that the ministerial exception barred a religious teacher's § 201-d claim.
Whatever the scope of section 201-d, Plaintiff's claim is barred by the ministerial exception, which precludes application of employment discrimination laws to claims involving an employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. Plaintiff's offer letter conclusively establishes that her core teaching responsibilities were religious, rather than secular, in nature. Accordingly, we affirm on this alternative ground.
See Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, 2025 NY Slip Op 06958 (N.Y. Dec. 16, 2025).
In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, the Fourth Circuit recounted that the school concluded the teacher's plans violated the diocese's policy against conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith.
Billard’s plans to marry a same-sex partner, CCHS concluded, violated the Diocese’s policy against engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith.
See Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, 101 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024).
In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, the Fourth Circuit held that the teacher fell within the ministerial exception to Title VII because he played a vital role as a messenger of the school's faith.
We conclude that because Billard played a vital role as a messenger of CCHS’s faith, he falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII.
See Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, 101 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024).
New York Labor Law § 201-d(9) exempts a Title VII-exempt religious educational institution from § 201-d only with respect to speech on religious matters to employees who work on its religious activities.
9. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution or society that is exempt from the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 42 USC 2000e-1(a) with respect to speech on religious matters to employees who perform work connected with the activities undertaken by such religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution or society.
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d(9).
New York Labor Law § 203-e(2)(a) bars an employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee because of the employee's or a dependent's reproductive health decision making.
2. An employer shall not: (a) discriminate nor take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of or on the basis of the employee's or dependent's reproductive health decision making, including, but not limited to, a decision to use or access a particular drug, device or medical service; or (b) require an employee to sign a waiver or other document which purports to deny an employee the right to make their own reproductive health care decisions, including use of a particular drug, device, or medical service.
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 203-e(2)(a).
In Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, the Fourth Circuit held that Title VII's section 702 religious-employer exemption does not apply to claims of sex, race or national origin discrimination, even when the employment decision is religiously motivated.
In sum, based on the statutory text, including a broad interpretation of the protective provisions of Title VII and narrow interpretation of its limitations, we hold that even when an employment decision is motivated by religious belief, section 702 does not apply to claims of discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin.
See Doe v. Catholic Relief Services, No. 25-1569 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026).
Must a religious school's employee handbook in New York include the Labor Law § 203-e reproductive health notice?
A religious school that provides a handbook is subject to the § 203-e(6) notice requirement, because the Second Circuit in 2025 vacated the injunction that had barred its enforcement. The court remanded for the district court to decide whether any plaintiff had plausibly alleged an expressive-association claim under Slattery v. Hochul.
Section 203-e bars an employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee because of the employee's or a dependent's reproductive health decision making. In Slattery v. Hochul, the Second Circuit concluded that § 203-e, as a crisis pregnancy center alleged it, forced the center to employ people who act against its mission, and CompassCare v. Hochul read Slattery to mean that an employer may have an associational-rights claim if the statute forces it to employ such people.
As of the November 19, 2026 review, the most recent appellate record cited here is the Second Circuit's January 2, 2025 decision in CompassCare, which vacated the injunction against the notice provision and addressed only whether the employers' allegations stated a plausible claim, not whether any employer is exempt. A possible as-applied claim about particular employment decisions is a different question from the duty to print the notice. Slattery recognizes a possible as-applied claim only for an employer that shows the statute forces it to employ people who act against its very mission, so the conservative course for a religious school with a handbook is to include the § 203-e(6) notice.
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New York Labor Law § 203-e(6) requires an employer that provides an employee handbook to include notice of employee rights and remedies under § 203-e; the text contains no religious-employer exception.
6. An employer that provides an employee handbook to its employees must include in the handbook notice of employee rights and remedies under this section.
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 203-e(6).
New York Labor Law § 203-e(2)(a) bars an employer from discriminating or retaliating against an employee because of the employee's or a dependent's reproductive health decision making.
2. An employer shall not: (a) discriminate nor take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of or on the basis of the employee's or dependent's reproductive health decision making, including, but not limited to, a decision to use or access a particular drug, device or medical service; or (b) require an employee to sign a waiver or other document which purports to deny an employee the right to make their own reproductive health care decisions, including use of a particular drug, device, or medical service.
See N.Y. Lab. Law § 203-e(2)(a).
In CompassCare v. Hochul, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment and permanent injunction against the § 203-e notice provision and remanded the expressive-association claim for decision under Slattery.
In light of Slattery, we vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary-judgment to Plaintiffs as to the Act’s Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. We remand for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an expressive-association claim under Slattery.
See CompassCare v. Hochul, 125 F.4th 49 (2d Cir. 2025) (decided Jan. 2, 2025).
In CompassCare v. Hochul, the Second Circuit read its Slattery decision as holding that an employer may have an associational-rights claim if § 203-e forces it to employ individuals who act or have acted against the very mission of its organization.
Thereafter, this Court decided Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer may have an associational-rights claim if the Act “forces [the employer] to employ individuals who act or have acted against the very mission of its organization.”
See CompassCare v. Hochul, 125 F.4th 49 (2d Cir. 2025).
In Slattery v. Hochul, the Second Circuit concluded that § 203-e, as the crisis pregnancy center alleged it, forces the center to employ individuals who act or have acted against its very mission.
The statute forces Evergreen to employ individuals who act or have acted against the very mission of its organization.
See Slattery v. Hochul, 61 F.4th 278 (2d Cir. 2023) (decided Feb. 27, 2023).