{ "type": "practice-guide", "canonical": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia", "links": [ { "rel": "self", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia.json", "type": "application/json" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia", "type": "text/html" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia/markdown", "type": "text/markdown" }, { "rel": "alternate", "href": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia/json", "type": "application/json" } ], "data": { "topic": "invention-assignment", "state": "georgia", "frontmatter": { "title": "Employee Invention Assignment in Georgia", "description": "Georgia has no employee-invention-assignment statute. Title to a patentable invention belongs to the inventor by default under federal patent law; an employer takes title only through a present-tense written assignment, which Georgia courts construe against the drafter and will not read into merely prospective wording; and a post-employment holdover clause is policed as a restrictive covenant under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act.", "state": "Georgia", "lastReviewed": "2026-06-30", "license": "CC BY 4.0", "authors": [ "steven-obiajulu" ], "summary": { "bottomLine": "Georgia has no employee-invention-assignment statute; the inventor owns by default under federal patent law, an assignment must use present-tense transfer language, and a post-employment \"holdover\" clause is policed as a restrictive covenant under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act.", "keyLaw": "No Georgia invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992); O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53, -57", "statutoryCarveOut": "none", "defaultOwnership": "employee", "employeeNoticeRequired": "n/a", "holdoverClauseLimit": "reasonablenessOnly", "carveOutScope": "No statutory carve-out; freedom of contract limited by construction-against-the-drafter and, for post-employment reach, the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act's reasonableness limits (O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53, -57)" }, "about": [ "Georgia no invention-assignment statute", "Georgia hired-to-invent", "Georgia shop right", "Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act invention", "Georgia-Pacific v. Lieberam", "Georgia holdover trailing assignment", "present vs future assignment Georgia" ], "translations": [ { "language": "中文", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Español", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Português", "status": "planned" }, { "language": "Deutsch", "status": "planned" } ], "relatedForm": { "slug": "openagreements-confidentiality-invention-assignment-agreement" } }, "questions": [ { "slug": "statutory-carve-out", "label": "Can the employer require assignment of every invention?", "heading": "Can a Georgia employer require assignment of every invention?", "answerText": "No — but not because a statute forbids it. Georgia has not enacted an employee-invention-assignment statute of the kind California (Labor Code § 2870) or Washington (RCW 49.44.140) adopted, so no category of inventions is carved out of an assignment clause by statute. What an employer may require is fixed instead by the contract, read against two background rules: the federal patent-law default that an invention belongs to its inventor, and the Georgia rule that ambiguous assignment language is construed against the employer that drafted it.", "sources": [ { "id": "stanford-inventor", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems", "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Since%201790%2C%20the%20patent%20law,invention%20belong%20to%20the%20inventor.", "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.", "verbatimQuote": "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.", "date": "2011-06-06", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-stanford-inventor" }, { "id": "gapac-construe", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam", "citation": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/#:~:text=any%20ambiguity%20in%20a%20contract,the%20party%20who%20drafted%20it.", "proposition": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam restates the settled Georgia rule that any ambiguity in a contract is construed against the party that drafted it — in the employment setting, the employer.", "verbatimQuote": "any ambiguity in a contract is to be construed against the party who drafted it.", "date": "1992-05-13", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-gapac-construe" } ] }, { "slug": "employee-notice", "label": "Must the employer give the employee written notice of the carve-out?", "heading": "Must a Georgia employer notify the employee?", "answerText": "No. Because Georgia has no employee-invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory notice or carve-out-disclosure requirement of the kind California (Labor Code § 2872) and Washington (RCW 49.44.140(3)) impose. A clause's validity does not depend on any notice to the employee; it depends on whether the contract effects a present transfer of title from the inventor, construed against the drafter.", "sources": [ { "id": "stanford-notice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems", "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Since%201790%2C%20the%20patent%20law,invention%20belong%20to%20the%20inventor.", "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche confirms that rights in an invention belong to the inventor by default; because Georgia has no invention-assignment statute, an employer takes title only through a valid assignment from the inventor, and no statutory notice to the employee is required or relevant.", "verbatimQuote": "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.", "date": "2011-06-06", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-stanford-notice" } ] }, { "slug": "default-ownership", "label": "Absent a written assignment, who owns the invention?", "heading": "Who owns an invention by default in Georgia?", "answerText": "The inventor. Absent a written assignment, the baseline rule under federal patent law — which governs who holds title to a patentable invention in Georgia as elsewhere — is that rights belong to the employee who conceived it, and any other party's interest must trace back to that inventor. An employer's routes to ownership without an express assignment are the common-law hired-to-invent doctrine and the shop right; both are narrow, so a Georgia employer relies on a written present-assignment clause — and Georgia courts demand present-tense transfer language, treating a clause that reaches what the employee may later make as merely prospective and construing it against the drafter.", "sources": [ { "id": "stanford-traceback", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems", "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Thus%2C%20although%20others%20may%20acquire,trace%20back%20to%20the%20inventor.", "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche holds that although others may acquire an interest in an invention, that interest as a general rule must trace back to the inventor — so an employer takes title only through an assignment from the employee-inventor.", "verbatimQuote": "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor.", "date": "2011-06-06", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-stanford-traceback" }, { "id": "dubilier-hired-to-invent", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.", "citation": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/#:~:text=One%20employed%20to%20make%20an,his%20employer%20any%20patent%20obtained.", "proposition": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. states the hired-to-invent rule: an employee engaged to make an invention who accomplishes that task during the term of service is bound to assign to the employer any patent obtained.", "verbatimQuote": "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.", "date": "1933-04-10", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-dubilier-hired-to-invent" }, { "id": "firststatebank-present", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co.", "citation": "First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co., 103 Ga. App. 270 (1961).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1377308/first-state-bank-v-hall-flooring-co/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1377308/first-state-bank-v-hall-flooring-co/#:~:text=to%20transfer%20it%20instantly%2C%20so,the%20property%20of%20the%20transferee.", "proposition": "Applying the settled Georgia assignment-intent rule it drew from Southern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Durdin, First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co. states that a writing operates as a legal assignment only when its language shows intent to transfer the right instantly, so that it becomes the property of the transferee; on its facts the court found the writing did not convey legal title, underscoring how exacting this present-transfer standard is — the same standard a Georgia invention-assignment clause must satisfy.", "verbatimQuote": "to transfer it instantly, so that it will be the property of the transferee.", "date": "1961-02-09", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-firststatebank-present" }, { "id": "gapac-prospective", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam", "citation": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CMay%E2%80%9D%20appears%20to%20refer%20to,something%20that%20has%20already%20occurred.", "proposition": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam reads assignment language framed around what an employee may make as referring only to a possibility — prospective rather than a completed present transfer — and therefore construed against the drafter.", "verbatimQuote": "“May” appears to refer to a possibility: to something that might happen as opposed to something that has already occurred.", "date": "1992-05-13", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-gapac-prospective" } ] }, { "slug": "holdover-clause-limit", "label": "Are post-employment trailing-assignment clauses enforceable?", "heading": "Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Georgia?", "answerText": "Only so far as they are reasonable. No Georgia statute caps an invention-assignment holdover as such, and no Georgia appellate decision found in our review squarely decides whether a clause reaching inventions first conceived after employment ends is enforceable. The operative lens is restrictive-covenant law: a post-employment clause that restrains a former employee's work is enforced only if it is reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act, which presumes a restraint of two years or less reasonable for a former employee — and Georgia law supplies that test even when the contract picks another state's law.", "sources": [ { "id": "ga-13-8-53", "authorityType": "primary-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53", "citation": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/ga/title-13-contracts/ga-code-sect-13-8-53/", "proposition": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) permits enforcement of contracts that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant only so long as the restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities.", "verbatimQuote": "enforcement of contracts that restrict competition during the term of a restrictive covenant, so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities, shall be permitted.", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-ga-13-8-53" }, { "id": "ga-13-8-57", "authorityType": "primary-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57", "citation": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b).", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/ga/title-13-contracts/ga-code-sect-13-8-57/", "proposition": "O.C.G.A. § 13-8-57(b) directs a court to presume reasonable in time any restraint of two years or less against a former employee, and to presume unreasonable any restraint longer than two years, measured from the termination of the business relationship.", "verbatimQuote": "a court shall presume to be reasonable in time any restraint two years or less in duration and shall presume to be unreasonable in time any restraint more than two years in duration, measured from the date of the termination of the business relationship.", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-ga-13-8-57" }, { "id": "burbach-touchstone", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach", "citation": "Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach, 317 Ga. 206 (2023).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10680038/motorsports-of-conyers-llc-v-burbach/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10680038/motorsports-of-conyers-llc-v-burbach/#:~:text=Georgia%20law%20remains%20the%20touchstone,says%20another%20state%E2%80%99s%20law%20applies.", "proposition": "Motorsports of Conyers, LLC v. Burbach holds that Georgia law remains the touchstone for determining whether a restrictive covenant is enforceable in Georgia courts, even where the contract selects another state's law.", "verbatimQuote": "Georgia law remains the touchstone for determining whether a given restrictive covenant is enforceable in our courts, even where the contract says another state’s law applies.", "date": "2023-10-11", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-burbach-touchstone" }, { "id": "vendo-general-skill", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Vendo Co. v. Long", "citation": "Vendo Co. v. Long, 213 Ga. 774 (1958).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1207690/vendo-company-v-long/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1207690/vendo-company-v-long/#:~:text=all%20the%20skill%20he%20has,the%20property%20of%20the%20employer.", "proposition": "Vendo Co. v. Long applies the established Georgia principle that a departing employee may take all the general skill, knowledge, and information acquired in the job, so long as nothing taken is the property of the employer — protecting the employee's general human capital from an overbroad post-employment restraint.", "verbatimQuote": "all the skill he has acquired, all the knowledge he has obtained, and all the information that he has received, so long as nothing is taken that is the property of the employer.", "date": "1958-02-10", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-vendo-general-skill" }, { "id": "gapac-construe-practice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam", "citation": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/580034/georgia-pacific-corp-v-lieberam/#:~:text=any%20ambiguity%20in%20a%20contract,the%20party%20who%20drafted%20it.", "proposition": "Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam restates the settled Georgia rule that any ambiguity in a contract is construed against the party that drafted it — in the employment setting, the employer.", "verbatimQuote": "any ambiguity in a contract is to be construed against the party who drafted it.", "date": "1992-05-13", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-gapac-construe-practice" }, { "id": "firststatebank-present-practice", "authorityType": "case-law", "tier": "primary-source-backed", "title": "First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co.", "citation": "First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co., 103 Ga. App. 270 (1961).", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1377308/first-state-bank-v-hall-flooring-co/", "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1377308/first-state-bank-v-hall-flooring-co/#:~:text=to%20transfer%20it%20instantly%2C%20so,the%20property%20of%20the%20transferee.", "proposition": "Applying the settled Georgia assignment-intent rule it drew from Southern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Durdin, First State Bank v. Hall Flooring Co. states that a writing operates as a legal assignment only when its language shows intent to transfer the right instantly, so that it becomes the property of the transferee; on its facts the court found the writing did not convey legal title, underscoring how exacting this present-transfer standard is — the same standard a Georgia invention-assignment clause must satisfy.", "verbatimQuote": "to transfer it instantly, so that it will be the property of the transferee.", "date": "1961-02-09", "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/georgia#src-firststatebank-present-practice" } ] } ] } }