# Employee Invention Assignment in Maine[^about] Maine has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the federal inventor-first baseline, and Maine's restrictive-covenant reasonableness line — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement. Maine's 2019 noncompete statute, 26 M.R.S. § 599-A, imposes real notice and ban rules, but only on contracts that prohibit working, not on ownership-allocating assignment clauses. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and a post-employment holdover clause would be judged under the covenant-reasonableness framework the Law Court has applied beyond noncompetes. ## Can a Maine employer require assignment of every invention? {#statutory-carve-out} **Short answer.** There is no statutory ceiling. Unlike California or Washington, Maine has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so a clause's reach is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the federal inventor-first baseline, and Maine's restrictive-covenant reasonableness line, which lets a covenant protect confidential information but never the employee's general skill and knowledge [^stanford-inventor-first-baseline][^roy-no-capture-general-skill]. The statutory gap is verifiable. A full-text search of the official Maine Revised Statutes for the word invention returns only two hits in the entire code, both irrelevant here — a criminal-theft trade-secret definition (17-A M.R.S. § 352(1)(F)) and a property-tax assessing standard (36 M.R.S. § 328) — and the current Title 26, chapter 7 (Employment Practices) section index contains no invention or patent provision. Because the official search index self-reports currency only through late 2018, the check was corroborated against the current chapter index as of the October 2025 extraction of the official statute pages. Maine does have a substantial 2019 noncompete statute, 26 M.R.S. § 599-A; its notice regime and its bearing on trailing clauses are taken up in the questions below. The substantive default an assignment contract operates against is the federal patent premise restated in *Stanford v. Roche*: absent an effective assignment, rights in an invention belong to the person who conceived it [^stanford-inventor-first-baseline]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-inventor-first-baseline] What bounds the clause instead of a statute is Maine's restrictive-covenant law, and that law cuts both ways. On the breadth side, the Law Court in *Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers* held that a covenant may protect confidential information even when it does not qualify as a trade secret under Maine's Uniform Trade Secrets Act (10 M.R.S. §§ 1541–1548) [^bernier-covenant-beyond-utsa]. "The confidential knowledge or information protected by a restrictive covenant need not be limited to information that is protected as a trade secret by the UTSA."[^bernier-covenant-beyond-utsa] On the limiting side, the doctrine that runs from *Roy v. Bolduc* through the modern cases forbids a covenant from capturing the employee's general skill and knowledge or unnecessarily interfering with the employee's ability to earn a living [^roy-no-capture-general-skill]. "while an employer, under a proper restrictive agreement, can prevent a former employee from using his trade or business secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of the employment, and from enticing away old customers, he has no right to unnecessarily interfere with the employee’s following any trade or calling for which he is fitted and from which he may earn his livelihood and he cannot preclude him from exercising the skill and general knowledge he has acquired or increased through experience or even instructions while in the employment."[^roy-no-capture-general-skill] The practical consequence is that a Maine employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or Washington employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. But that breadth is not unlimited. An assignment clause is still an ordinary contract term subject to contract-law defenses, and to the extent it operates as a restraint on what the employee may do — especially after employment ends — it runs into the reasonableness limits above and, if it functions as a de facto noncompete, the machinery of § 599-A. ## Must a Maine employer notify the employee? {#employee-notice} **Short answer.** Not applicable. Because Maine has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). Maine does impose real pre-signing notice duties on employers — but only for noncompete agreements as 26 M.R.S. § 599-A defines them, and an ownership-allocating assignment clause is not one [^me-599a-noncompete-definition][^me-599a-notice-regime]. Maine's notice regime is worth understanding precisely because it does not reach assignment clauses. Under § 599-A(4), an employer that will condition an offer on a noncompete must say so before making the offer, and must give the employee or prospective employee a copy of the agreement at least three business days before requiring a signature [^me-599a-notice-regime]. "An employer shall disclose prior to an offer of employment with the employer that will require the acceptance of a noncompete agreement a statement that a noncompete agreement will be required."[^me-599a-notice-regime] Those duties attach only to a noncompete agreement as defined. The § 599-A(1)(B) definition reaches a contract or provision that bars the employee from working in the same or a similar line of work, or within a defined geographic area, for some period after the job ends [^me-599a-noncompete-definition]. A clause that allocates ownership of inventions — even one trailing past termination — does not bar anyone from working, so on the statute's text it sits outside the definition, and outside the notice duty, the wage-based ban, and the delayed-effectiveness rule that travel with it. "prohibits an employee or prospective employee from working in the same or a similar profession or in a specified geographic area for a certain period of time following termination of employment."[^me-599a-noncompete-definition] The rest of the § 599-A package, as of the October 2025 extraction of the official statute pages, works the same way. The statute makes it a civil violation for an employer to require or permit a noncompete from an employee earning wages at or below 400 percent of the federal poverty level, and a 2023 amendment extends the same ban to employed veterinarians without an ownership interest in the practice. A covered noncompete does not take effect until the later of one year of employment or six months after signing (with a physician exception), and violations of the ban or notice provisions carry a fine of at least $5,000, enforced by the Maine Department of Labor. None of that machinery mentions invention-assignment provisions — and, importantly, none of it expressly saves them either. The statute contains no express exclusion for intellectual-property or invention-assignment clauses; assignment clauses fall outside § 599-A only because the definition is shaped around prohibitions on working [^me-599a-noncompete-definition]. That definitional silence is why the untested de facto-noncompete recharacterization question in the holdover section below is the risk worth drafting around. For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Maine employer neither has to give a California-style protected-inventions notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause. The § 599-A disclosure and three-business-day rules belong to noncompete rollouts, not to invention-assignment onboarding paperwork, and the enforceability of the assignment turns on the contract language and the general limits on restraints. ## Who owns an invention by default in Maine? {#default-ownership} **Short answer.** The inventor, unless hired to invent. No Maine statute and no Maine Law Court decision found in our review sets a state-specific default, so the baseline is the federal patent premise that rights belong to the employee who conceived the invention, with the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right operating as the traditional common-law adjustments [^stanford-default-inventor-owns][^dubilier-hired-to-invent]. *Stanford v. Roche* anchors the default. The Supreme Court treated the inventor-first premise as the baseline against which any assignment is measured, so an employer's title is derivative — it exists only if and to the extent the employee assigned it [^stanford-default-inventor-owns]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-default-inventor-owns] The principal exception is the employee hired to invent. Under *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer; short of that, an employee who used the employer's time, tools, and materials gives the employer at most an equitable shop right — a non-exclusive license to use the invention, not ownership of it [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]. "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained."[^dubilier-hired-to-invent] Maine's own courts have said essentially nothing here. Our review found no Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision on hired-to-invent, shop rights, or employee-invention ownership. The only invention-ownership decision decided on Maine soil found in our review is *Scott v. Madison Woolen Co.*, a 1925 decision of the federal district court in Maine applying the general federal doctrine — not Maine state law. There, a mill superintendent who devised an improved textile device on the employer's time and with its materials kept his patent, while the employer earned an implied irrevocable license to use the invention [^scott-shop-right-maine-soil]. "the facts stated amply warrant the finding of an implied irrevocable license or shop right, and that it would be inequitable to grant an injunction."[^scott-shop-right-maine-soil] Because ownership starts with the inventor and Maine has no statute or state-court doctrine filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) clause that transfers legal title automatically on conception, rather than a future promise to assign that leaves the employer with a mere equitable claim. ## Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Maine? {#holdover-clause-limit} **Short answer.** Probably enforceable only to the extent reasonable. No Maine decision found in our review has adjudicated a trailing invention-assignment clause, and no statute caps its duration. But Maine would not approach one on a blank slate. The Law Court applies its restrictive-covenant reasonableness framework beyond noncompetes, and in doing so it has favorably cited the leading holdover-agreement case, so a Maine court asked to enforce a trailing clause would most likely test it for reasonableness rather than apply any invention-specific rule [^bernier-reasonableness-question-of-law][^bernier-ingersoll-rand-holdover-parenthetical]. Maine's covenant-reasonableness line is old and settled. As restated in *Chapman & Drake v. Harrington*, quoting *Lord v. Lord*, such covenants are disfavored and enforceable only within reasonable bounds [^chapman-lord-reasonableness-formula]. "are contrary to public policy and will be enforced only to the extent that they are reasonable and sweep no wider than necessary to protect the business interests in issue."[^chapman-lord-reasonableness-formula] The framework is not confined to noncompetes. In *Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers*, the Law Court applied it to a nondisclosure covenant — an adjacent IP-protective covenant type — and treated reasonableness as the governing legal test [^bernier-reasonableness-question-of-law]. "To be enforceable, however, restrictive covenants must be reasonable. The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is a question of law."[^bernier-reasonableness-question-of-law] The same passage of *Bernier* supplies the closest thing Maine has to holdover authority. In describing the interests a covenant may protect, the Law Court cited *Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta*, 542 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1988) — the New Jersey Supreme Court's leading trailing-invention-assignment decision — with a parenthetical expressly describing that case as construing a holdover agreement and endorsing the employer interests such agreements can serve [^bernier-ingersoll-rand-holdover-parenthetical]. "(construing a holdover agreement and recognizing that ‘employers may have legitimate interests in protecting information that is not a trade secret or proprietary information, but highly specialized, current information not generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research environment furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been ‘exposed’ and ‘enriched’ solely due to his employment’)."[^bernier-ingersoll-rand-holdover-parenthetical] Two caveats keep this a prediction rather than a holding. *Bernier* is a nondisclosure case, and its *Ingersoll-Rand* citation is protectable-interest dicta — no Maine decision found in our review has enforced, trimmed, or struck a holdover invention-assignment clause, and no Maine authority blesses any particular holdover duration. And the statutory overlay points the same way without resolving it: § 599-A(2) declares noncompete agreements contrary to public policy and enforceable only to the extent reasonable and no broader than necessary to protect trade secrets, other confidential information, or goodwill — a near-verbatim codification of the *Lord* and *Chapman & Drake* formula — so even a trailing clause recharacterized as a noncompete would land back on reasonableness, though with the statute's ban and penalty machinery attached for covered employees [^me-599a-codified-reasonableness]. "Noncompete agreements are contrary to public policy and are enforceable only to the extent that they are reasonable and are no broader than necessary to protect one or more of the following legitimate business interests of the employer"[^me-599a-codified-reasonableness] Consideration is one point Maine's covenant cases have settled in the employer's favor for midstream rollouts. In *Brignull v. Albert*, continued employment supported a restrictive covenant signed mid-employment — a rule that would presumably carry over to an invention-assignment agreement rolled out to existing employees, though *Brignull* itself involved a noncompetition covenant [^brignull-continued-employment-consideration]. Note that for true noncompetes, § 599-A(5) now delays effectiveness until the later of one year of employment or six months after signing — a timing rule an assignment clause outside the definition does not face. "Thus Albert’s continued employment by Brignull during a three-year period constitutes consideration to support the noncompetition agreement."[^brignull-continued-employment-consideration] > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > The untested risk in Maine is recharacterization. A trailing assignment broad enough to make continued work in the field pointless — for example, one that hands the ex-employer every invention in the profession for years after departure — functions like a restraint on working, and 26 M.R.S. § 599-A contains no express exclusion for invention-assignment provisions that would prevent a court from treating such a clause as a noncompete agreement under the statutory definition. Recharacterization would drag in machinery the clause was never drafted to satisfy — the statutory public-policy declaration and reasonableness cap, the pre-offer disclosure and three-business-day notice duties, the delayed-effectiveness rule, the ban for employees at or below 400 percent of the federal poverty level and for employed veterinarians, and a civil fine of at least $5,000 [^me-599a-codified-reasonableness]. Draft trailing assignments narrow, short, and tied to the employer's trade secrets and confidential information rather than to the employee's field of work, because Maine's covenant doctrine forbids capturing general skill and knowledge [^roy-general-skill-practice], and no Maine decision found in our review endorses reformation of an overbroad covenant — the Law Court has softened overbreadth only by assessing an agreement as applied, which offers no help to an employer seeking to enforce a facially overbroad clause [^chapman-as-applied-practice]. [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-07-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Maine. This article synthesizes Maine primary law and is not legal advice from a Maine-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. CC BY 4.0. Cite as Steven Obiajulu, *Employee Invention Assignment in Maine*, OpenAgreements (last updated July 3, 2026), https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/maine. [^stanford-inventor-first-baseline]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^roy-no-capture-general-skill]: **Roy v. Bolduc** — "while an employer, under a proper restrictive agreement, can prevent a former employee from using his trade or business secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of the employment, and from enticing away old customers, he has no right to unnecessarily interfere with the employee’s following any trade or calling for which he is fitted and from which he may earn his livelihood and he cannot preclude him from exercising the skill and general knowledge he has acquired or increased through experience or even instructions while in the employment." *Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479 (1943).* [^bernier-covenant-beyond-utsa]: **Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers** — "The confidential knowledge or information protected by a restrictive covenant need not be limited to information that is protected as a trade secret by the UTSA." *Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 2001 ME 17, 770 A.2d 97.* [^me-599a-noncompete-definition]: **26 M.R.S. § 599-A** — "prohibits an employee or prospective employee from working in the same or a similar profession or in a specified geographic area for a certain period of time following termination of employment." *26 M.R.S. § 599-A(1)(B).* [^me-599a-notice-regime]: **26 M.R.S. § 599-A** — "An employer shall disclose prior to an offer of employment with the employer that will require the acceptance of a noncompete agreement a statement that a noncompete agreement will be required." *26 M.R.S. § 599-A(4).* [^stanford-default-inventor-owns]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]: **United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.** — "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained." *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).* [^scott-shop-right-maine-soil]: **Scott v. Madison Woolen Co.** — "the facts stated amply warrant the finding of an implied irrevocable license or shop right, and that it would be inequitable to grant an injunction." *Scott v. Madison Woolen Co., 3 F.2d 331 (D. Me. 1925).* [^bernier-reasonableness-question-of-law]: **Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers** — "To be enforceable, however, restrictive covenants must be reasonable. The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is a question of law." *Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 2001 ME 17, 770 A.2d 97.* [^bernier-ingersoll-rand-holdover-parenthetical]: **Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers** — "(construing a holdover agreement and recognizing that ‘employers may have legitimate interests in protecting information that is not a trade secret or proprietary information, but highly specialized, current information not generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research environment furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been ‘exposed’ and ‘enriched’ solely due to his employment’)." *Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 2001 ME 17, 770 A.2d 97 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 542 A.2d 879, 894 (1988)).* [^chapman-lord-reasonableness-formula]: **Chapman & Drake v. Harrington** — "are contrary to public policy and will be enforced only to the extent that they are reasonable and sweep no wider than necessary to protect the business interests in issue." *Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988) (quoting Lord v. Lord, 454 A.2d 830, 834 (Me. 1983)).* [^me-599a-codified-reasonableness]: **26 M.R.S. § 599-A** — "Noncompete agreements are contrary to public policy and are enforceable only to the extent that they are reasonable and are no broader than necessary to protect one or more of the following legitimate business interests of the employer" *26 M.R.S. § 599-A(2).* [^brignull-continued-employment-consideration]: **Brignull v. Albert** — "Thus Albert’s continued employment by Brignull during a three-year period constitutes consideration to support the noncompetition agreement." *Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82 (Me. 1995).* [^roy-general-skill-practice]: **Roy v. Bolduc** — "while an employer, under a proper restrictive agreement, can prevent a former employee from using his trade or business secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of the employment, and from enticing away old customers, he has no right to unnecessarily interfere with the employee’s following any trade or calling for which he is fitted and from which he may earn his livelihood and he cannot preclude him from exercising the skill and general knowledge he has acquired or increased through experience or even instructions while in the employment." *Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479 (1943).* [^chapman-as-applied-practice]: **Chapman & Drake v. Harrington** — "we assess that agreement only as Chapman & Drake has sought to apply it and not as it might have been enforced on its plain terms." *Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988).*