Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Montana?
Sometimes. Montana Code § 28-2-703 makes restraints on a lawful profession, trade, or business void, but Montana is not a California-style total-ban state because Dobbins preserves reasonable partial restraints.
The key distinction is absolute versus partial restraint. A covenant that effectively blocks the worker from practicing a trade is in serious danger. A covenant that leaves the worker free to practice, but regulates a limited client, territory, time, or fee consequence, can be tested under Montana's reasonableness framework.
That means the first drafting question is not simply whether the agreement is called a non-compete. It is whether the clause actually restrains work, whether it is absolute or partial, and whether the employer can prove the Dobbins elements.
Do not summarize Montana as a blanket-ban jurisdiction. The statute is broad, but Dobbins and later cases treat partial restraints differently from absolute restraints.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
A.1 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703Section 28-2-703 supports Montana's statutory baseline that contracts restraining a lawful profession, trade, or business are void except as otherwise provided.
28-2-703. Contracts in restraint of trade generally void. Any contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided for by 28-2-704 or 28-2-705, is to that extent void.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703.
Case law · 1985-11-06
A.2 Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & OlsonDobbins supports the rule that a fee-for-client covenant that does not prohibit accounting practice is a partial restraint rather than a prohibited restraint under § 28-2-703.
We hold that the written contract provisions do not constitute a restraint prohibited by Section 28-2-703, MCA.
See Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 218 Mont. 392, 708 P.2d 577 (1985).
What is the Dobbins test for Montana non-competes?
For a partial restraint, Montana asks whether the covenant is limited as to time or place, supported by good consideration, and reasonably protects the employer without imposing an unreasonable burden on the employee or the public .
The first element is phrased as time or place, not necessarily both. That still does not make open-ended drafting safe. The third element requires balancing, so a covenant that technically has a time or territory limit can still fail if the employer's protection is disproportionate to the worker or public burden.
Alborn later applied the same framework to a shareholder accounting-firm covenant, explaining that partial restraints require a reasonableness determination rather than automatic invalidation .
Sources for this answer
Case law · 1985-11-06
B.1 Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & OlsonDobbins supplies Montana's three-part reasonableness test for partial restraints.
“(1) the covenant should be limited in operation either as to time or place; (2) the covenant should be based on some good consideration; and (3) the covenant should afford a reasonable protection for and not impose an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the employee or the public.”
See Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 218 Mont. 392, 708 P.2d 577 (1985).
Case law · 2016-09-06
B.2 Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C.The 2016 Alborn appeal supports applying Dobbins when a covenant only partially restrains trade.
Because the Covenant is not an absolute prohibition, it cannot be declared invalid as a matter of law.
See Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., 2016 MT 218, 384 Mont. 464, 380 P.3d 747.
Is continued employment enough consideration for a Montana non-compete signed after hire?
Usually no for an at-will employee. Access Organics held that simple continued employment did not supply good consideration for a non-compete signed more than four months after hiring .
Montana treats post-hire covenants as afterthought agreements. They are not automatically invalid, but the employer needs independent consideration, such as a raise, promotion, access to trade secrets, or another real benefit tied to the new restriction .
The practical rule is timing-sensitive. A covenant presented as part of pre-employment negotiations can use the job offer as the exchange. A covenant presented later needs a new exchange, and past raises or prior employment are not enough.
For an existing Montana employee, do not rely on continued at-will employment alone. Tie the covenant to new consideration and document the exchange at the time the covenant is signed.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2008-01-03
C.1 Access Organics, Inc. v. HernandezAccess Organics supports the rule that continued at-will employment alone may not be sufficient consideration for a post-hire Montana non-compete.
In such circumstances, the simple fact of the employee’s continued employment may not serve as sufficient consideration.
See Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, 341 Mont. 73, 175 P.3d 899.
Case law · 2008-01-03
C.2 Access Organics, Inc. v. HernandezAccess Organics supports using independent consideration, such as a raise, promotion, trade-secret access, or confidential information access, for post-hire non-competes.
Non-compete agreements entered into by existing employees may be supported by independent consideration.
See Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 2008 MT 4, 341 Mont. 73, 175 P.3d 899.
Can a Montana employer enforce a non-compete after terminating the employee without cause?
Generally no. Wrigg held that an employer normally lacks a legitimate business interest in enforcing a covenant when the employer chooses to end the employment relationship .
The reason is practical and equitable. If the employer could avoid competition by keeping the worker employed, then firing the worker and still blocking the worker's livelihood looks like ordinary competition prevention rather than legitimate protection.
Wrigg leaves room for a different result when the employee's conduct gives the employer a real protective interest. Trade-secret misuse, customer-relationship misuse, or proprietary-information misuse can change the analysis, but the employer must prove the risk.
Before sending an enforcement letter after a layoff, nonrenewal, or termination without cause, identify a Montana-specific legitimate interest beyond ordinary competition. Wrigg makes employer-initiated separation a major enforcement problem .
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2011-11-22
D.1 Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.Wrigg supports the rule that an employer normally lacks a legitimate business interest in enforcing a covenant after the employer ends the employment relationship.
This disfavor only heightens when an employer chooses to end the employment relationship and yet seeks to enforce the covenant not to compete.
See Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2011 MT 290, 362 Mont. 496, 265 P.3d 646.
Case law · 2011-11-22
D.2 Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.Wrigg directs courts to analyze whether the former employee used trade secrets, customer relationships, or proprietary information that would supply an unfair advantage — which can establish a legitimate business interest even after an employer-initiated separation.
A court should analyze whether the former employee used trade secrets, customer relationships, or proprietary information that would provide an employee with an unfair advantage.
See Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2011 MT 290, 362 Mont. 496, 265 P.3d 646.
Case law · 2011-11-22
D.3 Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.Wrigg supports analyzing whether the former employee actually acquired trade secrets or intimate client knowledge before enforcing a covenant after termination.
JCCS never alleges that Wrigg acquired any JCCS trade secrets or intimate knowledge regarding any special accounting needs of JCCS’s clients.
See Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2011 MT 290, 362 Mont. 496, 265 P.3d 646.
Are fee-for-service and customer-fee clauses enforceable in Montana?
They can be. Montana courts have treated customer-linked fee provisions as partial restraints when the worker remains free to compete and serve the customer, subject to a contract payment.
The accounting-firm cases are the strongest pattern. In the 2016 Alborn appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that a fee provision requiring payment for servicing former firm clients was not an absolute prohibition. In the 2020 appeal, the court affirmed a $2,353,463.27 judgment tied to that fee structure and recognized the employer's protectable interest in its client base.
This does not make all customer restrictions safe. The covenant still needs time or place limits, good consideration, and a reasonable burden. But Montana's leading cases show that fee-for-service provisions are often a better fit than a no-work ban.
A pure customer non-solicitation clause is different from the fee-for-service provisions these cases enforced. Because § 28-2-703 voids contracts restraining a business of any kind, a customer or employee non-solicit is best treated as a restraint on trade tested under the same Dobbins partial-restraint analysis, but no Montana Supreme Court decision squarely fixes the permissible duration or scope of a stand-alone non-solicit .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
E.5 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703Section 28-2-703 voids contracts restraining a business of any kind, so a stand-alone customer or employee non-solicitation clause is itself a restraint on trade subject to the Dobbins partial-restraint analysis.
28-2-703. Contracts in restraint of trade generally void. Any contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided for by 28-2-704 or 28-2-705, is to that extent void.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703.
Case law · 2016-09-06
E.1 Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C.The 2016 Alborn appeal supports treating a former-client fee provision as a partial restraint rather than an absolute prohibition.
Rather, the Covenant requires Former Shareholders to pay liquidated damages if they provide services to a Junkermier client within one year of their departure from the firm.
See Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., 2016 MT 218, 384 Mont. 464, 380 P.3d 747.
Case law · 2020-07-14
E.2 Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. AlbornThe 2020 Alborn appeal supports that, on remand, the covenant was found reasonable under the Dobbins factors.
After conducting a bench trial, the District Court determined JCCS had proven the Covenant was reasonable based on the Dobbins factors.
See Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, 2020 MT 179.
Case law · 2020-07-14
E.3 Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. AlbornThe 2020 Alborn appeal supports the employer's legitimate business interest in protecting its client base.
We conclude the District Court did not err by finding JCCS had a legitimate business interest in the Covenant of protecting its client base.
See Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, 2020 MT 179.
Case law · 2020-07-14
E.4 Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. AlbornThe 2020 Alborn appeal concerned a $2,353,463.27 fee-for-service judgment, which the Court affirmed against the former shareholders jointly and severally.
Appellants owed JCCS $2,353,463.27.
See Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, 2020 MT 179.
What kinds of non-compete restraints are void in Montana?
Absolute restraints are void. A covenant that leaves the worker with no realistic way to practice the trade in the relevant market is likely an unlawful restraint under § 28-2-703.
Montana Mountain Products v. Curl is the practical warning case. The worker's local trade depended on working for a subcontractor of Montana Silversmiths, and the covenant prohibited exactly that. The court held the covenant unreasonable and void.
Mungas shows a related sale-of-goodwill boundary. A covenant does not fit the goodwill exception merely because a partnership document says so. The court looked for an actual sale of property for pecuniary consideration and held that the goodwill exception did not apply where no sale occurred .
Montana's partial-restraint cases are not permission to draft a broad no-work clause. If the restraint functions as an absolute prohibition in the worker's actual market, Curl and Mungas point toward invalidity.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2005-04-26
F.1 Montana Mountain Products v. CurlCurl supports invalidating a covenant that effectively prohibits the worker from practicing her trade in the relevant vicinity.
Because the covenant prohibits Curl from engaging in her profession, we conclude that it is unreasonable and therefore an unlawful restraint on trade.
See Mont. Mountain Prods. v. Curl, 2005 MT 102, 327 Mont. 7, 112 P.3d 979.
Case law · 2009-12-15
F.2 Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLPMungas supports the distinction between absolute prohibitions, which are void, and partial restraints, which require reasonableness review.
The Dobbins Court concluded that in those instances where a contract contains a restraint on a person’s ability to practice their profession, but such restraint is not an absolute prohibition, a factual determination must be made as to whether the covenant not to compete is reasonable.
See Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 426, 354 Mont. 50, 221 P.3d 1230.
Case law · 2009-12-15
F.3 Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLPMungas supports rejecting the sale-of-goodwill exception when no property sale occurred.
Section 28-2-704(1), MCA, the sale of goodwill exception to the prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade, does not apply to the partnership agreements at issue in this case.
See Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2009 MT 426, 354 Mont. 50, 221 P.3d 1230.
What are the sale-of-business and partnership exceptions in Montana?
Montana has two classic statutory exceptions: sale of business goodwill under § 28-2-704 and dissolution of partnership under § 28-2-705.
The sale-of-goodwill exception lets a seller agree with the buyer not to carry on a similar business in specified areas while the buyer or successor carries on a like business there. The geographic menu is statutory: the principal-office city or county, adjacent cities or counties, or a combination of those areas .
The partnership exception is narrower and tracks the same geographic areas. It applies when partners dissolve the partnership and agree that one or more partners may not carry on a similar business within the § 28-2-704 territory.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
G.1 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-704Section 28-2-704 supports Montana's sale-of-goodwill exception to the restraint-of-trade rule.
28-2-704. Exception -- sale of goodwill of business. (1) A person who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within the areas provided in subsection (2) so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the goodwill from the buyer carries on a like business in the described areas.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-704.
Primary law
G.3 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-704Section 28-2-704 supports the limited statutory geography available for sale-of-goodwill covenants.
(2) The agreement authorized in subsection (1) may apply in: (a) the city where the principal office of the business is located; (b) the county where the principal office of the business is located; (c) a city in any county adjacent to the county in which the principal office of the business is located; (d) any county adjacent to the county in which the principal office of the business is located; or (e) any combination of the areas in subsections (2)(a) through (2)(d).
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-704(2)(e).
Primary law
G.2 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-705Section 28-2-705 supports Montana's partnership-dissolution exception.
28-2-705. Exception -- dissolution of partnership. Partners may, upon dissolution of the partnership, agree that one or more of them may not carry on a similar business within the areas provided in 28-2-704(2).
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-705.
What special non-compete rules apply to Montana health-care providers?
Section 28-2-724 bars covered health-care provider contracts from restricting post-relationship practice, services, patient treatment, patient relationships, or patient solicitation, subject to a narrow sale-of-practice exception and a physician-only decreasing-repayment exception.
The current consolidated statute covers physicians, psychologists, naturopathic physicians, social workers, professional counselors, addiction counselors, marriage and family therapists, behavioral health peer support specialists, registered professional nurses, advanced practice registered nurses, and physician assistants.
The 2025 amendments matter for timing. HB 198 added naturopathic physicians, RNs, APRNs, and PAs and took effect on passage and approval, applying to contracts made or renewed on or after its effective date . HB 620 added all physicians licensed under Title 37, chapter 3 on a delayed effective date of January 1, 2026, applying to contracts made or renewed on or after that date . The practical takeaway is that the covered-provider analysis turns on when the contract was made or renewed, not only on when the dispute arises.
For covered providers, do not try to convert a non-compete into a patient non-solicit. Section 28-2-724 reaches both practice restrictions and restrictions on treating, advising, consulting with, establishing relationships with, or soliciting covered patients .
Sources for this answer
Primary law
H.1 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724Section 28-2-724 supports Montana's ban on covered health-care provider practice, service, patient-treatment, patient-relationship, and patient-solicitation restrictions.
(1) A contract that creates or establishes the terms of employment, a partnership, or any other form of professional relationship with a health care provider described in subsection (2) may not restrict the right of the health care provider, after the termination of the employment, partnership, or other form of professional relationship, to: (a) practice or provide services for which the provider is licensed, in any geographic area and for any period; (b) treat, advise, consult with, or establish a provider-patient relationship with any current patient of the employer or with a patient affiliated with a partnership or other form of professional relationship; or (c) solicit or seek to establish a provider-patient relationship with any current patient of the employer or with a patient affiliated with a partnership or other form of professional relationship.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724(1).
Primary law
H.2 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724Section 28-2-724 supports the covered-provider list, including physicians, naturopathic physicians, nurses, advanced practice registered nurses, and physician assistants.
(2) The requirements of subsection (1) apply to contracts or agreements involving the following health care providers: (a) a physician licensed under Title 37, chapter 3; (b) a psychologist licensed under Title 37, chapter 17; (c) a naturopathic physician licensed under Title 37, chapter 26; (d) a social worker licensed under Title 37, chapter 39; (e) a professional counselor licensed under Title 37, chapter 39; (f) an addiction counselor licensed under Title 37, chapter 39; (g) a marriage and family therapist licensed under Title 37, chapter 39; (h) a behavioral health peer support specialist licensed under Title 37, chapter 39; (i) a registered professional nurse or an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under Title 37, chapter 8; or (j) a physician assistant licensed under Title 37, chapter 20.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724(2).
Primary law
H.3 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724Section 28-2-724 supports the sale-and-purchase-of-practice exception and the decreasing physician payback exception.
(3) This section does not apply to a contract in connection with the sale and purchase of a practice or to a provision for repayment of all or a portion of money paid or advanced to a physician licensed under Title 37, chapter 3, that is subject to a payback provision that decreases over time, including but not limited to a bona fide loan, relocation cost, signing bonus, education expense, and tuition repayment expense.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-724(3).
Primary law · 2025-04-16
H.4 House Bill 198 (Ch. 131, L. 2025)PDFHB 198 amended § 28-2-724 to add naturopaths, registered and advanced practice nurses, and physician assistants, took effect on passage and approval, and applies to contracts made or renewed on or after its effective date.
Applicability. [This act] applies to contracts made or renewed on or after [the effective date of this act].
See 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 131 (HB 198), §§ 2-3.
Primary law · 2026-01-01
H.5 House Bill 620 (Ch. 698, L. 2025)PDFHB 620 amended § 28-2-724 to add all licensed physicians on a delayed effective date of January 1, 2026, applying to contracts made or renewed on or after that date.
Applicability. [This act] applies to contracts made or renewed on or after January 1, 2026.
See 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 698 (HB 620), §§ 2-3.
What trade-secret and severance alternatives remain in Montana?
Montana employers should usually protect confidential information through the Montana Uniform Trade Secrets Act and narrow confidentiality covenants, while treating severance as a limited fallback rather than a reliable cure for overbroad non-competes.
MUTSA defines trade secrets as information or software that has independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable and is subject to reasonable secrecy efforts . It also authorizes injunctions for actual or threatened misappropriation, with limited royalty and affirmative-act remedies in appropriate cases .
Section 28-2-604 gives Montana courts a partial-void rule when a contract has distinct lawful and unlawful objects. But restrictive covenants are strictly construed, and cases like Curl void overbroad restraints rather than rewriting them into better covenants. Treat severability as a cleanup rule for distinct promises, not a drafting strategy for an aggressive non-compete.
Do not assume Montana will rewrite an overbroad covenant into a narrower one. Draft separate confidentiality, trade-secret, customer, repayment, and competition provisions so lawful objects can stand on their own if a restraint fails.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
I.1 Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-401Section 30-14-401 supports identifying Montana's trade-secret statute as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
30-14-401. Short title. This part may be cited as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act".
See Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-401.
Primary law
I.4 Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-402Section 30-14-402 supports MUTSA's definition of trade secret based on independent economic value and reasonable secrecy efforts.
(4) "Trade secret" means information or computer software, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-402(4).
Primary law
I.2 Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-403Section 30-14-403 supports injunctive relief for actual or threatened trade-secret misappropriation.
30-14-403. Injunctive relief -- royalty. (1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-403(1).
Primary law
I.3 Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-604Section 28-2-604 supports Montana's rule that a contract with distinct lawful and unlawful objects is void as to the unlawful object and valid as to the rest.
28-2-604. When contract partially void. Where a contract has several distinct objects of which one at least is lawful and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the latter and valid as to the rest.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-604.
Case law · 2005-04-26
I.5 Montana Mountain Products v. CurlCurl supports the caution that a Montana court may decline to enforce an unreasonable covenant outright rather than save it with a narrowed reading.
However, because we conclude that the covenant is unreasonable, we nonetheless affirm the judgment of the District Court.
See Mont. Mountain Prods. v. Curl, 2005 MT 102, 327 Mont. 7, 112 P.3d 979.