Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Georgia?
Yes, when they are reasonable and the worker performs a covered job function. Under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act, a post-employment non-compete is permitted so long as it is reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities . As the next question explains, the Act separately limits which employees can be bound by a post-employment non-compete.
Georgia was historically a strict, covenant-hostile state, but a 2010 constitutional amendment and the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act (the GRCA), O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50 to 13-8-59, replaced that regime with a reasonableness standard backed by statutory presumptions and judicial modification. The legislature said as much in the Act's findings.
The core enforcement rule appears in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a). It permits a covenant that restricts competition if the restraint is reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope, and the rest of the Act supplies the presumptions and limits that give that reasonableness test concrete content.
The party seeking to enforce a covenant carries the initial burden. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55 requires the enforcing party to plead and prove a legitimate business interest, and only then does the burden shift to the worker.
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Primary law
A.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 states the legislative finding that reasonable restrictive covenants serve a legitimate purpose, marking Georgia's shift to a pro-enforcement reasonableness regime.
The General Assembly finds that reasonable restrictive covenants contained in employment and commercial contracts serve the legitimate purpose of protecting legitimate business interests and creating an environment that is favorable to attracting commercial enterprises to Georgia and keeping existing businesses within the state.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50.
Primary law
A.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) permits enforcement of a covenant restricting competition so long as it is reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, enforcement of contracts that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant, so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities, shall be permitted.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
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A.3 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55 requires the party seeking enforcement to plead and prove a legitimate business interest, and shifts the burden to the party opposing enforcement once the enforcing party makes a prima facie showing of compliance with § 13-8-53.
The person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant shall plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive covenant. If a person seeking enforcement of the restrictive covenant establishes by prima-facie evidence that the restraint is in compliance with the provisions of Code Section 13-8-53, then any person opposing enforcement has the burden of establishing that the contractually specified restraint does not comply with such requirements or that such covenant is unreasonable.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55.
Which Georgia employees can be bound by a non-compete?
Only employees who perform certain higher-level functions. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) provides that a post-employment non-compete may not be enforced against an employee who does not customarily solicit customers, make sales, perform defined managerial duties, or qualify as a key employee or professional — and in Blair v. Pantera Enterprises, Inc. the Court of Appeals held that an hourly equipment operator did not meet the key-employee definition.
This employee-category gate is the most important structural limit in the GRCA, and national surveys often miss it. Even a covenant that is perfectly reasonable in time, area, and scope is unenforceable as a post-employment non-compete if the worker does not fall into one of the listed categories. Customer non-solicitation and confidentiality provisions, discussed below, are treated separately and are not subject to this gate.
The key employee and professional categories are defined narrowly, and courts police them. In Blair — a decision issued as physical precedent only, so it is persuasive rather than binding — the employer tried to bind an hourly backhoe operator as a key employee, and the Court of Appeals rejected that characterization.
Confirm that the employee actually performs a covered function before relying on a non-compete. A reasonable covenant is still void as a post-employment non-compete against a worker who does not solicit, sell, manage, or qualify as a key employee or professional, as Blair v. Pantera Enterprises shows.
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Primary law
B.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) bars enforcement of a post-employment non-compete against any employee who does not perform one of the enumerated functions: soliciting customers, making sales, defined managerial duties, or qualifying as a key employee or professional.
However, enforcement of contracts that restrict competition after the term of employment, as distinguished from a customer nonsolicitation provision, as described in subsection (b) of this Code section, or a nondisclosure of confidential information provision, as described in subsection (e) of this Code section, shall not be permitted against any employee who does not, in the course of his or her employment: (1) Customarily and regularly solicit for the employer customers or prospective customers; (2) Customarily and regularly engage in making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for products or services to be performed by others; (3) Perform the following duties: (A) Have a primary duty of managing the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; (B) Customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other employees; and (C) Have the authority to hire or fire other employees or have particular weight given to suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees; or (4) Perform the duties of a key employee or of a professional.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
Case law · 2019-03-05
B.2 Blair v. Pantera Enterprises, Inc.Blair v. Pantera Enterprises (physical precedent only) concluded that an hourly equipment operator was not a key employee under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(8), so the non-compete could not be enforced against him.
Thus, Blair is not a “key employee” as that term is defined in OCGA § 13-8-51 (8). Consequently, the trial court erred in issuing injunctive relief to Pantera.
See Blair v. Pantera Enterprises, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 846 (2019) (physical precedent only).
How long can a Georgia non-compete last?
It depends on the relationship, with rebuttable presumptions of two, three, or five years. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57 presumes a restraint of two years or less reasonable against a former employee, three years or less against a distributor, dealer, franchisee, lessee, or licensee, and the longer of five years or the payout period reasonable against the seller or owner of a business.
The durational presumptions are the clearest drafting safe harbors in the GRCA. For an ordinary former employee, the dividing line is two years, measured from the date the relationship ends.
The Act gives more latitude outside the ordinary employment relationship. A covenant against a distributor, dealer, franchisee, lessee of real or personal property, or licensee gets a three-year presumption.
A covenant tied to the sale or ownership of a business gets the most latitude of all — the longer of five years or the period over which the buyer is paying the seller.
Because these presumptions are rebuttable, a covenant within the safe harbor can still be attacked as unreasonable in geography or scope, and a covenant beyond it can still be defended — but the burden flips with the time period.
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Primary law
C.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b) presumes reasonable any post-employment restraint of two years or less and unreasonable any restraint longer than two years, measured from termination.
a court shall presume to be reasonable in time any restraint two years or less in duration and shall presume to be unreasonable in time any restraint more than two years in duration, measured from the date of the termination of the business relationship.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b).
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C.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(c) presumes reasonable any restraint of three years or less against a current or former distributor, dealer, franchisee, lessee of real or personal property, or licensee.
a court shall presume to be reasonable in time any restraint three years or less in duration and shall presume to be unreasonable in time any restraint more than three years in duration, measured from the date of termination of the business relationship.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(c).
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C.3 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d) presumes reasonable any restraint against the owner or seller of a business for the longer of five years or the period during which sale payments are being made to the seller.
a court shall presume to be reasonable in time any restraint the longer of five years or less in duration or equal to the period of time during which payments are being made to the owner or seller as a result of any sale referred to in this subsection and shall presume to be unreasonable in time any restraint more than the longer of five years in duration or the period of time during which payments are being made to the owner or seller as a result of any sale referred to in this subsection, measured from the date of termination or disposition of such interest.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(d).
Does a Georgia non-compete need an express geographic territory?
No. In North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer, decided September 4, 2024, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) does not require an express geographic term and reversed the Court of Appeals' contrary rule; geographic reasonableness is instead assessed in context.
For several years the Court of Appeals had read § 13-8-53(a) to require non-compete and employee-non-solicitation covenants to spell out an explicit geographic area. The Supreme Court rejected that reading in Wimmer.
The statute supports an implied-geography approach. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56 supplies a presumption that the areas where the employer does business can be a reasonable territory, provided the total distance is reasonable, so the geographic inquiry turns on overall reasonableness rather than the presence of a magic-words territory clause.
Do not assume a Georgia covenant fails for lack of an express territory, and do not assume one with a territory is automatically safe. After Wimmer, geographic scope is judged for overall reasonableness under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56, so an unreasonably broad express territory is still vulnerable.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2024-09-04
D.1 North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. WimmerNorth American Senior Benefits v. Wimmer reversed the Court of Appeals' conclusion that O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) requires an express geographic term, holding that the Court of Appeals erred.
The petitioner — a Georgia corporation seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant against two former employees — asks us to review the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that, to be deemed geographically reasonable under OCGA § 13-8-53 (a), a restrictive covenant must contain an express geographic term. In light of the statutory text and context of the GRCA, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, so we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
See North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer, 319 Ga. 641 (2024).
Primary law
D.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2) presumes reasonable a geographic territory covering the areas where the employer does business, provided the total distance is also reasonable.
In determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant that limits or restricts competition during or after the term of an employment or business or commercial relationship, the court shall make the following presumptions:...(2) A geographic territory which includes the areas in which the employer does business at any time during the parties' relationship, even if not known at the time of entry into the restrictive covenant, is reasonable provided that: (A) The total distance encompassed by the provisions of the covenant also is reasonable; (B) The agreement contains a list of particular competitors as prohibited employers for a limited period of time after the term of employment or a business or commercial relationship; or (C) Both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2).
Are customer non-solicitation covenants treated differently in Georgia?
Yes. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) lets an employer restrict solicitation of customers with whom the employee had material contact, and it expressly says no geographic term is required. The Act defines material contact narrowly, focusing on customers the employee actually dealt with or learned about.
Customer non-solicitation provisions sit outside the employee-category gate and outside the express-geography question entirely. The statute allows them without a territory, so long as they are tied to material-contact customers and competitive products or services.
The leverage in a customer non-solicit is the definition of material contact. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51 limits it to customers the employee dealt with, supervised, learned confidential information about, or earned compensation from in the two years before termination.
Anchor a customer non-solicitation clause to material-contact customers rather than the employer's entire customer base. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) narrowly construes these covenants to customers the employee actually dealt with and to competitive products or services.
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Primary law
E.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) permits a customer non-solicitation covenant limited to material-contact customers and provides that no express geographic reference is required for enforceability.
an employee may agree in writing for the benefit of an employer to refrain, for a stated period of time following termination, from soliciting, or attempting to solicit, directly or by assisting others, any business from any of such employer's customers, including actively seeking prospective customers, with whom the employee had material contact during his or her employment for purposes of providing products or services that are competitive with those provided by the employer's business. No express reference to geographic area or the types of products or services considered to be competitive shall be required in order for the restraint to be enforceable.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b).
Primary law
E.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(10) defines material contact narrowly, limiting it to customers the employee dealt with, supervised, learned confidential information about, or earned compensation from within two years before termination.
'Material contact' means the contact between an employee and each customer or potential customer: (A) With whom or which the employee dealt on behalf of the employer; (B) Whose dealings with the employer were coordinated or supervised by the employee; (C) About whom the employee obtained confidential information in the ordinary course of business as a result of such employee's association with the employer; or (D) Who receives products or services authorized by the employer, the sale or provision of which results or resulted in compensation, commissions, or earnings for the employee within two years prior to the date of the employee's termination.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(10).
Are employee non-recruitment and no-hire covenants governed by the GRCA?
Yes. In Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, the Court of Appeals held that the covenants at issue fell within the GRCA, and in Wimmer the Supreme Court applied § 13-8-53(a) to a two-year employee non-recruitment provision — so these covenants are analyzed under the Act and, after Wimmer, do not require an express geographic term.
The statute carves out customer non-solicitation and confidentiality, but it does not separately address employee non-recruitment or no-hire covenants, so the courts have placed them inside the GRCA framework. Belt Power confirmed that a covenant restricting the recruitment of employees is analyzed under the Act rather than common law.
Wimmer itself involved a non-recruitment provision barring former employees from hiring or interfering with the employer's workforce for two years. The Supreme Court reviewed that provision under § 13-8-53(a) and held that it need not contain an express geographic term to be enforceable.
Treat an employee non-recruitment or no-hire clause as a GRCA covenant, not a common-law one. Belt Power v. Reed placed these covenants within the Act, which means the reasonableness standard and modification limits apply.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2020-03-13
F.1 Belt Power, LLC v. ReedBelt Power v. Reed held that the restrictive covenants at issue fall within the ambit of the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act.
Upon a close reading of the entire statute, we conclude that the restrictive covenants at issue do fall within the ambit of the Act.
See Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, 354 Ga. App. 289 (2020).
Case law · 2024-09-04
F.2 North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. WimmerNorth American Senior Benefits v. Wimmer arose from a two-year employee non-recruitment provision and reversed the Court of Appeals, confirming that such covenants are analyzed under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) without an express-geographic-term requirement.
In light of the statutory text and context of the GRCA, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, so we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
See North American Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer, 319 Ga. 641 (2024).
Can a Georgia court blue-pencil an overbroad covenant?
Yes, within a limit. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d) makes a non-compliant covenant void but allows a court to modify it, so long as the modification does not make the covenant more restrictive for the employee than as originally drafted; O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(b) directs courts to grant only the relief reasonably necessary.
The GRCA replaced Georgia's old all-or-nothing rule with a modification power, but that power runs in only one direction — a court can narrow an overbroad covenant, never broaden it.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54 frames the interpretive posture. Courts construe covenants in favor of reasonable protection of legitimate interests, and when a restraint does not comply they may modify it to grant only the relief reasonably necessary.
The modification power is discretionary, not automatic. In Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, the Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to blue-pencil the covenants at all, leaving them unenforceable as written .
Do not draft an overbroad covenant on the assumption a Georgia court will rewrite it into shape. Modification under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d) is discretionary and can only narrow, not expand — and in Belt Power v. Reed the court declined to modify at all.
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Primary law
G.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d) makes a non-compliant covenant void but permits a court to modify it, provided the modification does not make it more restrictive than originally drafted.
Any restrictive covenant not in compliance with the provisions of this article is unlawful and is void and unenforceable; provided, however, that a court may modify a covenant that is otherwise void and unenforceable so long as the modification does not render the covenant more restrictive with regard to the employee than as originally drafted by the parties.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d).
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G.4 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(a) directs courts to construe a restrictive covenant in favor of reasonable protection of the enforcing party's legitimate business interests.
A court shall construe a restrictive covenant to comport with the reasonable intent and expectations of the parties to the covenant and in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(a).
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G.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(b) permits a court that finds a non-compliant restraint to modify it and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest and achieve the parties' original intent.
In any action concerning enforcement of a restrictive covenant, a court shall not enforce a restrictive covenant unless it is in compliance with the provisions of Code Section 13-8-53; provided, however, that if a court finds that a contractually specified restraint does not comply with the provisions of Code Section 13-8-53, then the court may modify the restraint provision and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests and to achieve the original intent of the contracting parties to the extent possible.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-54(b).
Case law · 2020-03-13
G.3 Belt Power, LLC v. ReedBelt Power v. Reed held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the Act's blue-pencil provision to modify the covenants, leaving them unenforceable.
We nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the “blue pencil” provision in the Act to modify the terms of the covenants.
See Belt Power, LLC v. Reed, 354 Ga. App. 289 (2020).
Is continued employment sufficient consideration for a Georgia non-compete?
The GRCA does not codify a consideration rule. The Act sets the conditions for enforcing a covenant without addressing what consideration must support it, and Georgia practitioners generally treat continued at-will employment as sufficient — but no modern GRCA-era appellate decision squarely settles the point, so treat it as an area to monitor .
A common in-house question is whether an existing at-will employee can be asked to sign a new covenant without a raise, bonus, or other new benefit. The GRCA itself is silent on consideration; § 13-8-53(a) speaks to reasonableness and the employee categories, not to what the employer must give in exchange.
Because the statute does not address consideration, the question is governed by Georgia contract principles, and practitioner commentary generally describes continued at-will employment as adequate consideration for a covenant signed during employment. That said, a definitive modern appellate decision applying that rule under the GRCA is harder to find, so the conservative course is to pair a mid-employment covenant with some additional consideration where practical.
Do not assume continued employment alone will always suffice as consideration for a mid-employment Georgia covenant. The GRCA does not codify a consideration rule, and there is no clear modern GRCA-era appellate capstone, so where practical provide additional consideration and monitor for new case law .
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H.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) sets the reasonableness and employee-category conditions for enforcement without addressing what consideration must support the covenant, leaving consideration to general Georgia contract law.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, enforcement of contracts that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant, so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities, shall be permitted.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
Can an out-of-state choice-of-law clause avoid the GRCA?
Generally no. In Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that Georgia law remains the touchstone, so a Georgia court must first determine whether a covenant complies with the GRCA; if the covenant is unreasonable under the Act, the court may not apply another state's law to enforce it.
Employers with multi-state forms often insert a choice-of-law clause selecting a more permissive state. Motorsports makes clear that such a clause will not rescue a covenant that fails Georgia's public policy.
The court set out a sequence: test the covenant against the GRCA first, and only honor the foreign law if the covenant is reasonable under Georgia law.
Do not rely on a Delaware, Florida, or other out-of-state choice-of-law clause to enforce a covenant that would fail in Georgia. Motorsports of Conyers v. Burbach requires a Georgia court to test GRCA compliance first and bars foreign law when the covenant is unreasonable under the Act.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2023-09-06
I.1 Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. BurbachMotorsports of Conyers v. Burbach held that Georgia law remains the touchstone for enforceability of a restrictive covenant litigated in Georgia, even where the contract selects another state's law.
Having taken a fresh look, we conclude that Georgia law remains the touchstone for determining whether a given restrictive covenant is enforceable in our courts, even where the contract says another state's law applies.
See Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 317 Ga. 206 (2023).
Case law · 2023-09-06
I.2 Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. BurbachMotorsports of Conyers v. Burbach held that if a restrictive covenant is unreasonable under the GRCA, a Georgia court may not apply foreign law to enforce it.
If the restrictive covenant is unreasonable under the GRCA, a Georgia court may not apply foreign law to enforce it.
See Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 317 Ga. 206 (2023).
Does a Georgia non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation?
A court will not extend it, and a private tolling clause is on uncertain ground. In Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services, LLC, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court cannot extend a non-compete beyond its contractual expiration, even against a party violating an injunction, because Georgia courts have rejected the idea that equity lets a court extend the period of a non-compete. Whether a contractual clause that pauses and extends the restraint would fare better has not been squarely decided.
Many covenants include a tolling clause stating that the restricted period pauses while the employee is in breach or while litigation is pending, so the employer gets a full period of compliance. Georgia law is hostile to judicial extension of the restraint past its stated end date.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants and relied on Georgia precedent rejecting equitable extension of a covenant's duration.
That said, the GRCA's broad remedies provision lets courts enforce a covenant by injunction during the agreement's term, and an employer can still pursue contempt for violating an injunction — it simply cannot stretch the covenant's duration past its contractual end. A contractual tolling clause that purports to extend the restraint beyond its stated term is therefore on uncertain ground, and counsel should not count on a court enforcing it .
Do not rely on a tolling clause to extend a Georgia non-compete past its stated end date. Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services holds that a court cannot extend a covenant beyond its contractual expiration even against a party violating an injunction.
Sources for this answer
Case law · 2021-11-08
J.1 Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services, LLCDaneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services agreed with the defendants and reversed, holding that the trial court erred in extending its injunction beyond the contractual expiration of the noncompete agreement.
On appeal, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in extending its injunction beyond the contractual expiration of the noncompete agreement. For the reasons set forth infra, we agree and reverse.
See Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services, LLC, 361 Ga. App. 555 (2021).
Case law · 2021-11-08
J.2 Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services, LLCDaneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services relied on Georgia precedent rejecting the idea that equity permits a court to extend the period of a non-compete agreement.
But the Supreme Court of Georgia has rejected—at least implicitly—the idea that “equity permits a court to extend the period of a non-compete agreement.”
See Daneshgari v. Patriot Towing Services, LLC, 361 Ga. App. 555 (2021).
Primary law
J.3 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-58O.C.G.A. § 13-8-58(c) authorizes courts to enforce a restrictive covenant by any appropriate and effective remedy at law or equity, including temporary and permanent injunctions.
A court shall enforce a restrictive covenant by any appropriate and effective remedy available at law or equity, including, but not limited to, temporary and permanent injunctions.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-58(c).
How do confidentiality and trade-secret protections compare to a Georgia non-compete?
They are available and not subject to the non-compete limits. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(e) provides that confidentiality and trade-secret obligations are not limited in time or geography for as long as the information stays confidential or qualifies as a trade secret, and § 13-8-53(a) treats a nondisclosure-of-confidential-information provision as distinct from a post-employment competition restraint, so it sits outside the employee-category gate.
For information-protection interests, a confidentiality covenant is often the better tool than a non-compete because it is not capped by the durational presumptions and does not depend on the employee's job category. The GRCA preserves indefinite confidentiality protection.
The Act also recognizes trade secrets and valuable confidential information as legitimate business interests in their own right, which means a well-drafted confidentiality program can protect the same competitive concerns a non-compete addresses, while remaining enforceable against rank-and-file employees who could not be bound by a non-compete.
Use confidentiality and trade-secret covenants for information-protection interests, especially against employees outside the non-compete categories. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(e) allows these obligations to run for as long as the information stays confidential, without the durational or category limits that apply to non-competes .
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Primary law
K.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(e) provides that confidentiality and trade-secret obligations are not limited in time or geography for as long as the information remains confidential or a trade secret.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the period of time for which a party may agree to maintain information as confidential or as a trade secret, or to limit the geographic area within which such information must be kept confidential or as a trade secret, for so long as the information or material remains confidential or a trade secret, as applicable.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(e).
Primary law
K.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) distinguishes a nondisclosure-of-confidential-information provision from a post-employment competition restraint, so confidentiality provisions are not subject to the employee-category limits that apply to non-competes.
However, enforcement of contracts that restrict competition after the term of employment, as distinguished from a customer nonsolicitation provision, as described in subsection (b) of this Code section, or a nondisclosure of confidential information provision, as described in subsection (e) of this Code section, shall not be permitted against any employee who does not, in the course of his or her employment:
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
Are physician and other healthcare non-competes enforceable in Georgia?
Yes, under the same GRCA rules. Georgia has no special statutory ban on physician non-competes; a physician is typically a professional under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51, so a reasonable covenant is enforceable on the ordinary reasonableness terms. Because the legislature could change this, the area is worth monitoring.
Unlike a growing number of states, Georgia has not enacted a carve-out for physicians or other medical licensees. A physician generally qualifies as a professional under the Act, which is one of the employee categories that can be bound by a post-employment non-compete.
A physician covenant is therefore enforceable on the same terms as any other professional's — reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope under § 13-8-53(a). Other healthcare workers are not automatically covered, however: a nurse, technician, or staff member can be bound by a post-employment non-compete only if he or she independently falls within one of the § 13-8-53(a) employee categories.
Treat Georgia physician non-competes as enforceable under the ordinary GRCA reasonableness rules, but watch the legislature. Healthcare non-competes are a recurring subject of proposed legislation in Georgia, none of which has yet become law, so confirm the statute has not changed before relying on a physician covenant.
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Primary law
L.1 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(14) defines a professional, a category that ordinarily includes physicians, as an employee whose primary duty requires advanced knowledge acquired by prolonged specialized instruction.
'Professional' means an employee who has as a primary duty the performance of work requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction or requiring invention, imagination, originality, or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(14).
Primary law
L.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) governs physician non-competes on the same reasonableness terms as other professionals, because Georgia has no physician-specific statutory carve-out.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, enforcement of contracts that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant, so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities, shall be permitted.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
Which agreements does the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act cover?
Only agreements entered on or after May 11, 2011. The GRCA applies to contracts entered into on and after its effective date and does not apply when a court determines the enforceability of a covenant entered before that date — those older covenants are still judged under Georgia's stricter pre-2011 common law .
Georgia restrictive-covenant law is effectively two-track, divided by the date the covenant was signed. The Act expressly limits itself to agreements entered on or after its effective date.
The Act was signed and took effect on May 11, 2011. A covenant signed before that date is governed by the older, far less forgiving common-law regime, under which Georgia courts strictly scrutinized employee covenants and would not blue-pencil an overbroad employment non-compete. The Act applies only between the listed contracting relationships — employers and employees, franchisors and franchisees, sellers and buyers of a business, and the others § 13-8-52 lists.
Check the signing date before applying the GRCA. A covenant entered before May 11, 2011 is judged under Georgia's stricter pre-Act common law, where modification was unavailable for employment non-competes, so the modern reasonableness and blue-pencil rules do not apply to it.
Sources for this answer
Primary law
M.1 2011 Ga. HB 30, § 5 (O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 et seq.)The enacting legislation provides that the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act applies only to contracts entered into on or after its effective date and not to covenants entered before that date.
This Act shall become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming law without such approval and shall apply to contracts entered into on and after such date and shall not apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants entered into before such date.
See 2011 Ga. HB 30, § 5 (eff. May 11, 2011).
Primary law
M.2 O.C.G.A. § 13-8-52O.C.G.A. § 13-8-52(a) limits the Act to contracts between specified relationships, including employers and employees, franchisors and franchisees, and sellers and purchasers of a business.
The provisions of this article shall be applicable only to contracts and agreements between or among: (1) Employers and employees; (2) Distributors and manufacturers; (3) Lessors and lessees; (4) Partnerships and partners; (5) Franchisors and franchisees; (6) Sellers and purchasers of a business or commercial enterprise; and (7) Two or more employers.
See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-52(a).