{ "type": "practice-guide", "canonical": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania", "links": [ { "rel": "self", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania.json", "type": "application/json" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania", "type": "text/html" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania/markdown", "type": "text/markdown" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania/json", "type": "application/json" } ], "data": { "topic": "invention-assignment", "state": "pennsylvania", "frontmatter": { "title": "Employee Invention Assignment in Pennsylvania", "description": "Pennsylvania has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and a judge-made strict-construction canon — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, assignment agreements are construed strictly and presumptively do not reach future inventions, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled.", "state": "Pennsylvania", "lastReviewed": "2026-07-03", "license": "CC BY 4.0", "authors": [ "steven-obiajulu" ], "summary": { "bottomLine": "Pennsylvania has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and a judge-made strict-construction canon rather than a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent (the employer at most earns a shop right), Pennsylvania courts construe assignment agreements strictly and presume they do not reach future inventions without plain language, and no Pennsylvania authority found in our review has decided whether a post-employment holdover clause is enforceable.", "keyLaw": "No Pennsylvania invention-assignment statute; Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920)", "statutoryCarveOut": "none", "defaultOwnership": "employee", "employeeNoticeRequired": "n/a", "holdoverClauseLimit": "unsettled", "carveOutScope": "Pennsylvania has no statutory own-time carve-out; the reach of an assignment clause is limited by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default (subject to the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right), a strict-construction canon that presumes agreements do not reach future inventions absent plain language, and the federal patent and copyright overlay." }, "about": [ "Pennsylvania invention assignment", "Pennsylvania no invention-assignment statute", "Pennsylvania employee invention ownership", "Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland", "Pennsylvania hired to invent", "Pennsylvania shop right", "Pennsylvania holdover trailing assignment" ], "translations": [ { "language": "中文", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Español", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Português", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Deutsch", "status": "planned" } ], "relatedForm": { "slug": "openagreements-confidentiality-invention-assignment-agreement" } }, "questions": [ { "slug": "statutory-carve-out", "label": "Can the employer require assignment of every invention?", "heading": "Can a Pennsylvania employer require assignment of every invention?", "answerText": "There is no statutory ceiling, but there is a judge-made one of sorts. Pennsylvania has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention the way California or New York law does — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and a strict-construction canon rather than a legislative carve-out. Pennsylvania courts construe agreements to assign inventions strictly against the party seeking the invention, and a contract presumptively grants rights only to inventions that existed when it was made unless the language plainly reaches future inventions.", "sources": [ { "id": "whiteheat-strict-construction", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas", "citation": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/#:~:text=where%20the%20product%20of%20an,the%20intention%20of%20the%20parties", "proposition": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the rule that Pennsylvania construes agreements to assign inventions strictly, requiring clear language showing an unmistakable intention that the particular invention is within the intention of the parties.", "verbatimQuote": "where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties", "date": "1920-03-15", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-whiteheat-strict-construction" }, { "id": "monsanto-future-inventions-canon", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger", "citation": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1496556/monsanto-chemical-works-v-jaeger/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1496556/monsanto-chemical-works-v-jaeger/#:~:text=Presumptively%20a%20contract%20for%20the,of%20such%20purpose%20must%20appear.", "proposition": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger supports the canon that a contract for the sale of inventions presumptively grants rights only to inventions existing when the contract was made, and reaches future inventions only through language plainly expressive of that purpose.", "verbatimQuote": "Presumptively a contract for the sale of inventions grants rights only to those inventions which existed when the contract was made. If the parties intend to contract for future inventions, language plainly expressive of such purpose must appear.", "date": "1929-01-23", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-monsanto-future-inventions-canon" }, { "id": "hirshhorn-strictly-construed", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.", "citation": "Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 106 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 203 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1953).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1649406/hirshhorn-v-mine-safety-appliances-co/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1649406/hirshhorn-v-mine-safety-appliances-co/#:~:text=Jackson%E2%80%99s%20covenant%20to%20assign%20to%20Catalyst%20must,be%20strictly%20construed%20against%20Catalyst.", "proposition": "Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. supports the point that federal courts applying Pennsylvania law construe a covenant to assign inventions strictly against the party claiming the inventions, following White Heat.", "verbatimQuote": "Jackson’s covenant to assign to Catalyst must be strictly construed against Catalyst.", "pullQuoteLocator": "Jackson’s covenant to assign to Catalyst must|be strictly construed against Catalyst.", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-hirshhorn-strictly-construed" } ] }, { "slug": "employee-notice", "label": "Must the employer give the employee written notice of the carve-out?", "heading": "Must a Pennsylvania employer notify the employee?", "answerText": "Not applicable. Because Pennsylvania has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Pennsylvania enforces instead is contractual: a duty to assign exists only if an express or implied agreement creates it, and the Superior Court has refused to imply one from the employment relationship alone.", "sources": [ { "id": "aetna-no-implied-duty-notice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland", "citation": "Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 343 Pa. Super. 64, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2053206/aetna-standard-engineering-co-v-rowland/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2053206/aetna-standard-engineering-co-v-rowland/#:~:text=On%20these%20facts%2C%20we%20cannot,assign%20his%20invention%20to%20appellant.", "proposition": "Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland supports the point that in Pennsylvania a duty to assign an invention arises only from an express or implied agreement — the court refused to imply an agreement to assign from the employment relationship — so assignment obligations are contractual, not statutory, and there is no statutory notice regime.", "verbatimQuote": "On these facts, we cannot imply an agreement in appellee’s employment contract to assign his invention to appellant.", "date": "1985-05-31", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-aetna-no-implied-duty-notice" }, { "id": "whiteheat-clear-language-notice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas", "citation": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/#:~:text=where%20the%20product%20of%20an,the%20intention%20of%20the%20parties", "proposition": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the point that the employee's protection in Pennsylvania comes from strict construction of the assignment agreement's language rather than from any statutory notice requirement.", "verbatimQuote": "where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties", "date": "1920-03-15", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-whiteheat-clear-language-notice" } ] }, { "slug": "default-ownership", "label": "Absent a written assignment, who owns the invention?", "heading": "Who owns an invention by default in Pennsylvania?", "answerText": "The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, the baseline is that rights in an invention belong to the employee who conceived it; mere employment does not entitle the employer to an assignment. The exceptions are the employee hired to invent — whose resulting invention the employer owns — and the shop right, a nonexclusive license the employer earns when the invention was developed on its time and with its resources.", "sources": [ { "id": "stanford-inventor-default", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems", "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Since%201790%2C%20the%20patent%20law,invention%20belong%20to%20the%20inventor.", "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, the baseline against which any assignment clause is measured.", "verbatimQuote": "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.", "date": "2011-06-06", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-stanford-inventor-default" }, { "id": "aetna-no-implied-assignment", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland", "citation": "Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 343 Pa. Super. 64, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2053206/aetna-standard-engineering-co-v-rowland/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2053206/aetna-standard-engineering-co-v-rowland/#:~:text=On%20these%20facts%2C%20we%20cannot,assign%20his%20invention%20to%20appellant.", "proposition": "Aetna-Standard Engineering Co. v. Rowland, applying the Dubilier rule that mere employment does not entitle the employer to an assignment, holds that a general staff engineer owned his patent interest because no agreement to assign could be implied, with the employer receiving only a shop right.", "verbatimQuote": "On these facts, we cannot imply an agreement in appellee’s employment contract to assign his invention to appellant.", "date": "1985-05-31", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-aetna-no-implied-assignment" }, { "id": "quaker-state-hired-to-invent", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot", "citation": "Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot, 315 Pa. 517, 174 A. 99 (Pa. 1934).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4086466/quaker-state-oil-refining-co-v-talbot/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4086466/quaker-state-oil-refining-co-v-talbot/#:~:text=Where%20an%20employee%20by%20contract,he%20was%20hired%20to%20do", "proposition": "Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot supports the hired-to-invent exception in Pennsylvania — an employee hired by contract to make a particular invention or solve a specific problem must yield the resulting invention to the employer.", "verbatimQuote": "Where an employee by contract is hired to make a particular invention or solve a specific problem for the employer the property in the inventions of the employee belongs to the employer — the employee has sold in advance the fruit of his talent, skill and knowledge, to his employer, who is equitably entitled to it; in making such inventions or solving such problems the employee is merely doing what he was hired to do", "date": "1934-03-20", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-quaker-state-hired-to-invent" }, { "id": "dubilier-hired-to-invent", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.", "citation": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/#:~:text=One%20employed%20to%20make%20an,his%20employer%20any%20patent%20obtained.", "proposition": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. holds that an employee hired to make an invention who succeeds during the term of service is bound to assign the resulting patent to the employer.", "verbatimQuote": "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.", "date": "1933-05-08", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-dubilier-hired-to-invent" }, { "id": "university-patents-clear-convincing", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman", "citation": "University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1991).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1619785/university-patents-inc-v-kligman/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1619785/university-patents-inc-v-kligman/#:~:text=In%20an%20equitable%20action%20to,the%20assignment%20agreement%20were%20fulfilled.", "proposition": "University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, applying Pennsylvania law, states the standard that an employer seeking to compel assignment of an employee's invention in equity must show by clear and convincing proof a valid, binding, unambiguous contract whose conditions were fulfilled.", "verbatimQuote": "In an equitable action to compel the assignment of an invention of an employee to the employer, the employer must show by clear and convincing proof that (1) the invention was conceived by the employee while in the employ of the employer; (2) the assignment was governed by a valid, binding, and enforceable contract, unambiguous in its terms so as to warrant specific performance; and (3) all conditions and covenants concerning the assignment agreement were fulfilled.", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-university-patents-clear-convincing" } ] }, { "slug": "holdover-clause-limit", "label": "Are post-employment trailing-assignment clauses enforceable?", "heading": "Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Pennsylvania?", "answerText": "Unsettled. No Pennsylvania decision — state court or federal court applying Pennsylvania law — found in our review squarely decides whether a trailing clause reaching inventions first conceived after employment ends is enforceable, and there is no statutory temporal cap because there is no invention-assignment statute at all. What Pennsylvania does supply are strong limiting signals: restrictive covenants are disfavored and enforceable only within reasonableness limits, agreements are presumed not to reach future inventions absent plain language, and a covenant added mid-employment needs fresh consideration.", "sources": [ { "id": "hess-reasonableness", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc.", "citation": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 570 Pa. 148, 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1931597/hess-v-gebhard-co-inc/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1931597/hess-v-gebhard-co-inc/#:~:text=In%20Pennsylvania%2C%20restrictive%20covenants%20are,in%20duration%20and%20geographic%20extent.", "proposition": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co. states Pennsylvania's restrictive-covenant test — incident to an employment relationship, reasonably necessary for the employer's protection, and reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent — the framework a court would most plausibly apply if it treats a trailing assignment clause as a post-employment restraint.", "verbatimQuote": "In Pennsylvania, restrictive covenants are enforceable if they are incident to an employment relationship between the parties; the restrictions imposed by the covenant are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer; and the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent.", "date": "2002-10-16", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-hess-reasonableness" }, { "id": "hess-covenants-disfavored", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc.", "citation": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 570 Pa. 148, 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1931597/hess-v-gebhard-co-inc/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1931597/hess-v-gebhard-co-inc/#:~:text=However%2C%20restrictive%20covenants%20are%20not,employee%20from%20earning%20a%20living.", "proposition": "Hess v. Gebhard & Co. supports the policy point that restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania and are historically viewed as a trade restraint that prevents a former employee from earning a living.", "verbatimQuote": "However, restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania and have been historically viewed as a trade restraint that prevents a former employee from earning a living.", "date": "2002-10-16", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-hess-covenants-disfavored" }, { "id": "monsanto-aspinwall-mortgage", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger", "citation": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929) (quoting Aspinwall Co. v. Gill, 32 F. 697 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887) (Bradley, J.)).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1496556/monsanto-chemical-works-v-jaeger/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1496556/monsanto-chemical-works-v-jaeger/#:~:text=A%20naked%20assignment%20or%20agreement,itself%20favorably%20to%20our%20consideration.", "proposition": "Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, quoting Justice Bradley's opinion in Aspinwall Co. v. Gill, supports the hostility of courts sitting in Pennsylvania toward open-ended assignments of an inventor's future output — the mortgage-on-a-man's-brain objection — while remaining a contract-construction case rather than an employment-holdover holding.", "verbatimQuote": "A naked assignment or agreement to assign, in gross, a man’s future labors as an author or inventor — in other words, a mortgage on a man’s brain, to bind all his future products — does not address itself favorably to our consideration.", "date": "1929-01-23", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-monsanto-aspinwall-mortgage" }, { "id": "socko-fresh-consideration", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc.", "citation": "Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc., 633 Pa. 555, 126 A.3d 1266 (Pa. 2015).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3155889/socko-d-v-mid-atantic-systems-of-cpa-inc-aplt/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3155889/socko-d-v-mid-atantic-systems-of-cpa-inc-aplt/#:~:text=More%20specifically%2C%20the%20mere%20continuation,relationship%20terminable%20by%20either%20party.", "proposition": "Socko v. Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA holds that a restrictive covenant entered into mid-employment requires new and valuable consideration — mere continuation of at-will employment is insufficient — and that language invoking the Uniform Written Obligations Act cannot cure the defect.", "verbatimQuote": "More specifically, the mere continuation of the employment relationship at the time of entering into the restrictive covenant is insufficient to serve as consideration for the new covenant, despite it being an at-will relationship terminable by either party.", "date": "2015-11-18", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-socko-fresh-consideration" }, { "id": "rullex-essential-terms", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Rullex Co., LLC v. Tel-Stream, Inc.", "citation": "Rullex Co., LLC v. Tel-Stream, Inc., 232 A.3d 620 (Pa. 2020).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4761300/rullex-co-llc-aplt-v-tel-stream-inc/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4761300/rullex-co-llc-aplt-v-tel-stream-inc/#:~:text=From%20the%20foregoing%20it%20should,beginning%20of%20the%20employment%20relationship.", "proposition": "Rullex Co. v. Tel-Stream holds that a restrictive covenant executed after the first day of employment is enforceable without new consideration only if the parties had agreed to its essential provisions as of the beginning of the employment relationship.", "verbatimQuote": "From the foregoing it should be evident that, for a restrictive covenant executed after the first day of employment to be enforceable absent new consideration, the parties must have agreed to its essential provisions as of the beginning of the employment relationship.", "date": "2020-06-16", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-rullex-essential-terms" }, { "id": "westshore-nondisclosure-distinction", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser", "citation": "West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser, 661 F. Supp. 3d 356 (M.D. Pa. 2023).", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-pamd-1_22-cv-00499", "proposition": "West Shore Home, LLC v. Graeser supports the point that courts applying Pennsylvania law distinguish the enforceability requirements for noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants from those applicable to nondisclosure provisions — leaving open whether the covenant rules (Hess reasonableness, Socko consideration) reach a pure invention-assignment clause.", "verbatimQuote": "We recently relied upon Bell Fuel Corporation and the authority cited therein to further distinguish the enforceability requirements for noncompete and nonsolicitation covenants from those applicable to nondisclosure provisions in the employment context.", "date": "2023-03-14", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-westshore-nondisclosure-distinction" }, { "id": "whiteheat-clear-language-practice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas", "citation": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 266 Pa. 551, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6385584/white-heat-products-co-v-thomas/#:~:text=where%20the%20product%20of%20an,the%20intention%20of%20the%20parties", "proposition": "White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas supports the drafting point that Pennsylvania construes agreements to assign inventions strictly, so a trailing clause will capture only what its language clearly and unmistakably covers.", "verbatimQuote": "where the product of an inventive mind is sought to be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties", "date": "1920-03-15", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/pennsylvania#src-whiteheat-clear-language-practice" } ] } ] } }