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State Law Practice Note

Non-Competes in Connecticut

Connecticut generally enforces non-competes only when the restraint is reasonable under common law and not displaced by an occupation-specific statutory limit.

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Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Connecticut?

Yes, sometimes. Connecticut is a reasonableness state, not a general ban state, and an employee non-compete is enforceable only if it is partial, reasonable, protective of a fair employer interest, not unduly harsh on the employee, and not injurious to the public interest.

The common-law analysis comes from Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co. and related Connecticut cases. In practice, the five recurring questions are duration, geography, fair protection of the employer, restraint on the employee, and public interest.

Connecticut also has targeted statutory overrides. Physicians, physician assistants, APRNs, security guards, broadcast employees, and homemaker-companion or home-health workers have separate statutory rules that can cap, narrow, or void a covenant before ordinary common-law balancing matters.

The interests of the employee himself must also be protected, and a restrictive covenant is unenforceable if by its terms the employee is precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting himself and his family.

Practice caution

Do not classify Connecticut as a total-ban jurisdiction. Start with the worker category, then apply the statutory rule if one exists, and only then apply common-law reasonableness to any remaining covenant.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 1976-06-01

A.1 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports Connecticut's common-law rule that an employee non-compete must be partial, reasonable, protective of a fair employer interest, and consistent with the public interest.

In order to be valid and binding, a covenant which restricts the activities of an employee following the termination of his employment must be partial and restricted in its operation “in respect either to time or place, . . . and must be reasonable — that is, it should afford only a fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is made and must not be so large in its operation as to interfere with the interests of the public.

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Case law · 1976-06-01

A.2 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports the employee-livelihood side of Connecticut's non-compete reasonableness test.

The interests of the employee himself must also be protected, and a restrictive covenant is unenforceable if by its terms the employee is precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus prevented from supporting himself and his family.

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Primary law

A.3 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p

Section 20-14p supports Connecticut's separate statutory limits for physician non-competes.

A covenant not to compete is valid and enforceable only if it is: (A) Necessary to protect a legitimate business interest; (B) reasonably limited in time, geographic scope and practice restrictions as necessary to protect such business interest; and (C) otherwise consistent with the law and public policy.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p(b)(1).

Primary law

A.4 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-681

Section 20-681 supports the statutory ban on homemaker, companion, and home-health service non-competes.

Any covenant not to compete is against public policy and shall be void and unenforceable.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-681.

What legitimate business interests can support a Connecticut non-compete?

Trade secrets, confidential information, customer lists, and customer goodwill are the core interests that can justify a tailored Connecticut restraint.

Scott upheld protection for a customer list and other confidential information when the employee had access to them in a managerial role . Roessler treated customer relationships as protectable when the restriction was limited to customers the employee had serviced and solicited for the employer .

CUTSA supplies the trade-secret overlay. A trade secret includes information such as a formula, process, cost data, or customer list only when it has independent economic value from not being generally known and is subject to reasonable secrecy efforts . CUTSA also authorizes injunctions for actual or threatened misappropriation and damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment.

Drafting caution

Do not use a non-compete to block ordinary competition disconnected from a protectable interest. Tie the restraint to specific confidential information, trade secrets, customer lists, or goodwill, and keep trade-secret remedies in a separate confidentiality and CUTSA strategy.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 1976-06-01

B.1 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports protecting customer lists and other confidential information for a reasonable period.

The plaintiff’s knowledge of the defendant’s customer list was a potential threat to the defendant’s business, and the defendant was entitled to protect that and other confidential information for a reasonable period of time.

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Case law · 1934-12-05

B.2 Roessler v. Burwell

Roessler supports customer-goodwill protection where a covenant is limited to customers serviced or solicited by the employee.

The limitation of the solicitation to such customers was one well calculated to afford to the plaintiff a reasonable protection in his business against deprivation of customers with whom the defendant had very likely established friendly relations, and whom he could approach upon the definite basis of affording them as good or better service than the plaintiff had done in the past.

See Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289 (1934).

Primary law

B.3 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-51

Section 35-51 supports Connecticut's statutory trade-secret definition.

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210 , 31-40j to 31-40p , inclusive, and subsection (c) of section 12-62 , “trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, drawing, cost data or customer list that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-51(d).

Primary law

B.4 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-52

Section 35-52 supports injunctive relief for actual or threatened trade-secret misappropriation.

Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined upon application to any court of competent jurisdiction.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-52(a).

Primary law

B.5 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-53

Section 35-53 supports damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by trade-secret misappropriation.

In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complainant may recover damages for the actual loss caused by misappropriation. A complainant also may recover for the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing damages for actual loss.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-53(a).

What duration and geographic scope are reasonable for a Connecticut non-compete?

There is no single statewide cap for ordinary employees. Connecticut courts balance time, geography, employer protection, employee burden, and public interest as a whole.

Scott upheld a statewide management restriction because the employer had customers throughout Connecticut and did business in many towns . The same case upheld a five-year period based on the facts, including the years required to build the customer base and the employee's ability to keep working in his trade .

Customer-focused limits can be easier to defend than broad territory limits. In Roessler, a one-year restriction with broad locality language was upheld because it was limited to soliciting the employer's customers that the employee had serviced . Van Dyck likewise treated time and geography as intertwined rather than mechanical boxes .

Drafting caution

Avoid copying a duration or radius from another Connecticut form without matching the worker's role and customer exposure. A larger area may need a shorter period, a longer period may need a narrower area, and a customer-specific restriction may be safer than a broad market ban.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 1976-06-01

C.1 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports evaluating geographic scope in view of the employer's actual business and customer footprint.

A restrictive covenant which protects the employer in areas in which he does not do business or is unlikely to do business is unreasonable with respect to area.

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Case law · 1976-06-01

C.2 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports fact-specific review of duration, including a five-year restriction where the record supported the time period.

In this case, the court could reasonably and logically conclude that a five-year restriction is reasonable, as the finding reveals that it had taken years of effort for the defendant to acquire its customers.

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Case law · 1934-12-05

C.4 Roessler v. Burwell

Roessler supports the reasonableness of a one-year customer-solicitation limit despite broad locality wording when the restraint is customer-specific.

The time was only for one year, and while the statement of the locality itself was broad, the covenant was definitely restricted to the solicitation of customers of the plaintiff.

See Roessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289 (1934).

Case law · 1993-08-11

C.3 Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola

Van Dyck supports treating time and geography as intertwined considerations in Connecticut non-compete reasonableness analysis.

A restriction covering a large area might be reasonable if in effect for a brief time, while a restriction covering a small area might be reasonable for a longer time.

See Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 43 Conn. Supp. 191 (1993).

Is continued at-will employment enough consideration for a Connecticut non-compete?

Yes, if the continued employment is connected to the covenant. The current Connecticut rule is that continued at-will employment can supply sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant signed after employment has begun.

Dur-A-Flex is the current Connecticut Supreme Court anchor. It reversed a lack-of-consideration ruling and required further proceedings on whether the non-compete was supported by adequate consideration . Schimenti had already read Roessler as binding precedent that continued at-will employment can be sufficient consideration when the employee receives the benefit of continued employment after signing .

The important limitation is connection. Schimenti held that continued employment can be sufficient if connected to the covenant, but a defendant may still try to prove no connection between signing and continued employment . Thoma is now best read as fact-specific: the later agreement removed severance rights, and continued employment was not predicated on the new agreement .

Practice caution

Do not rely on a recital alone. Connecticut now permits continued at-will employment as consideration, but the enforcement record is stronger when the offer letter, promotion letter, or covenant states that signing is a condition of continued employment and the employee actually receives that continued employment.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 2024-07-02

D.1 Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy

Dur-A-Flex supports the current Connecticut Supreme Court rule that continued employment is not categorically insufficient consideration for a noncompete agreement, reversing the trial court's contrary determination.

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court incorrectly determined that continued employment can never be consideration for a noncompete agreement.

See Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513 (2024).

Case law · 2023-01-17

D.2 Schimenti Construction Co., LLC v. Schimenti

Schimenti supports the rule that continued employment for at-will employees can be sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant signed after employment begins.

Its holding that consideration in the form of continued employment for at-will employees can be sufficient to make enforceable a restrictive covenant agreed to by the parties at some point after the commencement of employment remains binding precedent.

See Schimenti Constr. Co., LLC v. Schimenti, 217 Conn. App. 224 (2023).

Case law · 2023-01-17

D.3 Schimenti Construction Co., LLC v. Schimenti

Schimenti supports the connection requirement for continued employment as consideration.

At trial, as the plaintiff did in Thoma, the defendant may present evidence that there was no con- nection between the nondisclosure agreement and his continued employment; but, if connected, continued employment can be sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant.

See Schimenti Constr. Co., LLC v. Schimenti, 217 Conn. App. 224 (2023).

Case law · 2014-09-23

D.4 Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc.

Thoma supports the earlier fact-specific contrary result where continued employment was not predicated on the later agreement and the employee lost existing contractual rights.

Consequently, the record supports the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s financing and the plaintiff’s continued employment were not predicated on the second agreement’s execution.

See Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., 153 Conn. App. 50 (2014).

Will a Connecticut court blue-pencil or narrow an overbroad non-compete?

Do not count on judicial rewriting. Connecticut authority gives employers no reliable rule that a court will rewrite an overbroad covenant into an enforceable one — internally inconsistent restraint language can be construed against the drafter, and the one statutory severance rule in this area preserves only the non-covenant provisions of a contract when the covenant itself is void.

The practical lesson is to draft severable and tiered restrictions. If the contract states one indivisible radius or one indivisible activity ban, a court may have no narrower text to preserve. Separable tiers, customer-specific alternatives, and a severability clause give a court cleaner text to enforce or strike.

Thoma illustrates the risk of internally inconsistent noncompetition language: the court could not reasonably reconcile the conflicting terms and construed the ambiguity against the drafter . The physician statute separately shows a narrow statutory severance model — when a physician covenant is void in whole or in part, the contract's remaining provisions survive .

Drafting caution

Use tiered and severable drafting rather than an aggressive savings clause. A clause that asks a court to supply a new Connecticut radius, duration, or job-function limit is riskier than contract text that lets a court strike an unenforceable tier and leave a narrower tier intact.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 2014-09-23

E.1 Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc.

Thoma supports the drafting risk that conflicting noncompetition language may not be reasonably reconcilable.

Such a reasonable construction is not possible in this case.

See Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., 153 Conn. App. 50 (2014).

Primary law

E.2 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p

Section 20-14p supports statutory severability for physician contracts containing a void or unenforceable covenant.

The remaining provisions of any contract or agreement that includes a covenant not to compete that is rendered void and unenforceable, in whole or in part, under the provisions of this section shall remain in full force and effect, including provisions that require the payment of damages resulting from any injury suffered by reason of termination of such contract or agreement.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p(c).

Which Connecticut industries and professions have special non-compete limits?

Connecticut has targeted statutory limits for physicians, physician assistants, APRNs, security guards, broadcast employees, and homemaker-companion or home-health service workers.

For physicians, a covenant must be necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited, and consistent with law and public policy; for covenants entered, amended, extended, or renewed on or after July 1, 2016, the restraint cannot exceed one year or a fifteen-mile radius from the primary practice site. Physician assistants and APRNs have parallel one-year and fifteen-mile limits for covenants entered, amended, extended, or renewed on or after October 1, 2023.

Security-guard covenants are barred for covered guards working the same or similar job at the same location unless the employer proves the guard obtained employer trade secrets . Broadcast-industry employers cannot require covered broadcast employees to refrain from other broadcast employment in a specified area for a specified time after termination .

For homemaker-companion and home-health services, Connecticut voids covenants not to compete, and a companion statute voids client no-hire clauses that impose penalties, fees, breach claims, damages, or injunction exposure for directly hiring the agency employee.

Practice caution

Do not use the ordinary Scott reasonableness test to rescue a covenant that a Connecticut occupation-specific statute voids. For covered workers, the statute controls first, and common-law reasonableness matters only if the statutory rule leaves room for enforcement.

Sources for this answer

Primary law

F.1 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p

Section 20-14p supports the physician one-year and fifteen-mile statutory cap.

A covenant not to compete that is entered into, amended, extended or renewed on or after July 1, 2016, shall not: (A) Restrict the physician's competitive activities (i) for a period of more than one year, and (ii) in a geographic region of more than fifteen miles from the primary site where such physician practices; or (B) be enforceable against a physician if (i) such employment contract or agreement was not made in anticipation of, or as part of, a partnership or ownership agreement and such contract or agreement expires and is not renewed, unless, prior to such expiration, the employer makes a bona fide offer to renew the contract on the same or similar terms and conditions, or (ii) the employment or contractual relationship is terminated by the employer, unless such employment or contractual relationship is terminated for cause.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p(b)(2).

Primary law

F.7 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p

Section 20-14p supports the physician non-renewal and termination-without-cause limits.

A covenant not to compete that is entered into, amended, extended or renewed on or after October 1, 2023, shall not be enforceable if (A) the physician who is a party to the employment or other contract or agreement does not agree to a proposed material change to the compensation terms of such contract or agreement prior to or at the time of the extension or renewal of such contract or agreement, and (B) the contract or agreement expires and is not renewed by the employer or the employment or contractual relationship is terminated by the employer, unless such employment or contractual relationship is terminated by the employer for cause.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-14p(b)(3).

Primary law

F.2 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-12k

Section 20-12k supports the physician assistant one-year and fifteen-mile statutory cap.

A covenant not to compete that is entered into, amended, extended or renewed on or after October 1, 2023, shall not: (A) Restrict the physician assistant's competitive activities (i) for a period of more than one year, and (ii) in a geographic region of more than fifteen miles from the primary site where such physician assistant practices; or (B) be enforceable against a physician assistant if (i) such employment contract or agreement was not made in anticipation of, or as part of, a partnership or ownership agreement and such contract or agreement expires and is not renewed, unless, prior to such expiration, the employer makes a bona fide offer to renew the contract on the same or similar terms and conditions, or (ii) the employment or contractual relationship is terminated by the employer, unless such employment or contractual relationship is terminated for cause.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-12k(b)(2).

Primary law

F.3 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-101d

Section 20-101d supports the APRN one-year and fifteen-mile statutory cap.

A covenant not to compete that is entered into, amended, extended or renewed on or after October 1, 2023, shall not: (A) Restrict the advanced practice registered nurse's competitive activities (i) for a period of more than one year, and (ii) in a geographic region of more than fifteen miles from the primary site where such advanced practice registered nurse practices; or (B) be enforceable against an advanced practice registered nurse if (i) such employment contract or agreement was not made in anticipation of, or as part of, a partnership or ownership agreement and such contract or agreement expires and is not renewed, unless, prior to such expiration, the employer makes a bona fide offer to renew the contract on the same or similar terms and conditions, or (ii) the employment or contractual relationship is terminated by the employer, unless such employment or contractual relationship is terminated for cause.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-101d(b)(2).

Primary law

F.4 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-50a

Section 31-50a supports Connecticut's security-guard non-compete ban unless the employer proves the guard obtained employer trade secrets.

No employer may require any person employed in the classification 339032 of the standard occupational classification system of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor to enter into an agreement prohibiting such person from engaging in the same or a similar job, at the same location at which the employer employs such person, for another employer or as a self-employed person, unless the employer proves that such person has obtained trade secrets, as defined in subsection (d) of section 35-51 , of the employer.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-50a(a).

Primary law

F.5 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-50b

Section 31-50b supports Connecticut's ban on specified post-employment restrictions for covered broadcast employees.

No broadcast industry employer employment contract for the services of a broadcast employee may contain a provision requiring that such broadcast employee: (1) Refrain from obtaining employment in a specified geographical area for a specified period of time after termination of employment with that broadcast industry employer; (2) Disclose the terms or conditions of an offer of employment, or the existence of any such offer, from any other broadcast industry employer following the expiration of the term of the employment contract; or (3) Agree to enter into a subsequent employment contract with the broadcast industry employer, or extend or renew the existing employment contract, upon the same terms and conditions offered by a prospective employer.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-50b(b).

Primary law

F.6 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-681

Section 20-681 supports the statutory rule that covered homemaker, companion, and home-health service non-competes are void and unenforceable.

Any covenant not to compete is against public policy and shall be void and unenforceable.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-681.

Primary law

F.8 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-683

Section 20-683 supports Connecticut's ban on no-hire clauses between homemaker-companion agencies and clients.

Any no-hire clause in a contract between a homemaker-companion agency and a client of such agency is against public policy and shall be void.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-683(b).

Does a Connecticut non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation?

This is an open Connecticut question. No staged Connecticut statute or appellate decision squarely endorses automatic judicial tolling or enforcement of an extension-on-breach clause after the stated restricted period expires.

The best staged Connecticut authority points toward caution. In Van Dyck, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief on a covenant whose claimed period had already run, and the Superior Court treated the request for injunctive relief as moot rather than automatically extending the restraint . That does not decide every contractual tolling clause, but it is not an endorsement of automatic extension.

Contractual extension-on-breach language still has to fit the Scott reasonableness lens. If the extension turns a fixed covenant into an open-ended restraint, or if litigation delay creates a much longer practical restraint than the employer could justify at signing, enforceability is unsettled and fact-dependent .

Practice caution

Open question: Connecticut law is unsettled on whether an extension-on-breach clause is enforceable after the original restricted period expires. Draft any tolling clause as a separate, reasonable restraint tied to breach duration and a legitimate interest, and do not assume a court will extend an expired covenant automatically.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 1993-08-11

G.1 Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola

Van Dyck supports the open-question caution because the request for injunctive relief became moot after the covenant period expired.

Because the plaintiffs claim concerning the covenant at issue applied to a two year period commencing in April, 1987, the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief has become moot.

See Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 43 Conn. Supp. 191 (1993).

Case law · 1976-06-01

G.2 Scott v. General Iron & Welding Co.

Scott supports applying Connecticut's reasonableness framework to any restraint that extends the restricted period.

In determining whether a restrictive covenant of employment is in restraint of trade, “[t]he test of its validity is the reasonableness of the restraint it imposes.”

See Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 171 Conn. 132 (1976).

Did the FTC's federal non-compete rule change Connecticut non-compete law?

No. The FTC's 2024 nationwide Non-Compete Rule was set aside by a federal district court, so Connecticut non-competes remain governed by Connecticut statutes, Connecticut common law, and any other applicable state or federal claim-specific rules .

Ryan LLC v. FTC held that the FTC lacked statutory authority to promulgate the rule and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious . The court then set aside the rule and stated that it would not be enforced or take effect on September 4, 2024, or later .

That federal outcome does not make every Connecticut covenant enforceable. It simply removes the FTC rule as the nationwide overlay. Connecticut's common-law reasonableness test and occupation-specific statutes still control the Connecticut analysis.

The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter.

Sources for this answer

Case law · 2024-08-20

H.1 Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission

Ryan supports the rule that the FTC Non-Compete Rule was set aside and did not take effect.

The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter.

See Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).

Case law · 2024-08-20

H.2 Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission

Ryan supports the federal court's holding that the FTC lacked statutory authority and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious.

In sum, the Court concludes that the FTC lacks statutory authority to promulgate the Non- Compete Rule, and that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious.

See Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).

What recent Connecticut non-compete reform efforts should employers watch?

None is currently law. Connecticut's most recent reform effort, House Bill 5492 (2026), would have voided non-competes for lower-wage workers . It did not pass: the bill reached the House Calendar but got no floor vote before the General Assembly adjourned, the latest in a line of failed attempts.

The enacted baseline remains common-law reasonableness plus the occupation-specific statutes described above. HB 5492 matters because it signals the likely direction of future legislation, not because it is current law.

HB 5492 would have made a covenant void and unenforceable against employees earning less than two times, and independent contractors earning less than five times, the minimum fair wage . The Labor and Public Employees Committee reported it favorably and it reached the House Calendar as File No. 393 on April 2, 2026, but it received no floor vote before the General Assembly adjourned for the 2026 session, so it died — following House Bill 7196 in 2025 and House Bill 5269 in 2024.

Practice caution

Treat a failed bill like HB 5492 as a monitoring item, not as present Connecticut law. Recheck the official Connecticut General Assembly bill status each session before changing forms or telling workers that Connecticut has enacted a general wage-threshold non-compete statute .

Sources for this answer

Primary law · 2026-04-02

I.1 An Act Concerning Limitations on the Use on Noncompete Agreements (H.B. 5492)PDF

HB 5492, the 2026 reform bill that did not pass, would have voided non-competes for lower-wage employees and independent contractors measured against the minimum fair wage.

A covenant not to compete shall be void and unenforceable against a worker if (1) such worker is (A) an employee whose hourly wage is less than two times the minimum fair wage, or (B) an independent contractor whose hourly wage is less than five times the minimum fair wage

See H.B. 5492, 2026 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2026) (File No. 393).