# Employee Invention Assignment in Nebraska[^about] Nebraska has no employee-invention-assignment statute — its only invention statutes are consumer-protection laws — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent; the Eighth Circuit applying Nebraska law has restated that default, the Nebraska Supreme Court left title with employee-inventors and gave the employer only an implied royalty-free license, and a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — with the added hazard that Nebraska courts never reform an overbroad covenant, so an overbroad clause is struck entirely rather than trimmed. ## Can a Nebraska employer require assignment of every invention? {#statutory-carve-out} **Short answer.** There is no statutory ceiling. Nebraska has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent and copyright overlay. The Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, restates the baseline that clause must overcome: the individual owns the patent rights to what he invents, even when he invents it on the job [^farmers-edge-inventor-default][^stanford-baseline]. Because there is no statute on point, the limits come from general principles rather than a legislative carve-out. A full-text search of the Nebraska Revised Statutes for invention surfaces only two enactments, and neither touches the employment relationship: the Invention Development Services Disclosure Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-601 to 87-610, a consumer-protection law aimed at invention-promotion firms selling services to the public, and § 62-302, a 1905 anti-fraud rule requiring a promissory note given in exchange for a patent right to disclose that fact on its face. There is no § 2870-style own-time carve-out, no employer-ownership provision, and no statute regulating how far an assignment clause may reach. Nebraska also has no general statute governing employment restraints — its restrictive-covenant law is entirely judge-made. The leading modern decision applying Nebraska law is *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC*, where the Eighth Circuit — quoting *Banks v. Unisys Corp.* — restated the default an assignment clause is written to displace [^farmers-edge-inventor-default]. "an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment."[^farmers-edge-inventor-default] That is the federal patent premise the Supreme Court restated in *Stanford v. Roche*: absent an effective assignment, rights in an invention belong to the person who conceived it [^stanford-baseline]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-baseline] The practical consequence is that a Nebraska employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or Washington employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. But that breadth is not unlimited: an assignment clause is still an ordinary contract term, subject to general contract-law defenses, and to the extent it operates as a restraint on the former employee it runs into Nebraska's judge-made covenant doctrine, which is unusually unforgiving of overbreadth (see the holdover question below). There is simply no statutory own-time safe harbor for the employee to invoke and no statutory ceiling for the drafter to code around. ## Must a Nebraska employer notify the employee? {#employee-notice} **Short answer.** Not applicable. Because Nebraska has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Nebraska enforces instead is contractual: the inventor-first default yields only to an express agreement or a hired-to-invent engagement, so any disclosure or assignment duty arises from the terms of the agreement itself [^farmers-edge-contract-default]. There is nothing to give notice of. A notice requirement exists in California and Washington precisely to alert the employee to a statutory own-time carve-out that limits the assignment; Nebraska has enacted no such carve-out, so there is no statutory line for a notice to mark. This is why the entry is marked not applicable rather than a bare no: the question presupposes a statutory carve-out that Nebraska does not have. Where invention-assignment duties exist in Nebraska, they come from the contract, not a statute. The Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law in *Farmers Edge*, started from the rule that the employee-inventor owns absent an agreement to the contrary — which is exactly why the employer in that case, which had no signed assignment from the relevant employees, ended up without ownership [^farmers-edge-contract-default]. "an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment."[^farmers-edge-contract-default] For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Nebraska employer neither has to give a § 2872-style notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause. The enforceability of the assignment turns entirely on the contract language and the judge-made limits on restraints, not on any statutory notice or disclosure formality. ## Who owns an invention by default in Nebraska? {#default-ownership} **Short answer.** The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, the baseline under federal patent law — which governs who holds title to a patentable invention in Nebraska as elsewhere — is that rights belong to the employee who conceived it, and the Eighth Circuit has applied that default as the operative rule under Nebraska law. Nebraska's own Supreme Court reached the matching result a century ago: employees who developed a patented device with city materials and labor kept title, and the employer earned only an implied royalty-free license — the shop-right outcome [^stanford-inventor][^farmers-edge-hired-to-invent][^hutton-implied-license]. *Stanford v. Roche* anchors the default. The Supreme Court held that even the Bayh-Dole Act did not displace the long-standing rule that an invention belongs to its inventor, treating that premise as the baseline against which any assignment is measured [^stanford-inventor]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-inventor] The principal exception is the employee hired to invent. In *Farmers Edge*, the Eighth Circuit — applying Nebraska law and quoting *Banks v. Unisys Corp.* — described that exception in the same terms the federal cases use [^farmers-edge-hired-to-invent]. "The second exception is that when an employee is ‘hired to invent something or solve a particular problem, the property of the invention related to this effort may belong to the employer.’"[^farmers-edge-hired-to-invent] The exception is narrow in application. The *Farmers Edge* employer lost precisely because it could not show the employees had been given a specific inventive assignment — general employment, even technical employment, is not enough [^farmers-edge-no-specific-assignment]. "FEI has not pointed to evidence in the record that Nuss, Gerlock, and Tatge ‘received an assignment on this occasion to invent.’"[^farmers-edge-no-specific-assignment] The classic statement of the hired-to-invent rule remains *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*: an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]. "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained."[^dubilier-hired-to-invent] Nebraska has its own state-court anchor for the middle case — the employee who was not hired to invent but used the employer's resources. In *Hutton v. City of Omaha*, sewer-department employees patented a concrete sewer-inlet device they had developed and put into practicable form with city materials and co-worker labor, then sued the city for royalties when it kept using the design. The Nebraska Supreme Court, adopting the rule of *Solomons v. United States*, held that only one inference was possible on those facts [^hutton-implied-license]. "the only conclusion to be drawn therefrom is an implied license without compensation"[^hutton-implied-license] That is the shop-right result: title stayed with the employee-inventors, and the employer got a royalty-free right to use the invention, not ownership of it. *Hutton* is a 1924 decision involving a municipal employer, decided on implied-license reasoning rather than a formal shop-right label, and no later Nebraska decision developing the doctrine was found in our review — so it is best read as Nebraska's adoption of the federal rule, not as a distinct state doctrine. Because ownership starts with the inventor and Nebraska has no statute filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) clause that transfers legal title automatically on conception, rather than a future promise to assign that leaves the employer with a mere equitable claim. ## Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Nebraska? {#holdover-clause-limit} **Short answer.** Unsettled. No Nebraska decision found in our review addresses a trailing clause reaching inventions first conceived after employment ends, and there is no statutory framework at all — Nebraska has no invention-assignment statute and no general employment-restraint statute, so its covenant law is entirely judge-made. The closest analogy is Nebraska's three-part reasonableness test for covenants arising from employment [^aon-three-part-test], and Nebraska adds a hazard most states do not: its courts have never allowed reformation of an overbroad covenant, so a holdover clause that fails the test would be struck entirely, not trimmed [^cae-vanguard-no-reformation]. Two gaps define the Nebraska picture. First, there is no statute: nothing caps the duration of a post-employment trailing assignment or otherwise limits what such a clause may reach. Second, our review found no Nebraska decision applying the covenant framework specifically to an invention-holdover clause, so the invention-specific application of the rule is genuinely open rather than settled. It is likewise undecided, on the authorities found in our review, whether continued at-will employment alone is sufficient consideration for an invention-assignment agreement signed mid-employment — a point worth papering with independent consideration rather than litigating. What Nebraska does supply is a general reasonableness standard for restraints growing out of the employment relationship. The Nebraska Supreme Court states the test in three parts [^aon-three-part-test]. "In determining whether a covenant not to compete is valid, a court considers whether the restriction is (1) reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to the public, (2) not greater than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest, and (3) not unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee."[^aon-three-part-test] The legitimate-interest prong has teeth. In *Gaver v. Schneider's O.K. Tire Co.*, the court drew the line that would matter for an aggressive holdover clause: protection against unfair competition is a legitimate interest, protection against competition itself is not [^gaver-ordinary-competition]. "An employer has a legitimate business interest in protection against a former employee’s competition by improper and unfair means, but is not entitled to protection against ordinary competition from a former employee."[^gaver-ordinary-competition] Extending that framework to holdover assignments is a prediction, not a holding. But if a Nebraska court did treat an overbroad trailing clause as an unreasonable restraint, the consequence would be harsher than in most states, because Nebraska rejects judicial rewriting outright. *CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman* is the square holding [^cae-vanguard-no-reformation]. "This court has never allowed reformation of a covenant not to compete."[^cae-vanguard-no-reformation] *CAE Vanguard* goes further: the parties cannot contract around the rule by inviting the court to reform, because a reformation clause itself is ineffective [^cae-vanguard-reformation-clause]. "The provision of the agreement which states that a court may reform the covenant is of no effect. Private parties may not confer upon the court powers which it does not possess."[^cae-vanguard-reformation-clause] Out-of-state decisions voiding open-ended post-employment invention assignments apply other states' law and are at most analogous; they are not Nebraska authority and should not be treated as controlling here. The safe reading is that an overbroad trailer clause is at meaningful risk in Nebraska — and, uniquely, that the downside of overreaching is total loss of the clause rather than judicial narrowing, since a Nebraska court will not save overbroad drafting. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not assume a Nebraska employee agreement works like a California or Washington one. There is no invention-assignment statute here, so there is no statutory carve-out to rely on and no notice safe harbor — the validity of the assignment turns entirely on the contract language and Nebraska's judge-made limits on restraints. Draft with present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) language so title passes automatically, because ownership starts with the inventor and an employer's rights are only as good as the words that transfer them [^stanford-traceback-practice]. Keep any trailing or holdover assignment narrow, short, and tied to the employer's confidential information, because if a Nebraska court treats an overbroad clause as an unreasonable restraint it will strike the clause entirely — Nebraska has never allowed reformation of a covenant, and even a contract term inviting the court to reform is of no effect [^cae-vanguard-no-reformation][^cae-vanguard-reformation-clause]. And do not lean on trade-secret law as a backstop without real secrecy hygiene: applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit rejected an employer's trade-secret claims because the information had been shared with a third-party contractor without a confidentiality agreement, leaving no secret to protect [^farmers-edge-secrecy-practice]. [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-07-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Nebraska. This article synthesizes Nebraska primary law and is not legal advice from a Nebraska-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. CC BY 4.0. Cite as Steven Obiajulu, *Employee Invention Assignment in Nebraska*, OpenAgreements (last updated July 2, 2026), https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/nebraska. [^farmers-edge-inventor-default]: **Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC** — "an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment." *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).* [^stanford-baseline]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^farmers-edge-contract-default]: **Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC** — "an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment." *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).* [^stanford-inventor]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^farmers-edge-hired-to-invent]: **Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC** — "The second exception is that when an employee is ‘hired to invent something or solve a particular problem, the property of the invention related to this effort may belong to the employer.’" *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).* [^hutton-implied-license]: **Hutton v. City of Omaha** — "the only conclusion to be drawn therefrom is an implied license without compensation" *Hutton v. City of Omaha, 111 Neb. 850, 198 N.W. 146 (1924).* [^farmers-edge-no-specific-assignment]: **Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC** — "FEI has not pointed to evidence in the record that Nuss, Gerlock, and Tatge ‘received an assignment on this occasion to invent.’" *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 409 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).* [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]: **United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.** — "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained." *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).* [^aon-three-part-test]: **Aon Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Financial Benefits, Inc.** — "In determining whether a covenant not to compete is valid, a court considers whether the restriction is (1) reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to the public, (2) not greater than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest, and (3) not unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee." *Aon Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Fin. Benefits, Inc., 275 Neb. 642, 748 N.W.2d 626 (2008).* [^cae-vanguard-no-reformation]: **CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman** — "This court has never allowed reformation of a covenant not to compete." *CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman, 246 Neb. 334, 518 N.W.2d 652 (1994).* [^gaver-ordinary-competition]: **Gaver v. Schneider's O.K. Tire Co.** — "An employer has a legitimate business interest in protection against a former employee’s competition by improper and unfair means, but is not entitled to protection against ordinary competition from a former employee." *Gaver v. Schneider's O.K. Tire Co., 289 Neb. 491 (2014).* [^cae-vanguard-reformation-clause]: **CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman** — "The provision of the agreement which states that a court may reform the covenant is of no effect. Private parties may not confer upon the court powers which it does not possess." *CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman, 246 Neb. 334, 518 N.W.2d 652 (1994).* [^stanford-traceback-practice]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^farmers-edge-secrecy-practice]: **Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC** — "Without such reasonable efforts or measures, there is no secret to protect, and FEI cannot maintain a claim under the NTSA or DTSA." *Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020).*