# Non-Competes in Mississippi[^about] Mississippi enforces non-competes only when the restraint is reasonable under common law, with distinctive rules that void a covenant after a bad-faith firing, reform overbroad terms, and accept continued employment as consideration. ## Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Mississippi? {#employee-noncompetes} **Short answer.** Yes, sometimes. Mississippi is a common-law reasonableness state, not a general ban state and not a statutory-cap state. A non-compete is enforceable only if it is reasonable when the court weighs three competing interests — the employer's, the employee's, and the public's — and the employer carries the burden of proving that reasonableness [^texas-road-boring-three-aspects][^redd-foster-disfavored]. There is no Mississippi non-compete statute. The enforceability analysis is judge-made, rooted in decisions like *Donahoe v. Tatum* and *Texas Road Boring Co. v. Parker*, which frame the inquiry as a balance rather than a checklist [^donahoe-reasonable-balance]. Courts treat these covenants as restraints on trade and individual freedom, so they are disfavored and construed strictly against the drafting employer [^redd-foster-disfavored]. Because the restraint must protect a legitimate business interest — trade secrets, confidential information, customer goodwill, or an employer's investment in specialized training — a covenant that exists only to suppress ordinary competition fails. Mississippi separately protects proprietary information by statute under the Mississippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19, which supplies injunctive relief and damages independent of any contract. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not treat a Mississippi covenant as automatically valid or automatically void. Confirm that the restraint protects a real business interest and is reasonable in time, territory, and activity, because the employer bears the burden of proving reasonableness and the court will construe ambiguity against the drafter [^texas-road-boring-three-aspects]. ## Is continued at-will employment enough consideration for a Mississippi non-compete? {#consideration} **Short answer.** Yes. Unlike states that demand fresh consideration for a covenant signed after hire, Mississippi treats continued at-will employment as sufficient consideration to support a restrictive covenant [^raines-continued-employment]. The rule traces to *Frierson v. Sheppard Building Supply Co.*, where the Mississippi Supreme Court enforced a two-year covenant against an existing manager, rejecting the argument that retaining an employee in the same position is not enough to support the restraint. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the point in *Raines v. Bottrell Insurance Agency*, where an agent who signed a covenant when his agency was acquired argued the deal gave him nothing new [^raines-continued-employment]. That said, timing still matters. Mississippi courts have suggested that a covenant extracted just before an imminent, bad-faith discharge stands on weaker ground, which connects to the bad-faith termination defense covered below. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not assume the consideration question disappears in Mississippi just because continued employment can suffice. Document the covenant's tie to the employment relationship, and pair it with new consideration where practical, because Mississippi still construes the agreement strictly and scrutinizes the circumstances of signing [^raines-continued-employment]. ## What duration and geographic scope are reasonable for a Mississippi non-compete? {#duration-geography} **Short answer.** There is no statutory cap. Mississippi courts test duration and territory against the employer's actual footprint and the employee's real influence, so a restraint tied to where the employee worked is far easier to defend than a sweeping statewide ban [^heatherly-statewide-unreasonable][^timber-lake-radius-reasonable]. In *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly*, the court refused to enforce a statewide pest-control restraint against an employee who only had customer relationships around Tupelo, observing that the company did not need protection across the whole state [^heatherly-statewide-unreasonable]. There is no fixed durational cap either: a restraint matched to the time the employer actually needs to protect the relationship is easier to defend, while the longer terms Mississippi has tolerated tend to appear in executive and sale-of-business deals. Remote work does not dissolve a geographic limit. In *Timber Lake Foods v. Estess*, a meat broker worked the phones from her home inside a 250-mile radius of Tupelo while serving customers nationwide; the Court of Appeals held the 250-mile restraint reasonable because a nationwide restriction would itself have been justified for that telephonic business [^timber-lake-home-in-radius][^timber-lake-radius-reasonable]. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not copy a fixed radius or term from another form. Match the territory to the employer's real market and the employee's actual reach, and remember that a remote worker located inside the restricted area is still bound — geography is measured by where the employee operates, not only where the customers sit [^timber-lake-home-in-radius]. ## Will a Mississippi court reform or blue-pencil an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing} **Short answer.** Often, yes. Mississippi follows an equitable-reformation approach: rather than voiding an overbroad covenant outright, its courts will enforce the agreement to the extent it is reasonable, narrowing scope to the area the employer is entitled to protect [^heatherly-enforce-reasonable-part]. *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly* is the classic example. The covenant on its face barred competition across the entire state, but the court enforced it only within Tupelo and a fifty-mile radius — the area where the employee actually held customer relationships — and remanded for an injunction limited to that reasonable scope [^heatherly-enforce-reasonable-part]. The court framed the issue as whether a restraint reasonable in part and unreasonable in the rest should be enforced as to the reasonable part, and answered yes [^heatherly-partial-enforcement-issue]. This power is broader than a strict blue pencil that only crosses out severable words, but it is not a safety net for abusive drafting. Reformation rests on the chancellor's equitable discretion, and a grossly overbroad covenant invites a court to decline enforcement rather than rewrite it. For a clause-by-clause pass over a specific agreement against these drafting rules, the [Mississippi non-compete review checklist](/checklists/non-compete/us/mississippi) walks the full covenant suite item by item with each requirement's force level. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not rely on Mississippi's reformation power to rescue an aggressive covenant. Draft tiered, severable, and genuinely reasonable restraints, because partial enforcement is a discretionary equitable remedy and a chancellor may refuse to narrow a covenant that overreaches [^heatherly-enforce-reasonable-part]. ## Can a Mississippi employer enforce a non-compete after a bad-faith termination? {#bad-faith-termination} **Short answer.** No. Under the *Empiregas* defense, when an employer terminates an employee arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith, the non-competition agreement will not be enforced — an injunction is an equitable remedy, and the employer cannot come to a chancery court with unclean hands [^empiregas-bad-faith][^empiregas-equity]. In *Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain*, the chancellor found that the employee had been discharged without cause and held the non-compete null and void; the Supreme Court affirmed [^empiregas-bad-faith]. The court explained that when a termination is arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, equity will not lend its hand to enforce the covenant [^empiregas-equity]. The defense has a clear limit: it turns on how the employment ended. An employee who voluntarily resigns generally cannot invoke it, and the covenant is then analyzed on ordinary reasonableness grounds. "Moreover, as we have indicated, when an employer terminates an employee in bad faith, the terms of a non-competition agreement will not be enforced."[^empiregas-bad-faith] > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not fire an employee arbitrarily and expect to enforce the non-compete in Mississippi. Document a legitimate, good-faith basis for any termination before seeking an injunction, because a bad-faith discharge forfeits the equitable enforcement of the covenant [^empiregas-bad-faith]. ## How do Mississippi courts read customer non-solicitation clauses? {#non-solicitation} **Short answer.** Strictly, and against the drafter. A clause that bars an employee from acting to *divert* business does not necessarily stop the employee from passively *accepting* business from former customers who seek the employee out on their own, unless the contract clearly says so [^kennedy-ambiguous-accepting]. In *Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.*, the covenant barred conduct that would *tend to divert* business from the insurer. The chancellor below found that the agent's participation in clients' coverage changes violated the clause, but the Supreme Court reversed: when former clients followed the agent to a competitor on their own initiative, the language was ambiguous because it did not expressly prohibit *accepting* their business, and the court construed that ambiguity against the employer [^kennedy-ambiguous-accepting]. The court was clear that a properly drafted no-acceptance clause can be enforceable — the problem was the drafting, not the concept [^kennedy-accepting-can-be-valid]. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not assume a standard non-solicitation clause stops a former employee from serving customers who come to them. If the goal is to bar servicing former clients regardless of who makes first contact, use explicit non-dealing or no-acceptance language, because Mississippi reads ambiguity against the employer [^kennedy-ambiguous-accepting]. ## Does a Mississippi non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation? {#tolling-extension} **Short answer.** Two different rules apply. A Mississippi court will not, on its own, extend a covenant beyond the end date the contract sets just because enforcement was delayed — under *Frierson*, the restricted period runs from the contractual termination date, not from a later decree. But where the agreement itself provides for an extension on breach, a court can give that clause effect [^frierson-no-extension][^cascio-extension-effect]. There is no Mississippi rule that a non-compete automatically tolls simply because the former employee is in breach or litigation is pending. *Frierson v. Sheppard Building Supply* points the other way: the court ran the two-year restraint from the contractual termination date and held that, having limited the period that way, a court may not extend the time beyond it [^frierson-no-extension]. So judicial tolling is not the lever — the contract is. A well-drafted extension clause can do what judicial tolling will not. In *Cascio v. Cascio Investments*, the agreement provided that the non-compete period would be extended by the time the covenantor was in breach, even past the term's ordinary expiration [^cascio-extension-clause]. The trial court enforced that mechanism — extending the covenant and awarding injunctive relief for the covenantor's continuing failure to cancel a protected trade name — and the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court on the issue [^cascio-extension-effect]. Any such extension still has to satisfy ordinary reasonableness. A clause tied to the duration of an actual breach is far more defensible than an open-ended, automatic extension that could turn a fixed restraint into a perpetual one [^q7-texas-road-boring]. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not rely on a Mississippi court to add time to an expired covenant on its own — under *Frierson* it will not. If you need the clock to pause during a breach, draft an explicit extension-on-breach clause tied to the actual period of breach, because that contractual route, not judicial tolling, is what Mississippi courts have enforced [^frierson-no-extension][^cascio-extension-effect]. ## Are sale-of-business and ownership covenants treated differently in Mississippi? {#sale-of-business} **Short answer.** Yes. Covenants tied to the sale of a business or an ownership interest are treated more favorably than ordinary employment restraints, and Mississippi courts have enforced broad ones — including multi-year, multi-state covenants — when reasonable on the facts, to protect the goodwill the buyer paid for [^cooper-general-application][^cascio-extension-clause-x]. In *Cooper v. Gidden*, the seller of a sand-and-gravel business breached a covenant not to compete that he had voluntarily made on the sale; the court treated the restraint as protecting the goodwill conveyed to the buyer and explained that such covenants are given general application unless the contract makes them personal to the original buyer [^cooper-general-application]. The modern high-water mark is *Cascio v. Cascio Investments*, where a five-year covenant covering Mississippi and four other states — arising from a shareholder settlement — was enforced; the trial court found a willful and malicious breach and awarded damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, and the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court on every issue but a party-joinder point [^cascio-affirmed]. The same favorable treatment reaches modern ownership and buyout disputes. In the 2025 decision *Wiggins v. Southern Securities Group*, an LLC member argued that once his interest was bought out he was no longer bound by the operating agreement's non-compete; the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding the covenant binding and enjoining him from competing [^wiggins-bound-after-buyout]. Because the seller or departing owner has been paid, the public-policy concern about restraining a livelihood is weaker, and longer terms and wider territories survive that would fail in the pure employment context. ## Can a business buyer enforce an employee's non-compete signed with the seller? {#successor-assignment} **Short answer.** Not automatically. A buyer that acquires a business by asset purchase may be unable to enforce an employee non-compete signed with the predecessor unless the covenant was properly assigned and the deal documents transfer that contract [^herring-not-enforceable]. In *Herring Gas Co. v. Pine Belt Gas*, the buyer of a propane business tried to enforce a non-compete that an employee had signed with the seller. The Supreme Court held it could not, for two independent reasons: the asset-purchase agreement's plain language did not transfer the employment contract, and a later attempt to assign it failed because it came after the employee had already resigned [^herring-not-enforceable]. This is the mirror image of the sale-of-business rule. A covenant given by the *seller* of a business travels with the goodwill, but a covenant given by an *employee* of the seller is just another contract that must be deliberately assigned in the deal. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not assume an asset purchase sweeps in the seller's employee non-competes. Identify each restrictive covenant in diligence and assign it expressly and before closing, because in *Herring Gas* a post-resignation assignment and silent deal documents left the buyer unable to enforce [^herring-not-enforceable]. ## Which Mississippi workers cannot be bound by a non-compete? {#who-is-bound} **Short answer.** Two categories stand out. A worker who was a minor when signing can disaffirm the agreement, and a lawyer cannot be bound by a practice-restricting non-compete in a partnership or employment agreement: Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6 prohibits it [^watercolor-disaffirm][^rule-5-6-ban]. In *Watercolor Salon v. Hixon*, a stylist signed a non-compete at twenty — a minor under Mississippi law at the time — and later disaffirmed it; the Supreme Court agreed the agreement was unenforceable against her [^watercolor-disaffirm]. For lawyers, Rule 5.6 forbids a partnership or employment agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after the relationship ends, except an agreement about retirement benefits [^rule-5-6-ban]; it also does not reach a restriction included in the sale of a law practice under Rule 1.17 [^rule-5-6-sale-exception]. Outside these categories, Mississippi has no statutory wage floor or occupational exemption. Low-wage and entry-level workers are protected only by the general reasonableness analysis — because the employer must prove a legitimate business interest, a restraint on an unskilled, entry-level worker is often hard to justify. ## Has Mississippi banned non-competes for physicians or health care providers? {#healthcare-reform} **Short answer.** No. Mississippi has no statutory ban on health care or physician non-competes. Bills to void them have been introduced repeatedly — most recently House Bill 500 in 2026 — but each has failed, so physician and health care covenants remain governed by ordinary common-law reasonableness [^hb500-healthcare-void]. House Bill 500, introduced in the 2026 session, would have made any restriction on a licensed health care provider's right to practice after the relationship ends void and unenforceable [^hb500-healthcare-void]. It died in committee on February 3, 2026, as did a materially similar House Bill 806 the year before. An earlier physician-specific measure, Senate Bill 2685 in 2018, would have voided restrictions on a physician's right to practice medicine but failed on the Senate floor [^sb2685-physician-void]. Until one of these proposals becomes law, a Mississippi health care non-compete is tested like any other — for consideration and reasonableness — rather than under a categorical ban. These bills are worth monitoring as a signal of legislative direction, not as current law. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Treat House Bill 500 and its predecessors as monitoring items, not present Mississippi law. Recheck the Mississippi Legislature's bill status each session before telling a physician or health care employer that a statutory non-compete ban applies, because as of this review no such ban has been enacted [^hb500-healthcare-void]. ## Did the FTC's federal non-compete rule change Mississippi non-compete law? {#federal-ftc-overlay} **Short answer.** No. The FTC's 2024 nationwide Non-Compete Rule was set aside by a federal court before it took effect, so Mississippi non-competes remain governed entirely by Mississippi common law [^ryan-ftc-set-aside]. In *Ryan LLC v. FTC*, a federal court held the agency lacked authority to issue the rule and set it aside with nationwide effect, so it never took effect on its scheduled date [^ryan-ftc-set-aside]. That outcome does not make Mississippi covenants more or less enforceable; it simply removes the federal rule as an overlay and leaves the state's reasonableness and good-faith requirements in control. "The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter."[^ryan-ftc-set-aside] [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Mississippi. This article synthesizes Mississippi primary law and is not legal advice from a Mississippi-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. [^texas-road-boring-three-aspects]: **Texas Road Boring Co. of Louisiana-Mississippi v. Parker** — "Non-competition agreements are not favored in law and in considering them, courts recognize there are three major aspects to be looked to: the rights of the employer, the rights of the employee, and the rights of the public." *Texas Road Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194 So. 2d 885 (Miss. 1967).* [^redd-foster-disfavored]: **Redd Pest Control Co. v. Foster** — "Contracts which contain non-compete agreements have been viewed by this Court as contracts that restrict trade and individual freedom and are not favored by the law." *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Foster, 761 So. 2d 967 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).* [^donahoe-reasonable-balance]: **Donahoe v. Tatum** — "It is the law's function to maintain a reasonable balance in this area." *Donahoe v. Tatum, 242 Miss. 253, 134 So. 2d 442 (Miss. 1961).* [^raines-continued-employment]: **Raines v. Bottrell Insurance Agency, Inc.** — "The supreme court, however, has held that continued employment alone can be sufficient consideration to uphold a contract." *Raines v. Bottrell Ins. Agency, Inc., 992 So. 2d 642 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).* [^heatherly-statewide-unreasonable]: **Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly** — "We are of the opinion that the chancellor was justified in finding that it would be unreasonable as to Heatherly to restrict him from engaging in the pest control business throughout the State of Mississippi for the reason that Heatherly possessed no information that would make his competition with Redd unfair except in the Tupelo area." *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1963).* [^timber-lake-radius-reasonable]: **Timber Lake Foods, Inc. v. Estess** — "Since we find that a nationwide geographic restriction would have reasonably protected Timber Lake’s interests, we cannot say that Timber Lake’s effort to balance Stephanie’s interest by reducing that restriction to within a 250-mile radius of Tupelo was unreasonable." *Timber Lake Foods, Inc. v. Estess, 72 So. 3d 521 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).* [^timber-lake-home-in-radius]: **Timber Lake Foods, Inc. v. Estess** — "She testified that she had worked out of Lawrence’s main office in California and from her home located in Baldwyn, Mississippi, which is within 250 miles of Tupelo." *Timber Lake Foods, Inc. v. Estess, 72 So. 3d 521 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).* [^heatherly-enforce-reasonable-part]: **Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly** — "There is no sound reason why the contract should not be enforced to the extent that it is reasonable since it protects a legitimate business interest." *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1963).* [^heatherly-partial-enforcement-issue]: **Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly** — "The second question raised by appellant is whether an agreement restricting competition which is reasonable as to part of the territory described in the agreement but unreasonable as to the rest should be enforced as to the reasonable part." *Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1963).* [^empiregas-bad-faith]: **Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain** — "Moreover, as we have indicated, when an employer terminates an employee in bad faith, the terms of a non-competition agreement will not be enforced." *Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992).* [^empiregas-equity]: **Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain** — "However, when the Chancellor finds that the employee's termination was arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith, he can ‘lend the hand of equity’ in refusing to enforce the agreement." *Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992).* [^kennedy-ambiguous-accepting]: **Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.** — "However, this Court concludes that the non-competition provision in the present case is ambiguous in that, unlike the provisions in Kemper and Girard , the provision in the present case does not expressly prohibit Kennedy from ‘accepting’ business with a former employee." *Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 759 So. 2d 362 (Miss. 2000).* [^kennedy-accepting-can-be-valid]: **Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.** — "This Court agrees with Met Life that a non-compete provision which prohibits an ex-employee from accepting business with his former customers may, in appropriate cases, constitute a reasonable and enforceable non-compete provision." *Kennedy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 759 So. 2d 362 (Miss. 2000).* [^frierson-no-extension]: **Frierson v. Sheppard Building Supply Co.** — "Having made the contract limiting the period to two years from the date of termination of employment, the court may not extend the time beyond that date." *Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 1963).* [^cascio-extension-effect]: **Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC** — "Also, injunctive relief was awarded by extending the NCA for Cascio’s failure to cancel the C- Rental trade name." *Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC, 327 So. 3d 59 (Miss. 2021).* [^cascio-extension-clause]: **Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC** — "Further, in the event of any breach of this agreement, the time period of non-competition shall be extended by the time the undersigned was in breach, even if the time period of non-competition would have otherwise expired according to the terms of this Non-Competition Agreement." *Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC, 327 So. 3d 59 (Miss. 2021).* [^q7-texas-road-boring]: **Texas Road Boring Co. of Louisiana-Mississippi v. Parker** — "Non-competition agreements are not favored in law and in considering them, courts recognize there are three major aspects to be looked to: the rights of the employer, the rights of the employee, and the rights of the public." *Texas Road Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194 So. 2d 885 (Miss. 1967).* [^cooper-general-application]: **Cooper v. Gidden** — "A covenant not to compete will be given general application unless, by its own terms, it specifically expresses an intent that it be a personal covenant flowing only to the original obligee." *Cooper v. Gidden, 515 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1987).* [^cascio-extension-clause-x]: **Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC** — "[Cascio] will execute a non-compete agreement with CSW for a period of five years covering Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Missouri." *Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC, 327 So. 3d 59 (Miss. 2021).* [^cascio-affirmed]: **Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC** — "Regarding the direct appeal, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s findings, and the circuit court is affirmed as to all issues except the joinder of the Jackie and Phyllis as plaintiffs." *Cascio v. Cascio Investments, LLC, 327 So. 3d 59 (Miss. 2021).* [^wiggins-bound-after-buyout]: **Wiggins v. Southern Securities Group, LLC** — "Thus, based on the evidence presented at the preliminary-injunction hearing, the trial court did not err by finding that the noncompete provision was binding on Wiggins and that Wiggins was enjoined from competing with SSG" *Wiggins v. Southern Securities Group, LLC, No. 2024-CA-00251-SCT (Miss. 2025).* [^herring-not-enforceable]: **Herring Gas Co. v. Pine Belt Gas, Inc.** — "We find that the covenant not to compete contained within Rutland’s employment contract with Broome Gas may not be enforced by Herring Gas against Pine Belt Gas for the following two reasons: (1) the plain language of the asset-purchase agreement precludes enforcement; and (2) the purported assignment of Rutland’s employment contract after the sale of assets was of no effect because it occurred after Rutland’s resignation." *Herring Gas Co. v. Pine Belt Gas, Inc., 2 So. 3d 636 (Miss. 2009).* [^watercolor-disaffirm]: **Watercolor Salon, LLC v. Hixon** — "And because Nealie disaffirmed the contract, it is unenforceable against her." *Watercolor Salon, LLC v. Hixon, No. 2021-IA-01151-SCT (Miss. 2022).* [^rule-5-6-ban]: **Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6** — "(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or" *Miss. R. Prof'l Conduct 5.6(a).* [^rule-5-6-sale-exception]: **Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6** — "This Rule does not prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17." *Miss. R. Prof'l Conduct 5.6.* [^hb500-healthcare-void]: **Mississippi House Bill 500 (2026 Reg. Sess.)** — "Any contract or agreement that creates, establishes or modifies the terms of a partnership, employment or any other form of professional relationship with a health care provider who is licensed in Mississippi, which includes any restriction of the right of the health care provider to practice his or her profession or occupation in any geographic area for any period of time after the termination of such partnership, employment or professional relationship, shall be void and unenforceable with respect to that restriction." *2026 Miss. H.B. 500 (Reg. Sess.).* [^sb2685-physician-void]: **Mississippi Senate Bill 2685 (2018 Reg. Sess.)** — "If a provision in a contract that creates or establishes the terms of a partnership, employment, or any other form of professional relationship with a physician includes any restriction of the right of the physician to practice medicine, that provision shall be void and unenforceable with respect to the restriction." *2018 Miss. S.B. 2685 (Reg. Sess.).* [^ryan-ftc-set-aside]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).*