# Employee Invention Assignment in Kentucky[^about] Kentucky has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, with the employer holding at most a shop right to use the invention without royalties under the Dorton cases, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — no Kentucky authority found in our review, and the one in-state federal holdover case applied North Carolina law by party agreement. ## Can a Kentucky employer require assignment of every invention? {#statutory-carve-out} **Short answer.** There is no statutory ceiling. Unlike California or New York, Kentucky has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent and copyright overlay. Kentucky's own employee-invention case law gives an employer an inference-based right to use an employee's invention, not a statutory claim to title, and the baseline the contract operates against is that rights in an invention belong to the inventor [^dorton-use-not-title][^stanford-baseline]. Because there is no statute on point, the limits come from general principles rather than a legislative carve-out. Nothing in KRS Chapter 336 (labor and employment) or KRS Chapter 365 (trade practices, where the Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act sits at KRS 365.880 to 365.900) addresses employee inventions, and Kentucky appears on no list of the states — California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Utah, and Washington — that have enacted a § 2870-style own-time carve-out. Searches for a Kentucky invention statute sometimes surface the Kentucky Consumer Data Protection Act, KRS 367.3611 to 367.3629; that is a consumer-privacy law, not an employee-invention statute. The adjacent employment statutes that do exist — the trade-secrets act, a narrow restriction on non-compete terms for temporary direct care staff placed by health care services agencies (KRS 216.724), and a prohibition on requiring employees to waive certain statutory rights as a condition of employment (KRS 336.700) — regulate other things; none reaches what an invention-assignment clause may capture. What Kentucky supplies instead is a common-law frame. In the Dorton litigation — two appeals decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals when it was the Commonwealth's highest court — the employer's entitlement to an invention its employee perfected on the job, absent a contract giving it more, was a shop right, meaning the right to use the invention in its business without paying royalties [^dorton-use-not-title]. "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties."[^dorton-use-not-title] The substantive default that contract law operates against is the federal patent premise restated in *Stanford v. Roche*: absent an effective assignment, rights in an invention belong to the person who conceived it [^stanford-baseline]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-baseline] The practical consequence is that a Kentucky employer can, in principle, contract for assignment more broadly than a California or Washington employer, because no statute carves out own-time inventions from the reach of the clause. That breadth is still not unlimited — an assignment clause is an ordinary contract term subject to contract-law defenses, and where it operates as a restraint on the former employee it invites Kentucky's general reasonableness scrutiny of restraints of trade, discussed in the trailing-clause question below. But there is no statutory own-time safe harbor for the employee to invoke and no statutory ceiling for the drafter to code around. ## Must a Kentucky employer notify the employee? {#employee-notice} **Short answer.** Not applicable. Because Kentucky has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). Whatever rights a Kentucky employer holds over employee inventions arise from the contract itself or from the common-law inference the Kentucky courts draw from the employment relationship, not from a statutory scheme with notice formalities [^dorton-notice]. There is nothing to give notice of. A notice requirement exists in California and Washington precisely to alert the employee to a statutory own-time carve-out that limits the assignment; Kentucky has enacted no such carve-out, so there is no statutory line for a notice to mark. This is why the entry is marked not applicable rather than a bare no — the question presupposes a statutory carve-out that Kentucky does not have. Where Kentucky law does give the employer rights in an employee's invention without a contract, it does so by inference from the employment relationship, not by a statute that must be disclosed. The Dorton litigation locates the employer's default entitlement — a royalty-free right of use — in the common-law authorities on master and servant, with no statutory notice apparatus attached [^dorton-notice]. "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties."[^dorton-notice] For a multistate employer the takeaway is the inverse of the notice states: a Kentucky employer neither has to give a § 2872-style notice nor can rely on one to cure an overbroad clause. The enforceability of the assignment turns entirely on the contract language and the general limits on restraints, not on any statutory notice or disclosure formality. ## Who owns an invention by default in Kentucky? {#default-ownership} **Short answer.** The inventor, unless hired to invent. Absent a written assignment, the baseline under federal patent law — which governs who holds title to a patentable invention in Kentucky as elsewhere — is that rights belong to the employee who conceived it. The narrow exception is the employee hired to invent, whose resulting invention the employer may claim; short of that, Kentucky's own case law gives the employer at most a shop right to use the invention without paying royalties, never ownership [^stanford-inventor][^dubilier-hired-to-invent][^dorton-shop-right]. *Stanford v. Roche* anchors the default. The Supreme Court held that even the Bayh-Dole Act did not displace the long-standing rule that an invention belongs to its inventor, treating that premise as the baseline against which any assignment is measured [^stanford-inventor]. "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor."[^stanford-inventor] Because ownership starts with the inventor, an employer's title is derivative — it exists only if and to the extent the employee assigned it. Any third-party interest must trace back to that inventor-grantor [^stanford-traceback]. "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor."[^stanford-traceback] The principal exception is the employee hired to invent. Under *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, an employee engaged to make a particular invention who succeeds during the term of service must assign the resulting patent to the employer [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]. No Kentucky appellate decision found in our review articulates the hired-to-invent doctrine as a matter of Kentucky common law, so on that point the federal formulation is the analogous — and nonbinding — doctrine a Kentucky court would most likely consult. "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained."[^dubilier-hired-to-invent] Short of hired-to-invent, the employer's remedy is the equitable shop right — a non-exclusive license to use the invention, not ownership of it. *Dubilier* states the classic formulation [^dubilier-shop-right]. "Recognition of the nature of the act of invention also defines the limits of the so-called shop-right, which shortly stated, is that where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive right to practice the invention."[^dubilier-shop-right] Kentucky's own courts adopted that framework in the Dorton litigation, a pair of appeals decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals when it was the Commonwealth's highest court. On the first appeal, in 1945, the court characterized the trial testimony as tending to establish an entitlement to shop rights — the right to use the invention without paying royalty [^ashland-shop-right-first-appeal]. On the second appeal, in 1946, the court grounded that entitlement in the master-and-servant authorities: the employer of an employee-inventor may use the invention in its business without paying royalties [^dorton-shop-right]. "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties."[^dorton-shop-right] A use right is not title. Because ownership therefore starts with the inventor and Kentucky has no statute filling the gap, the dependable path for an employer is a written present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) clause that transfers legal title automatically on conception, rather than a future promise to assign that leaves the employer with a mere equitable claim. ## Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Kentucky? {#holdover-clause-limit} **Short answer.** Unsettled. Kentucky has no statute capping the duration or reach of a post-employment trailing assignment — there is no invention-assignment statute at all and no general non-compete statute either — and no Kentucky decision found in our review addresses a holdover invention-assignment clause. The one holdover dispute litigated in a Kentucky forum was decided under North Carolina law because the parties agreed that law governed, so it does not state Kentucky law. A Kentucky court asked to enforce a trailing clause would most likely draw on the Commonwealth's general reasonableness standard for restraints of trade and its consideration rules for mid-employment restrictive agreements — an analogy, not settled authority [^n-harris-nc-law][^hammons-reasonableness]. Three gaps define the Kentucky picture. First, there is no statute: nothing in the KRS caps what a post-employment trailing assignment may reach, and the only enacted restriction on restrictive covenants, KRS 216.724, is a narrow health-care temporary-staffing provision that has nothing to do with invention assignment. Second, our review found no Kentucky appellate decision applying any standard to an invention-holdover clause. Third, whether a Kentucky court would even classify a trailing-assignment clause as a restraint of trade — rather than as a pure intellectual-property assignment outside covenant doctrine — is itself undecided. The absence of in-state authority is easy to overstate, because one federal decision sits in a Kentucky forum. In *N. Harris Computer Corp. v. DSI Investments, LLC*, the Western District of Kentucky upheld a one-year holdover clause — but it analyzed the clause under North Carolina law, applying that state's restrictive-covenant reasonableness cases and the invention-assignment statute the parties cited, because the parties agreed North Carolina law controlled [^n-harris-nc-law]. The decision is at most persuasive color for how a holdover clause can be litigated; it is not Kentucky law. "The parties agree that North Carolina law governs the interpretation, validity, and enforcement of the Assignment."[^n-harris-nc-law] What Kentucky does supply is a general reasonableness standard for agreements in restraint of trade. The formulation Kentucky courts quote comes from *Ceresia v. Mitchell*, decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1951 when it was the Commonwealth's highest court, as restated in *Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Service, Inc.* by the post-1976 intermediate Court of Appeals [^hammons-reasonableness]. "Also, it has been held in Kentucky that an agreement in restraint of trade is reasonable if, on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the cove-nantee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted."[^hammons-reasonableness] Consideration is the second Kentucky doctrine a holdover fight would likely engage. In *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown*, the Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to enforce a restrictive agreement that an employee, Brown, signed years into his at-will employment, because he received nothing new in exchange for signing it [^creech-consideration]. "He remained an at-will employee with no promotion, no increase in wages, and no specialized training. In short, Brown received no consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or after he signed the Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement is not enforceable."[^creech-consideration] Extending either doctrine to a trailing invention assignment is a prediction, not a holding. If a Kentucky court treats a holdover clause as a restraint of trade, the *Ceresia* standard restated in *Hammons* points toward asking whether the clause affords fair protection to the employer without imposing undue hardship on the former employee or the public — which would put an open-ended trailer that sweeps in everything an ex-employee invents at meaningful risk. If the court instead treats the clause as a pure assignment of property outside covenant doctrine, no Kentucky authority found in our review says what limit, if any, applies. Either way, the precise standard for invention holdovers in Kentucky has not been decided. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Kentucky gives an invention-assignment clause no statutory safe harbor and no statutory ceiling, so the words of the contract do all the work — ownership starts with the inventor, and an employer's rights are only as good as the language that transfers them, which is why present-assignment (*hereby assigns*) wording that passes title automatically is safer than a bare promise to assign later [^stanford-traceback-practice]. Rollouts to existing employees deserve particular care: the Supreme Court of Kentucky has refused to enforce a restrictive agreement an at-will employee signed mid-employment where he received no promotion, no wage increase, and no specialized training in exchange, and although no Kentucky case found in our review has applied that consideration rule to a pure invention-assignment clause, a mid-stream assignment agreement given for nothing new runs the same risk [^creech-consideration]. Keep any trailing or holdover assignment narrow, short, and tied to work rooted in the employment, because no Kentucky authority addresses such clauses and, if a court treats one as a restraint of trade, it will be tested against the fair-protection-without-undue-hardship standard with no statute to save an overbroad term [^hammons-reasonableness]. [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-07-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Kentucky. This article synthesizes Kentucky primary law and is not legal advice from a Kentucky-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. CC BY 4.0. Cite as Steven Obiajulu, *Employee Invention Assignment in Kentucky*, OpenAgreements (last updated July 3, 2026), https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/kentucky. [^dorton-use-not-title]: **Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.** — "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties." *Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 303 Ky. 279, 197 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1946).* [^stanford-baseline]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^dorton-notice]: **Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.** — "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties." *Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 303 Ky. 279, 197 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1946).* [^stanford-inventor]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^dubilier-hired-to-invent]: **United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.** — "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained." *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).* [^dorton-shop-right]: **Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.** — "An examination of the authorities cited in that opinion on this question, including 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, section 95, will show that the inference is that the employer has the right to use an invention of its employee in its business without the payment of royalties." *Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 303 Ky. 279, 197 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1946).* [^stanford-traceback]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).* [^dubilier-shop-right]: **United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.** — "Recognition of the nature of the act of invention also defines the limits of the so-called shop-right, which shortly stated, is that where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive right to practice the invention." *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).* [^ashland-shop-right-first-appeal]: **Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Dorton** — "The testimony covered a wide range and tended to establish that the invention was perfected and utilized under such circumstances as to entitle appellant to ‘shop rights, ’ that is, the right to use said invention in its business without the payment of royalty." *Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Dorton, 300 Ky. 385, 189 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1945).* [^n-harris-nc-law]: **N. Harris Computer Corp. v. DSI Investments, LLC** — "The parties agree that North Carolina law governs the interpretation, validity, and enforcement of the Assignment." *N. Harris Computer Corp. v. DSI Investments, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00142-GNS-HBB (W.D. Ky. June 17, 2022).* [^hammons-reasonableness]: **Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Service, Inc.** — "Also, it has been held in Kentucky that an agreement in restraint of trade is reasonable if, on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the cove-nantee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted." *Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951)).* [^creech-consideration]: **Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown** — "He remained an at-will employee with no promotion, no increase in wages, and no specialized training. In short, Brown received no consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or after he signed the Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement is not enforceable." *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).* [^stanford-traceback-practice]: **Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems** — "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor." *Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).*