Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Wisconsin?
Yes, but only if they are reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate employer interest. Wisconsin is not a ban state, yet Wis. Stat. § 103.465 makes a restrictive covenant lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer, and the courts apply a demanding five-factor test that an overbroad covenant fails.
Wisconsin enforces employee non-competes, but it is a notably employee-protective reasonableness state. The governing statute, Wis. Stat. § 103.465, starts from the premise that a covenant is enforceable only when it is no broader than necessary to protect the employer.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has distilled that standard into five prerequisites, every one of which a covenant must satisfy. A failure on any single factor is fatal.
The practical consequence, explored in the questions below, is that drafting precision matters more in Wisconsin than in most states: a covenant that reaches even slightly too far is not narrowed by the court — it is struck down in full.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
A.1 Wis. Stat. § 103.465Wis. Stat. § 103.465 makes a restrictive covenant in an employment contract lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal.
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his or her employer or principal during the term of the employment or agency, or after the termination of that employment or agency, within a specified territory and during a specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal.
See Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
Case law · 2009-07-14
A.2 Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal PraStar Direct v. Dal Pra states the five prerequisites a restrictive covenant must satisfy to be enforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
A restrictive covenant must: (1) be necessary for the protection of the employer, that is, the employer must have a protectable interest justifying the restriction imposed on the activity of the employee; (2) provide a reasonable time limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not be harsh or oppressive as to the employee; and (5) not be contrary to public policy.
See Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898.
Can a Wisconsin court blue-pencil or narrow an overbroad non-compete?
No. Wis. Stat. § 103.465 declares that a covenant imposing an unreasonable restraint is void and unenforceable even as to any part that would have been a reasonable restraint, so Wisconsin courts do not rewrite, narrow, or blue-pencil an overbroad covenant. The Court of Appeals has confirmed that a contractual modification or savings clause cannot rescue a covenant that violates the statute.
This is the defining feature of Wisconsin restrictive-covenant law. In most reasonableness states a court can trim an overbroad covenant to a lawful scope; Wisconsin's statute forbids it.
Employers sometimes try to engineer around the rule with a clause authorizing a court to modify the covenant to whatever scope is enforceable. Wisconsin courts give such clauses no effect, because a provision that conflicts with § 103.465 cannot itself supply the missing reasonableness.
Do not rely on a reformation, savings, or court-may-modify clause to backstop an aggressive Wisconsin non-compete. Section 103.465 voids an unreasonable restraint even as to the part that would have been reasonable, and Diamond Assets held that a modification clause contrary to the statute has no effect.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
B.1 Wis. Stat. § 103.465Wis. Stat. § 103.465 voids an unreasonable restraint even as to any part of the covenant that would have been a reasonable restraint, barring judicial blue-penciling.
Any covenant, described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.
See Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
Case law · 2022-07-14
B.2 Diamond Assets LLC v. GodinaDiamond Assets v. Godina held that a contractual modification provision contrary to Wis. Stat. § 103.465 has no effect and cannot save an overbroad covenant.
Given that the modification provision is contrary to WIS. STAT. § 103.465, it could have no effect here.
See Diamond Assets LLC v. Godina, 2022 WI App 47.
Are separate restrictive covenants in one Wisconsin agreement severable?
Yes, if they are genuinely distinct. Although a court cannot narrow a single overbroad covenant, Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra holds that separate covenants supporting different interests that can be independently read and enforced are divisible, so one invalid covenant does not automatically doom a stand-alone confidentiality or non-solicitation clause .
Divisibility is different from blue-penciling. Blue-penciling means rewriting the words of one covenant; divisibility means treating two truly separate covenants as separate. Wisconsin forbids the first but allows the second.
The structural lesson is to draft each restraint — non-compete, customer non-solicit, employee non-solicit, confidentiality — as a self-contained covenant that can stand or fall on its own, rather than as interlocking parts of one sprawling clause.
Write each restraint as a separate, independently enforceable covenant. Under Star Direct, distinct covenants supporting different interests are divisible, so isolating each one limits the damage if a court voids the most aggressive restraint .
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2009-07-14
C.1 Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal PraStar Direct v. Dal Pra holds that separate covenants supporting different interests that can be independently read and enforced are divisible, so an invalid covenant does not automatically void a distinct valid one.
Restrictive covenants are divisible when the contract contains different covenants supporting different interests that can be independently read and enforced.
See Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898.
Are employee and customer non-solicitation covenants governed by § 103.465?
Yes. In Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an employee non-solicitation provision is a restraint of trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465, and it struck down a clause barring solicitation of any Manitowoc employee as overbroad on its face — voiding the covenant and undoing an award that had included roughly $1 million in attorney fees.
Customer non-solicitation clauses have long been analyzed as § 103.465 restraints. The harder question was employee non-solicitation — no-poach clauses — which do not bar the departing employee from competing at all. Lanning resolved it: they are § 103.465 covenants too.
Because the clause swept in every Manitowoc employee — regardless of role, location, or whether the departing employee had any relationship with them — it failed the reasonableness test and was void in its entirety.
Narrow an employee non-solicitation clause to the employees the departing worker actually worked with or supervised, not the whole company. Manitowoc v. Lanning treats employee non-solicitation as a § 103.465 restraint and voided an all-employees clause as overbroad on its face.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2018-01-19
D.1 Manitowoc Co. v. LanningManitowoc Co. v. Lanning held that an employee non-solicitation provision is a restraint of trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
Accordingly, we conclude that Lanning's non-solicitation of employees provision is a restraint of trade governed by Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
See Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6.
Case law · 2018-01-19
D.2 Manitowoc Co. v. LanningManitowoc Co. v. Lanning concluded that a non-solicitation of employees provision barring solicitation of any employee was overbroad on its face and unenforceable under Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
In applying the prerequisites that must be met under Wis. Stat. § 103.465, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the non-solicitation of employees provision is overbroad on its face.
See Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6.
What consideration supports a Wisconsin non-compete signed during employment?
Conditioned continued employment is enough — at least formally. In Runzheimer International, Ltd. v. Friedlen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an employer's forbearance in exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee is lawful consideration for signing a restrictive covenant, so an employer that actually forbears from termination in exchange for the covenant does not necessarily have to pay extra to bind an existing worker .
The question in Runzheimer was whether merely keeping an at-will employee on the payroll could support a non-compete the employee was asked to sign mid-employment. The court said yes.
The court paired that holding with a caution against bad faith: an employer that fires an employee immediately after extracting the signature may face other contract doctrines. Many Wisconsin practitioners therefore advise giving the employee something tangible — a raise, bonus, promotion, or new access — both to reduce litigation risk and to strengthen the reasonableness case.
Even though continued at-will employment is technically sufficient consideration under Runzheimer, pairing a mid-employment covenant with new value (a raise, bonus, or promotion) is the safer course, because the court conditioned its holding on genuine forbearance rather than a sign-then-fire maneuver .
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2015-04-30
E.1 Runzheimer Int'l, Ltd. v. FriedlenRunzheimer Int'l v. Friedlen held that an employer's forbearance in exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee is lawful consideration for signing a restrictive covenant.
We hold that an employer's forbearance in exercising its right to terminate an at-will employee constitutes lawful consideration for signing a restrictive covenant.
See Runzheimer Int'l, Ltd. v. Friedlen, 2015 WI 45.
Can a Wisconsin non-compete be tolled or extended during a breach?
No — and trying voids the covenant. In H&R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc. v. Swenson, the Court of Appeals held that a clause extending the restricted period by any time the employee was in violation made the duration indefinite and unreasonable, so the entire clause was void under § 103.465 even if it would otherwise have been reasonable. A tolling or extension-during-breach clause is a void-trigger in Wisconsin, not an enforcement aid.
Many covenants include language stating that the clock pauses while the employee is breaching or while litigation is pending, so the employer gets the full period of compliance. In Wisconsin that drafting move backfires.
Because § 103.465 requires a reasonable — and therefore definite — time limit, an open-ended extension provision renders the whole restraint unreasonable. The court did not narrow the clause; it voided it.
Swenson squarely addressed an extension-for-breach clause. A clause that instead tolls the period during pending litigation has not been tested by a Wisconsin court, but it raises the same definiteness problem — and the no-blue-pencil rule means a court that finds it unreasonable will void the restraint rather than save it.
Do not include a clause that extends a Wisconsin non-compete for periods of the employee's breach. H&R Block v. Swenson held that such an extension makes the duration indefinite and voids the entire clause under § 103.465, and Wisconsin courts will not blue-pencil it back to a fixed term; a pending-litigation tolling clause, while untested, carries the same risk.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2007-12-20
F.1 H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc. v. SwensonH&R Block v. Swenson held that a clause extending the restricted period by any period of violation made the duration of the restraint indefinite rather than fixed and definite.
The effect of the extension provision thus makes the duration of the restraint not a fixed and definite time period but a time period that is contingent upon outcomes the employee cannot predict.
See H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc. v. Swenson, 2008 WI App 3.
Case law · 2007-12-20
F.2 H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc. v. SwensonH&R Block v. Swenson held that because the extension provision made the restraint unreasonable, each clause was void and unenforceable even if otherwise reasonable.
Because this restraint in each clause is unreasonable, each clause is void and unenforceable even if each is otherwise reasonable.
See H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc. v. Swenson, 2008 WI App 3.
Are confidentiality and non-disclosure clauses subject to § 103.465 in Wisconsin?
They can be. In Diamond Assets LLC v. Godina, the Court of Appeals treated a broad confidentiality covenant as a restrictive covenant subject to Wis. Stat. § 103.465 and held it unenforceable on a motion to dismiss, regardless of any evidence the employer might later offer — because an overbroad confidentiality restraint fails the same reasonableness test as a non-compete .
A confidentiality clause that sweeps in ordinary, non-secret business information functions as a restraint on the employee's ability to work and is judged under § 103.465. If any part of the confidentiality covenant is unreasonable, the whole covenant fails.
The takeaway is to scope confidentiality obligations to genuine trade secrets and competitively sensitive information, not to every fact the employee encountered. An NDA drafted as a catch-all is vulnerable to the same overbreadth attack as an aggressive non-compete.
Scope confidentiality and non-disclosure clauses to actual trade secrets and competitively sensitive information. Diamond Assets held an overbroad confidentiality covenant unenforceable under § 103.465 on a motion to dismiss, so a catch-all NDA can fall the same way an overbroad non-compete does .
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2022-07-14
G.1 Diamond Assets LLC v. GodinaDiamond Assets v. Godina held that an overbroad confidentiality covenant subject to Wis. Stat. § 103.465 was unenforceable on a motion to dismiss, regardless of later evidence.
As to the confidentiality covenant, we agree with Godina that it is properly subject to a motion to dismiss as unenforceable, regardless of the evidence Diamond might be able to submit.
See Diamond Assets LLC v. Godina, 2022 WI App 47.
Are sale-of-business and ownership covenants treated differently in Wisconsin?
Yes. A covenant given outside the employer-employee relationship — as part of a genuine business sale or equity transaction rather than as a condition of employment — falls outside § 103.465's exacting scrutiny and is judged under the common-law rule of reason. Reiman Associates, Inc. v. R/A Advertising, Inc. applied the more lenient rule of partial enforcement to a sale-of-business covenant, and Selmer Co. v. Rinn evaluated a covenant it found outside the employment relationship under the rule of reason instead of the statute.
The statute by its terms governs covenants by an employee or agent. A covenant given by a seller of a business, or tied to an equity interest, is analyzed under the older common-law rule of reason — which, critically, does permit partial enforcement.
Selmer confirms that the dividing line is the employment relationship, not the label on the document. A covenant connected to ownership or equity is measured against the common-law standard, not § 103.465.
Match the legal framework to the deal. A covenant given as part of a genuine business sale or equity transaction — one separable from the employment relationship and not imposed through the employer's hiring leverage — is judged under the common-law rule of reason, which allows partial enforcement, while an employee covenant is locked into § 103.465's all-or-nothing rule, so do not assume the two are interchangeable.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 1981-04-27
H.1 Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. R/A Advertising, Inc.Reiman v. R/A Advertising held that covenants incidental to the sale of a business benefit from the rule of partial enforcement, under which even an unreasonable restraint is enforced to the extent reasonable.
Additionally, covenants incidental to the sale of a business benefit from full application of the rule of partial enforcement: even an unreasonable restraint will be enforced to the extent necessary and reasonable under the circumstances.
See Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. R/A Advertising, Inc., 102 Wis. 2d 305 (Ct. App. 1981).
Case law · 2010-07-13
H.2 Selmer Co. v. RinnSelmer Co. v. Rinn held that a covenant outside the employment relationship is evaluated under the common law's rule of reason rather than Wis. Stat. § 103.465.
Having determined Wis. Stat. § 103.465 does not apply, we must determine whether the covenant not to compete satisfies the common law's rule of reason.
See Selmer Co. v. Rinn, 2010 WI App 106.
Can an out-of-state choice-of-law clause avoid Wisconsin's non-compete rules?
Generally no. Wisconsin courts refuse to enforce a choice-of-law clause that would apply another state's more permissive covenant law in place of § 103.465, because doing so would violate Wisconsin's fundamental public policy. Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp. refused to apply Ohio law that permitted severability, and Bush v. National School Studios identified laws prohibiting covenants not to compete as the kind of fundamental policy that overrides a contractual choice of law.
A common strategy is to draft the agreement under the law of a state friendlier to non-competes. Wisconsin courts police that strategy when the covenant would be applied to Wisconsin work.
That public-policy override rests on the foundational choice-of-law analysis in Bush, which identified laws prohibiting covenants not to compete as an example of a policy strong enough to defeat a contractual choice of law.
Do not assume a Delaware, Ohio, or other out-of-state choice-of-law clause will rescue a non-compete applied to Wisconsin employment. Beilfuss refused to enforce a choice-of-law clause that conflicted with § 103.465, relying on the fundamental-policy analysis of Bush.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2004-05-12
I.1 Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp.Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp. held a choice-of-law provision unenforceable because applying Ohio severability law would violate Wisconsin's public policy controlling covenants not to compete.
We hold the choice of law provision is unenforceable because it violates Wisconsin's long-standing public policy controlling covenants not to compete, in that Wisconsin does not permit severability as a matter of public policy, while Ohio does.
See Beilfuss v. Huffy Corp., 2004 WI App 118.
Case law · 1987-06-25
I.2 Bush v. National School Studios, Inc.Bush v. National School Studios identified laws prohibiting covenants not to compete as an example of an important state public policy that can override a contractual choice-of-law stipulation.
In general, however, statutes or common law which make a particular type of contract enforceable, e.g., usury laws, or which make a particular contract provision unenforceable, e.g., laws prohibiting covenants not to compete, or that are designed to protect a weaker party against the unfair exercise of superior bargaining power by another party, are likely to embody an important state public policy.
See Bush v. National School Studios, Inc., 139 Wis. 2d 635 (1987).
What remedies and litigation exposure apply to Wisconsin non-competes?
An employer can pursue injunctive relief and damages, and a recent decision recognizes disgorgement of profits as a remedy for tortious interference involving an employee non-compete; any attorney-fee award is in turn capped by a statutory reasonableness presumption. But the employee side has its own limits: under Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., an at-will employee fired for refusing to sign a non-disclosure or non-compete agreement has no wrongful-discharge claim.
On the employer side, Frey Construction & Home Improvement, LLC v. Hasheider Roofing & Siding, Ltd. recognized disgorgement as an available remedy where a competitor is found to have tortiously interfered with an employee non-compete.
On the employee side, Wisconsin does not turn an allegedly unreasonable covenant into a wrongful-discharge claim merely because an at-will employee refused to sign it.
Attorney-fee exposure deserves its own attention, because in restrictive-covenant litigation the fees can outrun the damages. Wisconsin's fee-reasonableness statute, Wis. Stat. § 814.045, presumes that reasonable attorney fees do not exceed three times the compensatory damages awarded, though a court may find a larger award reasonable after weighing the statutory factors.
The statute does not displace a contractual attorney-fee clause — common in non-compete agreements — and in fact presumes such an agreement is reasonable.
A competitor that hires away an employee bound by a Wisconsin non-compete can face a tortious-interference claim with disgorgement exposure under Frey Construction, while an employee fired for refusing to sign cannot rely on a wrongful-discharge theory under Tatge — so weigh the covenant's enforceability, not just the firing, before acting. Price in fee exposure too: § 814.045 anchors a fee award to a three-times-damages reasonableness presumption while still honoring a contractual fee clause.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2024-12-17
J.1 Frey Construction & Home Improvement, LLC v. Hasheider Roofing & Siding, Ltd.Frey Construction v. Hasheider Roofing held that disgorgement may be an appropriate remedy for an intentional interference with contract claim involving an employee non-compete.
However, we further conclude that disgorgement may be an appropriate remedy for an intentional interference with contract claim.
See Frey Construction & Home Improvement, LLC v. Hasheider Roofing & Siding, Ltd., 2025 WI App 4.
Case law · 1998-06-19
J.3 Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc.Tatge v. Chambers & Owen held that an at-will employee terminated for refusing to sign a non-disclosure/non-compete agreement cannot maintain a wrongful-discharge claim.
We also hold that a contract cause of action for wrongful discharge may not be maintained under Brockmeyer where an at-will employee is terminated for failing to sign a non-disclosure/non-compete agreement.
See Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 99, 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998).
Primary law
J.2 Wis. Stat. § 814.045Wis. Stat. § 814.045(2)(a) presumes that reasonable attorney fees do not exceed three times the compensatory damages awarded, rebuttable after weighing the statutory reasonableness factors.
In any action in which compensatory damages are awarded, the court shall presume that reasonable attorney fees do not exceed 3 times the amount of the compensatory damages awarded but this presumption may be overcome if the court determines, after considering the factors set forth in sub. (1) , that a greater amount is reasonable.
See Wis. Stat. § 814.045(2)(a).
Primary law
J.4 Wis. Stat. § 814.045Wis. Stat. § 814.045(3) preserves the parties' right to agree on attorney fees and presumes such an agreement is reasonable.
This section does not abrogate the rights of persons to enter into an agreement for attorney fees, and the court shall presume that such an agreement is reasonable.
See Wis. Stat. § 814.045(3).
What recent legislation and industry-specific rules affect Wisconsin non-competes?
No statutory change took effect. In the 2025-26 session the legislature considered a broad ban (2025 Assembly Bill 567) and medical-practitioner restrictions (2025 Assembly Bill 675 and Senate Bill 657), but all three failed to pass at the end of the session, leaving § 103.465 unchanged. The main industry-specific rule already on the books is the lawyer non-compete bar in SCR 20:5.6.
The most sweeping proposal, Assembly Bill 567, would have rewritten § 103.465 to bar most post-employment non-competes outright, with narrow carve-outs for certain customer-list and intellectual-property protections.
Two companion bills targeted health care, mirroring a national trend toward restricting physician and clinician non-competes.
All three measures failed to pass when the 2025-26 session ended, so none became law and § 103.465 continues to govern. One profession is already carved out by court rule: Wisconsin lawyers generally cannot be bound by non-competes.
Treat Wisconsin non-compete law as governed by § 103.465 and the case law, not by the 2025-26 bills. Assembly Bill 567 and the medical-practitioner bills (Assembly Bill 675 and Senate Bill 657) failed to pass, so re-check the legislature's status before relying on any of them, and remember that SCR 20:5.6 already bars most lawyer non-competes.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
K.1 2025 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 5672025 Assembly Bill 567 would have made most post-termination non-compete covenants illegal, void, and unenforceable; it failed to pass at the end of the 2025-26 session.
This bill makes most such covenants illegal, void, and unenforceable after the termination of employment or agency.
See 2025 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 567 (failed to pass, Mar. 23, 2026).
Primary law
K.2 2025 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 6752025 Assembly Bill 675 would have restricted non-compete covenants for medical practitioners; it failed to pass at the end of the 2025-26 session.
This bill makes changes regarding covenants not to compete for advanced practice registered nurses, advanced practice nurse prescribers, physicians, physician assistants, and psychologists ("medical practitioners").
See 2025 Wisconsin Assembly Bill 675 (failed to pass, Mar. 23, 2026).
Primary law
K.3 2025 Wisconsin Senate Bill 6572025 Senate Bill 657, the Senate companion to AB 675, would have voided medical-practitioner non-competes that restrict practice for more than 24 consecutive months; it failed to pass at the end of the 2025-26 session.
The bill provides that a covenant by a medical practitioner not to compete with his or her employer after the termination of the employment imposes an unreasonable restraint and is illegal, void, and unenforceable if the covenant includes a restriction that prohibits working as a medical practitioner for more than 24 consecutive months after the first day of the medical practitioner's employment with the employer that is imposing the covenant not to compete.
See 2025 Wisconsin Senate Bill 657 (failed to pass, Mar. 23, 2026).
Primary law
K.4 Wis. SCR 20:5.6PDFSCR 20:5.6 bars a lawyer from participating in an agreement that restricts the lawyer's right to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning retirement benefits or a settlement of a client controversy.
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.
See Wis. SCR 20:5.6.
How do trade-secret protections compare to a non-compete in Wisconsin?
They are often the more reliable tool. Wisconsin has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act at Wis. Stat. § 134.90, which protects qualifying information and authorizes injunctions and damages without the overbreadth risk that defeats so many non-competes — so an employer that cannot enforce a covenant may still protect genuine secrets .
Because a non-compete must clear § 103.465's all-or-nothing reasonableness test, many Wisconsin employers lean on trade-secret law, which turns on the nature of the information rather than the breadth of a contractual restraint. The statute defines what qualifies.
A trade-secret claim does not depend on a signed covenant and is not subject to § 103.465, so it survives even where a non-compete is void. The trade-off is that the employer must prove the information truly qualifies and that it took reasonable steps to keep it secret.
Build the protection program around trade-secret safeguards — access controls, confidentiality designations, and exit procedures — rather than relying on a non-compete alone. Wis. Stat. § 134.90 protects qualifying secrets regardless of § 103.465, but only if the information meets the statutory definition and was kept reasonably secret .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
L.1 Wis. Stat. § 134.90Wis. Stat. § 134.90, the Wisconsin Uniform Trade Secrets Act, defines a trade secret as information that derives independent economic value from not being generally known and is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process to which all of the following apply: 1. The information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. 2. The information is the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.
See Wis. Stat. § 134.90(1)(c).