{
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  "data": {
    "topic": "invention-assignment",
    "state": "alabama",
    "frontmatter": {
      "title": "Employee Invention Assignment in Alabama",
      "description": "Alabama has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns under the federal baseline (no Alabama appellate decision found in our review addresses the default), the Supreme Court of Alabama has treated a broad contractual invention-ownership clause as operative, and a post-employment holdover clause's enforceability is unsettled against the Restrictive Covenant Act's anti-restraint backdrop.",
      "state": "Alabama",
      "lastReviewed": "2026-07-02",
      "license": "CC BY 4.0",
      "authors": [
        "steven-obiajulu"
      ],
      "summary": {
        "bottomLine": "Alabama has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent under the federal baseline (no Alabama appellate decision found in our review addresses the default), the Supreme Court of Alabama has treated a broad contractual invention-ownership clause as operative, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — the Restrictive Covenant Act voids restraints of a lawful profession outside its exceptions, but no Alabama authority found in our review applies it to a trailing invention assignment.",
        "keyLaw": "No Alabama invention-assignment statute; Gilley v. Southern Research Institute, 176 So. 3d 1214 (Ala. 2015); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Ala. Code § 8-1-190",
        "statutoryCarveOut": "none",
        "defaultOwnership": "employee",
        "employeeNoticeRequired": "n/a",
        "holdoverClauseLimit": "unsettled",
        "carveOutScope": "Alabama has no statutory own-time carve-out; the reach of an assignment clause is limited only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default (subject to the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right, neither of which any Alabama appellate decision found in our review has articulated), and the federal patent and copyright overlay."
      },
      "about": [
        "Alabama invention assignment",
        "Alabama no invention-assignment statute",
        "Alabama employee invention ownership",
        "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute",
        "DeVoe v. Cheatham",
        "Alabama Restrictive Covenant Act invention assignment",
        "Alabama holdover trailing assignment"
      ],
      "translations": [
        {
          "language": "中文",
          "status": "planned"
        },
        {
          "language": "Español",
          "status": "planned"
        },
        {
          "language": "Português",
          "status": "planned"
        },
        {
          "language": "Deutsch",
          "status": "planned"
        }
      ],
      "relatedForm": {
        "slug": "openagreements-confidentiality-invention-assignment-agreement"
      }
    },
    "questions": [
      {
        "slug": "statutory-carve-out",
        "label": "Can the employer require assignment of every invention?",
        "heading": "Can an Alabama employer require assignment of every invention?",
        "answerText": "There is no statutory ceiling. Unlike California or Washington, Alabama has no employee-invention-assignment statute — nothing that voids an assignment of a true own-time, own-resource invention — so an assignment clause's reach is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent and copyright overlay. The Supreme Court of Alabama has treated a broad contractual invention-ownership clause as an operative contract term, and the baseline any such clause operates against is that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.",
        "sources": [
          {
            "id": "gilley-clause-operative",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute",
            "citation": "Gilley v. S. Research Inst., 176 So. 3d 1214 (Ala. 2015).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/#:~:text=When%20he%20was%20hired%20by,and%20exclusive%20property%20of%20%5BSRI%5D.%E2%80%9D",
            "proposition": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute shows the Supreme Court of Alabama treating a broad contractual invention-ownership clause — making the employee's inventions the employer's sole and exclusive property — as an operative contract term, so the reach of an assignment clause in Alabama is a matter of ordinary contract law rather than a statutory carve-out.",
            "verbatimQuote": "When he was hired by SRI in 1979, Gilley executed a contract acknowledging that any “improvements, inventions and discoveries” made by him during the tenure of his employment would “be the sole and exclusive property of [SRI].”",
            "date": "2015-03-13",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-gilley-clause-operative"
          },
          {
            "id": "stanford-baseline",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems",
            "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Since%201790%2C%20the%20patent%20law,invention%20belong%20to%20the%20inventor.",
            "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, the baseline against which any assignment clause is measured.",
            "verbatimQuote": "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.",
            "date": "2011-06-06",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-stanford-baseline"
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "slug": "employee-notice",
        "label": "Must the employer give the employee written notice of the carve-out?",
        "heading": "Must an Alabama employer notify the employee?",
        "answerText": "Not applicable. Because Alabama has no invention-assignment statute, there is no statutory carve-out to notify the employee about and no notice requirement of the kind California imposes under Labor Code § 2872 or Washington imposes under RCW 49.44.140(3). What Alabama enforces instead is contractual: invention-ownership obligations arise from the terms of the agreement itself.",
        "sources": [
          {
            "id": "gilley-contract-basis",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute",
            "citation": "Gilley v. S. Research Inst., 176 So. 3d 1214 (Ala. 2015).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/#:~:text=When%20he%20was%20hired%20by,and%20exclusive%20property%20of%20%5BSRI%5D.%E2%80%9D",
            "proposition": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute shows that in Alabama an employee's invention-ownership obligations arise from the agreement itself — the court treated the contractual sole-and-exclusive-property clause as the operative source of the employer's rights — not from any statute an employer would have to give notice about.",
            "verbatimQuote": "When he was hired by SRI in 1979, Gilley executed a contract acknowledging that any “improvements, inventions and discoveries” made by him during the tenure of his employment would “be the sole and exclusive property of [SRI].”",
            "date": "2015-03-13",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-gilley-contract-basis"
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "slug": "default-ownership",
        "label": "Absent a written assignment, who owns the invention?",
        "heading": "Who owns an invention by default in Alabama?",
        "answerText": "The inventor, unless hired to invent — as a prediction from the federal baseline. No Alabama appellate decision found in our review articulates the hired-to-invent or shop-right doctrines, so the default in Alabama rests on the premise of federal patent law that rights in an invention belong to the employee who conceived it, subject to the narrow exception for an employee hired to invent.",
        "sources": [
          {
            "id": "stanford-inventor",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems",
            "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Since%201790%2C%20the%20patent%20law,invention%20belong%20to%20the%20inventor.",
            "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche confirms the long-standing premise of U.S. patent law that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.",
            "verbatimQuote": "Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.",
            "date": "2011-06-06",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-stanford-inventor"
          },
          {
            "id": "stanford-traceback",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems",
            "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Thus%2C%20although%20others%20may%20acquire,trace%20back%20to%20the%20inventor.",
            "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche holds that although others may acquire an interest in an invention, that interest as a general rule must trace back to the inventor — so an employer takes title only through an assignment from the employee-inventor.",
            "verbatimQuote": "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor.",
            "date": "2011-06-06",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-stanford-traceback"
          },
          {
            "id": "dubilier-hired-to-invent",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.",
            "citation": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087847/united-states-v-dubilier-condenser-corp/#:~:text=One%20employed%20to%20make%20an,his%20employer%20any%20patent%20obtained.",
            "proposition": "United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. holds that an employee hired to make an invention who succeeds during the term of service is bound to assign the resulting patent to the employer.",
            "verbatimQuote": "One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.",
            "date": "1933-05-08",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-dubilier-hired-to-invent"
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "slug": "holdover-clause-limit",
        "label": "Are post-employment trailing-assignment clauses enforceable?",
        "heading": "Are trailing-assignment (holdover) clauses enforceable in Alabama?",
        "answerText": "Unsettled. No Alabama decision found in our review addresses a trailing clause reaching inventions first conceived after employment ends, and there is no statutory temporal cap because there is no invention-assignment statute at all. What Alabama does have is a strong general anti-restraint regime — the Restrictive Covenant Act voids every contract restraining anyone from exercising a lawful profession unless a statutory exception applies — so a court asked to police an aggressive holdover clause would most likely reach for that framework, but whether a trailing assignment even counts as a restraint under the Act is itself undecided.",
        "sources": [
          {
            "id": "ala-8-1-190-void",
            "authorityType": "primary-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Ala. Code § 8-1-190",
            "citation": "Ala. Code § 8-1-190 (Act 2015-465, eff. Jan. 1, 2016).",
            "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/code-of-alabama/8-1-190",
            "proposition": "Ala. Code § 8-1-190(a) supports the rule that in Alabama every contract restraining anyone from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business is void except to the extent a statutory exception in the section allows it — the anti-restraint backdrop against which an aggressive holdover invention-assignment clause would be tested.",
            "verbatimQuote": "Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind otherwise than is provided by this section is to that extent void.",
            "date": "2016-01-01",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-ala-8-1-190-void"
          },
          {
            "id": "ala-8-1-193-reform",
            "authorityType": "primary-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Ala. Code § 8-1-193",
            "citation": "Ala. Code § 8-1-193 (Act 2015-465, eff. Jan. 1, 2016).",
            "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/code-of-alabama/8-1-193",
            "proposition": "Ala. Code § 8-1-193 supports the stakes of classification under the Restrictive Covenant Act — a restraint within the Act's exceptions that is overbroad may be reformed to preserve the protectable interest, while a restraint outside the exceptions may be voided in its entirety.",
            "verbatimQuote": "If a contractually specified restraint is overly broad or unreasonable in its duration, a court may void the restraint in part and reform it to preserve the protectable interest or interests. If a contractually specified restraint does not fall within the limited exceptions set out in subsection (b) of Section 8-1-190, a court may void the restraint in its entirety.",
            "date": "2016-01-01",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-ala-8-1-193-reform"
          },
          {
            "id": "devoe-protectable-interest",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "DeVoe v. Cheatham",
            "citation": "DeVoe v. Cheatham, 413 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1982).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1749682/devoe-v-cheatham/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1749682/devoe-v-cheatham/#:~:text=In%20order%20to%20have%20a,contemplated%20by%20%5Ba%5D%20noncompetition%20agreement.%22",
            "proposition": "DeVoe v. Cheatham states Alabama's framework for restraints arising out of employment — a negative covenant is enforced only where the employer has a protectable interest and the restriction is reasonably related to it, reasonable in time and place, and imposes no undue hardship — the framework an Alabama court would most likely adapt to a trailing invention-assignment clause.",
            "verbatimQuote": "In order to have a protectable interest, the employer must possess \"a substantial right in its business sufficiently unique to warrant the type of protection contemplated by [a] noncompetition agreement.\"",
            "date": "1982-04-30",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-devoe-protectable-interest"
          },
          {
            "id": "gilley-clause-operative-practice",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute",
            "citation": "Gilley v. S. Research Inst., 176 So. 3d 1214 (Ala. 2015).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5010196/gilley-v-southern-research-institute/#:~:text=When%20he%20was%20hired%20by,and%20exclusive%20property%20of%20%5BSRI%5D.%E2%80%9D",
            "proposition": "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute shows the Supreme Court of Alabama treating a broad contractual invention-ownership clause — making the employee's inventions the employer's sole and exclusive property — as an operative contract term, so the reach of an assignment clause in Alabama is a matter of ordinary contract law rather than a statutory carve-out.",
            "verbatimQuote": "When he was hired by SRI in 1979, Gilley executed a contract acknowledging that any “improvements, inventions and discoveries” made by him during the tenure of his employment would “be the sole and exclusive property of [SRI].”",
            "date": "2015-03-13",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-gilley-clause-operative-practice"
          },
          {
            "id": "stanford-traceback-practice",
            "authorityType": "case-law",
            "tier": "primary-source-backed",
            "title": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems",
            "citation": "Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).",
            "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/",
            "deepLink": "https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/218133/board-of-trustees-of-the-leland-stanford-junior-university-v-roche/#:~:text=Thus%2C%20although%20others%20may%20acquire,trace%20back%20to%20the%20inventor.",
            "proposition": "Stanford v. Roche holds that although others may acquire an interest in an invention, that interest as a general rule must trace back to the inventor — so an employer takes title only through an assignment from the employee-inventor.",
            "verbatimQuote": "Thus, although others may acquire an interest in an invention, any such interest — as a general rule — must trace back to the inventor.",
            "date": "2011-06-06",
            "anchor": "https://openagreements.org/practice-guides/invention-assignment/us/alabama#src-stanford-traceback-practice"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}